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Financial Integration and Consumption Smoothing in Nigeria and Egypt: Do Global Uncertainties Matter?

SUMMARY

In this study, we adopt the structural vector auto-regressive (SVAR) model to assess the degree to which global uncertainties affect the relationship between financial integration and consumption smoothing in Egypt and Nigeria using quarterly data from 2010 to 2020. The study hypothesises that global uncertainty shocks will have adverse effects on consumption smoothing in both Nigeria and Egypt. Our main results from the study show that the economic policy uncertainty shock has a more declining effect on consumption smoothing in Egypt than other global uncertainty proxies. On the other hand, global economic condition shocks have a more declining effect on consumption smoothing in Nigeria than other global uncertainty proxies. In addition, financial integration accounted for more variability in consumption smoothing in Egypt than in Nigeria; this may be due to the fact that Egypt is more financially integrated than Nigeria. We therefore make the following recommendations: Nigeria may diversify the economy by promoting growth in other sectors, such as manufacturing, to reduce the impact of external shocks on the economy and provide greater stability for households. Policymakers in Egypt can diversify export markets and reduce reliance on the US market to mitigate the impact of US policy fluctuations on Egypt's economy.

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Keywords: financial integration, consumption smoothing, global uncertainties, economic policy uncertainty, geopolitical risk, global economic conditions, structural VAR

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Finansijska integracija i ujednačavanje potrošnje u Nigeriji i Egiptu: da li globalne nesigurnosti imaju uticaja?

SAŽETAK

U ovom istraživanju koristimo SVAR (*structural vector auto-regressive*) model da ocenimo stepen u kojem globalne neizvesnosti utiču na odnos između finansijske integracije i ujednačavanja potrošnje u Egiptu i Nigeriji, koristeći kvartalne podatke od 2010. do 2020. godine. U studiji je postavljena hipoteza da će šokovi globalne neizvesnosti imati negativne efekte na ujednačavanje potrošnje u obe zemlje. Glavni rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da neizvesnosti ekonomskih politika imaju snažniji negativan efekat na ujednačavanje potrošnje u Egiptu od globalne nesigurnosti. S druge strane, šokovi globalnih ekonomskih uslova imaju snažniji negativan efekat na ujednačavanje potrošnje u Nigeriji nego druge vrste globalne nesigurnosti. Pored toga, finansijska integracija bila je odgovorna za više varijabilnosti u ujednačavanju potrošnje u Egiptu nego u Nigeriji, što može biti zbog činjenice da je Egipat finansijski više integrisan nego Nigerija. Stoga dajemo sledeće preporuke: Nigerija može diverzifikovati ekonomiju promovisanjem rasta u drugim sektorima kao što je proizvodnja, kako bi se smanjio uticaj spoljnih šokova na privredu i pružila veća stabilnost domaćinstvima. Donosioci politika u Egiptu mogu diverzifikovati tržišta izvoza i smanjiti zavisnost od američkog tržišta kako bi ublažili uticaj fluktuacija američke politike na egipatsku ekonomiju.

Ključne reči: Finansijska integracija, ujednačavanje potrošnje, globalne nesigurnosti, ekonomska nesigurnost u politici, geopolitički rizik, globalni ekonomski uslovi, strukturni VAR.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, financial integration has become a critical feature of the global economy. The increasing interconnectedness of financial markets has facilitated cross-border investments and trade flows, leading to potential gains from risk sharing and consumption smoothing. Theoretically, financial integration allows households and firms to diversify their portfolios and access a broader range of financial instruments, reducing the impact of idiosyncratic shocks and enabling smoother consumption patterns across

countries. Financial integration is possible when countries liberate their capital accounts. Capital account liberalisation removes restrictions on the movement of capital across borders.

To be financially integrated, most countries in Africa liberalised their capital accounts in the late 1980s and early 1990s.³ Nigeria's capital account liberalisation started in 1995, when it removed restrictions on portfolio investment. The process of capital account liberalisation started earlier in Egypt in 1991, when it removed restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and established a foreign exchange market, and in 1995, when it removed restrictions on foreign capital flows.

Financial integration can play a crucial role in consumption smoothing in Africa. In Africa, where many households have irregular and unpredictable incomes, financial integration can help households better manage their finances and consumption patterns. More specifically, international financial integration makes it easier for Africans living abroad to send money home to support their families; African governments and corporations can raise funds by issuing bonds and stocks in international capital markets to finance government capital and corporate projects. Thus, household consumption expenditure and the ability of households to smooth consumption are seen as important indicators of economic activities and welfare. According to the World Bank, household final consumption expenditure in SSA in 2019 was about \$1.1 trillion, representing about 60 percent of the region's gross domestic product (GDP).⁴ Trends in final consumption expenditure in Africa's two biggest economies show different realities. While Nigeria's consumption expenditure grew by as much as 57.7 percent in 2001, in Egypt consumption expenditure grew by only 4.1 percent in the same period. Interestingly, within the period under review, household final consumption expenditure experienced more variability in Nigeria than in Egypt, where it was more stable.⁵ The two different consumption outcomes in both countries show that consumption smoothing behaves differently in both countries; thus, we performed the comparative inquiry.

However, consumption smoothing through financial integration can be threatened by global uncertainties. Global uncertainties are events or circumstances that are difficult to predict and may have a significant impact on economies across the world. These uncertainties can include geopolitical

³ Ahmed D. Abdullahi, "International financial integration, investment and economic performance in Sub-Saharan African countries", *Global Economy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2011, 1850239, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1712>.

⁴ World Bank, World Development Indicators, "Final Consumption Expenditure (Annual % growth) - Nigeria, Egypt, Arab Rep.", https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.TOTL.KD.ZG?end=2021&locations=NGEG&name_desc=false&start=1961&view=chart,04/04/2023.

⁵ Ibid.

risks, economic shocks, financial crises, and other exogenous factors that affect the availability and cost of external financing, alter risk perceptions and preferences, and impair cross-border risk-sharing mechanisms. As such, global uncertainties may disrupt the potential gains from financial integration by introducing additional risks and uncertainties. Uncertainties such as political instability, exchange rate volatility, and global financial crises can affect the availability and cost of credit, making it more difficult for households and firms to access international capital markets. For instance, the uncertainty that arose during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s led to a sharp reduction in capital inflows to the region, making it difficult for households and firms to smooth consumption.⁶ Studies have shown that countries with higher levels of financial integration were more vulnerable to the crisis and experienced a sharper decline in consumption than less integrated countries.⁷

Moreover, global uncertainties can also affect the composition of capital inflows, which could have implications for consumption smoothing. For instance, capital inflows may be dominated by short-term speculative capital during periods of global uncertainty, which is more volatile and less reliable than long-term investment capital. Studies have shown that short-term capital flows are associated with higher levels of consumption volatility.⁸ Therefore, global uncertainties could make it difficult for households and firms to smooth their consumption, particularly if capital inflows are dominated by short-term speculative capital.

The link between global uncertainties and consumption smoothing is further highlighted in the recent heightened geopolitical risk (GPR) occasioned by the Russia-Ukraine War, which showed the vulnerability of many African countries to agriculture and food supply from Russia and Ukraine.⁹ Apart from the direct impact on consumption that such global uncertainties can have, various episodes of geopolitical spats among large state and non-state actors have tended to affect the income prospects of economies in Africa, with their attendant effect on consumption smoothing. Yet, the transmission of such global uncertainty shocks is largely unquantified in the existing literature.

⁶ Qiang Zhang & Sung Jin Kang, "Crisis and Consumption Smoothing", *Annals of Economics & Finance*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2007, 137-154.

⁷ M. Ayhan Kose, Prasad S. Eswar & Marco E. Terrones, "Financial integration and macroeconomic volatility", *IMF Staff papers*, Vol. 50, No. spec, 2003, 119-142.

⁸ Kristin J. Forbes & Francis E Warnock, "Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment", *Journal of International Economics*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 2012, 235-251, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.03.006.

⁹ Assem Abu Hatab, "Africa's Food Security under the Shadow of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict", *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2022, 37-46, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v44i1.408>.


Trends

In Figure 1, it is observed that the trend in consumption smoothing in Egypt from 2010 to 2020 is generally positive but not very smooth. There are a few notable dips and spikes in the trend, such as the one in 2011 Q1 during the Arab Spring uprisings. This suggests that Egypt's ability to smooth consumption is still somewhat fragile, and it can be easily disrupted by shocks.

Despite these dips, the overall trend is positive, and it suggests that Egypt is making progress in its ability to smooth consumption. This is important for long-term economic growth and poverty reduction, as it allows households to better weather economic shocks and maintain their standard of living.

Additionally, the trend in financial integration is also generally positive (except for the decline between 2016 and 2017), suggesting that Egypt is becoming more integrated into the global financial system. This could be the result of the increasing availability of foreign capital, such as portfolio investment, and the increasing deregulation of the Egyptian financial sector, making it easier for Egyptian businesses and individuals to access financial services beyond Egypt.

Figure 1: Egypt: Trends in consumption smoothing and financial integration (2010Q1-2020Q4)




Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Figure 2 shows the trends in consumption smoothing in Nigeria for the period under review. The graph shows that the level of consumption smoothing in Nigeria has been relatively unstable over the past decade, but it has been increasing in recent years. There are notable dips and spikes in the

trend, one of which occurred around 2015/2016 during the oil price crash, thus showing that consumption in the country has not been smooth over the period.

The level of financial integration in Nigeria rose until Q4 of 2014, when it declined sharply. Even after recovery, it has not attained the pre-2014 level.

Figure 2: Nigeria: Trends in consumption smoothing and financial integration (2010Q1-2020Q4)



Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Compared to Nigeria, Egypt seems to have a more stable consumption path. One of the explanations for this may be that Egypt has a more stable macroeconomic environment than Nigeria. Egypt has an overall faster financial integration growth trend than Nigeria. This could be the result of more advanced domestic financial institutions that help organisations and individuals seeking to be financially integrated with the rest of the world.

Empirical Literature

Several studies have examined the relationship between consumption smoothing and economic crises, such as a recession.¹⁰ Additionally, smoothing household consumption during currency crises in 24 OECD countries is observed.¹¹ Furthermore, it is found that in the presence of

¹⁰ Ira S. Saltz & Richard J. Cebula, "A Comparison of the Smoothness of Consumption and Investment over the Business Cycle as between Developed and Developing Nations: 1970-79", *Review of World Economic*, Vol. 128, No.4, 1992, 681-694.

¹¹ Pushan Dutt & Vineet Padmanabhan, "Crisis and Consumption Smoothing", *Marketing Science*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2011, 491-512, DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1100.0630.

income shocks, households in Thailand use savings as a consumption smoothing mechanism, while in Ethiopia, income uncertainty is negatively related to per capita consumption.¹² Additionally, it is shown that general macroeconomic shocks have a significant negative effect on the relationship between household leverage and consumption expenditure in South Korea.¹³ Furthermore, macroeconomic uncertainties induce a negative consumption effect in India.¹⁴ The effect of exchange rate uncertainty on Asian economies is studied with the result of a significant long-run negative effect, while the effect in the short run is negative but less significant.¹⁵ The effect of the global financial crisis (GFC) on consumption is observed within the context of Irish households, and it is found that the consumption smoothing objectives of highly leveraged households in that period (GFC) were disrupted.¹⁶ On the other hand, financial integration measures such as FDI, debt, and equity positively influenced consumption smoothing in Korea during the GFC.¹⁷ The effect of economic policy uncertainty shocks on consumption smoothing in China is positive, thus increasing inflation.¹⁸ Furthermore, the effect of stock market volatility on consumption smoothing has been studied in Korea, with the result of consumption smoothing lagging due to stock market volatility.¹⁹ Other studies have examined the effect of health shocks and pandemic uncertainty on

¹² Aeggarchat Sirisankanan, "Risk, Uncertainty and Consumption-Smoothing Mechanisms: Evidence from Thai Household Socio-Economic Panel Data", *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2015, 163-179, DOI: 10.1355/ae-li; Yonas Alem & Jonathan Colmer, "Consumption Smoothing and the Welfare Cost of Uncertainty", *Ruhr Economic Papers*, No. 780, 2018, 1-49, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4419/86788908>.

¹³ Young Il Kim & Min Hwang, "Household Debt and Consumer Spending in Korea: Evidence from Household Data", *KDI Journal of Economic Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2016, 23-44, DOI: 10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.4.23.

¹⁴ Motilal Bicchil & S. Raja Durai Sethu, "Assessing Macroeconomic Uncertainties for an Emerging Economy", in: *Macroeconomic Stabilization in the Digital Age*, John Beirne & David G. Fernandez (eds.), Asian Development Bank Institute, 2020, 293-328.

¹⁵ Sin-Yu Ho & Iyke Bernard Njindan, "Consumption and Exchange Rate Uncertainty: Evidence from Selected Asian Countries", *The World Economy*, Vol. 43, No. 9, 2020, 2437-2462, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12900>.

¹⁶ Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Rossana Merola, "Consumption and credit constraints: a model and evidence from Ireland", *Empirical Economics*, Vol. 57, 2019, 475-503, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1461-4>.

¹⁷ Victor Pontines, "A Provincial View of Consumption Risk Sharing in Korea: Asset Classes as Shock Absorbers", *Journal of The Japanese and International Economies*, Vol. 55, 2020, 101063, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2020.101063>.

¹⁸ Fenghua Wen, Yilin Xiao, & Haiquan Wu, "The effects of foreign uncertainty shocks on China's macroeconomy: Empirical evidence from a nonlinear ARDL model", *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications*, Vol. 532, 2019, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.121879>.

¹⁹ Qiang Zhang & Sung Jin Kang, "Crisis and Consumption Smoothing".

consumption smoothing.²⁰ However, studies with emphasis on the role of US-specific economic policy uncertainty, global economic conditions, and geopolitical risks on the relationship between financial integration and consumption smoothing in Africa are very scarce. In other words, discussions on the effect of economic policy uncertainty shocks, global economic condition shocks, and geopolitical risk shocks on the relationship between financial integration and consumption smoothing are lacking in the literature, especially for Africa. Hence, our aim in this regard is to contribute to this discussion by investigating the role of these global uncertainties in the relationship between financial integration and consumption smoothing. For this study, we consider the two economies that represent the largest in their various sub-regions in Africa: Nigeria as the largest economy in Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and Egypt as the largest economy in North Africa. The idea is to present the implication of global uncertainty shocks on these two regions in Africa where economic development, financial integration efforts, and consumption patterns are different (this is evident in Figures 1 and 2, where Egypt demonstrates a more rapid trend towards financial integration and a more consistent pattern of consumption than Nigeria). Additionally, Table 4 highlights that Egypt appears to exhibit a higher level of financial integration with the global economy as a percentage of GDP compared to Nigeria, thus leading to potentially different effects of global uncertainties on the relationship between financial integration and consumption smoothing.

Following a brief review of the literature, the study specifies a testable hypothesis, which is:

H1: Global uncertainty shocks have adverse effects on consumption smoothing in both Nigeria and Egypt.

Methodology

To estimate how global uncertainties influence consumption smoothing through financial integration, a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model is employed. The SVAR model is an extension of the VAR model. The VAR model was developed by Sims (1980) and is widely used in the literature to examine the relationship between (or among) macroeconomic variables. The VAR model is expressed as follows:

²⁰ Maria Eugenia Genoni, "Health Shocks and Consumption Smoothing: Evidence from Indonesia", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 60, No. 3, 2012, 475–506, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1086/664019L>; Shuiting Wu, "Effects of pandemics-related uncertainty on household consumption: evidence from the cross-country data", *Frontiers in Public Health*, Vol. 8, 2020, 615344, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2020.615344>.

$$y_t = \vartheta + \sum_{j=1}^p B_j y_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t; t=1,2,\dots,T \quad (1)$$

In its reduced form the VAR model in equation (1) becomes:

$$y_t = \vartheta + B(L)y_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

Where y_t represents a vector of endogenous variables, ϑ is a vector of intercepts, B 's are matrices of the model coefficient, and ε_t is a vector of disturbance terms. The VAR is a lag operator. The VAR specification has the following advantages: the first is that all variables in the model are endogenous; the second is that endogenous variables are not arranged in any particular form; and lastly, the model is useful for forecasting²¹. One of the major drawbacks is that the estimated coefficients of the VAR equation have no economic interpretation given its multiple lags, a challenge that is solved by using the impulse response function (IRF) and the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) methods. While the IRF has weak power to capture shocks outside the model, the FEVD is known to be sensitive to variable ordering. Hence, the introduction of structural shocks into the system through structural VAR (SVAR). Therefore, the difference between the SVAR and the VAR is that in the SVAR, variables are arranged to fit the recursive nature of the system in their order of exogeneity.²² We employed the SVAR to examine the response of consumption smoothing to global uncertainties. The Equation (2) is hence respecified in the structural form to be:

$$A_0 y_t = \vartheta + B(L)y_t + B\varepsilon_{ng,t} \text{ (SVAR for Nigeria)} \quad (3)$$

And

$$A_0 y_t = \vartheta + B(L)y_t + B\varepsilon_{egy,t} \text{ (SVAR for Egypt)} \quad (4)$$

In the analysis, geopolitical risks, financial integration, wealth, per capita income, and consumption smoothing are the variables in the specification. Hence, the three structural shocks are global uncertainty shocks (from geopolitical risk, economic policy uncertainty, and global economic condition ε_{gu}), financial integration shocks ε_{fi} , wealth shocks ε_{wth} , per capita income shocks ε_{pci} and consumption smoothing shocks ε_{cons} .

²¹ Abdulkabir N. Adedeji, Funmilola F. Ahmed & Adam U. Shehu, "Examining the dynamic effect of COVID-19 pandemic on dwindling oil prices using structural vector autoregressive model", *Energy*, Vol. 230, 2021, 120813, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2021.120813>.

²² The recursive system in their order of exogeneity is motivated by the observation of various global uncertainties (for example the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic) which have an immediate impact on financial integration. Additionally, Mendoza, *et al* (2007) had noted that for financial integration to be welfare enhancing, it had to have a positive effect on the financial development of the domestic economy.

The SVAR model can be identified with the knowledge of A_0 . There are twenty-five elements in the matrix A_0 . The variance-covariance matrix of residuals provides ten equations (that is, $\frac{n^2-n}{2} = \frac{5^2-5}{2} = 10$). With ten equations and twenty-five unknowns, at least ten restrictions will be imposed (Galadima and Aminu, 2019). The restrictions are inferred by the use of Cholesky ordering in a recursive way that ensures that shocks are orthogonalized. It is expected that shocks to global uncertainties (geopolitical risk, global economic conditions, and economic policy uncertainty) will affect financial integration, followed by wealth, per capita income, and finally, consumption smoothing. In this light, the ordering of the variables in this study became: *GPR, FI, WTH, PCI, and CONS* (for the geopolitical risk equation), *GECON, FI, WTH, PCI, and CONS* (for the global economic condition equation), and *EPU, FI, WTH, PCI, and CONS* (for the economic policy uncertainty equation).

Structural Break test

In this study, we controlled for the effect of a structural break in each time series for the two countries considered using equation (11)^{23,24}

$$x_t = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^N l_j D_{jt} + \varepsilon_t \quad (11)$$

Data Measurement and Preliminary Analysis

This study uses quarterly data from 2010 Q1 to 2020 Q4. The data sources, description, and units of measurement are contained in Table 1.

Table 1: Variable Description

| S/N | Variable Abbreviation | Description | Unit of Measurement | Source |
|-----|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--|
| 1 | cons | Consumption smoothing | \$' Thousand | For Nigeria: Central Bank of Nigeria. Retrieved from: https://www.cbn.gov.ng/documents/Statbulletin.asp For Egypt: Central Bank of Egypt. Retrieved from: https://www.cbe.org.eg/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc={EBD2E5F1-B85D-497A-946E-D240E5066E61}&file=GDP_expenditure_constant%20prices_Quarterly.xlsx&action=default |

²³ Afees A. Salisu & Kingsley Obiora, "COVID-19 pandemic and the crude oil market risk: hedging options with non-energy financial innovations", *Financial Innovation*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2021, 1-19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-021-00253-1>.

²⁴ Pierre Perron, "L'estimation de modèles avec changements structurels multiples", *L'Actualité économique*, Vol. 96, No. 4, 2020, 789-837, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7202/602236ar>.

| S/N | Variable Abbreviation | Description | Unit of Measurement | Source |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---|---|---|
| 2 | pci | Per capita gross domestic product (gdp) | \$' Thousand Temporally disaggregated into the quarterly form | PennWorld Tables (PWT)/World Development Indicators (WDI) |
| Global uncertainties | | | | |
| 3. | gpr | Geopolitical risks | Index Converted to quarterly frequency by summing up observations in each month of the quarter. | https://www.policyuncertainty.com/global_monthly.html |
| | gecon | Global Economic Condition | Index Converted to quarterly frequency by summing up observations in each month of the quarter. | https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1-xGp5-PvgjoAcDQuw09nq4Kgoj16hqsu |
| | epu | Economic Policy Uncertainty | Index Converted to quarterly frequency by summing up observations in each month of the quarter. | Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) https://www.policyuncertainty.com/ |
| 4 | fi | Financial integration | % of GDP Temporally disaggregated into the quarterly form | Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2018) https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-external-wealth-of-nations-database/ |
| 5 | wth | Stock returns | Percentage Converted to quarterly frequency by summing up observations in each month of the quarter. | NGX All share index (for Nigeria) https://www.investing.com/indices/nigeria-indices EGX 30 index (for Egypt) https://www.investing.com/indices/egypt-indices |

Note: Quarterly data on consumption is in the local currency. They were converted to dollars using the local currency to the dollar exchange rate. Data on exchange rate is obtained at <https://data.imf.org/>

Source: Authors' compilation (2023)

Preliminary Analysis

Unit Root Tests: Test for Stationarity

The unit root test for time series is used to test for the stationarity of the series used in the study. The study adopts the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philip-Perron (PP) unit roots for this purpose. The null hypothesis for these tests is that the series under consideration has a unit root. The result is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Unit Root Test Result

| Unit Root Test Results (Egypt) | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) | | | Philip-Perron (PP) | | | Conclusion | Break Dates | |
| LEVEL | | | LEVEL | | | | | |
| | Constant | Constant and Trend | None | Constant | Constant and Trend | None | | |
| cons | -6.9580*** | -7.0078*** | -6.6695*** | -7.6778*** | -9.4068*** | -6.6867*** | Stationary | 2011Q1 |
| pci | -3.5443** | -3.6454** | -1.1492 | -2.8530** | -2.9295** | -1.4872 | Stationary | 2013Q1 |
| sr | -5.4651*** | -5.3959*** | -5.4888*** | -5.5543*** | -5.4900*** | -5.5797*** | Stationary | 2016Q4 |
| fi | -6.5954*** | -6.7174*** | -6.4791*** | -6.5710 | -6.8356*** | -6.4791*** | Stationary | 2018Q2 |
| gpr | -10.8644*** | -10.7312*** | -10.9833*** | -26.9504*** | -26.8305*** | -19.1477*** | Stationary | 2013Q3 |
| epu | -9.6218*** | -9.5688*** | -9.6900*** | -9.6218*** | -21.2344*** | -11.8932*** | Stationary | 2014Q2 |
| gecon | -8.2611*** | -8.1512*** | -8.3556*** | -8.2611*** | -10.0071*** | -10.7366*** | Stationary | 2020Q1 |
| Unit Root Test Results (Nigeria) | | | | | | | | |
| cons | -8.3771*** | -8.2664*** | -3.5708*** | -10.5640*** | -10.0071*** | -10.7366*** | Stationary | 2013Q3 |
| pci | -3.0570** | -0.8838 | -2.8280*** | -2.9140** | -2.7602 | -2.6538*** | Stationary | 2015Q1 |
| sr | -3.7123*** | -3.5561** | -3.7425*** | -3.7554*** | -3.6028** | -3.7852*** | Stationary | 2020Q3 |
| fi | -4.4892*** | -4.4323*** | -4.5166*** | -4.4664*** | -4.4065*** | -4.5000*** | Stationary | 2016Q1 |
| gpr | -10.8644*** | -10.7312*** | -10.9833*** | -26.9504*** | -26.8305*** | -19.1477*** | Stationary | 2013Q3 |
| epu | -9.6218*** | -9.5688*** | -9.6900*** | -9.6218*** | -21.2344*** | -11.8932*** | Stationary | 2014Q2 |
| gecon | -8.2611*** | -8.1512*** | -8.3556*** | -8.2611*** | -10.0071*** | -10.7366*** | Stationary | 2020Q1 |

Note: “*”, “**” and “***” represent probability values are 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Structural Break Test

It is observed that the structural break for global uncertainties occurred around the second quarter of 2014 and the third quarter of 2013 (for economic policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk). The geopolitical risk in 2013 may not be unconnected with the heightened tension following the alleged use

of Sarin gas in the Syrian war. The economic policy uncertainty of 2014 Q2 may not be unconnected with the debt ceiling crisis in the United States that started in January 2013 and ended in October 2013 and the passing of the “Continuing Appropriations Act” in 2014²⁵. The global economic condition shock of 2020 Q1 may not be unconnected to the shock to the global economy occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic. Consumption per capita and per capita income structural breaks for Nigeria and Egypt occurred at a time when, as earlier stated, countries around Africa were experiencing very rapid economic progress. The stock return, which stood as a proxy for wealth, had a break date for Egypt that coincided with the 2016 stock market crash in Egypt following the floating of the local currency. For Nigeria, the break date of 2020 Q3 for stock returns may have coincided with the rapid bounceback of the stock market from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Lag length Selection Criteria

Table 3 presents the results of the lag selection criteria. From the results, the preferred model is the one with an optimal lag of 2 for the two countries selected for the study.

Table 3: Lag Length Criteria

| Nigeria | | | | | | |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| Criterion | | | | | | |
| Lag | LogL | LR | FPE | AIC | SC | HQ |
| 0 | 542.8529 | NA | 1.44e-18 | -26.89265 | -26.68154 | -26.81632 |
| 1 | 631.6954 | 151.0322 | 5.98e-20 | -30.08477 | -28.81811* | -29.62679 |
| 2 | 675.6843 | 63.78394* | 2.46e-20* | -31.03422 | -28.71201 | -30.19458* |
| 3 | 703.7327 | 33.65801 | 2.49e-20 | -31.18663* | -27.80888 | -29.96534 |
| Egypt | | | | | | |
| 0 | 558.6576 | NA | 6.53e-19 | -27.68288 | -27.47177 | -27.60655 |
| 1 | 656.0767 | 165.6126 | 1.77e-20 | -31.30384 | -30.03718 | -30.84585 |
| 2 | 718.8774 | 91.06105* | 2.84e-21* | -33.19387* | -30.87166* | -32.35423* |
| 3 | 739.7963 | 25.10268 | 4.10e-21 | -32.98982 | -29.61206 | -31.76853 |

Note: Optimal lag length is 2, based on most of the decision criteria. The decision criteria include LogL= Log likelihood, LR = Likelihood ratio, FPE = final prediction error, AIC = Akaike information criterion, SC = Schwarz information criterion, HQ = Hanna-Quinn information criterion

Source: Authors’ computation using EViews 10 (2023)

²⁵ James V. Saturno & Jessica Tollestrup, “Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices”, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, <https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/r42647.pdf>, 04/04/2023.

Results

Descriptive statistics

In the summary statistics presented in Table 4, it is observed that per capita consumption in Egypt is on average higher than in Nigeria. While per capita consumption in Egypt stood at an average of \$2,922.9, in Nigeria, the average per capita consumption value stood at \$1,965.6. A close examination of the consumption and income summary statistics for Egypt indicated that about eighty percent of income was consumed in Egypt within the period under review. On the other hand, a close look at the summary statistics for Nigeria showed that about seventy-eight percent of income is consumed in the country within the period under review. This showed that while Egypt may earn more per capita, Nigeria spends less per capita. Furthermore, given this proportion of income consumed in both Egypt and Nigeria, it is likely that the consumption smoothing objective may be difficult to meet if it has to be done by earned income.

Within the period under review, all three global uncertainty indicators (EPU, GPR, and GECON) were observed to have high values, both in the average, maximum, and minimum values. This goes to show that there were a sizeable number of global uncertainty occurrences during the period under review.

It is interesting to find that in terms of wealth, for which stock returns stand as a proxy, judging by the maximum stock return of about 40 percent per quarter in Egypt and about 32 percent in Nigeria, it can be concluded that the Egyptian stock market yields greater returns than the Nigerian stock market. However, it is pertinent to note how close the mean stock return values are for the two countries.

Additionally, in both measures of financial integration, Egypt seemed to be more financially integrated than Nigeria, across the mean, median, maximum, and minimum values of the series.

Finally, only the global uncertainty measures were found to be normally distributed; the other series for both countries did not exhibit normality.

Table 4: Summary Statistics

| | CONS | EPU | FI | GECON | GPR | PCI | SR |
|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Egypt | | | | | | | |
| Mean | 2922.896 | 119.9172 | 6.188530 | -0.039400 | 113.9951 | 3651.611 | 1.119600 |
| Median | 2933.795 | 92.53195 | 3.706858 | 0.014121 | 99.33000 | 3573.366 | -0.580015 |
| Maximum | 3228.782 | 503.0123 | 13.04169 | 0.455144 | 380.6000 | 4035.108 | 40.08927 |
| Minimum | 2607.89 | 48.45344 | -0.610231 | -1.359053 | 41.89000 | 3467.472 | -24.15885 |
| Std. Dev. | 155.8366 | 81.95238 | 4.880650 | 0.329541 | 67.31230 | 203.1959 | 12.12757 |

| | CONS | EPU | FI | GECON | GPR | PCI | SR |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Egypt | | | | | | | |
| Skewness | -0.39195 | 2.922634 | 0.184379 | -2.116602 | 1.736293 | 0.754886 | 0.503444 |
| Kurtosis | 2.505115 | 13.01598 | 1.283252 | 8.849502 | 7.005022 | 2.077634 | 4.276588 |
| Jarque-Bera | 1.575565 | 240.9560 | 5.652541 | 93.41156 | 50.34415 | 5.608225 | 4.736274 |
| Probability | 0.454852 | 0.000000 | 0.059233 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.060560 | 0.093655 |
| Observations | 44 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 |
| Nigeria | | | | | | | |
| Mean | 1965.603 | 119.9172 | 4.123841 | -0.039400 | 113.9951 | 2535.675 | 0.910743 |
| Median | 1924.552 | 92.53195 | 3.659709 | 0.014121 | 99.33000 | 2519.799 | 0.849622 |
| Maximum | 2230.417 | 503.0123 | 7.356201 | 0.455144 | 380.6000 | 2709.833 | 31.99989 |
| Minimum | 1798.367 | 48.45344 | 1.343989 | -1.359053 | 41.89000 | 2376.117 | -15.65385 |
| Std. Dev. | 125.7847 | 81.95238 | 1.759027 | 0.329541 | 67.31230 | 95.33026 | 10.44884 |
| Skewness | 0.621538 | 2.922634 | 0.293797 | -2.116602 | 1.736293 | 0.314016 | 0.558090 |
| Kurtosis | 2.096315 | 13.01598 | 1.757606 | 8.849502 | 7.005022 | 2.241777 | 3.308837 |
| Jarque-Bera | 4.330124 | 240.9560 | 3.462819 | 93.41156 | 50.34415 | 1.736709 | 2.403049 |
| Probability | 0.114743 | 0.000000 | 0.177035 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 | 0.419642 | 0.300735 |
| Observations | 44 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 43 |

Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

To test the research hypothesis, the study employed impulse response and variance decomposition. In evaluating the impulse response, the study took note of the two dotted lines that represented the 5% asymptotic error bands. The line between the error bands represented the impulse function.


Impulse Response for Nigeria

Impulse Response of Consumption Smoothing to the Geopolitical Risk (GPR) Shock through its effects on income and financial integration

Results in Figure 3 showed that consumption smoothing responded positively until the third quarter to structural one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk. The effect of the geopolitical risk shock on consumption smoothing faded from the sixth quarter; thus, despite the geopolitical risk shock, consumption smoothing is achieved in Nigeria. On the other hand, due to a structural one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk, financial integration responded with a slight increase but remained steady and did not return to its equilibrium path throughout the forecast horizon. Wealth also responded with an initial positive rise to structural one standard

deviation shock to geopolitical risk. The effect of the shock started fading away from the sixth quarter, but not completely, within the forecast horizon. Per capita income remained in the negative region following the structural one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk, after which the effect faded in the ninth quarter.

Figure 3: Response to structural one standard deviation innovations (± 2 standard errors) Impulse Response to the Geopolitical Risk Shock: SVAR



Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)


Impulse Response of Consumption Smoothing to the Global Economic Condition (GECON) Shock through its effects on income and financial integration

The result presented in Figure 4 showed that following a structural one standard deviation shock to the global economic conditions, consumption smoothing fell steadily until it became negative just before the fourth quarter, after which recovery was barely reached until the tenth quarter; hence, despite the prolonged decline in consumption smoothing, it stabilised over time. On the other hand, financial integration responded positively to a structural one standard deviation shock to the global economic conditions,

but only until the second quarter, before it became negative and did not recover throughout the forecast horizon. On the other hand, wealth responded with a positive and immediate rise until the second quarter, after which it fell and became negative in the third quarter without recovering back to its initial equilibrium. Finally, apart from the initial positive response of per capita income to a structural one standard deviation shock to the global economic condition (up to the third quarter), for the majority of the forecast horizon, per capita income responded negatively to the global economic condition shock.

Following the position of the two dotted lines representing the 5% asymptotic error bands, it is observed that the effect of a shock to the global economic condition on consumption smoothing, wealth, and per capita income was statistically significant. For consumption smoothing and wealth, the significance of the shock lasted until the second quarter, while it lasted a little above the first quarter for per capita income.

Figure 4: Response to structural one standard deviation innovations (± 2 standard errors) Impulse Response Response to the Global Economic Conditions Shock: SVAR




Source: Authors' computation (2023), using EViews 10

*Impulse Response of Consumption Smoothing
to the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU)
Shock through its effects on income and financial integration*

In Figure 5, the response of consumption smoothing to a structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty is negative. It increased after the second quarter and briefly became positive in the third quarter of the same year before falling back to the negative region and dying off in the seventh quarter, still within the year of experiencing the shock. Hence, while the shock to economic policy uncertainty led to a decline in consumption smoothing, it stabilised over time. Financial integration fell following a structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty and continued to be cyclical until the fourth quarter of the same year, when it faded, but lost its equilibrium position in the middle of the seventh quarter and did not recover. On the other hand, wealth rose to a structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty. However, such a rise was in the negative region and remained so until it faded out after nine quarters. Per capita income had an initial rise following a structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty before falling consistently. However, it must be emphasised that the per capita income response to economic policy uncertainty remained positive throughout the forecast horizon.

It is observed that the effect of shock on US-specific economic policy uncertainty did not exert any statistically significant effect on the variables considered, judging by the position of the two dotted lines representing the 5% asymptotic error bands.

Figure 5: Response to structural one standard deviation innovations (± 2 standard errors) Impulse Response to the Economic Policy Uncertainty Shock: SVAR



Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Variance Decomposition for Nigeria

In Table 5, we compare the proportion of variations in consumption smoothing that is accounted for by the various uncertainty shocks.

A close examination of the table reveals that:

1. Wealth accounts for the variations in consumption smoothing more than geopolitical risk. Wealth accounts for about 13.9 percent of variations in consumption smoothing in the tenth quarter, while geopolitical risk accounts for just about 3.4 percent.
2. Global economic uncertainties accounted for more variation in consumption smoothing than other variables. While it accounts for about 17.4 percent of changes in consumption smoothing from the fourth to the tenth quarter, wealth, which comes closely, accounts for approximately 9 percent of variations in consumption smoothing from the second to the tenth quarter.

3. Wealth is also a larger determinant of consumption smoothing than economic policy uncertainty. While wealth accounts for about 12 percent of variations in consumption smoothing from the second quarter to the tenth quarter, economic policy uncertainty accounts for about 2 percent.

Table 5: Variance Decomposition of consumption smoothing for Nigeria

| Contribution of Geopolitical Risk Shock consumption smoothing | | | | | | |
|--|----------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Forecast Horizon (h) | S.E. | Geopolitical risk | Financial integration | Wealth | Per capita income | Consumption smoothing |
| h_1 | 0.141545 | 1.377747 | 0.011986 | 5.027940 | 0.376399 | 93.20593 |
| h_2 | 0.153908 | 1.268041 | 0.145211 | 14.09925 | 0.459263 | 84.02823 |
| h_3 | 0.155512 | 3.063510 | 0.185632 | 13.85272 | 0.537803 | 82.36033 |
| h_4 | 0.155815 | 3.266661 | 0.220750 | 13.81672 | 0.595280 | 82.10058 |
| h_5 | 0.156092 | 3.413760 | 0.246310 | 13.78587 | 0.671261 | 81.88280 |
| h_6 | 0.156198 | 3.409719 | 0.264515 | 13.82563 | 0.716047 | 81.78409 |
| h_7 | 0.156275 | 3.412438 | 0.270132 | 13.85329 | 0.755252 | 81.70889 |
| h_8 | 0.156333 | 3.411723 | 0.271610 | 13.88653 | 0.782223 | 81.64791 |
| h_9 | 0.156373 | 3.410702 | 0.271493 | 13.90888 | 0.801957 | 81.60696 |
| h_{10} | 0.156402 | 3.410200 | 0.271860 | 13.92544 | 0.815962 | 81.57654 |
| Cholesky Ordering: Geopolitical Risk, Financial Integration, Wealth, Per Capita Income, Consumption Smoothing | | | | | | |
| Contribution of Global Economic Condition Shock to consumption smoothing | | | | | | |
| Forecast Horizon (h) | S.E. | Global economic uncertainty | Financial integration | Wealth | Per capita income | Consumption smoothing |
| h_1 | 0.139966 | 18.19639 | 0.223045 | 0.085055 | 0.200734 | 81.29477 |
| h_2 | 0.155292 | 17.27292 | 0.327087 | 8.884847 | 0.290085 | 73.22506 |
| h_3 | 0.155604 | 17.30149 | 0.410936 | 8.998044 | 0.353774 | 72.93576 |
| h_4 | 0.155855 | 17.39468 | 0.449854 | 9.036808 | 0.407088 | 72.71157 |
| h_5 | 0.155957 | 17.39726 | 0.464835 | 9.077129 | 0.442489 | 72.61828 |
| h_6 | 0.156016 | 17.40463 | 0.468989 | 9.093230 | 0.469497 | 72.56366 |
| h_7 | 0.156056 | 17.40835 | 0.469666 | 9.106773 | 0.489061 | 72.52616 |
| h_8 | 0.156085 | 17.41165 | 0.469496 | 9.115776 | 0.503274 | 72.49980 |
| h_9 | 0.156105 | 17.41372 | 0.469836 | 9.121919 | 0.513459 | 72.48106 |
| h_{10} | 0.156120 | 17.41496 | 0.471165 | 9.125867 | 0.520702 | 72.46731 |
| Cholesky Ordering: Global Economic Conditions, Financial Integration, Wealth, Per Capita Income, Consumption Smoothing | | | | | | |

| Contribution of Economic Policy Uncertainty Shock to consumption smoothing | | | | | | |
|---|----------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Forecast Horizon (h) | S.E. | Economic policy uncertainty | Financial integration | Wealth | Per capita income | Consumption smoothing |
| h_1 | 0.142563 | 1.005668 | 0.040455 | 2.953941 | 3.249838 | 92.75010 |
| h_2 | 0.155856 | 2.171431 | 0.104674 | 12.08516 | 3.179047 | 82.45969 |
| h_3 | 0.156249 | 2.236210 | 0.133355 | 12.20363 | 3.180968 | 82.24583 |
| h_4 | 0.156509 | 2.393696 | 0.182298 | 12.16454 | 3.268496 | 81.99097 |
| h_5 | 0.156601 | 2.391315 | 0.214556 | 12.17949 | 3.319787 | 81.89485 |
| h_6 | 0.156716 | 2.404813 | 0.234634 | 12.22207 | 3.362739 | 81.77575 |
| h_7 | 0.156789 | 2.404123 | 0.241989 | 12.26111 | 3.392742 | 81.70004 |
| h_8 | 0.156846 | 2.406092 | 0.243995 | 12.29465 | 3.414128 | 81.64113 |
| h_9 | 0.156883 | 2.406505 | 0.243997 | 12.31810 | 3.428983 | 81.60242 |
| h_{10} | 0.156909 | 2.407151 | 0.244142 | 12.33438 | 3.439162 | 81.57517 |
| Cholesky Ordering: Economic Policy Uncertainty, Financial Integration, Wealth, Per Capita Income, Consumption Smoothing | | | | | | |


Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Impulse Response for Egypt

Impulse Response of Consumption Smoothing to the Geopolitical Risk (GPR) Shock through its effects on income and financial integration

In Figure 6, it is observed that the response of consumption smoothing to a structural one-standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk is cyclical. There is stability around the seventh quarter following the shock within the same year, as the response faded in the tenth quarter. This indicates that despite some periods of sustained decline in consumption smoothing due to shocks to geopolitical risk, consumption smoothing stabilised over time. It is observed that financial integration responded positively to a structural one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk up to three quarters. It remained positive for the rest of the forecast horizon but declined and faded off subsequently. Also, wealth responded to structural one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk like that of consumption smoothing: cyclically. Finally, per capita income responded positively to a structural one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk and remained so throughout the forecast horizon.

Figure 6: Response to structural one standard deviation innovations (± 2 standard errors) Impulse Response to the Geopolitical Risk Shock: SVAR



Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Impulse Response of Consumption Smoothing to the Global Economic Condition (GECON) Shock through its effects on income and financial integration


The study presented the result of the impulse responses to the global economic condition shock in Figure 7.

Following a structural one standard deviation shock to the global economic conditions, consumption smoothing responded with cyclical movements. Consumption smoothing did not settle on its equilibrium path throughout the forecast horizon. This showed that, following the shock to the global economic condition, consumption is not smoothed in Egypt. On the other hand, financial integration remained positive for six quarters following a shock to global economic conditions; thereafter, it remained negative and fizzled out after ten quarters. Wealth declined following a negative shock to the global economic conditions but stayed positive until the second quarter of the same year following the shock and remained

cyclical throughout the forecast horizon. Per capita income initially fell with a structural one standard deviation shock to the global economic conditions, but recovered after the second quarter and remained positive till the tenth quarter.

Wealth responded most significantly to the structural one standard deviation shock to global economic conditions. The significant effect did not last into the second quarter.

Figure 7: Response to structural one standard deviation innovations (± 2 standard errors) Impulse Response Response to the Global Economic Conditions Shock: SVAR



Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)


Impulse Response of Consumption Smoothing to the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Shock through its effects on income and financial integration

The response of consumption smoothing to structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty, presented in Figure 8, is similar to that found in geopolitical risk and global economic conditions

shocks. Consumption smoothing increased and remained positive until the fourth quarter, within the same year following the shock. It sustained a stable equilibrium between the ninth and tenth quarters; hence, consumption smoothing was achieved despite a sustained period of economic policy uncertainty shock. Financial integration responded positively to a structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty, but it declined and remained negative from the seventh quarter. Wealth experienced an immediate decline following a structural one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty but remained positive until the second and third quarters, when it became negative but recovered and remained positive until the ninth quarter. On the other hand, per capita income barely responded to the economic policy uncertainty shock until the third quarter, when it rose and remained positive until the tenth quarter.

None of the variables responded significantly to the structural one standard deviation shock to the economic policy uncertainty shock except economic policy uncertainty itself.

Figure 8: Response to structural one standard deviation innovations (± 2 standard errors) Impulse Response to the Economic Policy Uncertainty Shock: SVAR



Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

Variance decomposition for Egypt

In Table 6, we compare the proportion of variations in consumption smoothing that is accounted for by the various uncertainty shocks.

A close examination of the table reveals that:

1. Financial integration accounts for more variations in consumption smoothing than geopolitical risk. Financial integration accounts for more than 5 percent of the variations in consumption smoothing from the fifth to the tenth quarter, while geopolitical risk accounts for approximately 2 percent from the third to the tenth quarter. While wealth explains about 2 percent of the variation in consumption smoothing from the third quarter, per capita income explains just about 0.69 percent by the tenth quarter.
2. In the same vein, financial integration explains more variations in consumption smoothing than the global economic condition, but just marginally (and for most, compared to wealth and per capita income). The same can be said about the variations in consumption smoothing explained by per capita income and wealth.
3. On the other hand, economic policy uncertainty accounts for most of the variations in consumption smoothing. The result showed that about 7.7 percent of the variations in consumption smoothing is accounted for by economic policy uncertainty, from the fourth quarter to the tenth quarter. This is followed by financial integration, wealth, and per capita income.

Table 6: Variance Decomposition of consumption smoothing for Egypt

| Contribution of Geopolitical Risk Shock to consumption smoothing | | | | | | |
|---|----------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Forecast Horizon (h) | S.E. | Geopolitical risk | Financial integration | Wealth | Per capita income | Consumption smoothing |
| h_1 | 0.194150 | 1.423269 | 3.580511 | 1.389563 | 0.066607 | 93.54005 |
| h_2 | 0.195809 | 1.414673 | 3.791790 | 1.369419 | 0.144365 | 93.27975 |
| h_3 | 0.199908 | 1.614461 | 4.539162 | 2.072084 | 0.141392 | 91.63290 |
| h_4 | 0.200417 | 1.609184 | 4.948718 | 2.065387 | 0.167983 | 91.20873 |
| h_5 | 0.200837 | 1.637003 | 5.209965 | 2.072908 | 0.251657 | 90.82847 |
| h_6 | 0.200992 | 1.665391 | 5.214361 | 2.083936 | 0.329700 | 90.70661 |
| h_7 | 0.201153 | 1.693378 | 5.214418 | 2.092064 | 0.437797 | 90.56234 |
| h_8 | 0.201343 | 1.690906 | 5.261275 | 2.101395 | 0.534678 | 90.41175 |
| h_9 | 0.201647 | 1.715939 | 5.367732 | 2.144467 | 0.613758 | 90.15810 |
| h_10 | 0.201889 | 1.725689 | 5.442970 | 2.167061 | 0.687286 | 89.97700 |
| Cholesky Ordering: Geopolitical Risk, Financial Integration, Wealth, Per Capita Income, Consumption Smoothing | | | | | | |

| Contribution of Global Economic Conditions (GECON) shocks to consumption smoothing | | | | | | |
|---|----------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Forecast Horizon (h) | S.E. | Global economic conditions | Financial integration | Wealth | Per capita income | Consumption smoothing |
| h_1 | 0.192095 | 0.140526 | 2.121431 | 0.483890 | 0.635623 | 96.61853 |
| h_2 | 0.194814 | 1.050948 | 2.718044 | 0.580175 | 0.655728 | 94.99510 |
| h_3 | 0.198946 | 2.284850 | 3.254092 | 0.901071 | 0.629096 | 92.93089 |
| h_4 | 0.199989 | 2.654136 | 3.605308 | 0.922645 | 0.644008 | 92.17390 |
| h_5 | 0.201000 | 3.363043 | 3.763647 | 0.917695 | 0.706658 | 91.24896 |
| h_6 | 0.201174 | 3.357311 | 3.790230 | 0.937485 | 0.807892 | 91.10708 |
| h_7 | 0.201690 | 3.714752 | 3.785685 | 0.933827 | 0.896403 | 90.66933 |
| h_8 | 0.202008 | 3.828731 | 3.852628 | 0.947409 | 0.987627 | 90.38361 |
| h_9 | 0.202584 | 3.998702 | 3.922506 | 1.004790 | 1.086638 | 89.98736 |
| h_10 | 0.202899 | 4.049625 | 4.003011 | 1.028376 | 1.172220 | 89.74677 |
| Cholesky Ordering: Global Economic Conditions, Financial Integration, Wealth, Per Capita Income, Consumption Smoothing | | | | | | |
| Contribution of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) shocks to consumption smoothing | | | | | | |
| Forecast Horizon (h) | S.E. | Economic policy uncertainty | Financial integration | Wealth | Per capita income | Consumption smoothing |
| h_1 | 0.184824 | 0.276989 | 3.230098 | 0.951122 | 0.504701 | 95.03709 |
| h_2 | 0.188505 | 2.472051 | 3.534748 | 0.942767 | 0.615449 | 92.43498 |
| h_3 | 0.194645 | 4.576280 | 4.325346 | 2.682769 | 0.590466 | 87.82514 |
| h_4 | 0.199003 | 7.717619 | 4.698517 | 2.601052 | 0.620265 | 84.36255 |
| h_5 | 0.200203 | 7.625434 | 4.892456 | 2.754476 | 0.688788 | 84.03885 |
| h_6 | 0.200763 | 7.761617 | 4.881675 | 2.743332 | 0.764758 | 83.84862 |
| h_7 | 0.200845 | 7.758464 | 4.881216 | 2.744252 | 0.812856 | 83.80321 |
| h_8 | 0.201108 | 7.770698 | 4.931173 | 2.790439 | 0.875845 | 83.63184 |
| h_9 | 0.201462 | 7.789408 | 5.024176 | 2.822144 | 0.979713 | 83.38456 |
| h_10 | 0.201692 | 7.794630 | 5.113506 | 2.826287 | 1.068740 | 83.19684 |
| Cholesky Ordering: Economic Policy Uncertainty, Financial Integration, Wealth, Per Capita Income, Consumption Smoothing | | | | | | |

Source: Authors' computation using EViews 10 (2023)

From both the results of impulse responses and variance decomposition, the hypothesis specified for this study, which states that global uncertainty shocks have adverse effects on consumption smoothing in both Nigeria and Egypt, is accepted.

Discussion of Research Finding

It is observed that in the impulse response function for Nigeria, consumption smoothing in the interim declines following the global uncertainty shocks. Thus, despite the initial fluctuations in consumption in the short run following the global uncertainty shocks, households in Nigeria were able to maintain a stable consumption path eventually. Part of the reason why consumption smoothing recovers in Nigeria following a global uncertainty shock is because the country often looks inward during periods of crisis. Empirical investigations related to this are hard to find; however, another study that examined the effect of shock to stock returns (the proxy for wealth in this study) on consumption in South Africa found that households were able to smooth food consumption over their lifetime because consumption did not respond to stock return shock²⁶. The study, however, failed to account for the role of global uncertainties in this relationship, which this present study has done. The study has been able to establish that households' response to shocks to wealth, through financial integration is represented by jumps and falls up to about the fifth quarter before it stabilises.

The variance decomposition result shows that wealth and global economic uncertainties are responsible for most of the variations in consumption smoothing in Nigeria. It is possible for global uncertainty to make the imports of consumer and producer items more expensive as supply chains are affected, thus reducing consumption; it is also possible that global uncertainties make the demand for domestic output rise, thus helping to smooth consumption. On the other hand, given that natural resource wealth is a major factor in the Nigerian economy, it is no wonder that it exerts a significant influence on consumption smoothing. This is in line with the findings of another study,²⁷ where natural resources (in the form of per capita oil revenue) significantly influence long-run household consumption.

The impulse response function for Egypt, on the other hand, showed that the effect of global uncertainties takes time to wear out and, in some instances, did not wear out within the forecast horizon. This may be attributed to the country's high degree of economic interconnectedness with the global economy. Egypt's economy relies on external factors such as foreign investment, trade, and tourism, making it vulnerable to global

²⁶ Simo-Kengne, Beatrice D., and Joel Hinaunye Eit, "Consumption Response to Stock Prices Shocks in South Africa: Does Life Cycle Hypothesis Hold?" *Advanced Science Letters*, vol. 23, no. 9, 2017, 8623-8627.

²⁷ Eric Kehinde Ogunleye, "Natural resource abundance in Nigeria: From dependence to development", *Resources Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2008, 168-174, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.03.002>.

economic fluctuations. When global uncertainty arises, it can disrupt these channels and have lasting effects on the Egyptian economy.

The variance decomposition result for Egypt showed that of the three global uncertainty measures, US-specific economic policy uncertainty shock had the most effect on consumption smoothing. US-specific economic policy uncertainty can impact consumption smoothing due to the close economic ties between the two countries. Egypt relies on foreign investments, trade, and aid from the United States, which can be influenced by changes in US economic policies. If there is uncertainty regarding US policies, such as trade restrictions or changes in aid programmes, it can create a ripple effect on Egypt's economy. This uncertainty can affect business confidence, investment decisions, and overall economic stability, leading to fluctuations in income levels, employment, and consumer spending. As a result, households may face difficulties maintaining stable consumption patterns as their incomes and economic prospects become uncertain.

In general, Nigeria suffered more significantly from exposure to global uncertainty shocks than Egypt. Worthy of note is the fact that consumption smoothing recovered over time following its initial decline due to the global uncertainty shocks for both Egypt and Nigeria.

Conclusion and Policy Implication

It is recognised that the effect of financial integration on consumption smoothing can become vulnerable to global uncertainties. Thus, the dynamic effect of financial integration on consumption smoothing as a result of global uncertainties (geopolitical risk, global economic conditions, and economic policy uncertainty) is estimated and compared between Nigeria and Egypt. The result of the impulse response function showed that, unlike Egypt, the effect of geopolitical risk, global economic condition, and economic policy uncertainty on consumption smoothing wears out more quickly in Nigeria in the long run. On the other hand, the variance decomposition for Nigeria showed that wealth and global economic conditions explained more changes in consumption smoothing than other variables (including financial integration). Meanwhile, in Egypt, changes in consumption smoothing are explained more by financial integration and economic policy uncertainty.

Finally, shocks to global economic uncertainties were important determinants of consumption smoothing in Africa. Compared to Egypt, Nigeria suffered more in the short run from global uncertainties, especially a decline in consumption smoothing. Financial integration in Egypt had more effect on consumption smoothing than on Nigeria. It has become important for countries in Africa to factor in the effects of external shocks on consumption smoothing. While very little can be done by way of preventing these shocks, countries can strengthen their self-reliance to be

able to withstand such shocks. Furthermore, building resilience to shocks is important, but policies around this will vary depending on the extent of exposure to such shocks that countries have. Given that Nigeria's consumption smoothing objectives could be more susceptible to the effects of global uncertainties (especially shocks to global economic conditions) than in Egypt, Nigeria may diversify the economy by promoting the growth of other sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services that can help to reduce the impact of external shocks on the economy and provide greater stability for households. On the other hand, given the greater susceptibility of consumption smoothing in Egypt to US-specific economic policy uncertainty shocks, policymakers can diversify export markets and reduce reliance on the US market by expanding trade relationships with other countries and regions. This can help mitigate the impact of US policy fluctuations on Egypt's economy, especially its consumption smoothing objectives.

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The WTO's compulsory licencing of patented pharmaceuticals: implementation challenges

SUMMARY

The focus of the research is the topic of compulsory licencing, the right under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights for countries to use patented medicines without the patent holder's consent as a form of relief (flexibilities) for developing countries. The research aims to assess whether the application of compulsory licencing has fulfilled its primary goals and purpose. The research problem is the inconsistency between the compulsory licencing application in practice and the original purpose. It is reflected in the mass use of this right by countries with higher incomes and, secondly, in the symbolic presence of contagious diseases. That was investigated using the Generalized Linear Model. The results confirmed that the actual situation of public health and the income level of beneficiaries had been marginalised as grounds for exercising compulsory licencing. The arbitrary application of compulsory licencing has led to the situation that the poorest countries, with the most significant health crises, remain in the background of this World Trade Organisation mechanism.

Keywords: WTO, compulsory licencing, TRIPS flexibilities, developing countries, intellectual property rights, pharmaceuticals.

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STO prinudno licenciranje patentiranih farmaceutskih proizvoda: izazovi implementacije

SAŽETAK

U fokusu istraživanja je tema prinudnog licenciranja, prava iz Sporazuma o trgovinskim aspektima prava intelektualne svojine, da zemlje koriste patentirane lekove bez saglasnosti nosioca patenta, kao vid olakšice (fleksibilnosti) za zemlje u razvoju. Istraživanje ima za cilj da proceni da li je primena prinudnog licenciranja ispunila svoje primarne ciljeve i svrhu. Istraživački problem je nedoslednost između primene prinudnog licenciranja u praksi i prvobitne namene. Ono se ogleda u masovnom korišćenju ovog prava od strane zemalja sa višim prihodima, i drugo, u simboličnom prisustvu zaraznih bolesti. Istraživanje je obavljeno korišćenjem generalizovanog linearnog modela. Rezultati su potvrdili da su stvarno stanje javnog zdravlja i nivo prihoda korisnika marginalizovani kao osnova za sprovođenje prinudnog licenciranja. Proizvoljna primena prinudnog licenciranja dovela je do toga da najsiromašnije zemlje, sa najkritičnijom zdravstvenom situacijom, ostaju ukraćene za korišćenje ovog mehanizma Svetske trgovinske organizacije.

Ključne reči: STO, obavezno licenciranje, TRIPS fleksibilnosti, zemlje u razvoju, prava intelektualne svojine, farmaceutski proizvodi.

Introduction

In the last decades of the 20th century, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has made significant efforts to establish a globally recognised system of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. As a result of these multilateral initiatives and activities, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was signed in 1994 and entered into force on January 1, 2005.⁴

One of the fundamental backbones of disagreement among WTO members was the protection of intellectual property in the field of pharmaceuticals. The majority of the world's population has always been unable to afford the most effective medicines and pharmaceuticals, and the TRIPS rules made them even more unaffordable for developing countries. In the late 1990s, this problem made developing countries propose certain flexibilities (exceptions) in the TRIPS Agreement. Partly due to the inability to protect intellectual property rights in international trade and partly due

⁴ WTO, "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the 'TRIPS Agreement')", Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994.

to humanitarian impetus, the WTO adopted several flexibilities in applying TRIPS to pharmaceutical patents in 2001 under the Doha Declaration.

The most common explanations for TRIPS flexibilities in the literature are “to ensure access to medicines for all”; “to make it easier for economically weaker WTO members to access affordable generic drugs manufactured in other countries”; or “to mitigate the negative externalities of diminished medicines access from cross-country harmonisation of patent protection”; and so on.⁵

There are four different types of concessions for the use of protected and registered patents in the pharmaceutical industry: a) compulsory licencing; b) the Least Developed Country transition provisions (LDCs); c) patent exceptions; and (d) parallel imports. This study focuses on compulsory licencing (CL) as the most commonly used TRIPS flexibility, in addition to the great challenges that arise in its application. In short, CL is a right granted by a state authority to use a patent without the patent holder's consent. CL was conceived to handle health crises, which the WTO would keep under control with strict standards. In contrast, CL has reached enormous proportions.

The research aims to assess whether the implementation of compulsory licencing met the primary goals and purposes that made the WTO adopt this type of flexibility. The justification and purposefulness of the application of CL in this study are assessed qualitatively and quantitatively, seeking answers to the following research questions:

1. Are the rights to CL most often used by developing countries, for which all TRIPS flexibilities were initially intended?
2. Is it used only in situations of a public health crisis?

The first section of the article analyses the main challenges of compulsory licencing–inconsistency between the application of CL in practice and its original purpose. In two separate parts of this section, two problem indicators were analysed. The first relates to the CL mechanism itself and some provisions of Article 31, which do not support developing countries. Second, a preliminary review of the TRIPS database indicated the absence of a health crisis as a ground for CL implementation. Based on the explained problems, two primary hypotheses are formed: the first is that CL is not suitable for developing countries, and the second is that the application of CL is inconsistent with the real presence of the public health situation.

⁵ FM't Hoen, Jacquelyn Veraldi, Brigit Toebes & Hans V. Hogerzeil, “Medicine procurement and the use of flexibilities in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 2001–2016”, *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, Vol. 96, No. 3, 2018, 185–193, DOI: 10.2471/BLT.17.199364; Sanja Jelisaovac Trošić, Dragoljub Todić & Milorad Stamenović, *Svetska trgovinska organizacija, životna sredina i sistem zdravstvene zaštite*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2018; Ebenezer K. Tetteh, “Pharmaceutical innovation, fair following and the constrained value of TRIPS flexibilities”, *The Journal of World Intellectual Property*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2011, 202, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2010.00415.x>.

These hypotheses are tested empirically in the second chapter using a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). The main factors included in research questions are income level and public health crises, as well as health expenditure and governments' efficiency. These four characteristics of countries are set as variables in the empirical model. Quantitative research aims to assess the intensity and direction of the impact of these critical factors on the application of CL.

The third chapter is a discussion of the results obtained. It observes whether the empirical model has proven two initial hypotheses about the inappropriate use of this instrument.

Challenges of compulsory licencing in TRIPS flexibilities

In practice, TRIPS flexibilities were not used as expected. Out of the total of 158 signatories to the TRIPS Agreement, only 82 countries claimed this right from the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement from 1995 to 2021.

The distribution of requests by regions of the world is expected to follow their level of development. Africa had the most significant number of requests for TRIPS flexibilities (73), followed by Asia and Latin America. However, the number of requests from Europe is not small, as many as 16.⁶

Most of the requests, as many as 110, have been submitted for pharmaceuticals treating HIV/AIDS, including antiretroviral therapy, as they are considered costly treatments. Most HIV/AIDS-related requests (72) were under compulsory licencing.⁷ The second-largest group of diseases is connected with chronic non-inflammable diseases – cancer treatments (14). Analysis shows that the preferred flexibility option is connected with the compulsory licence for that type of medicine.

The effects of applying TRIPS flexibilities were primarily assessed positively by the authors, who study these mechanisms collectively. They usually focus on the general idea of access to lower-priced generic medicines without noticing any adverse effects or inadequate implementation.⁸ Some of them point to the need for its more comprehensive application to all

⁶ Medicines Law & Policy, "The TRIPS Flexibilities Database", <http://tripsflexibilities.medicineslawandpolicy.org>, 14/09/2022.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Jilian Clare Cohen-Kohler, Jillian Clare, Lisa Forman & Nathaniel Lipkus, "Addressing legal and political barriers to global pharmaceutical access: Options for remedying the impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the imposition of TRIPS-plus standards", *Health Economics, Policy and Law*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2008, 229256; Dianne Nicol & Olasupo Owoeye, "Using TRIPS flexibilities to facilitate access to medicines", *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, Vol. 91, 2013, 533–539; FM't Hoen, Jacquelyn Veraldi, Brigit Toebes & Hans V. Hogerzeil, "Medicine procurement and the use of flexibilities in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 2001–2016".

diseases, while others cite some internal constraints to implement TRIPS flexibilities and suggest a regional approach as a way to overcome them.⁹

Among TRIPS flexibilities, compulsory licencing is the most commonly used. Contrary to widespread support for TRIPS flexibilities in general, almost all authors researching compulsory licencing evaluate its application as controversial or even harmful. At the heart of most criticisms are the risks of overuse of CL, discouraging investment in innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, decomposing the R&D structure in pharmaceuticals, and leaving only the generic drug market.¹⁰ The possibility of slowing down innovation in pharmaceuticals is not the focus of this research, but it is essential to keep in mind this negative aspect as well.

In addition to criticisms for the risk of reduced innovation, many authors point to controversial and unjustified applications of CL. These articles mainly related to case studies in certain countries or even individual cases and gave plenty of cases of unjustified use of CL. Zolotaryova cites the example of Brazil, where the government has repeatedly used CL as a threat “in order to have stronger bargaining power in their negotiations with pharmaceutical companies”.¹¹ Many articles refer to the Thai government’s decision to carry out extensive, multiple compulsory licencing of cancer and heart disease drugs (not included in Article 31). The Thai government excessively used CL as many as 11 times in 2006–2012 (some of them were justified by the real HIV epidemic, but most were not), which has led to much domestic and international controversy. Some authors criticised the government for its decisions, which led to compensation, political conflicts, international pressures, etc.¹² Others praised the exceptional results in cancer treatment, not denying that the whole process was inconsistent with

⁹ Kevin Outterson, “Should access to medicines and TRIPS flexibilities be limited to specific diseases?”, *American journal of law & medicine*, Vol. 34, No. 2-3, 2008, 279–30; Bryan Mercurio, “TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs: recent trends”, in: *Regional Trade Agreements and The WTO Legal System*, Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino, (eds.), 2006, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 215–237.

¹⁰ Pier DeRoo, “Public non-commercial use compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical drugs in government health care programs”, *Mich. J. Int’l L.* Vol. 32, No. 2, 2011, 347; Daniel D. Kim, “Voluntary licensing of pharmaceuticals: The strategy against compulsory licensing”, *Am. U. Intell. Prop. Brief*, Vol. 8, 2016, 63; Tsai-Yu Lin, “Compulsory License for Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Agreements: Are There Issues beyond the Trips Agreement?”, *IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law*, Vol. 40, 2009 123–246; K. D. Raju, “Compulsory v voluntary licensing: A legitimate way to enhance access to essential medicines in developing countries”, *Journal of Intellectual Property Rights*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2017, 23–31.

¹¹ Vera Zolotaryova, “Are we there yet? Taking TRIPS to Brazil and expanding access to HIV/AIDS medication”, *Brook. J. Int’l L.*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2007, 1099.

¹² Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, “Questioning the frequency and wisdom of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical patents”, *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 71, 2011, 71–93.

regulations.¹³ As De Roo noticed, “there is a fine line dividing when the practice of issuing compulsory licences is proper and when it will cause disastrous results”.¹⁴

The basis for such an arbitrary interpretation is mainly found in the provisions of Article 31 itself, in which cases the application of CL is justified:

- a) When reasonable commercial negotiations have failed;
- b) When the compulsory licence is for “public non-commercial use,” a condition that is not defined;
- c) When a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency has arisen, with the additional explanation that “each Member *has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency* or other circumstance of extreme urgency”.¹⁵

The first provision left plenty of room for applying CL based on the balance of power between pharmaceutical lobbies and authorities in a particular country rather than the health system's needs. The second and third gave legitimacy to any government to issue compulsory licencing at any time and for any purpose.

Based on the above provisions of the Declaration (2001), the CL justification problem is divided into two segments. The first problem, questioning its justification, is that CL is less used by underdeveloped countries than developed ones; and second, CL is often not justified by a health crisis, nor is the disease cited as the basis for CL contagious. These are two critical research problems, which are further analysed. Separate hypotheses about them were adopted and then subjected to statistical evaluation.

Income level, health expenditure, and compulsory licencing

The frequent application of CL by high-income countries is entirely in line with the content of Article 31. What is this about?

The pharmaceutical companies with the most advanced R&D sectors and the highest innovations are primarily from the most developed countries. In order to distribute benefits more equitably, Article 31 provided flexibility for

¹³ Suwit Wibulpolprasert, Vichai Chokeyivat, Cecilia Oh & Inthira Yamabhai, “Government use licenses in Thailand: The power of evidence, civil movement and political leadership”, *Globalization and Health*, Vol. 7, No. 32, 2011, 1-8; Inthira Yamabhai, Adun Mohara, Sripen Tantivess, Kakanang Chaisiri & Yot Teerawattananon, “Government use licenses in Thailand: an assessment of the health and economic impacts”, *Globalization and Health*, Vol. 7, No. 32, 2011, 1-12.

¹⁴ Pier DeRoo, “Public non-commercial use compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical drugs in government health care programs”.

¹⁵ WTO, “Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health”, 5b, 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.

developing countries. CL was used to produce generic drugs, for which the patent belongs to companies from developed countries in the territory of developing countries. But many LDCs could not produce generic medicines of sufficient quality, so they imported generic drugs from other less developed countries with production capacity and that could provide an acceptable price based on CL. The provision of the 2001 Declaration, Article 31(f), stated that CL should be used predominantly for domestic use, virtually closing the possibility of using the benefits of CL for the LDCs that do not have a pharmaceutical industry.

The provision on the use of CL for the domestic market in a few years has led to the demands from high-income countries reaching a larger share in the total CL than the middle and least developed countries. There is a relatively large number of requirements for CL in countries with the most developed pharmaceutical industries: the US, the UK, Israel, Italy (three times each), Switzerland, and Norway.

All this is an indicator for the following hypothesis:

H1: A country's low income does not increase the likelihood that its government will apply compulsory licencing to pharmaceutical patents.

Public health crisis and measuring the justification of compulsory licencing

The direct result of the provision that each WTO member “has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency” are numerous examples of the use of CL for HIV by countries with 0.1–0.3% of registered infected populations (Korea, which is not in any database for AIDS data, then Romania, Pakistan, Mongolia, with less than 500 patients, etc.).

Another, though not very different, problem relates to the use of CL for medicines for diseases not listed in the TRIPS Agreement or Declaration. In the Declaration, public health crises are defined as those “related to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics that can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Apart from African countries, with a consistently high number of people living with HIV, there are not many examples of the use of CL for health crises. The use of CL for cancer drugs, as the most common of the “unrecognised” bases for CL, is widespread. In addition, there are numerous examples of CL requirements for cardiovascular diseases (Thailand), rheumatoid arthritis (Ecuador twice), kidney transplantation (Ecuador), diabetes (India), bacterial infection, migraine and prostatic hyperplasia (Italy), cystic fibrosis (the UK), even opioid overdose (the US, pending), etc.¹⁶

¹⁶ Medicines Law & Policy, “The TRIPS Flexibilities Database”.

This preliminary review serves as an indicator for the next hypothesis.

H2: Public health crises do not increase the likelihood of applying compulsory licencing to pharmaceutical patents.

Empirical Model

Data and variables

The data included in the empirical model refer to all 158 TRIPS flexibility cases for which 82 countries applied. Most of the required data were collected from the TRIPS Flexibilities Database and include the type of flexibility, the country that used it, the year in which it was realised, and the disease that is the reason for flexibility.

The TRIPS flexibility types (Paragraph 7, Article 30, Article 31, and Article 31bis) are set as dependent variables in the model. As the goal is to estimate the factors that affect only the request for CL, in the model with the binary dependent variable, CL has a value of 1. In contrast, other types of flexibilities have a value of 0. Their presence is, however, statistically necessary for model construction.

The model includes four independent variables, two of which are categorical (income level and public health crisis) and two quantitative (Government Effectiveness and Health Expenditure).

1. Income level in this model is not a numerical but a categorical variable. Although there are numerous and common ways to present revenues numerically (GDP, GDP *per capita*, GNI, etc.), the numerical indicator is not suitable for this research. A statistical link between a country's economic strength and the use of any health assistance mechanism is expected, but this link is not expected to be linear. Therefore, it is assumed that the statistical significance of belonging to a particular income group is greater than the monetary value of income. More importantly, since flexibilities are realised in different years (there are no time series in the model), incomes from different years for different countries must not be related to the same model. The income level variable refers to the classification of the United Nations according to the GNI per capita criteria.¹⁷ The variable includes the following categories: High-Income (HI); Upper Middle-Income (UMI); Lower Middle-Income (LMI); and Low-Income countries (LI).
2. Due to the overuse of CL, the justification for a public health crisis (PHC) was assessed in each case of its application. This categorical variable is

¹⁷ UNAIDS, "Countries", <https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries>, 22/08/2023.

represented in the model by the binary principle: by 0 when the data show that the disease listed in the Declaration is not prevalent; by 1 when a public health crisis is an objective situation. The following are combined to assess the justification: a) the mentioned definition of PHC in the Declaration that “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” and b) the TRIPS Flexibilities Database.¹⁸ On this basis, to build an empirical model, CL related to all forms of influenza (H1N1 influenza, COVID-19, and avian flu), anthrax, and SARS, and all applications marked with “all diseases”, were rated with 1. On the other hand, the cases of cancer, migraine, rheumatoid arthritis, and kidney transplantation are marked with zero since they do not meet any criteria for a public health crisis defined in the Declaration.

A particular challenge for model construction is evaluating the justification of CL in HIV cases. This is the most common ground for applying CL in a number of cases in countries with a negligible number of patients. The margin of 0.5% infected with HIV/AIDS was determined arbitrarily. This is the lowest margin determined by reviewing epidemic status data in general. A larger (probably more realistic) margin would further emphasise the unfoundedness of many CL cases. All cases of CL related to HIV are shown at zero in countries with less than 0.5%. The number of infected is given in the WHO and UNAIDS databases.¹⁹ The classification of the parameters obtained in this way shows that the number of unjustified uses of CL is higher than justified (67 versus 42).

3. The variable Health Expenditure (HE) implies per capita data, expressed in thousands of US dollars, in the year in which the CL was applied, according to the World Bank indicators database.²⁰ This is one of the primary indicators of the observed countries investing in healthcare and can indicate the government's need to implement CL.
4. In addition to low income and a lower level of investment in the health system, most LDCs have poor implementation of procedures and regulations. The ability to manage is one of the critical factors in the functioning of any system, including public health. Therefore, another variable is considered: Government Effectiveness. According to the World Bank, this composite indicator includes the quality of public and civil services, policy formulation and implementation quality, the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies, and more.²¹

¹⁸ Medicines Law & Policy, “The TRIPS Flexibilities Database”.

¹⁹ WHO, “The number of people living with HIV”, <https://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.22100?lang=en> 18/03/2023; UNAIDS, “Countries”.

²⁰ World Bank, “Current health expenditure per capita (current US\$)”, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PC.CD>, 29/04/2023.

This is a potentially critical factor in developing healthcare institutions (including the health emergency preparedness level). No hypothesis has been created for this variable, not even an assumption, because the effectiveness of government can be seen as a willingness to manage the health system without flexibilities successfully, but it can also be seen as efficiency in using all available support mechanisms, thus compulsory licensing. The estimation of this variable relies entirely on the empirical model.

The time frame for the collected data refers to the entire period from the introduction of TRIPS flexibilities in 2001 to the latest available data for 2020. All data are harmonised with the year when certain flexibility for the pharmaceutical product has been approved.

Method and research design

Assessing the effects of these variables (countries' characteristics) on the use of CL rights requires constructing an empirical model. The data were structured into a country-by-year-level panel. Regarding the choice of model, this research has special requirements. The dependent variable is binary, while some independent variables are categorical and others are quantitative. Most empirical models imply only quantitative variables (multiple regression and its variants) or refer only to categorical variables (Probit analysis, Logistic regression).

Only some types of Generalized Linear Models (GLM), in particular the standard General Linear Model and Poisson regression, meet all the criteria of this research:

- a) They may include categorical or quantitative, fixed or random, crossed or nested variables in the same model.²¹ In this case, the possibility of simultaneously including quantitative and categorical variables is very important. Most of the variables in this research could not be presented quantitatively, and those that could (such as income) were categorised into groups.
- b) Despite the word linear, these models do not assume a linear relationship between dependent and independent variables. This is crucial because this dependent variable cannot be normally distributed with a constant variance;
- c) GLM estimates the probability (maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) instead of ordinary least square (OLS) that a country with specific

²¹ World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators", <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>, 14/05/2023.

²² Alan Agresti, *Foundations of linear and generalized linear models*, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey, 2015.

characteristics will apply for CL. The probability is significant for this type of research because the goal is not to determine all the factors that affect the application of CL, but “What is the effect of specific factors on the application of CL?”

- d) The great advantage of the GLM, although it does not assume a linear relationship between dependent and independent variables, is that it allows “the linear model to be related to the response variable...”²³

The assumption of GLM is the availability of observations on a set of independent “response variables” Y_1, \dots, Y_n , whose expectations μ_1, \dots, μ_n are related to the “explanatory variables” of x_1, \dots, x_k through the model jx_{ij}

$$g(\mu_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \dots + \beta_k x_{ik} \quad (1)$$

The function $g(\mu_i)$, assumed to be known, is referred to as the “link function” and is one of the most important generalizations of the classical “general linear model” (McCullagh, Nelder 1989). β_1, \dots, β_k are unknown parameters, and x_{i1}, \dots, x_{ik} are the values of the explanatory variables for the i th response.

In this research, the GLM took the following form:

$$CL = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Income level}) + \beta_2(\text{Public health crisis}) + \beta_3(\text{Health Expenditure}) + \beta_4(\text{Government Effectiveness}) \quad (2)$$

Disaggregating groups of factors into independent variables produced the following model:

$$CL = \alpha + (\beta_1 * HI + \beta_2 * UMI + \beta_3 * LMI + \beta_4 * LI) + (\beta_5 * PHC0 + \beta_6 * PHC1) + (\beta_7 * HE) + (\beta_8 * GE) \quad (3)$$

The GLM was applied using Statgraphics 18 software, which, in contrast to commonly used software, includes the natural GLM’s advantage of separate parameter estimation for each category in categorical variables.

Results and discussion

Table 1 summarises the results of fitting a general linear statistical model relating compulsory licencing to four predictive factors. Since the P-value in the first ANOVA table for CL is less than 0.01, there is a statistically significant relationship between CL and the predictor variables at the 99.0% confidence level.

²³ Zhao Yangchang, “Regression”, in: *R and Data Mining*, Zhao Yangchang (ed.), Academic Press, 2013, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-396963-7.00005-2>, 45.

Table 1. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for GLM

| Source | Sum of Squares | Mean Square | F-Ratio | P-Value |
|---------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| Model | 34.3253 | 5.72088 | 8.70 | 0.0000 |
| Residual | 99.3456 | 0.657918 | | |
| Total (Corr.) | 133.671 | | | |
| R ² | 31.679% | | | |
| R ² (adjusted) | 30.726% | | | |
| Standard Error | 0.8107 | | | |
| Mean absolute error | 0.6363 | | | |

Source: authors

As one of the creators of GLM, McCullagh explains its multiplicative effects resulting from “independence in cross-classified data”.²⁴ That means that the result is not one parameter per variable but a separate parameter for each category. The results are shown in Table 2.

The confidence interval for the coefficients in the model is 99.0%. The ANOVA of coefficients, which was included in the model, showed the high statistical significance of each of the factors at the 99.0% confidence level. The exception is Health Expenditure, which is statistically significant at the 90.0% confidence level (P-value = 0.07).

The variance inflation factors (VIF) are also included to measure the extent to which the predictor variables are correlated amongst themselves (similar to the multicollinearity test in other models). VIF's above 10, of which there are 0, are usually considered to indicate serious multicollinearity, which can significantly increase the estimation error of the model coefficients. According to the results, the model variables are not correlated with each other.

²⁴ Peter McCullagh & John A. Nelder, *Generalized linear models*, 2nd edition, Chapman and Hall, London, 1989, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3242-6>.

Table 2. Coefficient estimates for Compulsory Licencing

| Variables | Parameter | Estimate | F-Ratio | V.I.F. |
|------------------------------|-----------|------------------------|---------|--------|
| CONSTANT | | 1.8106 (0.1603) | | |
| <i>Public health crisis</i> | PHC 0 | 0.2313*** (0.0761) | 8.52 | 1.3632 |
| | PHC 1 | -0.2313*** (0.0761) | | 1.3632 |
| <i>Income level</i> | HI | 0.5216*** (0.1689) | 10.93 | 2.5261 |
| | UMI | -0.0191*** (0.1452) | | 2.8271 |
| | LMI | 0.1570*** (0.1134) | | 1.7524 |
| | LI | -0.6595*** (0.1248) | | 2.1027 |
| <i>Health expenditure</i> | HE | 0.0163* (0.0137) | 0.46 | 1.0637 |
| <i>Government efficiency</i> | GE | -0.0084*** (0.0033) | 6.38 | 1.6557 |

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$; Standard error in parenthesis.

Source: authors

The obtained parameters for the binary variable PHC confirm the hypothesis that the public health crisis has no impact on the likelihood that the government will apply CL to pharmaceutical patents. PHC1, which indicates the presence of a situation defined by the WHO as urgent, has a negative sign (-0.23). In contrast, the parameter for the absence of an emergency for the disease underlying CL (PHC0) has a positive sign. The statistical significance for this variable is 99% (p -value < 0.01). Although the epidemiological situation in many countries was the primary impetus for adopting the Declaration on TRIPS flexibilities, in practice, the state of public health is completely marginalised as a prerequisite for CL in pharmaceuticals.

Concerning the income level of countries exercising compulsory licencing rights, the results support the initial hypothesis that low income does not increase the likelihood that their governments will use CL. Similar to previous findings, the parameters have the opposite sign of the initial intentions of the WTO. For example, model variables show that LI and UMI countries are less likely to apply for CL than HI countries. In contrast, the TRIPS database used shows that LI and especially UMI countries use CL in greater numbers than HI category countries. To reiterate, this is not a simple statistical probability based on the distribution within the realised CLs. The empirical model gives a probability assessment within a framework that

includes all factors. Other listed independent variables are considered, but most importantly, the model includes zero as a dependent variable when the country uses some other TRIPS flexibility. The UMI and LI countries have a negative sign of the parameter because they probably find more convenient mechanisms than CL to supply themselves with affordable medicine (Paragraph 7, for example).

Given the high degree of statistical reliability and relatively high parameters, it can be argued that the application of compulsory licencing within TRIPS flexibilities is not in line with the initial idea of supporting the health systems of developing countries.

The parameters for the UMI and LMI categories are slightly below and above zero. No hypothesis has been set for these two income categories. However, the data show the same tendency as in previous results: both groups of middle-income countries are more likely to apply CL than low-income countries.

In addition to confirming key hypotheses, the research results provide additional information on the impact of health expenditure and government efficiency on the probability of compulsory licencing. These variables were not included in the research question but served as a supplement to the broader picture of the factors that define governments' compulsory licencing decisions. Although without a significant impact, both variables showed statistical significance.

Conclusion

This article has deeply analysed the compulsory licencing of pharmaceutical patents as the most commonly used and controversial type of exception in protecting intellectual property rights. An analysis of the content of the final version of Article 31 has shown that instead of establishing strict protection measures, the WTO left plenty of room for arbitrary interpretation of situations when the use of this right is justified. A review of CL implementation by countries and diseases and a review of articles investigating individual cases of its application have shown that these opportunities are used very often.

Based on these indicators, two hypotheses have been made: neither low income nor a health crisis affects the likelihood that the government will apply compulsory licencing.

They were estimated statistically by designing an empirical model. The general linear model (GLM) method was applied, which estimates the probability (MLE) that a country with specific characteristics uses the right of CL. The model included four independent variables: Income level, Public Health Crisis, Government Effectiveness and Health Expenditure. Since GLM can evaluate separate parameters for each category in categorical

variables, the probability of CL being implemented by high-, middle-, and low-income countries was separately assessed, as was the probability of CL being used by countries with and without a health crisis.

The results (with a statistical probability of 99%) confirmed the assumption that the real situation of public health and the income level of beneficiaries have been completely marginalised as a basis for exercising the right to compulsory licencing.

In terms of the impact of the income group on the choice of CL as a means of purchasing cheaper medicines, the model parameters showed that CL is most suitable for high-income countries. This is not because they use this opportunity more often than other groups, but because middle- and less-developed countries are more likely to opt for other types of TRIPS flexibilities (paragraph 7, for example). Empirical research has confirmed the hypothesis that income level is not an essential factor in the use of CL and the preliminary general assumption that CL is not particularly useful for countries whose health systems need the most help.

The state of public health as a basis for CL is a simple but more severe problem than the previous one. Countries with a stable state of public health are more likely to implement CL than those amid a health crisis. This is the result of an empirical model and a simple statistical distribution, which shows that the number of unjustified uses of CL is about 50% higher than the number of justified cases. This does not indicate a choice of other flexibilities but a direct disregard for the rules of the TRIPS Declaration.

The conclusion that emerges is not so much about the harmfulness of arbitrary application of CL but about the fact that the poorest countries, at the same time with the most significant health crisis, remain in the background of the whole mechanism of compulsory licencing in pharmaceuticals.

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Vaccine Diplomacy of the United States, China, India, and Russia During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Comparative Analysis

SUMMARY

This research strives to present a comparative analysis of the vaccine diplomacy of the United States, China, India, and Russia during the COVID-19 pandemic. As each of the examined countries possesses the technology to research and manufacture the vaccines, as well as the logistical capacity and infrastructure for their global distribution, it was natural to expect that they would start with their own vaccine diplomacy, especially in the countries and regions that are considered a priority for their national and foreign policy interests. However, each country had a different approach to the vaccine diplomacy engagement based on their vaccine manufacturing capacity and global distribution limitations. At the same time, competition was observed between the rival powers. It can be concluded that although even such a severe global crisis as the COVID-19 pandemic failed to bring closer cooperation between the great powers, such a crisis established vaccine diplomacy as an additional element of foreign policy, and it will most likely be developed as a soft-power tool even more in the near future.

Keywords: COVID-19, vaccine diplomacy, mask diplomacy, medical diplomacy, health diplomacy, United States, China, India, Russia, COVAX.

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Diplomatija vakcina Sjedinjenih Država, Kine, Indije i Rusije tokom pandemije COVID-19 - uporedna analiza

SAŽETAK

Ovo istraživanje ima za cilj da predstavi uporednu analizu diplomatije vakcina Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Kine, Indije i Rusije tokom pandemije COVID-19. Budući da svaka od analiziranih zemalja ima tehnologiju za istraživanje i proizvodnju vakcina, kao i logistički potencijal i infrastrukturu za njihovu globalnu distribuciju, bilo je prirodno za očekivati da će početi sa sopstvenom diplomatijom vakcina, posebno u zemljama i regionima koji se smatraju prioritetima za njihov nacionalni i spoljnopolitički interes. Međutim, svaka od zemalja imala je drugačiji pristup učesću u diplomatiji vakcina, u zavisnosti od svojih proizvodnih kapaciteta i ograničenja za globalnu distribuciju vakcina. Istovremeno, primećena je konkurencija između suparničkih sila. Može se zaključiti da, iako čak i tako ozbiljna globalna kriza kao što je pandemija COVID-19 nije uspela da dovede do bliže saradnje između velikih sila, takva kriza je diplomatiju vakcina učinila dodatnim elementom spoljne politike i verovatno će se u bliskoj budućnosti još više razvijati kao instrumente meke moći.

Ključne reči: COVID-19, diplomatija vakcina, diplomatija maski, medicinska diplomatija, diplomatija zdravstva, Sjedinjene Američke Države, Kina, Indija, Rusija, COVAX.

Introduction

During the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States, China, India, and Russia, each in their own way, started to interact with the global community by donating medical aid and resources to the countries that required them. In the mass media, as well as in the speeches of world leaders and parts of the global academic community, the terms “health diplomacy”, “medical diplomacy”, “mask diplomacy”, and, later on, “vaccine diplomacy” could be heard.²

Taking into consideration the term “health diplomacy”, it can be defined as “international aid or cooperation meant to promote health or that uses health programming to promote non-health-related foreign aims”.³ We can understand

² Christian Shepherd & Stephanie Findlay, “China’s Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy steals a march on US”, *Financial Times*, 21 October 2020; Dennis Munene, “Sino-African cooperation on health more vital than ever”, *China Daily*, 28 April 2023; Dan Banik & Renu Modi, “India is counting on medical diplomacy to build influence in Africa”, *Uganda Business News*, 25 March 2021.

³ Tanisha M. Fazal, “Health Diplomacy in Pandemical Times”, *International Organization*, Vol. 74, No. S1, 2020, 78–97, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000326>.

“medical diplomacy” as a “foreign policy of the state that implies the export of medical services and goods, the referral of medical personnel, the exchange of experience in the fight against infectious diseases, joint research, etc.”.⁴ “Mask diplomacy” derives from both “health” and “medical” diplomacy, and it follows the similar path of providing “aid, equipment, expertise, training, and personal power to other countries”.⁵ However, the term mask diplomacy originated purely during the first stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, as face masks became a prevailing symbol of medical protection (and also a highly sought-after commodity on the market). With China being the main global producer and supplier of face masks, its engagements with medical diplomacy around the world soon became known as mask diplomacy by global mass media.⁶

Unlike mask diplomacy, which can be understood as a COVID-19 type of medical diplomacy, vaccine diplomacy could refer to “almost any aspect of global health diplomacy that relies on the use or delivery of vaccines and encompasses the important work of the GAVI Alliance, as well as elements of the WHO, the Gates Foundation, and other important international organisations”.⁷

The escalation of the COVID-19 pandemic proved to be a catalyst for reforms in international public health cooperation, although the process of centralising the global health regime (most recognisable in the form of the World Health Organisation) still did not achieve high levels of global health governance.⁸ Nevertheless, the global scale of the COVID-19 pandemic created a strong impulse for multilateral collaboration in the field of international public health cooperation. One such example is an initiative known as COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), which includes members such as GAVI, the World Health Organisation, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and UNICEF, among others, with the main goal being the global delivery of vaccines in order to combat the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.⁹

⁴ И. И. Арсентьева, “Трансформация медицинской и вакцинной дипломатии в эпоху COVID-19”, *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*, Vol. 15. No. 5, 182–207, <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2022-5-86-182-207>.

⁵ Stefan Müller, Samuel Brazys & Alexander Dukalskis, “Discourse Wars and ‘Mask Diplomacy’: China’s Global Image Management in Times of Crisis”, AIDDATA, https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS109_Discourse_Wars_and_Mask_Diplomacy_Chinas_Global_Image_Management_in_Times_of_Crisis.pdf, 04/09/2023.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Peter J. Hotez, “‘Vaccine Diplomacy’: Historical Perspectives and Future Directions”, *PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases* Vol. 8, No. 6, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0002808>.

⁸ Žaklina Novičić, “Reforma međunarodnog zdravstvenog režima: Ka globalnoj upravi?”, *Međunarodni problemi/International problems*, Vol. 74, No. 2, 2022, 209–231, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2202209N>.

⁹ Joseph Amankwah-Amoa & Robert E. Hinson, “COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine nationalism and counterfeit products: Discourse and emerging research themes”, *Thunderbird International Business Review*, Vol. 64, No. 6, 595–604, DOI: 10.1002/tie.22302.

With the accumulation of funds from the various participating countries, the COVAX vaccine-sharing initiative officially launched in late February 2021, when Ghana became the first country to receive COVID-19 vaccines under this programme.¹⁰ Some experts believe that since COVAX focuses on the international effort of helping out low and middle-income countries in their vaccination efforts, such a global initiative represents a mid-point between vaccine nationalism and vaccine diplomacy approaches.¹¹ Two important elements were promoted by the COVAX Facility: equitable vaccine allocation and a cost-effective dose-sharing mechanism.¹² Nonetheless, a recent analysis showed that COVAX was not so successful in persuading governments to share the excess vaccine doses with its facility, as a number of them chose instead to donate their surplus vaccines through bilateral agreements.¹³

However, it is important to note that vaccine diplomacy, as a foreign policy soft power tool, is not limited only to major powers and/or COVID-19 vaccine-producing countries. Any country with access to COVID-19 vaccines through purchase, donations, or domestic production can engage in vaccine diplomacy through direct bilateral donations, or COVAX.¹⁴ Nevertheless, vaccine diplomacy as a soft power tool is not without criticism. For example, some experts are of the opinion that Western countries' vaccine donations had the purpose of branding them as "*charitable donors motivated by global solidarity*" in order for them to be distanced from the image of "*vaccine hoarders driven by national self-interest*".¹⁵ With frequent violations of COVAX's dose-sharing principles, it is suggested that Western countries prioritise "*privileged short-term diplomatic recognition*" over "*maximising the impact of donations*".¹⁶

It could be argued that this kind of behaviour is not only limited to Western countries but also to each of the major powers that sought not only to aid the global efforts in countering the COVID-19 pandemic but also to demonstrate their technological superiority (in the case of vaccine development and production), as well as to build a positive image and strengthen economic and political ties with other countries around the world. Additionally, the influence struggle between the United States, China, and

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée & Katerini Tagmatarchi Storeng, "COVAX, vaccine donations and the politics of global vaccine inequity", *Global Health*, Vol. 18, No. 26, 2022, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-022-00801-z>.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Eckart Woertz & Roie Yellinek, "Vaccine diplomacy in the MENA region", The Middle East Institute, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/vaccine-diplomacy-mena-region> 04/09/2023.

¹⁵ Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée & Katerini Tagmatarchi Storeng, "COVAX, vaccine donations and the politics of global vaccine inequity".

¹⁶ Ibid.

Russia via vaccine diplomacy was more than visible in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and, to a degree, in Europe as well, especially in Central and South-Eastern Europe.¹⁷

It is important to state that at the beginning of 2023, the COVID-19 global pandemic was still ongoing and that vaccines were still very valuable medical goods for every country that strived to inoculate as much of its population as possible, especially to counter new strains of COVID-19 that are emerging regularly. Although the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict at the beginning of 2022 shifted global attention away from the pandemic, there are no guarantees that there won't be any new outbreak of some more lethal COVID-19 strain that could shift the global focus back to the availability of vaccines, vaccine production, and their global supply and access.

The aim of this article is to provide an in-depth exploration of the complex landscape of vaccine diplomacy and how major global players strategically allocate vaccines to enhance their global influence and achieve their national interests. This will be realised by employing methodological tools such as content analysis, which will be used in the research of documents such as official strategies, policy position papers, and relevant statistical data, and comparative analysis, which will be used during the research of the different approaches towards vaccine diplomacy employed by the United States, China, India, and Russia.

By applying a realist perspective, the power politics, security considerations, and pursuit of national interests that drive great powers in their vaccine diplomacy endeavours can be understood, which will aid in the assessment of the effectiveness of their vaccine diplomacy campaigns.

If we look at the motives of the major powers for engaging in vaccine diplomacy, it can be assumed, based on John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, that they act based on fear, self-help, and power maximisation.¹⁸ By "fear", Mearsheimer means that great powers look at each other with distrust and suspicion while regarding each other as adversaries.¹⁹ By "self-help", he understands that great powers are operating in a self-help world where they act according to their own self-interests while rejecting subordination to the interests of other states or the international

¹⁷ Ana Jović Lazić & Sanja Jelisavac Trošić, "Evropska unija i pandemija virusa Kovid 19 – neposredni odgovor i dugoročne mere za prilagođavanje budućim krizama", in: *Razvojni pravci Evropske unije nakon pandemije KOVID 19*, Nevena Stanković, Dragana Dabić, Goran Bandov (eds.), Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 2021, 93–120; Mirjana Dokmanović & Neven Cvetićanin, "Geopolitics of COVID-19 vaccines – a new Cold war of the 'Vaccine Superpowers'?", *Journal of Regional Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2022, 209–240, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5937/jrs17-32782>

¹⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 32.

¹⁹ Ibid.

community.²⁰ And by “power maximisation”, Mearsheimer observes that states make special efforts to maximise their share of world power by looking for opportunities to alter the balance of power by “*acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals*”, which is achieved by employing military, economic, and diplomatic means in order to shift the balance of power in their favour.²¹

Therefore, through the lenses of Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism”, great powers look at each other as adversaries during the COVID-19 pandemic, each separately developing its vaccine or trying to obtain the technology or licence for its local production instead of pooling resources and developing a joint vaccine programme (for example, a US-Sino-Russian joint vaccine programme). The self-interests of some of the great powers could be seen in their race for prioritised inoculation of their own population in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic rather than their immediate contribution to the global effort to distribute vaccines. This is also defined as “vaccine nationalism”, or “the mindset and act of gaining preferential access to newly developed COVID-19 vaccines by individual countries”.²² Power maximisation can be seen in employing vaccine diplomacy as a soft power tool by the great powers for gaining international prestige and recognition, as well as for their influence and image-building among the countries and regions of interest.

As it was mentioned several times before, vaccine diplomacy became an important part of the soft power arsenal of the major countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Soft power, according to Joseph S. Nye, refers to the “*ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payments*”.²³ In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the vaccines also function as tools of soft power, contributing to a positive international perception of countries that manufacture or distribute them. This plays a crucial role in cultivating diplomatic goodwill through the compelling force of attraction rather than coercion or financial incentives. This adherence to the fundamental principles of soft power reinforces the COVID-19 vaccines as a powerful tool of influence in the global arena and a crucial part of the vaccine diplomacy efforts of the great powers.²⁴

²⁰ Ibid., 33.

²¹ Ibid., 34.

²² Yanqiu Rachel Zhou, “Vaccine nationalism: contested relationships between COVID-19 and globalization”, *Globalizations*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2022, 450–465, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2021.1963202>.

²³ Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2004, 256, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/20202345>.

²⁴ Seow Ting Lee, “Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play”, *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, Vol. 19, 2023, 64–78, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-021-00224-4>.

As indicated earlier, realism portrays international affairs as a power struggle among self-interested states driven by competitive behaviours. Realism predicts a lack of cooperation among states, as evident in COVID-19 responses like travel bans, pharmaceutical protectionism, and great power competition.²⁵ The European Union's response to the pandemic, characterised by individual state actions over collective ideals, aligns with realist expectations. China's "mask diplomacy" and the United States' nationalistic approach reflect realist principles. Realists assert that international institutions often serve as arenas for zero-sum competition, as seen in the politicisation of the World Health Organisation.²⁶ This will be seen in the following chapters, where the vaccine diplomacy efforts of the United States, China, India, and Russia will be more in-depth explored and analysed.

The United States – from “America First” to “Arsenal of Vaccines for the World”

The vaccine diplomacy of the United States can be divided into two periods: an initial period that can be designated as “neo-isolationism”, in which Washington introduced limitations on the export of medical goods and services during the outbreak of COVID-19, and the latter period of more open global engagement, with promises for the United States to become an “arsenal of vaccines” for the world. These two periods correspond with the presidencies and administrations of Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as the two US presidents held different views on foreign policy and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The initial response of the United States to the COVID-19 pandemic was characterised by the closure of borders, limited exports, increased tariffs, blaming China for the “*bad management*” of the pandemic, and accusations of the White House towards COVAX for malpractice and the WHO for being “*corrupted*” and “*influenced by China*”.²⁷ Some experts believe that such stances were formed in light of President Trump's “America First” and “neo-isolationism” policies and as a consequence of global competition between Washington and Beijing.²⁸ Additionally, President Trump's administration was observed to supply an anti-Chinese discourse in the media by calling COVID-19 a “*Chinese virus*” or “*Wuhan virus*”.²⁹

²⁵ Rajesh Basrur & Frederick Kliem, “Covid-19 and international cooperation: IR paradigms at odds”, *SN Soc Sci*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2021, DOI: 10.1007/s43545-020-00006-4.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Juan Luis Manfredi-Sánchez, “Vaccine (public) diplomacy: legitimacy narratives in the pandemic age”, *Place Brand Public Dipl*, Vol. 19, September 2023, 398–410, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-022-00258-2>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

In the opinion of some experts, one of the reasons for the failure of the Trump administration to properly address the outbreak of COVID-19 was seen in the infighting and inter-bureaucratic conflict within and between the White House, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration.³⁰ As a consequence, the federal government was not able to agree to joint goals that prioritised or funded a nationwide mass testing capacity, which was needed in order for the virus to be effectively tracked and contained.³¹ The distribution of the United States COVID-19 vaccine supply also reflected the “America First” policy of the Trump administration. The relations between the United States and the WHO came under significant strain in April 2020 when President Trump announced that the United States would halt funding to the WHO, while in July 2020, the US officially started a withdrawal process from the WHO on the grounds that the WHO “*mismanaged its response to the COVID-19 pandemic*”, while there was also a perception within the Trump administration that the WHO had an “*alarming lack of independence from China*”.³²

One can argue that the initial response of the “neo-isolationist” Trump administration, driven by its “America First” policy, distinctly embodies what realists designate as the “self-interest” pursuit of states. This becomes even more evident in the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the WHO, seemingly prioritising vaccine distribution primarily for US citizens. Washington’s pandemic response was additionally complicated by inter-agency conflicts among key bodies like the White House, the Health Department, the CDC, and the FDA. These conflicts hindered a coordinated approach to crisis management, raising questions about the effectiveness of such a strategy. Subsequently, the election of Joe Biden in the 2020 American presidential elections led to significant changes in the vaccine distribution strategy.

Considering the United States’ general vaccine diplomacy strategy in the post-Trump era, it can be concluded that it concentrated on global donations of the COVID-19 vaccines, as opposed to the “America First” policy of the Trump administration. This was reflected in the decision of the Biden administration to resume normal relations with the WHO and formally join COVAX, which in effect reversed the decisions made by the Trump

³⁰ Charles F. Parker & Eric K. Stern, “The Trump Administration and the COVID-19 crisis: Exploring the warning-response problems and missed opportunities of a public health emergency”, *Public Administration*, Vol. 100, No. 3, 616–632, 2022, DOI: 10.1111/padm.12843.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization: Process and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46575.pdf>, 04/09/2023, 2-3.

³³ “Global COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution”, Congressional Research Service, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11796.pdf>, 04/09/2023, 2-3.

administration.³³ As of February 2023, South and Central Asia received 230 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines from the United States; East Asia and the Pacific received 134 million doses; the Western Hemisphere received 73 million doses; the Middle East and North Africa received 39.6 million doses; and Europe and Eurasia received 8.9 million doses of vaccines.³⁴

Based on the US International COVID-19 Vaccine Donations Tracker, the COVID-19 vaccine that made up the majority of the donations was Pfizer BioNTech (76% of total doses), followed by Moderna (12%), Janssen Pharmaceuticals (10%), and AstraZeneca (less than 2%). For the delivery mechanism, the United States overwhelmingly relied on COVAX, which accounted for 89% of total vaccine donations. The countries that received most of the vaccines through donations include Bangladesh (114.5 million doses), Pakistan (79 million), Indonesia (42.3 million), Vietnam (40.8 million), the Philippines (33.6 million), Nigeria (32.6 million), Egypt (28.9 million), Uganda (18.1 million), Mexico (16.9 million), and Mozambique (14.2 million).³⁵

These activities of the United States in the field of vaccine diplomacy correspond with the statement made by President Joe Biden in May 2021, in which he announced that the United States will become “*the arsenal of vaccines for the rest of the world*”, while adding that the vaccines will be shared “*in the service of ending the pandemic everywhere. And we (the United States) will not use our vaccines to secure favours from other countries*”.³⁶

In the document titled “Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy”, it is stated that initiatives and efforts like the Vaccine Alliance, Gavi, and the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response are essential elements for the forging of public-private alliances and fit-for-purpose coalitions that are needed to solve global challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁷ Further on, it is additionally stated that the United States donated the most vaccines on an international level compared to other countries, implying that it was done without political strings attached, while at the same time, Washington aimed to boost sustainable vaccine manufacturing in South Asia and Africa.³⁸

³⁴ “U.S. International COVID-19 Vaccine Donations Tracker”, Kaiser Family Foundation, <https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/u-s-international-covid-19-vaccine-donations-tracker/>, 04/09/2023.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ “Remarks by President Biden on the COVID-19 Response and the Vaccination Program”, The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/17/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-covid-19-response-and-the-vaccination-program-4/>, 04/09/2023.

³⁷ “Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy”, The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>, 04/09/2023, 19.

³⁸ Ibid., 28.

This strategy further envisions that the United States will engage with all countries on a global level, including those countries that are in political disagreement with Washington as “*pandemics know no borders*”, while at the same time mentioning that the United States has donated more than 72 million vaccines in the Americas and that Washington is actively engaged in the region, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, in order to prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemic threats and other public health emergencies.³⁹

The Biden administration’s approach to vaccine distribution and diplomacy was radically different from that of the Trump administration. This is seen primarily in Biden’s administration’s relations with the WHO and COVAX, as well as in its engagement with vaccine distribution to regions around the world, reflecting President Biden’s “Arsenal of Vaccines” policy, underlined in the “Biden-Harris Administration National Security Strategy”. It can be said that in trying times for the United States’ image abroad, due to its internal and external challenges, Washington sought to enhance its global position by aiding strategically important regions with its assertive engagement with vaccine diplomacy, especially since it was challenged in this field by China and, to a degree, Russia. If we take into consideration the realist approach towards such a shift in US policy, we can argue that the pro-active vaccine diplomacy policy was chosen by the Biden administration because it was assessed that it advanced the national interests and foreign policy goals of the United States more efficiently than the previous, more isolationist policy of the Trump administration.

The advancement of US interests in important regions for Washington can be seen in the examples of the Caribbean region, Central America, and Latin America, which became a sort of contested zone of the influence struggle for US and Chinese vaccine diplomacy. Although historically these regions were considered the zone of interest of the United States, China proved to be an alternative source of medical and vaccine aid during the initial outbreak of the pandemic. Due to the initial slow distribution of US-made vaccines, governments of various Latin American countries turned to China as a source of vaccines and medical aid.⁴⁰ The Chinese shipments of the vaccines generated positive media coverage in the region, while at the same time, they allowed the local leaders to meet with the Chinese officials. However, some experts believe that this should not be seen as a sign that these countries are replacing the United States with China, as the

³⁹ Ibid., 40-41.

⁴⁰ María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, Bosco Marti, Riyad Insanally & Claudia Trevisan, “US-China vaccine diplomacy: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean”, Atlantic Council, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/us-china-vaccine-diplomacy-lessons-from-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>, 04/09/2023.

US continues to engage the region by providing both pandemic assistance and cooperation on various other issues, such as security, climate change, and migration.⁴¹

However, the US vaccine donations did not generate as much impact as the Chinese ones, mostly due to the limitations of the reach of the COVAX facility. Only ten Latin American countries were qualified for the COVAX Advance Market Commitment mechanism, which covered the purchase of vaccines for low-income countries, while the other Latin American countries signed self-financing agreements with COVAX.⁴² One more important element of the Sino-American vaccine diplomacy competition in the region was the interaction between the leaders of the United States and China with local governments. While Chinese President Xi Jinping was conducting personal calls to Latin American leaders, both President Trump and President Biden were less engaged in such interaction, with meetings mostly conducted in multilateral settings.⁴³

Additionally, some experts criticise the lack of US vaccine diplomacy engagement within the Middle East and North Africa region while observing that China managed to promote itself as a global public good provider, which led to the strengthening of its position in the global health system.⁴⁴ For example, the shortcomings of US vaccine diplomacy in Africa were attributed to the limitations of COVAX in that region, with China stepping in as a more reliable donor and supplier.⁴⁵

The United States is an example of a major power that had two different concepts on how it should engage with vaccine diplomacy, based on the two different domestic and foreign policy concepts that derived from the administrations of Trump and Biden. During the initial COVID-19 outbreak, the United States was following the path of “vaccine nationalism”, which corresponded with President Trump’s “America First” policies. The Biden administration followed a different path, engaging in global vaccine diplomacy but also competing with China and, to a degree, Russia in Latin America and Asia. However, in this phase, the United States demonstrated a lack of engagement with the Middle East and Africa due to the COVAX limitations in these regions, thus allowing China to position itself as a responsible supplier and donor of medical goods.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Passant Mamdouh Ridwan, “China and US Vaccine Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa”, *The Diplomat*, 25 October 2022.

⁴⁵ Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée & Katerini Tagmatarchi Storeng, “COVAX, vaccine donations and the politics of global vaccine inequity”, *Globalization and Health*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2022.

China – “The Health Silk Road” and the vaccines as a “public good”

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, China had actively engaged in medical diplomacy since the 1960s due to ideological reasons, mainly providing aid to the countries that were fighting for their independence and against colonial rule.⁴⁶ During recent decades, the ideological component of medical diplomacy has been abandoned in favour of soft power projection and economic interests. Chinese medical diplomacy evolved to mask diplomacy first and vaccine diplomacy with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan.⁴⁷ Therefore, China was quick to officially adopt the vaccine diplomacy strategy for the COVID-19 pandemic at the highest governmental level. This included close cooperation among the three ministries: the China International Development Cooperation Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce, while at the same time, the strategy relied on the significant participation of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Transport, the National Health Commission, the General Administration of Customs, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Medical Products Administration, among others.⁴⁸

Due to its strong technological and production capabilities, China was able to quickly develop COVID-19 vaccines, with 22 vaccines being approved for testing by the state.⁴⁹ Out of those undergoing the final phase of testing, Sinopharm and CoronaVac were approved by the WHO for emergency use in the summer of 2021.⁵⁰ The scale of China’s engagement in global vaccine diplomacy was significant, as by September 2021, Beijing had provided 1.2 billion doses of vaccines to more than a hundred countries and international organisations.⁵¹

The fact that the Chinese state coordinated all of the country’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts is reflected in Beijing’s approach towards phase 3 of the clinical trials for the three vaccines. For Sinopharm, phase-3 clinical trials were conducted in Peru, Argentina, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Malaysia, and the UAE; for Sinovac in Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, and the

⁴⁶ И. И. Арсентьева, “Трансформация медицинской и вакцинной дипломатии в эпоху COVID-19”.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Liangtao Liu, Yongli Huang & Jiyong Jin, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy and Its Implications for Global Health Governance”, *Healthcare*, Vol. 10, No. 7, 1276, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare10071276>.

⁴⁹ Вера Смирнова, “Пандемия COVID-19 и международные факторы вакцинной политики постсоветских государств Центральной Азии”, *Пути к миру и безопасности*, No. 2 (61), 153–173, 2021, DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-153-173.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Philippines; for CanSino in Saudi Arabia, Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Pakistan; and for CAS-Zhifei Longcom in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Ecuador.⁵² The reason for such a strategy was twofold: firstly, it minimised the competition between the Chinese vaccine producers, while it maximised the fidelity for countries across continents; and secondly, this approach enabled the broadening of the buyers for the Chinese vaccines, as the clinical trial agreements usually included clauses for post-trial purchases. Additionally, the vaccine manufacturers provided a number of vaccine doses to the hosting countries in the case of successful clinical trials, which meant prioritising access to the vaccines for the developing countries. As the examples in the clinical trial host countries showed, the domestic pharmaceutical companies usually became partners for local production and distribution of the vaccines after the clinical trials, and by August 2021, China secured orders from Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia for 326 million doses of Sinovac, 68 million doses of CanSino from Mexico and Pakistan, and 146 million doses of Sinopharm for Indonesia, Morocco, and Argentina.⁵³

China's approach to the ideological component of its vaccine diplomacy can be seen in Chinese President Xi Jinping's statement, in which he designated the Chinese vaccines as "*public goods*", in contrast with the "*Western-made vaccines hoarded by industrialised countries*".⁵⁴ The fast delivery of the Chinese vaccines, along with the flexibility in the means of delivery (meaning the vaccines being either finished products, ready-to-fill ingredients, or raw materials for production with technological transfer), supported this kind of approach in which China presented itself as a responsible power willing to share its medical resources and technical know-how in order to especially help out developing nations that struggle to obtain vaccines due to financial, logistical, or other reasons.⁵⁵

It can be argued that China's initial approach towards its vaccine diplomacy efforts clearly correlates with the realist principles of a calculated strategy of states for maximising power, influence, and national interests on the global stage. This is especially evident in Beijing's strategy of vaccine development and distribution, which was under full state control and ideologically driven as well. However, there was also one more important component of Chinese arguably expeditious engagement with global vaccine

⁵² Mao Suzuki & Shiming Yang, Mao Suzuki & Shiming Yang, "Political Economy of Vaccine Diplomacy: Explaining Varying Strategies of China, India, and Russia's COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy", *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 3, No. 30, 2022, 9, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2022.2074514.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Mao Suzuki & Shiming Yang, Mao Suzuki & Shiming Yang, "Political Economy of Vaccine Diplomacy: Explaining Varying Strategies of China, India, and Russia's COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy", 10.

diplomacy besides domestic vaccine production and ideological drive, and that was developed infrastructure.

China's rapid response and global supply of medical goods were possible due to the utilisation of the so-called Health Silk Road. Introduced in 2015 and originally envisioned to strengthen people-to-people bonds along the Belt and Road, by 2017, it had already evolved into a full-fledged multilateral initiative for promoting global health cooperation, which merged some of China's policy measures that had been included previously in Beijing's other domestic and international health action plans.⁵⁶ While the Health Silk Road initiative played a significant role in Chinese global medical logistics during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was also seen in a negative light from the side of Western countries, which saw Chinese efforts of "mask diplomacy" as an opportunity for Beijing to present itself as "the donor saviour" of the global community.⁵⁷ While the Health Silk Road is also seen as a direct geopolitical challenge to the United States, Beijing actively strives to increase through it both its medical aid and the international market share of Chinese medical products.⁵⁸

The Chinese regional vaccine diplomacy strategy yielded positive results, as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries were receptive towards the Chinese vaccines, with Beijing also announcing that it was planning donations of the vaccines to Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and Myanmar.⁵⁹ China's vaccine diplomacy was also visible within the One Road, One Belt initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). For example, in December 2020, New Zealand started a joint programme on vaccine research with China within the Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccines Cooperation, while on a later date, Beijing announced joint programmes with 29 additional countries within the same framework.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Jiahao Cao, "Toward a Health Silk Road", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 01, 23, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740020500013>.

⁵⁷ Orietta E. Hernández Bermúdez, Mayra M. Bázaga García & Sunamis Fabelo Concepción, "Narratives and dissent in times of COVID-19", in: *International Organizations and States' Response to COVID-19*, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić & Jelica Gordanić (eds.), Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2021, 218-219, DOI: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_response2covid19.2021.ch12.

⁵⁸ Yanzhong Huang, "The Health Silk Road: How China Adapts the Belt and Road Initiative to the COVID-19 Pandemic", *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 112, No. 4, 2022, 567-569, DOI: [10.2105/AJPH.2021.306647](https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306647).

⁵⁹ Anna Kobierecka, "Post-covid China: 'vaccine diplomacy' and the new developments of Chinese foreign policy", *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, No. 19, 2023, 280-293, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-022-00266-2>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Considering the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, during the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO in the summer of 2021, participants declared their willingness to combat the pandemic, as well as to fight against vaccine nationalism and promote joint efforts and solidarity in the global fight against the pandemic, among other proclaimed goals.⁶¹ Such statements were repeated once again in November 2021 in a speech made by Chinese President Xi Jinping during the 8th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in which he also stated that China is ready to provide an additional one billion doses of vaccines, out of which 600 million will be donated and 400 million will be provided through the joint production of Chinese pharmaceutical companies and participating African countries.⁶²

China was also very actively engaged in vaccine diplomacy in Central Asia, a region considered to be of high importance due to its political and economic ties, especially in light of the One Road, One Belt initiative. Some experts assess that by 2021, Chinese vaccines accounted for more than 70% of the total number of vaccines that were delivered to the Central Asian states, with data only lacking for Turkmenistan due to the classified nature of the information regarding the COVID-19 pandemic in that country.⁶³ It helps to understand the efforts of the Chinese vaccine diplomacy engagement in this region if the economic and political context is understood first. China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are all major suppliers of hydrocarbons, and Beijing has significant investments in the mining operations in the region, while at the same time, it provides development loans to regional countries. On the other hand, the population of the Central Asian countries is wary of what some perceive as the “*creeping Chinese occupation*”, while the trust in the Chinese vaccine was also not very high; nevertheless, it was higher than the trust the population of the Central Asian countries had towards domestically produced drugs and medical equipment.⁶⁴

China was engaged in vaccine diplomacy in other regions and countries around the world, such as, for example, Greece, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, etc., with experts being of the opinion that such agreements brought significant political and economic results for China.⁶⁵ Hungary, the

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² И. И. Арсентьева, “Трансформация медицинской и вакцинной дипломатии в эпоху COVID-19”, *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*, Vol. 15. No. 5, 182–207, <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2022-5-86-182-207>.

⁶³ Вера Смирнова, “Пандемия COVID-19 и международные факторы вакцинной политики постсоветских государств Центральной Азии”, *Пути к миру и безопасности*, No. 2 (61), 153–173, 2021, DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-153-173.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ А.В. Авилова и др., *Фактор Китая в Средиземноморье*, Институт Европы РАН, 2022, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/report12022_387.

EU country, agreed with China in 2020 to receive 5 million doses of the Sinopharm vaccine, even though the Chinese vaccine was not registered within the EU.⁶⁶

Chinese vaccine diplomacy also played a significant role in strengthening Sino-Serbian relations. China sent cargo planes with medical workers and aid to Belgrade in March 2020, in an event highly publicised by both Serbian and Chinese state media.⁶⁷ This was also a significant development in relations between China and a European country that is an EU candidate. As the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, stated not long before Chinese aid arrived, “*European solidarity does not exist...it was just a fairy-tale on the paper. The only one who can help us now is China*”.⁶⁸

China continued to send aid to Serbia in the following months, and besides almost two million doses of Sinopharm vaccine that were delivered to the country, Beijing also donated two hi-tech mobile laboratories for mass rapid testing of the Serbian population.⁶⁹ Additionally, in September 2021, the construction of the Sinopharm vaccine factory in Belgrade started, while mass production of the vaccines is expected to begin in 2023.⁷⁰ The opinion polls conducted among the Serbian population in 2020 and 2021 confirmed the positive image of China in Serbia, which was significantly enhanced by the Chinese vaccine diplomacy in Serbia during the initial years of the COVID-19 pandemic.⁷¹

It is plausible to state that China’s utilisation of the Health Silk Road and vaccine diplomacy showcases shrewd application of soft power to further its geopolitical interests, as was evident in Central Asia, Europe, and other regions. It could be suggested that Beijing utilised the vaccine diplomacy not only to enhance its image abroad, which was to a degree tainted by China being “ground zero” for the outbreak, but at the same time to challenge Western hegemony while positioning itself as “donor saviour” and

⁶⁶ Алексей Михайлович Бетмакаев, “ЕС, Венгрия и вакцинная дипломатия России”, *Вестник Томского государственного университета*, No. 78, 2022, 97-105, DOI: 10.17223/19988613/78/13.

⁶⁷ Aleksa Filipović, “Vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic on the example of the Republic of Serbia”, *Международные отношения*, No. 4, 2021, DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2021.4.36719.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Sanja Arežina, “China and Serbia fight pandemic together”, *China Daily*, 22 April 2020.

⁷⁰ Aljosa Milenković, “Europe’s first Sinopharm vaccine factory under construction in Serbia”, *CGTN*, 20 October 2021.

⁷¹ Jelena Gledić et al., “Serbian public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19: An unyielding alliance?”, BCSP, <https://sinofon.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/SRB-poll-report.pdf>, 06/06/2023; Maja Bjelos, Vuk Vuksanović & Luka Sterić, “Many Faces of Serbian Foreign Policy Public Opinion and Geopolitical Balancing”, BCSP, <https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/MANY-FACES-OF-SERBIAN-FOREIGN-POLICY.pdf>, 04/09/2023.

“responsible great power”. Some experts additionally state that Chinese vaccine diplomacy efforts correspond to President Xi’s “China Dream”, a “rejuvenated China” policy proclaimed at China’s 19th Party Congress meeting of 2017, which envisions Beijing turning increasingly to soft power in order to spread its influence around the world.⁷²

However, there were some setbacks for the Chinese vaccine diplomacy; for example, the government of India made a political decision not to import Chinese vaccines. Nevertheless, Beijing exported ventilators, masks, and medical equipment to the country based on humanitarian reasons.⁷³ The reason for the rejection of the Chinese vaccines by New Delhi can be seen in the structural distrust between these two countries, which originated due to historical conflicts and territorial disputes, as well as due to the regional competition between China and India.⁷⁴

Another example would be the regional competition between the United States and China in Africa and Latin America. The United States strived to actively limit Chinese vaccine diplomacy efforts by significantly increasing its vaccine donations in these regions.⁷⁵ At the same time, Washington accused China of using coercion when dealing with the regional governments in order to receive Chinese vaccines.⁷⁶ Distrust of the EU towards Chinese vaccine diplomacy was also visible in the comments of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in which she expressed scepticism of the Chinese global vaccine export while stating that Beijing is neglecting its own population at the same time.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, at this point in time, it is clear that China managed to successfully mobilise its global networks of the Belt and Road Initiative. One such example is the so-called Air Silk Road, which was repurposed as a supply line for aid goods between China and the hubs in Luxembourg and Liège.⁷⁸ The rail links of the Belt and Road Initiative were also repurposed in a similar way, which additionally augmented the already developed infrastructure of

⁷² Seow Ting Lee “Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power play”.

⁷³ Peng Hao Wang, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy during Covid-19 Pandemic: When it Worked and When it Did Not Work?”, *Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Literature, Art and Human Development (ICLAHD 2021)*, Atlantis Press, 2021, 156 DOI: 10.2991/assehr.k.211120.029.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Liangtao Liu, Yongli Huang & Jiyong Jin, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy and Its Implications for Global Health Governance”.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Moritz Rudolf, “China’s Global Health Diplomacy: Revisiting Beijing’s Pre- and Post-COVID-19 Outreach Efforts”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 25, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/19608.pdf>, 04/09/2023.

the Health Silk Road, and for many recipient countries, China successfully branded itself as a “first responder” and “responsible great power”.⁷⁹

China’s visionary policies and projects, which mainly include the Road and Belt Initiative and the Health Silk Road, demonstrated flexibility and adaptability in the face of the COVID-19 global pandemic. While China came under considerable negative publicity as the origin point of the COVID-19 outbreak, it managed to quickly mobilise its significant medical resources to deliver aid to countries in need via its Belt and Road infrastructure network, which was built less than a decade ago. China successfully positioned itself as a responsible provider of medical aid, personnel, and, later on, vaccines, with countries of the Global South especially relying on Beijing to provide that which the Western countries, namely the United States, failed to do so or did not consider a priority. While Chinese vaccine diplomacy was not always considered a successful endeavour (as was the case with India), Beijing managed to demonstrate to the global community both its technological achievements and its desire to be a “responsible great power” in the forthcoming multipolar world order.

India – “Pharmacy of the World” with the “Vaccine Maitri” policy

India is considered the largest producer of vaccines, which accounts for more than 60% of the supply of vaccines distributed to the developing world.⁸⁰ Due to the R&D and manufacturing capacities of Indian pharmaceutical companies, India became known as the “*Pharmacy of the World*”, a brand that was especially popularised by India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.⁸¹ Although lacking an indigenous COVID-19 vaccine programme, India nevertheless managed to obtain Western technology and contracts, which enabled it to quickly produce COVID-19 vaccines on a large scale. This foremost included “Covishield”, which is an Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine manufactured by the Serum Institute of India (SII), with the SII signing an agreement to produce the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine already in April 2020 while the vaccine was still undergoing clinical trials.⁸² This enabled India to create a significant stockpile of vaccines and also to quickly respond to the call for aid from other countries in the region.⁸³

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Niladri Chatterjee, Zaad Mahmood & Eleonor Marcussen, “Politics of Vaccine Nationalism in India: Global and Domestic Implications”, *Forum for Development Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2021, 360, DOI: 10.1080/08039410.2021.1918238.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Mao Suzuki & Shiming Yang, “Political Economy of Vaccine Diplomacy: Explaining Varying Strategies of China, India, and Russia’s COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy”, 10.

⁸³ Ibid., 11

India was also immediately active in the collaborative efforts of regional organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi initiating a joint SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund.⁸⁴ India launched its ambitious “Vaccine Maitri” (Vaccine Friendship) programme in January 2021, intending to export COVID-19 vaccines to India’s South Asian neighbours as well as to some countries outside this region.⁸⁵

Under the “Neighbourhood First” policy of New Delhi, since the beginning of 2021, India has provided COVID-19 vaccines to Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, which was met with significant gratitude from the political leadership of these countries.⁸⁶ This was later expanded to other countries and regions, with India providing the vaccines to around 45 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean region.⁸⁷

Some experts believe that India’s vaccine diplomacy brought good results with countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Myanmar, especially in light of the competition with China, which was also initiating its vaccine diplomacy in the region.⁸⁸ Therefore, not only did India manage to lessen the Chinese clout in the region, but the country’s vaccine diplomacy also gave New Delhi a new impetus to its geopolitical position in the region.⁸⁹ The importance of India’s vaccine diplomacy initiative is also seen in light of the previous failures of New Delhi to match Chinese economic and political influence in the region.⁹⁰ Thus, experts believe that India was successful in polishing its regional image, since, for example, in South Asia, New Delhi was often criticised for its “big brother” behaviour.⁹¹

⁸⁴ Bawa Singh, Sandeep Singh, Balinder Singh, & Vijay Kumar Chattun, “India’s Neighbourhood Vaccine Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Humanitarian and Geopolitical Perspectives”, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 6, 2022, 1021–1037, DOI: 10.1177/00219096221079310.

⁸⁵ Ramita Iyer & Diego Maiorano, “India’s COVID-19 Vaccine Policy”, ISAS, <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/WP-353.pdf>, 04/09/2023.

⁸⁶ Simant Shankar Bharti & Sushant Shankar Bharti, “India’s Vaccine Diplomacy: Role in New Order and Challenges,” *Torun International Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 14, 2022, 97, DOI: 10.12775/TIS.2021.007.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Bawa Singh, Sandeep Singh, Balinder Singh, & Vijay Kumar Chattun, “India’s Neighbourhood Vaccine Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Humanitarian and Geopolitical Perspectives”.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Niladri Chatterjee, Zaad Mahmood & Eleonor Marcussen, “Politics of Vaccine Nationalism in India: Global and Domestic Implications”, 361.

⁹¹ Ibid.

We can identify here two important elements of the Indian vaccine diplomacy strategy: one that can be seen as a response to China's growing influence in the region, with New Delhi's efforts to counter it; and the second one that can be seen as a polishing of its image and countering the previous criticisms of its "big brother" behaviour in the region. It is also important to underline that India's ability to produce COVID-19 vaccines on a large scale, despite not having an indigenous programme, while engaging in both regional and global vaccine diplomacy, reflects New Delhi's correct understanding of the geopolitical challenges that emerged during the pandemic, with additional understanding of the Indian leadership for the necessity to apply soft power tools, such as vaccines and vaccine diplomacy.

However, since April 2021, the new surge of infections in India, along with the shortage of the raw materials for the vaccine, has, to a degree, hampered India's global efforts in vaccine diplomacy, as the newly produced vaccines were urgently needed for domestic use.⁹² With 300.000 new infections and 3,000 mortalities per day during the peak month of May, the Indian government banned all vaccine exports in order to counter the consequences of the new wave of the pandemic, which forced COVAX and AstraZeneca to seek other suppliers of the vaccine.⁹³

This created an opportunity for India's main regional competitor, China, to fill the gap in the vaccine supply, which, coupled with India's domestic issues with vaccine production and supply, seriously hurt the country's vaccine diplomacy efforts.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the Indian leadership has a strong desire to continue with the vaccine diplomacy efforts, and New Delhi is promoting collaboration between the local and foreign pharmaceutical companies, such as SII and Novavax, Cipla and Moderna, Biological E. and Janssen, and SII and Gamaleya Institute, for the production and distribution of foreign vaccines in India and potentially abroad at a later date.⁹⁵

India was quick to understand the importance of vaccine diplomacy and global engagement in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the country's developed pharmaceutical and industrial base, as well as its relations with the West, India was quick to obtain both the technology and contracts necessary to produce the COVID-19 vaccines. The country's initial vaccine diplomacy corresponded with the "Neighbourhood First" foreign policy, but later on, it expanded into global outreach. However, India's interests clashed with those of its main adversary, China, and even in light of the global

⁹² Simant Shankar Bharti & Sushant Shankar Bharti, "India's Vaccine Diplomacy: Role in New Order and Challenges," 99.

⁹³ Mao Suzuki & Shiming Yang, "Political Economy of Vaccine Diplomacy: Explaining Varying Strategies of China, India, and Russia's COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy", 12.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

pandemic, the two countries failed to establish any significant cooperation. For now, it seems that India's vaccine diplomacy got cut short due to the new surges of COVID-19 cases in the country, as well as the lack of raw materials needed to create new batches of vaccine numbers that would be enough for both domestic use and global export and donation. Nonetheless, in the near future, it can be expected that India will resume its vaccine diplomacy as soon as the internal health situation in the country allows for that.

Russia – a “Sputnik” moment with the first registered COVID-19 vaccine

Russia's vaccine diplomacy had a more difficult start compared to the other major powers, which was mostly due to the difficulties with the registration of the Sputnik V vaccine.⁹⁶ The “Sputnik V” vaccine (named after the first man-made satellite that was launched into orbit by the USSR in 1957) was registered by the Russian Ministry of Health on August 11, 2020, although the third phase of clinical trials ended on September 7, 2020.⁹⁷ Therefore, this was met with criticism from the most Western academic community as well as the mass media.⁹⁸ Besides Sputnik V, Russia developed three more COVID-19 vaccines: Sputnik Light, Epivac, and Covivac.⁹⁹ However, after the influential medical journal “The Lancet” published a positive report on the safety and efficiency of the Sputnik V vaccine in February 2021, opinion around the world changed in favour of it, and Russia officially acquired an effective tool for its vaccine diplomacy offensive.¹⁰⁰

The Sputnik V vaccine first appeared in the Central Asian countries, and by the summer of 2021, the Russian vaccine was in use in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.¹⁰¹ In Kazakhstan, Karagand Pharmaceutical Complex (*Карагандинский фармацевтический комплекс*) started the local production of Sputnik V in December 2020, while in Uzbekistan, Jurabek Laboratories started the local production of the

⁹⁶ К. В. Власова, “Вакцинная дипломатия как новая сфера межгосударственного соперничества”, К. В. Власова & В. А. Тимченко, *Общество. Наука. Инновации* (НПК-2022), Сборник статей XXII Всероссийской научно-практической конференции, Киров: Вятский государственный университет, 2022, 971–980.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Aliaksei Kazharski & Andrey Makarychev, “Russia's Vaccine Diplomacy in Central Europe: Between a Political Campaign and a Business Project” *Mezinárodní vztahy*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2021, 141, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32422/mv-cjir.1820>.

¹⁰⁰ К. В. Власова, “Вакцинная дипломатия как новая сфера межгосударственного соперничества”.

¹⁰¹ Ксения Маслова “‘Мягкая сила’ России в Центральной Азии в контексте борьбы с пандемией коронавируса: может ли ‘вакцинная дипломатия’ завоевать ‘умы и сердца’?” *Постсоветские исследования*, Vol. 4, No. 6, 2021, 531–536.

Russian vaccine in September 2021.¹⁰² The opinion polls that were conducted in Central Asian countries in February 2021 showed that the majority of the population of this region considered Russia to be the country that could provide the most help to their countries in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰³ However, the opinion polls also showed that the prevailing majority of the older population in the region looked at Russia as the country that could provide the most aid against the COVID-19 pandemic, while younger generations saw predominately China, the United States, and other countries as those partners who could aid their countries most.¹⁰⁴

Italy was considered an EU country that had good relations with Russia before the start of the pandemic, and in March 2020, Russia was quick to answer the call for medical aid issued by Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte.¹⁰⁵ The presence of Russian military personnel in the EU and NATO countries caused considerable stir among the Italian media, especially due to the involvement of one alleged Russian military intelligence officer in the spy affair not long after the aid mission arrived in Italy.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the Italian government was supportive of the Sputnik V vaccine, and the Spallanzani Institute in Rome conducted a joint test of the Russian vaccine with the Gamaleya Institute.¹⁰⁷ The high popularity of Sputnik V in Italy was also due to the online marketing campaign, as it was the only COVID-19 vaccine in the country that had its own Facebook page, Twitter handle, and YouTube channel.¹⁰⁸

Russia's initial vaccine diplomacy efforts clearly demonstrated a realist approach towards the use of soft power tools for image-building and engagement in the global influence struggle between the great powers. Starting from the development and registration of the first working COVID-19 vaccine to the images of Russian military trucks with medical aid driving on the EU highway, along with the popularity (and distribution) of the Sputnik V vaccine in regions such as Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa, all

¹⁰² Вера Смирнова, "Пандемия COVID-19 и международные факторы вакцинной политики постсоветских государств Центральной Азии", *Пути к миру и безопасности*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 153-173, DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-153-173.

¹⁰³ Ксения Маслова "'Мягкая сила' России в Центральной Азии в контексте борьбы с пандемией коронавируса: может ли 'вакцинная дипломатия' завоевать 'умы и сердца'?"

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Serena Giusti & Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, "Making the Best Out of a Crisis: Russia's Health Diplomacy during COVID-19", *Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2022, 53, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11020053>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Raffaello Pantucci & Tafuro Ambroset, "Russian and Chinese Influence in Italy", RUSI, https://static.rusi.org/288_EI_Italy_Russia_China.pdf, 04/09/2023, 19.

contribute to the Russian efforts of demonstrating technological and diplomatic superiority regardless of the Western-induced economic and political sanctions, while at the same time helping Moscow to preserve the image of the great power that is still relevant on the global scene. And while Moscow's vaccine-producing capabilities were lacking compared to the Chinese and US ones, it still managed to challenge both Beijing's and Washington's efforts at vaccine diplomacy in the regions deemed important for the Kremlin. However, as the following examples will show, the Russian vaccine diplomacy efforts were something of a mixed success, especially considering the engagements with the EU countries.

Due to the initiative of Slovakian Prime Minister Igor Matovič, Slovakia bought 200,000 doses of the Sputnik V vaccine, which prompted a political crisis in the country. This was due to the lack of approval from the side of the EU regulatory bodies who were still assessing the quality of the Russian vaccine, as well as the lack of access to the data of the clinical trials of the vaccine that were conducted in Russia since they were not delivered to the pharmaceutical regulator bodies in Slovakia.¹⁰⁹ This caused a rift between Prime Minister Matovic and the President of Slovakia, Zuzana Čaputová, as well as some other members of the Slovakian government.¹¹⁰ Additionally, only around 40.000 doses of Sputnik V were distributed among the population, and the State Institute for Drug Control (ŠÚKL) published information that there were discrepancies between the composition of the delivered doses of Sputnik V and the published composition of Sputnik V that was published in "The Lancet".¹¹¹ This all caused strong opposition within the Slovakian governmental coalition, which in turn caused Prime Minister Matovič to resign, while Russia bought back the remaining 160,000 doses of Sputnik V from Slovakia at the purchase price.¹¹²

A similar situation occurred in the Czech Republic, where, at the personal request of Czech President Miloš Zeman, Russia offered to sell 300.000 doses of Sputnik V.¹¹³ This attracted significant criticism from both members of the Czech parliament and the opposition parties, as there was a perception among them that the vaccines were "a weapon in Russia's hybrid warfare".¹¹⁴ This all led to the resignation of the Czech Minister of Health and Minister

¹⁰⁹ Расилевна Каримова, "Медийный образ российской вакцины как инструмент вакцинной дипломатии", *Образование и право*, No. 4, 2022, 25, DOI: 10.24412/2076-1503-2022-4-23-29.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Alla Atamanenko & Natalia Konopka, "Russia's and China's Vaccine Diplomacy in Central and Eastern Europe", *COPERNICUS Political and Legal Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2022, 10, DOI: 10.15804/CPLS.20221.01.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

of Foreign Affairs, while at the same time, a number of Russian diplomatic personnel were expelled from the country. This led to the actual worsening of relations between the Czech Republic and Russia, as well as the political crisis in the Czech Republic itself.¹¹⁵

Russia's vaccine diplomacy has achieved greater success in Hungary and Serbia. Considering the case of Hungary, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, was actively promoting so-called "Eastern vaccines", such as Sputnik V and Sinopharm, as a part of the "Eastern opening" strategy of the Hungarian foreign policy.¹¹⁶ The Hungarian government additionally conducted a campaign that was positively related to the Russian and Chinese vaccines, while they were also being presented as more effective than their Western counterparts.¹¹⁷ This all contributed to the Hungarian government's claims that by the summer of 2021, around 1.8 million Hungarian citizens (out of roughly nine and a half million) were vaccinated with Sputnik V.¹¹⁸ However, the positive image of Russia and the Russian vaccine in Hungary was significantly augmented by the multi-vector foreign policy of Orbán's government, which contributed to the official governmental support for the vaccination of the population with Sputnik V.¹¹⁹

Considering the case of Serbia, in April 2020, Russia sent eleven cargo planes with medical equipment and around a hundred military personnel who were specialised in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence.¹²⁰ In December 2020, Russia sent the first batches of the Sputnik V vaccines to Serbia, followed by more deliveries in the following months. Russia not only delivered significant quantities of the Sputnik V vaccines to Serbia, but it also granted a licence for domestic production. In April 2021, the Serbian institute Torlak, in cooperation with the Russian Investment Fund, started the production of the Sputnik V vaccines, and by August 2021, already half a million doses had been produced.¹²¹ The opinion polls conducted in 2020 and 2021 confirmed the successful reinforcement of Russia's positive image among the Serbian people due to Russia's response to Serbia's call for aid, and the Russia-positive narrative was also highly present in the government media during the first years of the pandemic.¹²²

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Aliaksei Kazharski & Andrey Makarychev, "Russia's Vaccine Diplomacy in Central Europe: Between a Political Campaign and a Business Project".

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Aleksa Filipović, "Vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic on the example of the Republic of Serbia", *Международные отношения*, No. 4, 2021, DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2021.4.36719.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

Sputnik V is also present in the Latin American region. As of 2021, countries such as Argentina and Mexico are producing the Russian vaccine domestically, while Sputnik V is also present in Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.¹²³ However, Russia's efforts in the region were highly negatively influenced by the delay of promised doses to the countries that ordered Sputnik V, as well as a significant reduction of delivered doses compared with the amount that was promised.¹²⁴ Some reports suggest that by May 2021, Russia delivered 8.7 million doses of Sputnik V to the Latin American states, while for the same period of time, China delivered 75.8 million doses to the region.¹²⁵

It can be concluded that Russia's vaccine diplomacy met with some success in non-Western countries, mostly due to the confirmation of Russia's technological superiority and ability to globally distribute its COVID-19 vaccine. Even within the European Union, some countries positively reacted to Russia's vaccine initiative, such as Italy and Hungary.¹²⁶ There were also setbacks for Russia's vaccine diplomacy, as it was visible in the Czech Republic and Slovakia for technical and political reasons, as well as in the Latin American states, mostly due to logistical and delivery issues. UNICEF data show that by the end of 2021, Russia had managed to distribute less than 80 million doses of the Sputnik V and Sputnik Light vaccines internationally, compared to the 528 million doses distributed by Sinopharm, the 729 million doses distributed by Sinovac, and the 1.5 billion Pfizer doses distributed by the United States.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, Russia demonstrated its ability to quickly adapt to the changing global environment and position itself as a major power willing and able to contribute globally in the humanitarian venture of countering the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic while building its influence and improving its image in the world. However, there are indications that,

¹²³ Claudia Marcela Vélez, "COVID-19 and vaccination in Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges, needs and opportunities", UNESCO Office Montevideo and Regional Bureau for Science in Latin America and the Caribbean, 57-70, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000378377_eng, 04/09/2023.

¹²⁴ Bernabé Malacalza & Debora Fagaburu, "Empatía o Cálculo? Un Análisis Crítico De La Geopolítica De Las Vacunas En América Latina", *Foro Internacional*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2021, 25, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v62i1.2866>.

¹²⁵ Sinikukka Saari, "Russia's Corona Diplomacy and Geoeconomic Competition. A Sputnik Moment?", FIIA, https://www.fiaa.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/bp315_russias-corona-diplomacy-and-geoeconomic-competition_sinikukka-saari.pdf, 04/09/2023, 7.

¹²⁶ Miloš Petrović & Zlatan Jeremić, "Damaging effects of vaccine geopolitics and the EU's distorted soft power", *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. 73, Br. 4, 721-722, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2104709P>.

¹²⁷ Arsenii V. Kirgizov-Barskii & Vladimir M. Morozov, "Vaccine Diplomacy and Vaccine Nationalism", *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2022, 174, DOI: [10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-3-162-181](https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-3-162-181).

in light of the escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine, Western countries will be negatively inclined towards accepting the Sputnik V vaccine in the near future, especially since the European Medicines Agency and the World Health Organisation might suspend indefinitely the rolling review of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine.¹²⁸ Additionally, in February 2022, the US Department of the Treasury, as well as the Council of Europe, included the Russian Direct Investment Fund (responsible for global marketing and operations related to Sputnik V) on the list of sanctioned Russian entities, therefore halting the activities of the RDIF in Western countries.¹²⁹ Some Russian experts believe that the completion of the Sputnik production facilities in Argentina, India, Kazakhstan, and Serbia will aid Russia in circumventing the sanctions and enable continuous distribution of the “Sputnik V” vaccine worldwide.¹³⁰ Even though Russia suffered certain setbacks with its vaccine diplomacy efforts, nevertheless, the country’s engagement with it has been crucial in gaining influence, obtaining finances, and enhancing the visibility of Russia in the international medical arena, which was especially true for regions with a power vacuum, such as, for example, Latin America.¹³¹

The case of Russia demonstrates how technological breakthroughs in vaccine research, along with a good global PR campaign, can generate enough political goodwill even among countries that can be considered adversarial. Russia’s vaccine diplomacy engagement around the world was naturally successful in those countries that, before the COVID-19 pandemic, had good relations with Russia. However, some success was also noted in countries that introduced political and economic sanctions against Russia before the pandemic started. However, in the long run, this was nullified by the escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine at the beginning of 2023.

Although Russia was the first country to develop and register an effective COVID-19 vaccine, the country’s global vaccine distribution efforts were hindered by production and logistical issues that prevented delivery of the vaccines to other countries on time. This, to a degree, tarnished the image of Russia as a reliable vaccine supplier. However, it is important to note that Russian industry, economy, and R&D centres operate under unprecedented sanctions invoked by the collective West, while at the same time, they face competition in global vaccine distribution from the United States and China. If these factors are taken into general account, then it can be concluded that

¹²⁸ Serena Tinari, “Ukraine conflict calls Russia’s vaccine diplomacy into question”, *BMJ*, <https://www.bmj.com/content/376/bmj.o626>, 04/09/2023.

¹²⁹ Arsenii V. Kirgizov-Barskii & Vladimir M. Morozov, “Vaccine Diplomacy and Vaccine Nationalism”.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

Russia's vaccine diplomacy managed to "do more with less" for Russian interests abroad, while it also significantly contributed to the global efforts to counter the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that each of the examined countries had a different approach to vaccine diplomacy based on technological limitations, production capabilities, and geopolitical aims. For each of the countries examined in this research, it can be said that their vaccine diplomacy initiatives yielded positive results. However, as seen from the various examples, each of them also faced difficulties with the production and delivery of the COVID-19 vaccines to other countries or were locked in a regional influence struggle with their competitors, which reflected negatively on their image, as well as the global fight against the pandemic.

During the Trump administration, the United States followed the "America First" policy, which was also reflected in the initial handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Trump administration prioritised US citizens for vaccine access, while at the same time, it was breaking links with the WHO over suspicions that China was exerting a strong influence over its leadership. However, this changed with the Biden administration, which sought to restore relations with the WHO and commit resources to the COVAX facility. The United States initiated a vaccine diplomacy offensive, donating vaccines predominantly to Asia and the Western Hemisphere. However, there was a lack of attention given to Africa and the Middle East, and in Latin America, the US was locked into the influence struggle with China over vaccine donations.

China managed to rapidly react to the global need for medical equipment and vaccines due to the developed infrastructure and supply routes of its Health Silk Road, which is part of Beijing's ambitious Road and Belt Initiative. Beijing made a significant impact on the countries of the Global South, as it was not only quick in providing the vaccines and other medical materials to the countries in need, but it also positioned itself as an alternative to the United States and the other Western countries that perhaps did not consider countries of the Global South as a priority for vaccine distribution. Even though Chinese vaccine diplomacy was not always successful, as the case of India demonstrated, Beijing managed to position itself as a "responsible great power" in the emerging multipolar world order.

India quickly understood the importance of vaccine diplomacy in light of the global pandemic, and due to its developed pharmaceutical and vaccine production base, it was able to rapidly engage with the medical and vaccine distribution efforts in its neighborhood. This reflected its "Neighbourhood first" foreign policy, but India's vaccine diplomacy later expanded on a

global level, which caused a direct clash of interests with India's main regional adversary, China. At the end of 2022, India experienced a major increase in the number of new cases of COVID-19 within the country, and, coupled with the lack of the raw materials needed for vaccine production, the country's global vaccine distribution efforts were cut short for the time being. However, it is reasonable to expect that India will resume an active role in its global vaccine diplomacy efforts once the situation in the country is stabilised.

Russia gained significant global prestige with the development and registration of the first effective COVID-19 vaccine, but the distribution efforts to countries that required it were hindered by production and logistical issues. However, Russia managed to make a significant medical R&D breakthrough and start mass-scale industrial production of several COVID-19 vaccines while under the pressure of significant economic and political sanctions imposed by Western countries. At the same time, Moscow faced competition from the United States and China in global vaccine distribution, especially in the regions crucial for Russian national interests, thus forcing the country to do "more with less" with its vaccine diplomacy efforts.

It can be concluded that the major world powers understood the need for engagement in global vaccine diplomacy, not only in order to bring the COVID-19 pandemic to a successful resolution but also to increase their standing as well as their economic and political influence among the countries and regions deemed a priority for their national interests. At the same time, there was a clear global struggle to influence via vaccine diplomacy between the United States, China, Russia, and India, in which arguably both China and Russia sought to challenge the United States' prevailing global political, economic, and military presence. This was evident with the highly media-covered deliveries of Russian and Chinese vaccines to European countries, including some within the EU. Vaccine diplomacy also played an important role in the image branding of both China and Russia, as it countered the prevailing Western narrative that the so-called "Eastern vaccines" are inferior compared to the Western-made ones. However, China and Russia were also locked in competition in Central Asia, a region that sees the diplomatic, economic, and political influence struggle between Moscow and Beijing. This is similar to the competition in regional vaccine diplomacy between India and China, where both New Delhi and Beijing strived to counter each other's vaccine diplomacy efforts and influence building in Southeast Asian countries.

The motives and behaviour of great powers are easily understood if we look at them from the realist perspective, which portrays international affairs as a power struggle among self-interested states driven by competitive behaviours. We can also apply Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, in which great powers, driven by fear of each other, act in their own self-interest (self-help) in order to maximise power – or, in other words, employ

military, economic, and diplomatic means to shift the balance of power in their favour. Therefore, we can conclude that in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this means employing soft-power tools such as vaccines and vaccine diplomacy in a competitive manner in order to achieve the goals mandated by their national interests. From a realist perspective, it is also important to note the lack of cooperation between the main competitors in the vaccine distribution efforts because the national interests of major world powers negate the possibility of global cooperation and joint vaccine development and distribution.

It can be stated that vaccine diplomacy will still have a prominent role as a tool in the soft-power arsenal of any country that is able to manufacture and distribute the COVID-19 vaccines. By the time of some new global pandemic in the future or the possible emergence of some new COVID-19 strain that could call for new types of vaccines to be developed, we can expect vaccine diplomacy to be a fully developed and prioritised activity in the official foreign policy strategies of the major world powers, based on the experience of the COVID-19 global pandemic.

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Chinese Investments in Renewable Energy Projects in Central and Eastern European Countries

SUMMARY

The main aim of this paper is to analyse the most important challenges of Chinese investments in renewable energy projects in Central and East European countries. The focus of research is on challenges within the China-Central and Eastern European countries cooperation framework because theoretical and empirical research is mainly oriented towards traditional energy projects. The analysed period spans from 2014 until 2022. With 26 active or completed projects out of the 29 proposed projects in the renewable energy field, the cooperation has been positive so far, but with modest outcomes. The investors in this field were both Chinese state-owned and private companies, while most of the projects were realised through investments and not loans. The main challenges within China-Central and East European countries renewable energy cooperation were political issues, public policies and strategies of national governments, corruption, finances, and legal issues.

Keywords: China, Central and East European countries, renewable energy, results, challenges.

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Kineske investicije u projekte obnovljivih izvora energije u Centralnoj i Istočnoj Evropi

SAŽETAK

Glavni cilj ovog rada je da analizira glavne izazove kineskih investicija u oblasti obnovljive energije u zemljama srednje i istočne Evrope. Istraživanje je orijentisano na poteškoće u okviru formata Kina–zemlje centralne i istočne Evrope, jer su teorijska i empirijska istraživanja uglavnom orijentisana na projekte vezane za tradicionalne izvore energije. Analizirani period obuhvata period od 2014. do 2022. godine. Sa 26 aktivnih/završenih od 29 predloženih projekata u oblasti obnovljivih izvora energije, saradnja je do sada bila pozitivna, ali sa skromnim rezultatima. Investitori u ovoj oblasti bile su i državne i privatne kineske kompanije, a najveći broj projekata je realizovan kroz investicije, a ne zajmove. Glavni izazovi u saradnji između Kine i zemalja centralne i istočne Evrope bili su politička pitanja, javne politike i strategije nacionalnih vlada, korupcija, finansije i pravna pitanja.

Ključne reči: Kina, zemlje Centralne i Istočne Evrope, obnovljiva energija, rezultati, izazovi.

China-CEEC Cooperation Format: Then and Now

The China-Central and Eastern European countries' (CEEC) cooperation mechanism marked its 10th anniversary in 2022. The format, which was formerly known as the 16+1 or 17+1 cooperation framework, was proposed by China in 2012, and, according to Liu and Kong, it was part of the Chinese pragmatical strategy.² It was founded with the purpose of improving China's relations with a region with which it had not developed cooperation in previous times. China saw an opportunity to collaborate with these countries, especially given the effects of the financial crisis and the CEE countries' lack of EU funds during those difficult times.³ Considering that one of the key effects of the global economic crisis was a reduction in FDI inflow, China saw an opportunity to collaborate with CEE countries that became eager for new investments.⁴

² Zukoi Liu, "History and prospects of cooperation between China and countries in Central and Eastern Europe", *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1181, 2021, 43–54, DOI: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2021.72.1181.3; Tianping Kong, "16+1 cooperation framework: Genesis, characteristics and prospect", *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. 67, Br. 2–3, 2015, 167–183, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP1503167T>.

³ Tianping Kong, "16+1 cooperation framework: Genesis, characteristics and prospect".

⁴ Gardó Sándor & Martin Reiner, "The impact of the global economic and financial crisis on Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: A stock-taking exercise", European Central Bank, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp114.pdf>, 1–67; Sanja Filipović, „Efekti globalne finansijske krize na finansijski sektor Srbije“, *Industrija*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2010,

The format was named 16+1 as an indicator of the 16 countries that were part of the original group, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. After Greece joined the group in 2019, the format was renamed 17+1. However, in 2022, three countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) left the format, and the name China-CEEC cooperation mechanism (format) was used further on.

Although the main aim of the cooperation was the improvement of economic relations, China did not stop there. It founded a comprehensive platform that functions on political, cultural, and people-to-people levels. To facilitate cooperation, China and the involved countries established specialised centres in each country dedicated to different types of projects. For instance, a regional transportation centre was established in Serbia and a regional energy centre in Romania. The idea was to formalise and centralise projects according to the type of cooperation or projects, and then to organise and follow their implementation within the platform so that planning and their execution would be efficient. However, this centralisation did not yield significant results, as the centres did not take proactive approaches. As a result, most projects were carried out bilaterally.

During ten years of cooperation within the format, economic relations between China and CEE countries improved significantly, although those improvements were not distributed evenly across the region. While most of the countries saw an increase in trade with China, at the same time, their trade deficit increased. The distribution of loans and investments was also uneven. Some countries received substantial loans and investments, but others received none. There are several reasons why some of the CEE countries were not interested in developing better economic and business relations with China, with political reasons being among the strongest.⁵

According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), China has increased trade with the CEEC by 85% during 2012–2020, which is around 8% on an annual level.⁶ At the same time, two-way investments reached only \$20 billion⁷, and those investments did not attain

79–94; Richard Q. Turcsányi, “China and the Frustrated region: Central and Eastern Europe’s repeating troubles with great powers”, *China Report*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2020, 60–77, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445519895626>.

⁵ Nevena Stojanović Šekarić & Katarina Zakić, “Renewable energy as a connecting spot between China and Central and Eastern European countries: status, directions and perspectives”, *Energy, Sustainability and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 10, 2024, 1–18, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-024-00439-2>.

⁶ “Economic Watch: China-CEEC trade booming with bright prospects”, *Xinhua Net*, 5 January 2024.

⁷ Ibid.

the expected level from the CEEC point of view.⁸ However, it is difficult to specify the correct number (volume) of Chinese investments in the CEEC since different sources use different methodologies to calculate the volume. For example, Matura stated that the total value of China-related projects in the CEEC is €27.2 billion. However, if we only consider foreign direct investments (FDI), the value is €14.01 billion.⁹ At the same time, he points out that the value of Chinese infrastructural projects in the CEEC is €13.6 billion, and according to the MOFCOM, Chinese investments in the CEEC amount to €2.6 billion.¹⁰ Therefore, depending on methodology, sources, and statistics, the results could be completely different. Regardless, it is crucial to emphasise that there is still vast potential for improving economic relations between China and CEE countries, whether in trade or investments.

The primary research question in this analysis is why the cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) in the renewable energy sector is not yielding more successful outcomes and what the main challenges are in this cooperation. This paper seeks to analyse the types of investments and projects undertaken, assess the reasons for successful and unsuccessful projects, identify the challenges encountered by countries in implementing them, and provide recommendations on how to improve cooperation in the renewable energy field in the future.

Qualitative descriptive statistical analysis was used as the methodology tool for this research, supported by case study analysis. The aim is to review all projects China applied for and then see what the main challenges in cooperation have been thus far. As a base for this analysis, the database of Chinese renewable energy projects in the CEEC, formed by Stojanović Šekarić and Zakić (2024), was used. The timeframe of this research starts with the year 2014 and ends in 2022.

The analysis is structured into five chapters in order to adequately explain the research problem. The first chapter focuses on the literature review, which helped to position previously formulated research problems within the existing literature. The reasons behind Chinese pollution problems, how those problems affected its development domestically, and how they influenced Chinese investments in the renewable energy (RE) field both domestically and internationally are explained in the second chapter. The third part provides insight into the use of traditional and renewable

⁸ Richard Q. Turcsányi, "China and the Frustrated region: Central and Eastern Europe's repeating troubles with great powers"; Marcin Przychodniak, "The rough 'strategic relationship' between Poland and China", *China Observers*, <https://chinaobservers.eu/the-rough-strategic-relationship-between-poland-and-china/>, 01/12/2023.

⁹ Matura Tamas, "Chinese Investment in Central and Eastern Europe A reality check", *CEECAS*, https://bird.tools/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/72d38a_373928ea28c44c7f9c875ead7fc49c44.pdf, 02/02/2023.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 14

energy resources, particularly in electricity production in the Central and Eastern European countries, highlighting the challenges they face while trying to achieve a better, more environmentally friendly energy mix. The fourth chapter lists Chinese projects in each CEE country, providing a better understanding of each project in each country individually. The fifth chapter presents challenges and perspectives occurring in RE-China-CEEC cooperation, while the final chapter provides conclusions.

China-CEEC Energy Cooperation

One of the sectors in which China invested regularly and heavily in the CEEC was the energy sector. That was usually a secondary sector, with infrastructure being the primary one.¹¹ China was interested in this sector because it has expertise and economic interest. On the other hand, many countries in the CEEC lacked investments in that sector. According to available data, China wanted to invest in or participate in every possible type of energy-related project, from traditional to renewable energy (RE).¹² Both Chinese state-owned and privately-owned companies participated in projects. So far, the only type of energy investment in which China did not have the opportunity to invest or participate was nuclear energy.¹³ China, from its side, placed financial sources in the form of FDI and in the form of loans. Although FDI, in most cases, positively affects the development of any country, the same cannot be said for loans, which can result in an increase in the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio. This was observed in the CEE countries after the financial crisis and is still relevant today due to the war in Ukraine, which is pressuring the development of the CEEC economies.¹⁴ Due to these circumstances, it was positive that most of the Chinese projects in the CEE countries in the RE field came in the form of FDI, which will be explained later in the analysis.

As with the value of the investments, it is difficult to determine how much China invested in the energy sector in the CEEC. Many projects and

¹¹ Andreja Jaklič & Marjan Svetličič, "China and Central and Eastern European Countries within '16+1': Group or Bilateral Relations?", *Entrepreneurial Business and Economics Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2019, 83–100.

¹² Katarina Zakić & Nevena Šekarić, "China's energy cooperation within the 17+1", *Međunarodni problem*, Vol. 73, No. 1, 2021, 7–38, DOI: 10.2298/MEDJP2101007Z.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Sanja Filipović, Neda Raspopović & Tošković Jelena, "Correlation between reforms and foreign debt in transition countries", *Industrija*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2015, 175–191, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5937/industrija43-7709>; Levon Kameryan, "Managing Public Debt in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges, Opportunities Shift as Borrowing Costs Rise", Yahoo Finance, <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/managing-public-debt-central-eastern-101244334.html>, 02/02/2023.

signed agreements do not have precise values or are unknown. However, available data can provide significant information and serve as the basis for analysis and conclusions. Due to this, one of the aims of this paper, besides identifying the main challenges in cooperation, is to look at the problems from both Chinese and European angles.

Upon examining the literature on energy cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), it becomes apparent that most research papers focus on China-EU cooperation, while the CEEC framework is seldom analysed. In order to address this gap, a brief literature review will be conducted to identify the most significant analyses and findings in this area.

Liedtke covered several subjects, such as Chinese energy interests, policy approaches, and types of energy investments in the EU, in his analysis published in 2017.¹⁵ While analysing the motivation behind Chinese investments in the EU energy sector, he noticed that China does not import energy from the EU, meaning that this was not the main reason for its investments in the EU. In his opinion, the main reason for investments were Chinese energy supply capabilities (for example, the export of RE equipment), as well as the interest of Chinese energy companies to gain access to the EU energy companies' know-how, technologies, and operational management skills.¹⁶ Besides this, Liedtke, like Pareja-Alcaraz and Turcsanyi, discussed bilateral energy relations between China and the EU countries, stating that a non-unified approach by the EU countries led to different bilateral results in this field and concluding that a unified approach would be better for the EU, especially in the investment field.¹⁷ While examining green energy projects, Liedtke wrote that: "As part of their EU-China 2020 Agenda for Cooperation adopted in 2013, both parties also put special emphasis on increased energy efficiency and clean energy technologies and agreed to develop a 'roadmap for EU-China energy cooperation' (European Commission, 2013, 10)."¹⁸

Lv and Spigarelli authored an article about the green energy cooperation between the EU and China from 2004 to 2013, before the

¹⁵ Stephan Liedtke, "Chinese energy investments in Europe: an analysis of policy drivers and approaches", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 101, 2017, 659–669, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.037>.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 663.

¹⁷ Pablo Pareja-Alcaraz, "Chinese investments in Southern Europe's energy sectors: Similarities and divergences in China's strategies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 101, 2017, 700–710, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.034>.

Richard Q. Turcsanyi, "Central European attitudes towards Chinese energy investments: The cases of Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 101, 2017, 711–722, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.035>.

¹⁸ Stephan Liedtke, "Chinese energy investments in Europe: an analysis of policy drivers and approaches".

establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹⁹ Their main research aim was to see if there was a pattern of Chinese green investments in the EU. They concluded that companies from China that are well established in the Chinese market (provinces) prefer the same companies within the EU that have a similar institutional environment within the country as China, and vice versa. Similar findings could be found in the analysis by Lv and Spigarelli from 2016.²⁰

An analysis of trade and investments in the field of RE and how they changed over time in China and the EU was conducted by Curran et al.²¹ They stated that China changed its starting position regarding RE, and it became a net exporter of RE instead of a net importer. According to Curran et al., China is today the biggest exporter to the EU of wind and solar energy products. Germany was, and still is, the main target for investments and exports for Chinese companies. They also prefer greenfield investments in the EU. If they did complete projects through acquisitions, the main reason for doing that was access to technologies and knowledge.

A regional approach to Chinese energy investment analysis in South Europe (namely Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy) was used in Pareja-Alcaraz's work.²² He concluded that Chinese investors in these countries have mainly focused on assets and the market. Portugal and Italy have seen a significant increase in Chinese investments in this area since 2010. According to the findings, Spain and Italy have received the most investments among the four countries.

Jungmann, on the other hand, wrote about the connection between China-CEEC and sustainable development. Although China has adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Jungmann noticed that the CEE countries did not recognise the importance of sustainable development in cooperation with China, unlike in some other areas.²³ Although there are

¹⁹ Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "The integration of Chinese and European renewable energy markets: The role of Chinese foreign direct investments", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 81, June 2015, 14–26, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.01.042>

²⁰ Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "The determinants of location choice: Chinese foreign direct investments in the European renewable energy sector", *International Journal of Emerging Markets*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2016, 333–356, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-09-2014-0137>.

²¹ Louise Curran, Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "Chinese investment in the EU renewable energy sector: Motives, synergies and policy implications", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 101, February 2017, 670–682, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.018>.

²² Pablo Pareja-Alcaraz, "Chinese investments in Southern Europe's energy sectors: Similarities and divergences in China's strategies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain".

²³ Maximilian Jungmann, "The 16+1 Cooperation and China-EU Relations - Window of Opportunity for Sustainable Develop", Working paper, No. 15, 22 June 2018, China-CEE Institute, Budapest.

ideas and statements about cooperation in this field, the author thinks that they are not concrete enough.

While discussing several types of energy projects in the CEE countries, Zakić and Šekarić stated that the number of implemented projects in renewable energy was the highest compared to traditional energy projects. However, according to their value, they were much lower than investments in other fields of energy projects, such as thermal power plants. China and the CEEC have the same agenda regarding renewable energy, and this is why this cooperation has been successful thus far, according to the mentioned authors.²⁴

In their extensive report, Jahns et al. wrote about the energy investment cooperation between China and the Western Balkan countries and compared it with the WB-EU cooperation. Although the authors did state that the majority of Chinese projects in the WB are in thermal power plants (TPP), they think that the specific situation of the WB countries (large reserves of lignite) requires firm support both from the EU and China in the field of renewable energy so that they can transition towards more sustainable development.²⁵ They also proposed forming a WB regional centre for green and sustainable infrastructure, which would serve as a link between the WB countries but also as a link between China and the EU.

Chinese energy projects in the WB were also a part of Csapó's analysis.²⁶ He discussed the pros and cons of Chinese investments in the energy field. He recognises both the need for energy investments that the Balkan countries have and the conflict of interest that the EU has in this field. The main controversy is the construction of thermal power plants that China is financing. On the other hand, the EU is sponsoring the construction of small hydropower plants that also hurt the ecosystem in the Balkan countries.

China's Path Domestically and Internationally to Renewable Energy Development and Cooperation

As China is heading to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and since it is actively promoting sustainable development and green energy in the last 14th five-year development plan, it is clear that China is seriously considering

²⁴ Katarina Zakić & Nevena Šekarić, "China's energy cooperation within the 17+1".

²⁵ Henriette Jahns, Malin Emmerich, Marjan Stojiljković, Slaviša Jelisić, Sebastian Rink & Karsten Löffler, "Greening BRI projects: In the Western Balkan countries", Frankfurt School of Finance & Management - UNEP centre, https://www.fs-unep-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2020-11-02_FS-UNEP-Centre_Greening-BRI-projects-in-Western-Balkan-Countries_study.pdf, 2020, 07/01/2024, 1-69.

²⁶ Gábor Dániel Csapó, "Chinese backed energy projects in the Western Balkans: where supply and demand could meet", *Romanian Journal of European affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2020, 100-119.

today's environmental issues and is making progress in solving them. Additionally, China has consistently supported global climate initiatives such as the Paris COP21 2016 Agreement and the Glasgow COP26 2021 Pact.

In making many changes regarding renewable energy (RE) on domestic territory, China demonstrated what could be done in this field. Its experience could be used to improve RE cooperation within the China-CEEC cooperation framework. Starting with the 11th and 12th five-year development plans, China introduced many measures and policies to solve the problems associated with traditional energy production and pollution.²⁷ The Chinese government worked simultaneously on many levels to reduce it. Firstly, the government adopted new policies to motivate the country's major commercial polluters to work on downsizing their pollution. Secondly, citizens were encouraged to rationalise their pollution. Thirdly, the government is promoting measures directed towards the better and more successful implementation of renewable energy sources. Besides this, China is constantly working on improving the legal framework regarding RE.²⁸ Due to all these interventions, as of 2020, renewable energy accounts for 41% of total electricity capacity in China, with the following structure: 15% is coming from hydropower, 12% from solar, 13% from wind energy, and 1% from bioenergy.²⁹

The main reason behind China's orientation towards the development of renewable energy is the level of domestic pollution, which was severely increased at the beginning of the 21st century. Gippner and Torney stated that starting from 2005 until 2009, China heavily invested in the development of heavy industry, which required excessive use of coal, leading to severe air pollution that reached dangerous levels in major manufacturing cities and provinces.³⁰ The government was aware of these issues and implemented

²⁷ The first official document that documents China's orientation towards sustainable development and RE could be found in China's Agenda 21, which followed the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Agenda 21 adopted in Rio (1992), according to Lv and Spigarelli. "Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "The integration of Chinese and European renewable energy markets: The role of Chinese foreign direct investments"; Louise Curran, Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "Chinese investment in the EU renewable energy sector: Motives, synergies and policy implications"; Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "The integration of Chinese and European renewable energy markets: The role of Chinese foreign direct investments".

²⁸ Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "The integration of Chinese and European renewable energy markets: The role of Chinese foreign direct investments".

²⁹ "[IRENA] International Renewable Energy Agency", Energy Profile China, https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_Profiles/Asia/China_Asia_RE_SP.pdf, 01/02/2023.

³⁰ Olivia Gippner & Diarmuid Torney, "Shifting policy priorities in EU-China energy relations: Implications for Chinese energy investments in Europe", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 101, No. 652, 2017, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.09.043>; ChinaPower; "How Is China's Energy Footprint Changing?", Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016, (updated January 30, 2021), <https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/>, 20/02/2023.

new environmental and industrial policies, which later resulted in lower coal imports and consumption.³¹

When analysing the Chinese domestic market, one can notice that among the RE energy investments, those in the hydro sector were the highest, which was expected due to their costs and the number of projects. However, if we account only for green energy projects, China invested the most in solar and wind energy. According to Nahm and Steinfeld (2014), the development of wind energy production was pushed by the demand on the domestic market, while the development of solar energy was driven by the export of solar panels and equipment, most notably to European countries, Germany specifically.³² Today, besides the US and the EU, China is one of the leaders in promoting, investing in, and developing renewable energy sources.³³ It should also be emphasised, that in recent years, China has invested significantly more in developing hydrogen production, specifically green hydrogen, which uses renewable energy for hydrogen production. This type of hydrogen is the most important to preventing and downsizing pollution as it is carbon neutral, unlike other types of hydrogen (grey, blue, pink, etc.).

China's orientation towards sustainable development is also evident through investments in green energy projects within the BRI countries. Alun and Zhou wrote that until 2018, China invested in renewable energy projects in 45 countries through BRI, with an installed electricity capacity of approximately 34 GW.³⁴ They also noted that the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Pakistan, Egypt, and Myanmar were the countries that received the most of those investments. While reviewing the type of energy in which it was invested, the authors cited that 74% was invested in solar energy, 25% in wind energy, 1% in geothermal projects, and 0.3% in small hydropower projects.³⁵ More recently, commenting on Chinese projects in the form of investments and loans within the BRI during the first half of 2023, Nedopil noted that this was regrading investments in general in the greenest first six months since the BRI was introduced in 2013.³⁶ Compared to 2022, when

³¹ Olivia Gippner & Diarmuid Torney, "Shifting policy priorities in EU-China energy relations: Implications for Chinese energy investments in Europe".

³² Louise Curran, Ping Lv & Francesca Spigarelli, "Chinese investment in the EU renewable energy sector: Motives, synergies and policy implications".

³³ Sara Schonhardt, "China Invests \$546 Billion in Clean Energy, Far Surpassing the U.S.", *Scientific American*, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/china-invests-546-billion-in-clean-energy-far-surpassing-the-u-s/>, 05/01/2024.

³⁴ Alun Gu & Xiaoyu Zhou, "Emission reduction effects of the green energy investment projects of China in belt and road initiative countries", *Ecosystem Health and Sustainability*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/20964129.2020.1747947.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Cristoph Wang Nedopil, "China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023", The Green Finance & Development Center, <https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2023-h1/>, 05/01/2024.

renewable energy investments in the BRI countries were 7.11 billion US dollars, in 2023 they amounted to 8.04 billion US dollars.³⁷

Countries within the European Union are among the main Chinese partners in the renewable energy field. China has been cooperating with the EU for almost three decades in different ways so they can better regulate mutual relations in the energy field. The first signed documents date from 1994, and between then and now, several rounds of negotiations, memoranda, and agreements were conducted and signed. This part of the relationship is important because of the fourteen countries that are part of the China-CEEC cooperation framework, eleven are EU members. Therefore, the EU legal framework cannot be omitted in this analysis. Other countries are not in the EU but are aiming to join, so it is important to keep that in mind while discussing energy issues.

It is worth noting that the China-CEEC framework has seen significant energy cooperation. The Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects was established in Bucharest in 2016, and green energy cooperation was emphasised during the 2019 Dubrovnik Summit. At this event, it was asserted that the projects of the Bucharest Centre for Energy should be used as a base for better energy cooperation. In addition to this, at the 2021 China-CEEC online Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed the importance and need for cooperation in the fields of green energy and climate change, among many suggestions and proposals dedicated to the improvement of cooperation within this framework.³⁸ However, there was no other institutional push towards more significant RE cooperation within this format since the usual in-person (or online) Summit of Prime Ministers within the China-CEEC format has not been held since 2021.

CEEC and Energy Structure

Without going into the detailed characteristics of each CEE country's energy mix and the reasons behind it, a brief overview of data provided by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is presented in Table 1. The purpose of showing this data is to present the potential for cooperation in renewable energy between China and CEE and suggest ways for improving the current situation. Each country has its own energy profile on the IRENA website. Data on total primary energy supply and electricity capacity for non-renewable and renewable sources were specifically selected among other available data for this research, along with the structure of the

³⁷ "The American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation", China Global Investment Tracker, <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>, 05/01/2024.

³⁸ "Full Text: Keynote Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the China-CEEC Summit", *Xinhua Net*, 09 February 2021.

renewable energy sources (hydro, solar, wind, bioenergy, and geothermal) used in that country.

After summarising the results presented in Table 1 and looking at many other resources, we can draw several conclusions. Due to their geographical position and water and wind resources, Albania, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are achieving better and cleaner energy results than others. Seven countries have nuclear power plants: Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia are sharing one plant; the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia each have one; and Poland and Romania are planning to build a new one. Although their nuclear power plants have low CO₂ emissions, they pose high environmental risks. Some countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, and Serbia, are heavily dependent on coal (mostly lignite) and thermal power plants (TPP). Countries like the Czech Republic, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Romania still have significant coal usage in their energy mix, even though they do not have large coal reserves.

Table 1. Total primary energy supply in 2018 and Electricity capacity in 2020 in CEEC

| Country | Total primary energy supply ³⁹ | TPES in 2018 (TJ) | % | Electricity capacity ⁴⁰ | Capacity in 2020 (MW) | % |
|----------------|---|-------------------|------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| <i>Albania</i> | Non-renewable | 51664 | 66 | Non-renewable | 99 | 4 |
| | Renewable | 26627 | 34 | Renewable | 2307 | 96 |
| | | | | Hydro/ marine | 2289 | 95 |
| | | | | Solar | 17 | 1 |
| | | | | Wind | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 1 | 0 |
| | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 | |

³⁹ Total primary energy supply is the total amount of energy that a country has at its disposal (TPS = production + imports - exports +/- stock change - international bunkers), while total final energy consumptions is TPS minus losses (TFS = TPS - losses). "[IRENA] International Renewable Energy Agency".

⁴⁰ Energy Statistics Pocketbook 2021 defines electricity capacity as "Electricity capacity is the abbreviated form for the Net Maximum Electrical Capacity, which in turn is defined as the maximum active power that can be supplied continuously, with all plants running at the point of outlet (i.e., after taking the power supplies for the station auxiliaries and allowing for the losses in those transformers considered integral to the station)." United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, "Energy Statistics Pocketbook", United Nations, Statistics Papers Series E, No. 4, 2021, New York, <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/energystats/pubs/documents/2021pb-web.pdf>, 05/01/2024.

| Country | Total primary energy supply | TPES in 2018 (TJ) | % | Electricity capacity | Capacity in 2020 (MW) | % |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| <i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i> | Non-renewable | 244039 | 78 | Non-renewable | 2573 | 57 |
| | Renewable | 67102 | 22 | Renewable | 1954 | 43 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 1829 | 40 |
| | | | | Solar | 35 | 1 |
| | | | | Wind | 87 | 2 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 3 | 0 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Bulgaria</i> | Non-renewable | 684720 | 89 | Non-renewable | 6910 | 61 |
| | Renewable | 83209 | 11 | Renewable | 4347 | 39 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 2514 | 22 |
| | | | | Solar | 1073 | 10 |
| | | | | Wind | 703 | 6 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 57 | 1 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Croatia</i> | Non-renewable | 249348 | 71 | Non-renewable | 1644 | 34 |
| | Renewable | 100799 | 29 | Renewable | 3226 | 66 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 2200 | 45 |
| | | | | Solar | 85 | 2 |
| | | | | Wind | 788 | 16 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 143 | 3 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 10 | 0 |
| <i>Czech Republic</i> | Non-renewable | 1635189 | 90 | Non-renewable | 17230 | 80 |
| | Renewable | 177989 | 10 | Renewable | 4342 | 20 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 1090 | 5 |
| | | | | Solar | 2073 | 10 |
| | | | | Wind | 339 | 2 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 840 | 4 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |

| Country | Total primary energy supply | TPES in 2018 (TJ) | % | Electricity capacity | Capacity in 2020 (MW) | % |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| <i>Greece</i> | Non-renewable | 810482 | 88 | Non-renewable | 10050 | 48 |
| | Renewable | 112163 | 12 | Renewable | 10887 | 52 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 3412 | 16 |
| | | | | Solar | 3247 | 16 |
| | | | | Wind | 4113 | 20 |
| | | | | Bioenergy Geothermal | 115 0 | 1 0 |
| <i>Hungary</i> | Non-renewable | 993409 | 88 | Non-renewable | 7655 | 73 |
| | Renewable | 125095 | 11 | Renewable | 2813 | 27 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 58 | 1 |
| | | | | Solar | 1953 | 19 |
| | | | | Wind | 323 | 3 |
| | | | | Bioenergy Geothermal | 476 3 | 5 0 |
| <i>North Macedonia</i> | Non-renewable | 90356 | 82 | Non-renewable | 1104 | 57 |
| | Renewable | 19182 | 18 | Renewable | 827 | 43 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 686 | 36 |
| | | | | Solar | 94 | 5 |
| | | | | Wind | 37 | 2 |
| | | | | Bioenergy Geothermal | 10 0 | 1 0 |
| <i>Montenegro</i> | Non-renewable | 30410 | 69 | Non-renewable | 225 | 22 |
| | Renewable | 13583 | 31 | Renewable | 782 | 78 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 658 | 65 |
| | | | | Solar | 6 | 1 |
| | | | | Wind | 118 | 12 |
| | | | | Bioenergy Geothermal | 0 0 | 0 0 |

| Country | Total primary energy supply | TPES in 2018 (TJ) | % | Electricity capacity | Capacity in 2020 (MW) | % |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| <i>Poland</i> | Non-renewable | 4067227 | 91 | Non-renewable | 34146 | 74 |
| | Renewable | 391709 | 9 | Renewable | 12220 | 26 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 976 | 2 |
| | | | | Solar | 3936 | 8 |
| | | | | Wind | 6267 | 14 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 1041 | 2 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Romania</i> | Non-renewable | 1160941 | 83 | Non-renewable | 8504 | 43 |
| | Renewable | 242906 | 17 | Renewable | 11141 | 57 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 6593 | 34 |
| | | | | Solar | 1387 | 7 |
| | | | | Wind | 3023 | 15 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 139 | 1 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Serbia</i> | Non-renewable | 550671 | 87 | Non-renewable | 4685 | 62 |
| | Renewable | 82843 | 13 | Renewable | 2909 | 38 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 2460 | 32 |
| | | | | Solar | 29 | 0 |
| | | | | Wind | 397 | 5 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 24 | 0 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |
| <i>Slovakia</i> | Non-renewable | 647494 | 90 | Non-renewable | 5324 | 69 |
| | Renewable | 71192 | 10 | Renewable | 2435 | 31 |
| | | | | Hydro/marine | 1612 | 21 |
| | | | | Solar | 593 | 8 |
| | | | | Wind | 4 | 0 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 226 | 3 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |

| Country | Total primary energy supply | TPES in 2018 (TJ) | % | Electricity capacity | Capacity in 2020 (MW) | % |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| <i>Slovenia</i> | Non-renewable | 243989 | 85 | Non-renewable | 2416 | 62 |
| | Renewable | 43766 | 15 | Renewable | 1509 | 38 |
| | | | | Hydro/ marine | 1171 | 30 |
| | | | | Solar | 267 | 7 |
| | | | | Wind | 5 | 0 |
| | | | | Bioenergy | 66 | 2 |
| | | | | Geothermal | 0 | 0 |

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency, Statistical Profiles of Countries, https://www.irena.org/IRENADocuments/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/

The usage of renewable energy sources within the CEEC is quite different. Maybe the best way to describe the situation regarding RE in the CEEC is to say that it is not so green or sustainable. However, we should reiterate that these countries have different energy resources and circumstances regarding the type of renewable energy they can install and use. Most CEE countries have good geographical positions to install and use more solar energy. Additionally, many Central and Eastern European countries could achieve better results by using wind energy. These countries include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. Nowadays, small hydropower plants are considered more harmful than beneficial due to many environmental issues, so they are not an option for most CEE countries. However, biofuel and biowaste are becoming more and more popular. Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are achieving excellent results in this field.

Additional problems in transitioning towards a more ecologically friendly environment and the implementation of RE projects in the CEEC have been evident in their political and legal backgrounds. Reports from some EU countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, have highlighted that the EU common goals related to climate change and transition towards more green energy were obstructed on several fronts, from governments' positions towards RE and the costs associated with it to energy lobbies, pressure from citizens, etc.⁴¹ There were also reports of corruption in the allocation of the

⁴¹ Simona Davidescu, Ralitsa Hiteva & Tomas Maltby, "Two steps forward, one step back: Renewable energy transitions in Bulgaria and Romania", *Public Administration*, Vol. 96, 2018, 611-625, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12522>.

EU RE funds.⁴² Bosnia and Herzegovina, although not an EU member state, has experienced problems within the legal framework related to the implementation of RE projects, and there were some troublesome transactions connected to concession rights.⁴³

Furthermore, in some countries, there were abrupt changes in green energy policies, meaning they would start with the feed-in tariffs (FIT) and then relatively quickly change to the feed-in premiums (FIP). Those kinds of changes resulted in numerous problems, and many companies that wanted to invest or have already invested in the CEE countries withdrew from projects or faced losses.⁴⁴ Those issues and many others are indicating what needs to be changed in many CEE countries in the RE field, both on a political and legal level, to achieve better results.

China-CEEC RE Projects: What Has Been Done Thus Far?

This research is based on the two databases formulated by Stojanović Šekarić and Zakić (2024)⁴⁵ and Zakić and Šekarić (2021).⁴⁶ The first database provides data only about Chinese RE projects. The second provides data on traditional and renewable energy projects together. Both have different sets of data but are complementary to this analysis. In this part of the paper, all RE projects in which we observed China-CEEC cooperation will be presented.

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the first project is the construction of the wind farm Ivovik, which will be realised by giving concession rights for 30 years to two Chinese companies. The deal is worth €133 million.⁴⁷ The second wind project involves CMEC as a potential partner. This company has partnered with two local firms, Tomix Kneževa and TLG Travnik, to build two wind farms (Vlašić and Galica) in the Central Bosnia Canton with a total capacity of 100 MW under a joint venture, where 90 per cent of the project would be financed by the Chinese Exim Bank and the

⁴² Aron Buzogány & Simona Davidescu, "Energy Governance in Romania", in: Michèle Knodt, Jörg Kemmerzell (eds), *Handbook of Energy Governance in Europe*, Springer, Cham, 2022, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43250-8_24.

⁴³ Dragan Maksimović, "Karbonizacija zelene energije u BiH", *Deutsche Welle*, 13. avgust 2023.

⁴⁴ Olivia Gippner & Diarmuid Torney, "Shifting policy priorities in EU-China energy relations: Implications for Chinese energy investments in Europe".

⁴⁵ Nevena Stojanović Šekarić & Katarina Zakić, "Renewable energy as a connecting spot between China and Central and Eastern European countries: status, directions and perspectives".

⁴⁶ Katarina Zakić & Nevena Šekarić, 2021. "China's energy cooperation within the 17+1".

⁴⁷ Vladimir Spasić, "CMEC considering construction of wind farms at Galica, Vlašić location", *Balkan Green Energy News*, 22 June 2023.

remainder from local sources. The project is worth €140 million, and negotiations are ongoing.⁴⁸

Chinese companies applied for several hydropower projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Dabar hydropower plant (HPP), HPPs on the Drina River (Buk Bijela, Foča, and Paunci), and four smaller HPPs (three on the Bistrica River and one on Janjina). The Dabar HPP will be built by the Chinese company China Energy Gezhouba Group, and the project is worth €222.8 million.⁴⁹ The second project is the construction of three HPPs in Buk Bijela, Foča, and Paunci on the Drina River, with China National Aero-technology International Engineering Corporation (AVIC-ENG) negotiating with the government over this investment valued at €460 million.⁵⁰ The same company is also interested in building three small-scale HPPs on the Bistrica River, worth €103 million.⁵¹ Chinese company Dongfang Electric will be involved in the construction of the solar power plant Bileća, worth \$49 million.⁵²

In the **Czech Republic**, one of the first Chinese investments in energy was made by the China-CEE Fund, which acquired Energy 21, a firm that operates a 61 MW solar power plant.⁵³ The value of this transaction remains unknown, but experts assume it was worth several hundred million dollars. In June 2021, the CEE Fund sold an undisclosed-value investment portfolio to a Vienna-based energy development company.⁵⁴

Only one energy venture involving China was realised in **Croatia**. China North Industries Cooperation (Norinco) acquired a 76 per cent stake in the Croatian company Energija Projekt for €32 million. In addition, Norinco also bought the rights to build 39 wind turbines in the city of Senj with an electricity-generating capacity of 156 MW. According to the agreement, the rights were worth €230 million.⁵⁵ The construction of wind turbines in the city of Senj and nearby Brinje municipality is finished, and the wind park is operational.

⁴⁸ Igor Todorović, „Elektroprivreda BiH dobila koncesiju za vetroelektranu Vlašić“, *Balkan Green Energy News*, 2020, 22. jun 2023; Vladimir Spasić, „CMEC considering construction of wind farms at Galica, Vlašić location“.

⁴⁹ Vladimir Spasić, „ERS dokapitalizacijom planira da pribavi 218 miliona evra za HE Dabar“, *Balkan Green Energy News*, 13. januar 2022.

⁵⁰ Vladimir Spasić, „Kineska kompanija AVIC nudi finansiranje i gradnju HE Buk Bijela i 4 MHE“, *Balkan Green Energy News*, 24. jul 2019.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Igor Todorović, „EFT hires China’s Dongfang to build its 60 MW solar power plant in BiH“, *Balkan Green Energy News*, 7 December 2021.

⁵³ CEE Equity Partners, „CHINA CEE Investment Co-operation Fund invests in Energy 21“, 2016, <http://cee-equity.com/china-cee-investment-co-operation-fund-invests-in-energy-21/>, 07/01/2024.

⁵⁴ CEE Equity Partners, „China-CEE Fund I exits Energy 21“, 2021, <http://cee-equity.com/china-cee-fund-i-exits-energy-21/>, 07/01/2024.

⁵⁵ Hina NS, „Plenković otvorio radove na vjetroparku kod Senja, Kinezi na projektu od 160 milijuna eura“, *tportal.hr*, 20. novembar 2018.

Greece and China have several very interesting projects in the energy and electricity fields, but in the RE fields, there are two that stand out. The first is the acquisition of 75% of wind farms within the Copelouzos company by China Energy Europe Renewable Energy S.A. (CEERE) (Shenhua Group), which was finalised in 2017 and was worth €1454 million.⁵⁶ This is by far the highest value achieved for any RE project in CEE countries. Due to this acquisition, the construction Chinese company is in charge of four wind farms in Greece: Organis, Grammatikaki, Megavouni, and Korfovouni. The second project for which the finances are still not fully submitted is the MINOS Concentrated Solar Power Project in Crete, for which China Energy Engineering Corporation and Zhejiang Supcon Solar Technology Co., Ltd. will be in charge. The project is worth \$320 million.⁵⁷ Because of these two projects, Greece is the number one country regarding the achieved value of RE energy projects with China.

Until now, **Hungary** and China have cooperated only in the green energy field, and all projects have been successful. The first project was the design and construction of a 40-megawatt geothermal power station in Tura, a town in Pest County, and it has been completed. The key investor, KSORKA, contracted the Chinese company Zhejiang Kaishan Compressor Co. to build the €141 million project. However, the amount of the Chinese company's investment is unknown.⁵⁸ The second project, finalised in 2021, was the construction of the Kaposvar solar power plant. This greenfield investment was made by China National Machinery Import & Export Corporation (CMC), a subsidiary of China General Technology (Group) Holding Co., Ltd. (Genertec). This facility is Hungary's largest solar power plant, worth €100 million.⁵⁹ The third energy project is interesting as it demonstrates Chinese companies' interest in acquiring investment rights in solar energy. The Chinese company ReneSola is highly active in this field; it bought the rights to build two solar power stations of 13.9 MW and 2.15 MW, respectively, but sold them later for an undisclosed price. This move was made following the company's policy to "achieve its goal of \$100 million in cash flow generation from the monetisation of projects".⁶⁰ Unisun

⁵⁶ [CGIT] China Global Investment Tracker, "The American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation", 2024, <https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>, 05/01/2024.

⁵⁷ "The American Heritage and Enterprise Institute".

⁵⁸ "Kaishan's geothermal power plant in Turawell Hungary attracts visitors from countries in Europe", Kaishan, 2018, <http://www.ouyangailian.com/en/shownews/id/4708.html>, 05/06/2023.

⁵⁹ Xin Chen & Marton Ugródsy, "China and Hungary: 70 Years of Bilateral Relations in a Changing World".

⁶⁰ "ReneSola Divests 13MW Polish Solar Projects to SUNfarming", Yahoo Finance, 2019, <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/renesola-divests-13mw-polish-solar-150903403.html>, 06/05/2023.

Energy Group started the construction of an 11.6 MW solar power plant in village Tiszaszollos in 2018.⁶¹ The plan was to install a power plant with a 50 MW capacity. However, there has been no news in relation to the new capacities since 2018. The level of investment is also unknown. Shanghai Electric Power Solar Power Plant is in charge of construction and has a commission right for the new solar power plant in north Hungary, for which the rights to build the power plant belonged to Chint Solar Hungary.⁶² The project is active, but its value is unknown.

In **Montenegro**, one project was completed successfully, i.e., the construction of a wind turbine on Mt. Možuri. The Maltese firm Enemalta plc was the main investor, but China's Shanghai Power Electronics actually did the construction work in Montenegro, which was worth €87 million.⁶³ In March 2019, Norinco submitted documentation to the Montenegrin government for the construction of a 293.6 MW HPP on the Morača River. This project consists of building eight HPPs in a cascade arrangement on the Morača, which will be financed by a concession. The negotiations have been going on for several years, and the estimated value of this project is approximately €500 million.⁶⁴

Poland has seen successful involvement by Chinese energy companies, especially in the alternative energy field. The first such transaction was the China-CEE Fund's purchase of a 16 per cent stake in Polenergia (which produces power from conventional and renewable sources) for PLN 240 million, or around \$60 million.⁶⁵ In 2021, the CEE Fund sold its stake in Polenergia to Brookfield Renewable Partners for an undisclosed value.⁶⁶ Besides this, the CEE Fund partnered with Israel-based Enlight Renewable Energy in a joint venture to buy two wind projects developed by Poland's GEO Renewables. The Polish company retained a minority stake (10 per cent) in the two ventures, while the Chinese and Israeli firms acquired the remaining 90 per cent.⁶⁷ The main target for this investment was the

⁶¹ Ivan Shumkov, "China's Unisun starts building 11.6-MW solar farm in Hungary", *Renewables Now*, 2018, <https://renewablesnow.com/news/chinas-unisun-starts-building-116-mw-solar-farm-in-hungary-632144/>, 07/01/2024.

⁶² Ivan Shumkov, "Chint sells 200-MWp PV bundle in Hungary to Shanghai Electric Power", *Renewables Now*, 2023, <https://renewablesnow.com/news/chint-sells-200-mwp-pv-bundle-in-hungary-to-shanghai-electric-power-820209/>, 12/12/2023.

⁶³ "Winds of BRI blow into green energy ambitions of Montenegro, Malta", *Xinhua Net*, 20 November 2019.

⁶⁴ „Kinezi ponudili gradnju osam hidroelektrana na Morači", *Investitor*, 12. mart 2019.

⁶⁵ "Fund invests \$77m to help create Poland's largest independent vertically-integrated energy group", *CEE Equity Partners*, 2014, <http://cee-equity.com/fund-invests-77m-to-help-create-polands-largest-independent-vertically-integrated-energy-group/>, 05/06/2023.

⁶⁶ "China-CEE Fund I exits Energy 21".

⁶⁷ "China-CEE, Israeli Enlight to invest \$406 mln in Polish wind farms", *Reuters*, 1 September 2014.

acquisition of 250 MW in wind power capacity at two wind farms, the 36 MW Wroblew and the 214 MW Project 2. In 2015, when the purchase took place, the Wroblew wind farm had already been constructed, whereas the second one was incomplete. Some sources put the value of this acquisition at \$406 million, although China Global Investment Tracker reports the transaction was worth \$200 million.⁶⁸ Moreover, very soon after the transaction was finalised, the Wroblew wind farm was sold to Ikea for PLN 200 million, equivalent to \$50 million.⁶⁹ The third project for the China-CEE Fund was a joint venture with GEO Renewables, where the Fund took on a 90 per cent stake and the Polish company retained 10 per cent.⁷⁰ Together, they bought the Zopowy wind farm, with 15 turbines rated at a total of 30 MW.⁷¹ The value of this transaction remains unknown. Additionally, the Fund acquired the Korytnica 1 wind farm in 2015, with a capacity of 3.3 MW, and continued to construct the Korytnica 2 wind farm until 2021, with a capacity of 50.4 MW.⁷² The CEE Fund sold its stakes in Zapowy and Korytnica wind farms to Spanish Iberdrola in 2021. The last Chinese energy venture in Poland was launched by the solar panel manufacturer ReneSola. In November 2018, ReneSola successfully bid for the construction rights to 26 utility projects of 1 MW each. The firm sold the rights for those projects to two companies in 2019 and 2020: 13 power plants with a total output of 13 MW were sold to SUNfarming Polska Asset, and the remaining 13 (also 13 MW) were bought by Polish Mosty Group.⁷³

Before the 16+1 framework was established, **Romania** and China cooperated mainly in the wind energy field, but due to changes in law procedures and many changes in the national government ruling parties, they stopped with those investments. Recently, there have been three solar projects in this country with the involvement of Chinese companies. First is Ratesti Solar Park, and two Chinese companies (CHINT Solar and INTEC Energy Solutions and Design) are in charge of the engineering, procurement, construction, and high-voltage grid connection. The project is worth €100 million, and the park owners are the companies Econergy Renewable Energy and Nofar Energy. Chinese company Jiangsu Zhongli, together with its partner ReneSola Energy, acquired the ownership of a small solar plant in

⁶⁸ This is the reason why the 'Value' column for this project has been left blank in the Appendix.

⁶⁹ "CEE Equity Partners", 2015, <http://cee-equity.com/category/press-releases/page/2/>, 07/01/2024.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Richard Q. Turcsanyi, "Central European attitudes towards Chinese energy investments: The cases of Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic".

⁷² "China-CEE Fund I exits Energy 21", CEE Equity Partners, 2021, <http://cee-equity.com/china-cee-fund-i-exits-energy-21/>, 07/01/2024.

⁷³ "ReneSola Divests 13MW Polish Solar Projects to SUNfarming".

Timiș for €1.86 million.⁷⁴ The last solar project is the Ucea De Sus solar farm, which Jianguo Sunshine Group bought for around €100 million.⁷⁵

In **Serbia**, oil and gas company NIS, in which Russia's Gazprom holds a controlling stake, contracted Shanghai Electric Group Company for the turnkey construction of the Pančevo combined cycle power plant, with a generating capacity of 200 MW. The project was finished in 2022, and it involved installing "two Ansaldo Energia gas turbines and one steam turbine".⁷⁶ The investment is valued at €180 million and is financed by Gazprom. The Belgrade City Council and the Power Construction Corporation of China signed a deal in January 2020 for the construction of a hot water pipeline to connect the Obrenovac TPP and the New Belgrade heating plant.⁷⁷ This €164.7 million project will probably be financed using a loan from Exim Bank.⁷⁸ The construction of the new solar park Agrosolar in Kula, which is owned by MK Group and Fintel Energija, is given to Power China Construction Solar. The value of the project is €340 million.⁷⁹

Overall, the achieved results are modest. The number of projects and participating companies is increasing, as is the type of renewable energy sources installed. Most of the investments were in solar (12), wind (9), and hydro energy (4), while other forms of RE projects appear rarely. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, and Poland had the most successful cooperation rates with China compared to other CEE countries. These countries also had the most diversified cooperation. Greece, on the other hand, had the highest value of realised projects. Both Chinese state-owned and private companies participated in RE projects, with more FDIs and acquisitions than loan arrangements. Most of the projects in renewable energy were not so expansive, and that was probably one of the reasons for their success. Another reason for success lies in having Europe's climate and energy-related interests coincide with Chinese investments. However, projects related to hydropower are still in limbo because the procedures and effects

⁷⁴ Tudor Popescu, "INTEC, China's CHINT to develop 154 MWp solar park in Romania", *Renewables Now*, 2022, <https://renewablesnow.com/news/intec-chinas-chint-to-develop-154-mwp-solar-park-in-romania-783160/07/01/2024>; Vladimir Spasić, "Chinese companies sell three solar power plants in Romania", *Balkan Green Energy News*, 8 January 2021.

⁷⁵ "AidData, A Research Lab of William&Marry, "China Development Bank provides EUR 50 million loan to Green Vision Seven SRL for 82MW Solar Power Park Project", <https://china.aiddata.org/projects/66498/05/01/2024>.

⁷⁶ "Gazprom starts building thermal power plant in Serbia", Gazprom, 2019, <https://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2019/march/article476546/>, 07/01/2024.

⁷⁷ Jelica Dojčinović, "Definitivno: Kinezi potpisali za toplovod Obrenovac – Novi Beograd", *Mondo*, 9. Jaunar 2020.

⁷⁸ "Kinezi će graditi toplodalekovod Obrenovac-Novu Beograd", *RTS*, 27. Novembar 2017.

⁷⁹ Hana Stevović, "Najveća solarna elektrana biće u Srbiji i gradiće je Kinezi", *Bloomberg Adria*, 04. Jul 2022.

of those projects are more complicated and the costs are higher, so their realisation takes more time.

Challenges and Perspectives of Future Cooperation in the RE Field

The latest climate summit in Glasgow in 2021 showed that China and the CEE countries are dedicated to a sustainable development agenda. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted many problems in the international community, and it became more evident that climate change, pollution, and unsustainable development are among the pressing issues that the global community needs to address and solve as soon as possible.

Although sustainable development goals should be universal, the means and ways of achieving them are universal for all countries. They have different economic means, natural resources, and visions of transitioning to a healthier environment. These are all legitimate reasons that should be considered while analysing the results of the transition of each CEE country towards green development and renewable energy. Moreover, those same considerations should be used for China as well.

When speaking of renewable energy cooperation in practice, there should be no conflicts of interest between the EU and China, but in reality, they exist. For example, the conflict between China and the EU regarding antidumping prices of solar power equipment started in 2012. The EU company, Prosun, went to the EU Commission to indicate that Chinese solar companies used unfair competition in formulating the prices of solar panels in the EU, which were enabled by state subsidies.⁸⁰ The EU Commission did find that Prosun's claims were founded and suggested certain measures. This issue was eventually resolved by having Chinese solar companies use the minimum prices defined by the EU when formulating their own. Chinese solar companies that invested in the EU were also more oriented towards sales than production, and that was the additional cause for friction in addition to antidumping prices.⁸¹

One of the points of dispute was also wind energy projects, this time in China. When the first European companies wanted to establish the production of wind turbines in China, they first had to undertake to have high local added value within those wind projects. That value sometimes went up to 70%⁸², so the EU companies saw that as additional pressure and unfair requirements for pursuing their production in China.

⁸⁰ Louise Curran, Ping Lv, Francesca Spigarelli, "Chinese investment in the EU renewable energy sector: Motives, synergies and policy implications".

⁸¹ Ibid., 677

⁸² Ibid., 673

On the other hand, Chinese companies faced many uncertainties while operating in the CEE countries. They had many difficulties establishing renewable energy cooperation even before the beginning of the 16+1 cooperation framework. As stated previously, they faced political pressure, corruption, and constant changes in legal regulations regarding tariffs, so many of them withdrew from the CEEC market.

Even in cases where we witnessed good RE cooperation between China and some CEE countries, political and other pressures played a significant role in the overall results. It is worth noting that Poland had excellent results in collaboration with China in green energy up until 2021, and the China-CEE Fund was especially active by investing the most. However, since the beginning of 2021, the Fund has sold its entire wind energy investment portfolio in Poland. There were no reports on the reasons for the sudden disinvestment in this field, but this cannot be an indicator of better future cooperation between China and Poland in the green energy field.

Law procedures and implementation of renewable energy projects in the Balkans are not the same or progressive as in the CEE EU countries. However, those same CEE EU countries lag behind more developed EU countries concerning green energy.⁸³ Therefore, each country has its own problems and issues to be addressed and solved according to domestic circumstances. To ensure that funds are spent and allocated properly, it is crucial to have a consistent rule of law. Additionally, it is essential to establish a precise institutional framework and adhere to it. Unfortunately, in most Balkan countries, the institutional framework dedicated to green energy is not as advanced as in EU countries, which makes it difficult to achieve comparable results.

Moreover, the Western Balkan countries have a lower level of economic development when compared to the EU. The pandemic has caused significant economic problems for these countries in particular, making it difficult for them to recover. Unlike other EU countries, they do not have access to EU recovery funds, which means that their economic recovery will take longer. Given their current circumstances, it is challenging for them to consider implementing green development initiatives.

Furthermore, the WB countries oriented their cooperation with China more towards thermal power plants than renewable energy. The reason is that they have large lignite reserves, and thanks to TPP, their energy security mix is stable. Also, they have enough energy to export due to TPP. In order to transition towards sustainable development and carbon neutrality, the WB countries must invest heavily in renewable energy, and even if they invest in

⁸³ Teresa Pakulska, "Green Energy in Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries: New Challenges on the Path to Sustainable Development", *Energies*, Vol. 14, No. 884, 2021, 1-19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3390/en14040884>.

it, they cannot reach the electricity production level they have with TPP. Additionally, they will not have a stable and on-demand energy supply as they do now.

However, at the same time, since the WB countries are the EU candidate countries, their policies and actions must be aligned to the EU standards, particularly in the RE field. The EU is devoted to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Therefore, it urges its members and candidate countries to speed up the process. Because of this, the EU imposed measures that will motivate countries to adhere to this process. For example, companies that operate in non-EU countries will start to pay special taxes regulated by the Cross-Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026, with full effect in 2030. The purpose of those taxes is to downsize the export of products that have highly intensive carbon usage in their production⁸⁴ and to prevent spill-off effects of carbon leakage from non-EU countries to the EU market.⁸⁵ As a result, the affected countries or companies will lose their competitive advantage since their products will become more expensive in the EU market. Given this situation, cooperation between the WB countries and China in the RE field becomes even more crucial for their economic development.

The Bucharest Energy Centre, established for purposes of 16+1 cooperation, has not been fully utilised thus far. The Centre should start with more ambitious work and organise more meetings, fairs, and educational workshops regarding renewable energy. It should be a starting point for all companies and governments from China and the CEEC that want to cooperate in the RE field. In addition, the CEEC should also work together to develop joint projects in renewable energy.

The CEEC should make more effort on the local level to explore possibilities for green energy projects, especially in a rural environment where there is still excessive usage of crude ore and wood for heating. They should also create concrete programmes to help local communities transition towards more sustainable development. Local provinces should be financially prepared and educated to execute green energy projects.

The cooperation in solar and wind energy has been successful, but biowaste, biofuel, and geothermal energy have not, and it is a pity this potential was not utilised. So far, China and the CEEC have not had joint projects in hydrogen energy.⁸⁶ However, recently, there was an announcement by the Serbian government that China would open a green

⁸⁴ Such as the automotive industry, production of iron and steel, chemical industry, etc.

⁸⁵ Jelena Ignjatović, Sanja Filipović & Mirjana Radovanović. "Challenges of the green transition for the recovery of the Western Balkans", *Energy, Sustainability and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-023-00421-4>.

⁸⁶ China has successful projects in green and blue hydrogen domestically and is intensively working on using this type of energy even more. Blue hydrogen is made by splitting natural

hydrogen production facility near the Bor copper mine.⁸⁷ Even though the production of hydrogen energy is still very expensive compared to other green energy sources, China and the CEEC can work together on those projects. Most countries in the world do not have enough resources to invest in the research and development of this type of energy, and they will need the help of more developed countries. China can certainly be one of them.

Renewable energy should be a top priority for cooperation between China and the CEEC due to the increasing number of uncertainties in the world. Sustainable development, climate change, and energy production are crucial topics that will gain even more attention in the future. The focus is no longer on whether we should transition to sustainable development and renewable energy but on how we can achieve it.

Conclusion

China's rapid economic development over the past 70 years is unprecedented. Whether someone admires Chinese economic success or not, its results cannot be denied. During the reform years, generations of Chinese people lived in poverty and difficult situations. Nevertheless, the perseverance and hard work of many generations resulted in unique achievements. Today, Chinese people live in better conditions than their ancestors, but the reforms are still ongoing. Yet such rapid development has its setbacks as well. The speed of growth of the Chinese manufacturing industry had its price: TPP overcapacity, air pollution, and the health of citizens. The price for achieving economic goals was high. However, it was a collective decision that it was worth paying. However, the circumstances have changed. Chinese citizens and the government have been working on sustainable development and the development of green energy for decades. China achieved tremendous domestic results in those regards. Furthermore, China invests in renewable energy worldwide through initiatives such as the BRI.

Over time, there were notable shifts in the economic cooperation between China and the CEE nations. While some countries have had successful collaborations with China, others have not. Nevertheless, China has shown a willingness to cooperate with each CEE country, which has resulted in the successful completion of numerous projects. Each country had the opportunity to propose projects they believed would be beneficial, and it was

gas into hydrogen and CO₂, and green hydrogen by splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen by electrolysis. There is no problem with storing CO₂ with green hydrogen, but with blue, there is. However, the production of blue hydrogen is less expensive.

⁸⁷ Marijana Avakumović, „Kinezi najavili ulaganje dve milijarde evra u OIE u Srbiji“, *Bloomberg Adria*, 06. Novembar 2023.

up to them to decide which sectors and projects would be priorities. Initially, numerous projects were proposed, but as time passed, it became apparent that many of them could not be realised due to various reasons. In some cases, the negotiation process was too slow, while in others, the requirements imposed by China for funding did not align with the needs of the particular country. Additionally, some projects were too expensive to be realised.

In the case of trade, results are even more evident, and the volume is significantly higher. The main concern of many CEE countries is that, although trade volume went up, they still have a large trade deficit with China. However, it was optimistic to expect that the CEE countries would have a considerably lower trade deficit with China due to the cooperation framework. What happened was that exports to and imports from China went up, meaning that this cooperation opened opportunities for many companies to make connections and work in countries with which they could not work until then.

The analysis done in this paper focused on China-CEEC cooperation on renewable energy. The research showed that out of the proposed 29 projects, 26 are finished or active, and state- and private-owned Chinese companies worked on them. Most of the projects were realised through FDIs or acquisitions, and in some cases, Chinese companies were in charge of the construction or design of the project. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Poland, and Greece had thus far the most successful cooperation, bearing in mind the number and volume of realised projects. Wind and solar energy projects are in the lead, while biofuel and geothermal projects have only one project. Among the CEE countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have been the only ones in negotiations with China regarding hydropower plants. However, many countries within the China-CEE cooperation framework did not cooperate in the renewable energy field, namely Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, North Macedonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The current geopolitical and geoeconomic situation is a constant reminder that circumstances can change rapidly. As a result, programmes aimed at transitioning towards renewable energy and sustainable development might be jeopardised, so time and resources dedicated to those issues should be used wisely. The main challenges within China-Central and East European countries' renewable energy cooperation were political and legal issues, public policies and strategies of national governments, corruption, and finances. The wind and solar energy investment projects by Chinese investors in the CEEC have yielded satisfying results. However, there is still untapped potential for cooperation in hydrogen, biowaste, geothermal, and hydropower energy. There are many ways and possibilities to improve renewable energy cooperation within the China-CEEC framework, and both sides should strive to explore and improve those relations.

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Različiti pristupi razumevanju rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba

SAŽETAK

Razumevanju goruće teme međunarodnih odnosa kakav je Rusko-ukrajinski rat, koji je započeo februara 2022, moguće je pristupiti na različite načine. Postojeći naučni fond o rusko-ukrajinskom sukobu koji je kulminirao ovim ratom omogućava da se napravi klasifikacija i kritički osvrt na pristupe njegovom razumevanju. Autor ovog rada to čini polazeći od četiri kriterijuma: „dodeljivanje krivice“ za sukob, naspram sistemskog pristupa; nivoi analize na kojima se traži za uzrocima sukoba; teorija/škola mišljenja o međunarodnim odnosima na osnovu koje se sukob analizira; istorijski naspram aistorijskom pristupu. Posebno obrazlažući i geopolitički pristup, a razlikujući Rusko-ukrajinski rat od šireg rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, te dublje uzroke od neposrednih povoda za sukob, autor iz ocene prednosti i nedostataka različitih pristupa sugerše onaj koji bi bio optimalan za razumevanje ovako značajne teme.

Ključne reči: Rusko-ukrajinski rat, rusko-ukrajinski sukob, razumevanje međunarodnih sukoba, sistemski pristup, nivoi analize, teorije međunarodnih odnosa, istorijski pristup, geopolitika.

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Different Approaches to Understanding the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

SUMMARY

Understanding a hot topic in international relations like the Russo-Ukrainian War (which broke out in February 2022) can be approached in a variety of ways. The existing scientific literature about the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that culminated in this war leaves room for a classification and critical review of the approaches to its understanding. The author of this paper does it based on the four criteria: "assigning blame" for the conflict against the systemic approach; levels of analysis at which causes of the conflict are sought; IR theory/school of thought based on which the conflict is analysed; and historical against a non-historical approach. Separately considering the geopolitical approach and differentiating between the Russo-Ukrainian War and a wider Russo-Ukrainian conflict, as well as between deeper and precipitating causes of the conflict, the author uses his assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to suggest the one that would be optimal for understanding such an important topic.

Keywords: Russo-Ukrainian War, Russo-Ukrainian conflict, understanding international conflicts, systemic approach, levels of analysis, IR theories, historical approach, geopolitics.

Uvod

Od svog početka, februara 2022, Rusko-ukrajinski rat postao je tema međunarodnih odnosa od neprikosnovenog značaja.² Razumeti uzroke njegovog izbijanja, putanju koja je vodila ka njemu, kao i njegov tok i posledice – postalo je izazov, ali i imperativ za istraživače svetske politike. Činjenica da ovaj rat u trenutku pisanja još uvek traje (zasad nepune dve godine), te da u odnosu na njega nema dovoljne vremenske distance, glavna je poteškoća pri obavljanju zadatka njegovog potpunog razumevanja, kao i osnovni razlog zašto je naučna literatura koja se tim zadatkom bavi još uvek relativno oskudna.³ Rusko-ukrajinski rat, međutim, samo je najnoviji čin eskalacije jednog dugotrajnijeg rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, čiji pokušaji razumevanja takođe traju duže i kao

² Što će ostati sve dok septembra 2023. ne bude dobio konkurenciju u vidu sukoba Izraela i Hamasa.

³ Kao najznačajniji dosad objavljeni naslov koji se sveobuhvatno bavi tekućim Rusko-ukrajinskim ratom (iako hronološki pokriva samo njegovu prvu godinu), izdvojili bismo knjigu Serhija Plohog, *Rusko-ukrajinski rat: povratak istorije*, koja se pojavila u proleće 2023. Videti: Serhii Plokyh, *The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History*, W.W. Norton and Company, 2023.

rezultat su dali i mnogo veći fond naučne literature (posebno nakon prethodne ukrajinske krize i rata 2013–2015), koristan (ali i nezaobilazan) za objašnjenje i tekućeg rata. Cilj ovog rada je da prikaže, klasifikuje i pojasni različite pristupe razumevanju rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba (shvaćenog u širem smislu nego što je to aktuelni Rusko-ukrajinski rat), te da utvrdi njihove prednosti i nedostatke kako bi se čitaocima pomoglo da se lakše snađu i pronađu svoj model poimanja ove teme, uz dve bitne napomene. Ovaj rad ne pretenduje da sačini iscrpan kritički pregled literature o rusko-ukrajinskom sukobu, već će selektivni naslovi (knjige – u kojima je ova problematika najtemeljnije i najsveobuhvatnije prikazana, a zatim i naučni članci) koje razmatra biti u funkciji reprezentativnih primera za pristupe o kojima bude bilo reči. Uz to, iako se stavlja naglasak na literaturu nastalu nakon prethodne ukrajinske krize (jer je rusko-ukrajinsko pitanje tada u punoj meri dospelo u fokus istraživača međunarodnih odnosa), u radu se uzimaju u obzir i relevantni argumenti o rusko-ukrajinskim odnosima nastali ranije.

Pristupe razumevanju rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba možemo da klasifikujemo na četiri osnovna načina. Prva podela bila bi na one koji „dodeljuju krivicu“ sukobljenim stranama – bilo jednoj od njih bilo obema – tražeći, dakle, odgovornost za sukob kod samih aktera, i na one koji uzroke sukoba traže u sistemskim činiocima izvan volje tih istih aktera. Druga podela pravi se na osnovu nivoa analize, odnosno da li se za uzrocima sukoba traga na nivou međunarodnog sistema (međunarodni – sistemski nivo), da li unutar samih sukobljenih aktera (državni/unutrašnji – jedinični nivo), ili na nivou pojedinaca – političkih lidera koji u ime tih aktera donose odluke (pojedinačni nivo). Treća podela uzima u obzir teoriju međunarodnih odnosa, odnosno školu mišljenja sa čijeg stanovišta se objašnjava sukob, a to može biti realizam, liberalizam, konstruktivizam, neki četvrti pristup, ili mešavina više njih. Četvrta podela bila bi između istorijskog i aistorijskog pristupa objašnjenju aktuelnog sukoba, odnosno da li se on nastoji razumeti dubljim proučavanjem njegove istorije, ili samo fokusiranjem na savremene uzroke i kontekst. Kao poseban ugao razumevanja rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, koji se i prepliće s navedenim podelama i stoji izvan njih, razmotrićemo geopolitički pristup. U razmatranju značajnog dela aspekata navedenih klasifikacija i pristupa, oslonićemo se na jednog od vodećih američkih teoretičara međunarodnih odnosa – Džozefa Naja (*Joseph S. Nye*), u čijem se udžbeniku *Kako razumevati međunarodne sukobe* – koji se inače već decenijama koristi na katedrama međunarodnih odnosa širom sveta – na raznovrsnim istorijskim primerima prikazuju i klasifikuju pristupi razumevanju međunarodnih sukoba.⁴

⁴ Naslov smo dali onako kako glasi u srpskom izdanju knjige, ali se za svrhe ovog rada služimo jednim od izvornih izdanja na engleskom jeziku: Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, Longman, New York, 2003 (fourth edition).

„Dodeljivanje krivice“ vs. sistemski pristup

U ratu u kome je jasno ko je koga napao, tj. koja strana je agresor, lako je upasti u iskušenje da se njoj „dodeli“ krivica za sukob i ne ide u dalje razmatranje geneze sukoba, koje bi eventualno pokazalo i neki element odgovornosti druge strane (ili treće – političkog Zapada predvođenog SAD), ili pak delovanje sistemskih činilaca na aktere. Tim pre što je među zapadnim autorima označavanje Rusije kao krivca za sukob sa Ukrajinom preovlađivalo i pre tekućeg rata. Dvojica angloameričkih istoričara ukrajinskog porekla, Serhii Plohi (*Serhii Plokhyy*) i Taras Kuzio (*Taras Kuzio*), reprezentativni su primeri antiruskog/proukrajinskog tumačenja rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba. S tim što ovaj Plohi zauzima nešto umereniju orijentaciju odbijanjem da prihvati narativ formulisan od strane osnivača savremene ukrajinske historiografije, Mihaila Hruševskog (*Mikhailo Hrushevsky*), koji ukrajinsku istoriju posmatra kao istoriju naroda koji postoji još od srednjeg veka.⁵ Ipak, kod njega je jasno da prevashodnu krivicu za savremeni sukob snosi Rusija koja, u nemogućnosti da svoj nacionalni identitet odvoji od imperijalnog i usled težnje da obnovi „izgubljeno kraljevstvo“, Ukrajinu smatra veštačkom tvorevinom i teži da je prisajedini „jedinstvenoj ruskoj naciji“ koja bi obuhvatila sve Istočne Slovene objedinjene ruskim jezikom i kulturom, dok je, s druge strane, ukrajinski nacionalni program uključiv i „od početka“ dozvoljava i druge jezike i kulture.⁶ Kuzio je u tom pogledu još kategoričniji – izvor sukoba vidi u nesposobnosti Rusije da prihvati nezavisnost Ukrajine još od trenutka njenog proglašenja, te u jačanju ruskog imperijalnog nacionalizma koji ne priznaje posebnost ukrajinske nacije, već smatra da Ukrajina treba da sledi „istočnoslovensku nacionalnu politiku“ poput Belorusije (da se transformiše u „Belorusiju 2“).⁷ Poredeći ruski i ukrajinski nacionalizam on ističe negativne karakteristike prvog, dok ih kod drugog ublažava ili pretvara u pozitivne – npr. kada kaže da Rusija želi hegemoniju nad Evroazijom, dok Ukrajina samo teži očuvanju suvereniteta, ili kada ocenjuje da Rusija negira ukrajinski jezik, dok mere protiv ruskog jezika od strane Ukrajine naziva „afirmativnom akcijom“, ili pak kad navodi da su Ukrajinci izabrali „evropske vrednosti“, za razliku od Rusa koji zapadne vrednosti smatraju dekadentnim, a sopstvene

⁵ Plohi se eksplicitno izjasnio protiv projektovanja savremenih identiteta tako daleko u prošlost. Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, Basic Books, New York, 2015, 20–21.

⁶ Ibid., 349–351; Serhii Plokhyy, *Lost Kingdom: A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin*, Penguin Books, 2017 (e-book), 11–14.

⁷ Taras Kuzio, *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality*, Routledge, London and New York, 2022, 9–10, 37–38, 45–46.

⁸ Ibid., 21–25. Kuzio ide čak do tvrdnje da je Rusima „šoviniistički kompleks“ duboko ukorenjen u identitet, dok, s druge strane, nacionalisti u Ukrajini nikada nisu protiv Rusa

superiornim itd.⁸ Ni Plohi ni Kuzio ne vide naročitu odgovornost političkog Zapada za rusko-ukrajinski sukob, kao ni Endrju Vilson (*Andrew Wilson*) koji, recimo, mnogo benignije posmatra zapadni doprinos ukrajinskoj krizi i sukobu, između ostalog suprotstavljajući „neefikasnu zapadnu meku moć“ „ruskoj lomljivoj tvrdoj moći“.⁹

Na drugom polu su pristupi autora, među njima i zapadnih, koji aboliraju Rusiju od odgovornosti, a krivicu pretežno pripisuju Zapadu i ukrajinskim nacionalistima. Među njima bismo istakli Ričarda Sakvu (*Richard Sakwa*) i Džona Miršajmera (*John J. Mearsheimer*). Sakva smatra da se ukrajinska kriza zapravo sastoji od dve međupovezane krize – ukrajinske krize, kao krize unutar same Ukrajine (*Ukrainian crisis*), i krize oko Ukrajine, kao krize šireg evropskog sistema povezane s dešavanjima u Ukrajini (*Ukraine crisis*). Za drugu je kriv Zapad, koji je u svom širenju NATO na istok i „agresivnom promovisanju demokratije“ zanemario bezbednosne interese Rusije, koja se umesto zapadne ideje „šire Evrope“, odnosno na istok proširene evroatlantske bezbednosne i političke zajednice, nakon Hladnog rata zalagala za „veliku Evropu“ od Lisabona do Vladivostoka, sa više nezavisnih centara moći.¹⁰ Za prvu su krivi ukrajinski nacionalisti koji su prigrlili „monističku“ viziju ukrajinstva, prema kojoj Ukrajina mora da bude zasnovana isključivo na ukrajinskom etnosu, unitarna, jednojezična, politički i kulturno odvojena od Rusije, za razliku od „pluralističke“ vizije ukrajinske državnosti koja Ukrajinu vidi kao dom više različitih naroda, kultura i jezika, oblikovan pod uticajem duge istorije fragmentirane državnosti i promena granica.¹¹ Miršajmer glavni uzrok ukrajinske krize vidi u ideološki motivisanom zapadnom širenju NATO i EU na istok, te promovisanju demokratije koje je zadrlo u sferu uticaja Rusije kao velike sile i isprovociralo njenu vojnu reakciju.¹²

Postoje pristupi koji ukazuju na podeljenu krivicu, odnosno odgovornost za sukob svaljuju na obe strane, kao i oni koji krivicu ne pripisuju nikome već uzroke sukoba traže u sistemskim činiocima koji

koristili „genocidni diskurs“ kakav protiv Ukrajinaca koriste „ruski evrozijci, fašisti i neonacisti“, niti je prema njemu ijedna ukrajinska nacionalistička grupa ikada negirala postojanje ruske države ili nacije. *Ibid.*, 133, 196.

⁹ Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2014, 204.

¹⁰ Richard Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*, I. B. Taurus, 2014 (e-book), 51–52.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 29–50.

¹² John J. Mearsheimer, „Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin“, *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 2014, 1–12. Za detaljnije sumiranje Miršajmerovih argumenata, videti: Pavle Nedić i Nebojša Vuković, „Plivanje protiv struje: argumenti Džona Miršajmera o odgovornosti za rat u Ukrajini“, u: *Rat u Ukrajini: ono što znamo i ono što ne znamo*, Nebojša Vuković i Mihajlo Kopanja (urs.), Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2023, 249–262.

ograničavaju slobodu aktera. Primer za prvu grupu su Semjuel Čarap (*Samuel Charap*) i Timoti Kolton (*Timothy J. Colton*), koji smatraju da u ukrajinskom sukobu niko nema „čiste ruke“, te da su konstruktivne politike i delovanje pre izuzetak nego pravilo kod svih strana. Prema njima, sukob karakteriše igra „negativne sume“ u kojoj su sve strane u gorem položaju nego pre njegovog početka, a kao proizvod igre „nulte sume“ koju prema „državama između“, u koje spada i Ukrajina, vode Rusija, SAD i EU.¹³ Andrej Cigankov (*Andrei P. Tsygankov*), koji je ranije bio naklonjeniji Rusiji, za aktuelni rat takođe iznosi ocenu o podeljenoj krivici – između Zapada, koji želi da oblikuje svet prema svojim pravilima, i Rusije, koja poseduje „istorijski ustanovljeni kompleks razmišljanja Petra Velikog“.¹⁴ Uravnoteženi pristup zauzima i Milan Subotić, koji u svojoj knjizi o „politici istorije“ podjednako kritikuje i ukrajinski i ruski nacionalizam.¹⁵ Drugu grupu – sistemske pristupe – predstavlja Pol D’Anijeri (*Paul D’Anieri*), koji eksplicitno kritikuje „dodeljivanje krivice“, smatrajući da je ono stvar subjektivnog mišljenja i vrednosti koje neko usvaja.¹⁶ Prema D’Anijeriju, rusko-ukrajinski sukob ima korene u „dubokom neslaganju kako posthladnoratovski svet treba da izgleda“, te spremnosti aktera da preuzmu povećane rizike kada bi im se učinilo da je njihova koncepcija pod pretnjom. Sukob je pokrenut trima paralelnim dinamikama: bezbednosnom dilemom između Rusije i Zapada; spojem demokratizacije i geopolitike; unutrašnjom politikom koja je na sve tri strane (ruskoj, ukrajinskoj i zapadnoj) favorizovala „čvrstorukaška“ rešenja.¹⁷ Rusija i Ukrajina sporile su se oko toga da li njihov odnos treba da se zasniva na suverenoj jednakosti ili tradicionalnoj ruskoj hegemoniji, a Rusija i Zapad oko toga treba li Rusija da bude „normalna“ država ili velika sila sa sferom uticaja i pravom veta na bezbednosne aranžmane.¹⁸ Ipak, D’Anijerijevu „neutralnost“ donekle dovodi u pitanje forsiranje teze o zapadnoj demokratizaciji kao pretnji za Rusiju (o čemu ćemo videti kasnije), te koautorstvo knjige sa Kuziom.¹⁹

¹³ Samuel Charap & Timothy J. Colton, *Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2017, 23, 27.

¹⁴ Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The Harvest of Globalism: How Russia Can Move from Confrontation to Construction”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2022, 64.

¹⁵ Videti: Milan Subotić, *Napred, u prošlost: studije o politici istorije u Poljskoj, Ukrajini i Rusiji*, Fabrika knjiga, Pešćanik, Beograd, 2019, 91–179, 193–292.

¹⁶ Paul D’Anieri, *Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, 263–264.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 10–11.

¹⁹ Videti: Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri, *The Sources of Russia’s Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order*, E-International Relations Publishing, Bristol, 2018.

Osnovni problem s pristupima koji „dodeljuju krivicu“ jeste što su najčešće posledica pristrasnosti autora (koja je npr. kod zapadnih autora ukrajinskog porekla i očekivana), te neravnopravnog tretiranja sukobljenih strana, od kojih se jedna posmatra kao moralno „dobra“, a druga kao „zla“.²⁰ Uloga agresora u tekućem ratu sama po sebi ne može da bude dovoljan argument da se krivica svali isključivo na Rusiju, pogotovo ako se uđe u razmatranje geneze šire shvaćenog rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba.²¹ Isto važi i za pristupe koji su pristrasni u korist Rusije, te stoga prednost dajemo pristupima koji ističu podeljenu odgovornost. No, podeljena odgovornost ne znači i *jednaku* odgovornost – jedna strana može da se ispostavi odgovornijom od druge, ali tek nakon nepristrasne analize, koja uzima u obzir interese svih aktera.²² Takođe, utvrđivanje odgovornosti sukobljenih strana ne kosi se sa sistemskim pristupom, tako da dilemu iznetu u naslovu ovog odeljka zapravo smatramo lažnom. Sasvim je legitimno posmatrati sukob istovremeno i kao proizvod volja aktera i činilaca nezavisnih od njihove volje. Kako se ti činoci mogu naći na različitim „nivoima analize“, to je sledeća tema koju valja razmotriti.

Pristupi prema nivoima analize

Drugu podelu pristupa razumevanju rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba izveli smo na osnovu čuvenog koncepta nivoa analize koji je razvio Kenet Volc

²⁰ Suprotan ovom bio bi pristup koji Naj naziva moralnim skepticizmom, jer izbegava da u analizi međunarodnih sukoba traži moralno ispravnu i pogrešnu stranu. Joseph S. Nye, „Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History“, 23, 28. Pomenućemo i da se svojevrsnim „ocem“ pristrasnosti prema Ukrajini među zapadnim misliocima o međunarodnoj politici može smatrati Zbignjev Bžežinski (*Zbigniew Brzezinski*), koji je u svojoj *Velikoj šahovskoj tabli* kritikovao SAD i druge zapadne države zbog „tromosti u prepoznavanju geopolitičkog značaja posebne ukrajinske države“ u prvoj polovini 90-ih godina prošlog veka, pozdravivši to što su sredinom decenije postale „snažna zaleđina kijeuskog separatnog identiteta“, dok je Rusiju pozvao da „raskine s imperijalnom prošlošću“ i „jasno i nedvosmisleno prihvati nezavisnu egzistenciju Ukrajine, njenih granica i njenog samosvojnog nacionalnog identiteta“. Zbignjev Bžežinski, „Velika šahovska tabla“, CID, Podgorica, Romanov, Banja Luka, 2002 (1997), 107, 113.

²¹ Ako bi agresija bila kriterijum, podsetili bismo na primer da su u Prvom balkanskom ratu 1912–1913. države članice Balkanskog saveza (Srbija, Bugarska, Grčka i Crna Gora) tehnički izvršile agresiju na Osmanlijsku imperiju, pa ipak niko danas ne spori da je taj rat iz njihovog ugla bio oslobodilački. Ni Rusija ne vidi svoju trenutnu vojnu akciju protiv Ukrajine kao agresorsku, već je pravda „oslobodilačkom“ misijom.

²² Za primer takve analize, koja ustanovljava podeljenu odgovornost Rusije, Ukrajine i političkog Zapada za savremeni rusko-ukrajinski sukob, da bi na kraju ocenila Rusiju, odnosno njenog predsednika Putina, kao aktera prvenstveno odgovornog za eskalaciju tog sukoba do tekućeg rata. Videti: Vladimir Trapara, *Rusija i Ukrajina: poreklo jedne tragedije*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2023, 272–275, 279, 287–288.

(Kenneth N. Waltz), prema kome se uzroci međunarodnih fenomena mogu tražiti na nivou međunarodnog sistema (*systemic level of analysis*), država kao njegovih jedinica (*unit level*) i pojedinaca koji donose političke odluke (*individual level*).²³ Pojedini autori favorizuju neki od nivoa analize, drugi ih kombinuju. Izbor nivoa analize donekle je povezan s pitanjem dodeljivanja krivice. Recimo, logično je da će oni koji „dodeljuju krivicu“ favorizovati državni i pojedinačni nivo, dok će pristalice sistemskog pristupa biti sklonije uvođenju u igru sistemskog nivoa (iako sistemskih činilaca ima i na državnom nivou). Pojedinačni nivo manje-više ističu svi koji krivicu svaljuju na Rusiju, jer apostrofiraju njenog predsednika Vladimira Putina kao lično odgovornog za sukob. Recimo, Vilson to čini na više mesta ističući kako je ka sukobu odvelo to što je Putin vremenom doživeo ideološku evoluciju i postao „žrtva sopstvene propagande“.²⁴ Pojedinačni nivo, međutim, retko ide sam – iako npr. Kuzio i Plohi takođe govore o Putinovoj evoluciji i odlukama koje su započele sukob, kod njih ipak dominira državni nivo analize. Za Kuzija je osnovni problem u tome što je Putin prigrlio „civilizacionistički nacionalizam“, koji u Rusiji zastupa znatno šira politička grupacija koju on naziva „crveno-belo-braon koalicijom“, a s kojom stavove u pogledu Ukrajine dele čak i mnogi liberali, iz čega proizilazi predviđanje da bi se neprijateljstvo prema Ukrajini nastavilo i nakon Putina.²⁵ Prema Plohom, ruskom elitom danas dominiraju naslednici slavjanofila i antizapadnjaka, dok sukob samo učvršćuje ukrajinski nacionalni identitet i težnju ka nezavisnosti.²⁶ Autori koji aboliraju Rusiju uglavnom nisu skloni pojedinačnom nivou. Sakva pomenutim razlikovanjem ukrajinske krize i krize oko Ukrajine kombinuje državni i međunarodni nivo. Od Miršajmera bi se očekivalo da kao ofanzivni neorealista favorizuje sistemski nivo, ali se navođenjem liberalne ideologije kao uzroka neadekvatne američke politike spušta na državni. Čarap i Kolton kombinuju sistemski i državni pristup, ali ukazuju i na „dinamičku interakciju“ koja se odvija na ovom drugom, odnosno među spoljnim politikama aktera.²⁷ Najskloniji sistemskom pristupu je D'Anijeri, jer navodi bezbednosnu dilemu kao ključni uzrok sukoba, ali se obilato služi i državnim nivoom (pitanje demokratizacije, unutrašnjopolitička dinamika

²³ Videti: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (with a foreword by Stephen M. Walt), Columbia University Press, New York, 2018 (1954). Konciznije obrazloženo, kod Naja: Joseph S. Nye, „Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History“, 34–36.

²⁴ Andrew Wilson, „Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West“, 3, 195.

²⁵ Konkretno predviđanje je izneto ovde: Taras Kuzio, „Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality“, 266.

²⁶ Serhii Plokhly, „The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine“, 353.

²⁷ Samuel Charap & Timothy J. Colton, *Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia*, 25.

kod aktera), dok je najskeptičniji prema pojedincu, ističući kako u njegovom pristupu lideri imaju manju slobodu nego što im druge analize pripisuju.²⁸

Usredsređivanje samo na jedan nivo analize, sleđenjem pravila parsimonije – da bi se „malim objasnilo mnogo“ – samo donekle može da bude rešenje. Za objašnjenje složenog fenomena kao što je rusko-ukrajinski sukob ipak je bolje kombinovati dva ili čak sva tri nivoa analize, tako da nije neobično što većina autora koja se bavi ovom temom to zaista i čini. Za početak je najvažnije znati za čim se traga na svakom od nivoa. Na međunarodnom/sistemskom nivou su bitna dva elementa: *struktura* – raspodela moći među jedinicama (državama) u međunarodnom sistemu, a posebno među sukobljenim stranama; i *proces* – obrasci i tipovi interakcije među jedinicama (i s njim povezano pitanje *legitimiteta* – koji su tipovi ponašanja i interakcije prihvatljivi).²⁹ Na državnom/jediničnom nivou bitni su svi unutrašnji činioци koji (zajedno sa onim s međunarodnog nivoa) oblikuju spoljne politike država, a posebno u pravcu da li se te politike mogu smatrati *status quo* (zadovoljnim postojećim stanjem), ili revizionističkim (teže izmeni postojećeg stanja).³⁰ Pri kombinovanju međunarodnog i državnog nivoa analize treba voditi računa i o njihovoj dinamičkoj interakciji, odnosno kako oni utiču jedan na drugi, ali i kako činioци sa državnog nivoa (i spoljne politike kao njihov proizvod) prisutni kod različitih sukobljenih strana utiču međusobno. Načelno, systemske činioce treba posmatrati kao one koji kreiraju uslove, odnosno omogućavaju i podstiču aktere na određeno spoljnopolitičko ponašanje, ali kakvo će ono zaista biti zavisi od odgovora aktera na te inpute, koji se oblikuje pre svega pod uticajem unutrašnjih činilaca. Tu dolazimo do pojedinačnog nivoa analize, jer su u praksi pojedinci – pre svega politički lideri – ti koji donose odluke u ime država kao kolektiviteta. Iako u načelu s rezervom uzimamo ulogu pojedinca u međunarodnoj politici, jer

²⁸ Paul D'Anieri, "Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War", 8.

²⁹ O strukturi i procesu videti kod Naja: Joseph S. Nye, "Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History", 36–37. O legitimitetu videti kod Kisindžera: Henry Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, Penguin Books, 2015 (2014), 9–10. Specifičan model sistemskog pristupa objašnjenju rusko-ukrajinskih odnosa, i to značajno pre najnovije eskalacije njihovog sukoba, ponudio je Semjuel Hantington (*Samuel P. Huntington*), kod koga su civilizacije, a ne države, osnovne jedinice svetskog sistema. U *Sukobu civilizacija* on je i Rusiju i Ukrajinu nazvao „pocepanim“ državama, u smislu njihove raspolućenosti između pripadnosti zapadnoj i posebnoj pravoslavnoj civilizaciji. No, definitivno svrstavši posthladnoratovsku Rusiju u pravoslavnu civilizaciju (nakon njenog raskida s zapadnom ideologijom komunizma), kojoj pripada i veći deo stanovništva Ukrajine, Hantington je dao, nažalost, neispunjeno predviđanje da je „ako se civilizacija računa, nasilje između Ukrajinaca i Rusa malo verovatno“, odnosno da je najverovatniji scenario opstanak ujedinjene, pocepane i s Rusijom bliske Ukrajine. Semjuel P. Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, CID, Podgorica, Romanov, Banja Luka, 2000 (1996), 155–160, 184–187 (citat na strani 186).

smatramo njegovu slobodu odlučivanja bitno ograničenom delovanjem činilaca sa druga dva nivoa, istorija nam govori da se povremeno javljaju okolnosti kada ti činioци deluju na način da ostave pojedincu mnogo veću slobodu da oblikuje događaje (Hitler i Drugi svetski rat su svakako najpoznatiji primer). Zaključno za ovaj odeljak, o tome šta će od činilaca sa kog nivoa analize biti posmatrano kao ključno, zavisi i od teorijskog okvira kome autor pripada, što je ujedno i sledeće pitanje na koje skrećemo pažnju.

Pristupi prema teoriji – školi mišljenja

Teorijska orijentacija – pripadnost autora koji se bavi rusko-ukrajinskim sukobom određenoj školi mišljenja o međunarodnim odnosima – može biti eksplicitno navedena, ali i ne mora, već se može ustanoviti metateorijskom analizom njegovih argumenata. Ova analiza je svakako neophodna jer se autori katkad izjašnjavaju kao pripadnici jedne teorijske orijentacije, a svoje argumente zasnivaju na nekoj drugoj. Miršajmer je, recimo, teoretičar koji pripada ofanzivnom (neo)realizmu, kako se i sam izjašnjava, ali smo videli da potezanjem pitanja ideologije iskače iz neorealizma, pa i realizma uopšte. D'Anijeri sebe eksplicitno proglašava za neoklasičnog realistu, spajajući bezbednosnu dilemu kao sistemski činilac koji uslovljava međunarodnu politiku, sa unutrašnjim činioциma koji utiču na to kako će države na nju odgovoriti.³¹ On, međutim, u knjizi sa Kuziom otvoreno kritikuje realizam, posebno Miršajmera, uključivanjem u igru nacionalizma kao činioца (pod Kuziovim uticajem) priklanja se konstruktivizmu, a „demokratskim“ argumentom – da je uzrok sukoba to što Putinu smeta funkcionalna demokratija u Ukrajini, kao „loš primer“ za Rusiju – približava se liberalizmu.³² Liberalni argument o izvoru sukoba u Putinovom autoritarnom režimu, koji vode „neki vrlo čudni ljudi“, polittehnolozi koji nastoje da u Ukrajinu izvezu metode manipulacije i kontrole već primenjene u Rusiji, poteže i Vilson.³³ Sakva kombinuje realističke (širenje NATO na istok na štetu bezbednosnih interesa Rusije) i konstruktivističke argumente (sukob vizija ukrajinskog nacionalnog identiteta), mada ga pomenuti Kuzio i D'Anijeri smatraju i

³⁰ Videti za početak kod Naja o umerenim i revolucionarnim ciljevima država: Joseph S. Nye, "Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History", 37-39.

³¹ Paul D'Anieri, "Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War", 8.

³² O D'Anijeri/Kuziovoj kritici realističkog pristupa ukrajinskom sukobu, koja je na Miršajmerov račun posebno zanimljiva jer ga optužuje da svaljujući krivicu za ukrajinsku krizu na Zapad zapravo odstupa od realističkog argumenta. Videti: Taras Kuzio & Paul D'Anieri, "The Sources of Russia's Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order", 8-10. O „demokratskom argumentu“, videti: Ibid., 82-83.

³³ Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West", 19-20.

„levičarem“.³⁴ Cigankov se izjašnjava kao konstruktivista (što i jeste s obzirom na favorizovanje škola spoljnopoličkog mišljenja kao glavnog činioca spoljne politike Rusije),³⁵ takvim se može smatrati i Subotić (zbog bavljenja narativima i, videćemo kasnije, „politikom istorije“), dok bi Plohi mogao da se oceni kao istoričar koji na eklektički način koristi koncepte međunarodnih odnosa, što naročito dolazi do izražaja u njegovoj najnovijoj knjizi.

Za različite međunarodne probleme u različitim kontekstima mogu da budu korisni i koncepti iz različitih škola mišljenja, te bi zato bilo štetno unapred ograničiti sebe samo na jednu, kada vidimo da čak i teoretičari koji sebe predstavljaju kao „tvrđi“ pripadnici određenih orijentacija (poput Miršajmera) itekako „pozajmljuju“ koncepte iz drugih.³⁶ Ipak, za rusko-ukrajinski sukob, kao zapravo prvi klasični međudržavni sukob većih razmera u posthladnoratovskom periodu, realizam smatramo najpodesnijim, makar kao polaznu tačku. Realizam se zasniva na nekoliko osnovnih pretpostavki o međunarodnim odnosima, koje su vidljivo na delu i u rusko-ukrajinskom sukobu: *država* je, bez konkurencije, najvažniji subjekt međunarodnih odnosa; međunarodni odnosi su *anarhični*, jer ne postoji svetska vlada koja bi bila nadređena državama; *moć* (makar bila i „mek“a) je osnovni atribut države i „jedinica mere“ njene vrednosti na međunarodnoj sceni; *interes* je ono što države primarno slede nastupajući na svetskoj sceni – mogu slediti i druge vrednosti, ali ako to ide na štetu interesa, smanjuje se šansa za uspeh njihove spoljne politike; *sukob* je redovno stanje stvari u međunarodnim odnosima (*difolt*), upravo usled anarhičnosti sistema, suprotstavljenih interesa i borbe za moć među državama, dok je za uspostavljanje saradnje neophodan planski napor (*dizajn*). Kako dublja analiza rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, međutim, podrazumeva da se razmotre i činioci poput identiteta, ideologija, narativa, političkih sistema, za šta su podesnije druge škole mišljenja, „solomonsko“ rešenje bilo bi pribegavanje pravcu pod nazivom *neoklasični realizam*. On kombinuje međunarodni i državni nivo analize, kako bi uzeo u obzir bitne nijanse razlika u spoljnim politikama država (ili jedne države u različitim periodima), te omogućio da se neki od korisnih koncepata bolje razvijenih kod drugih škola mišljenja inkorporiraju u pristup posredstvom državnog nivoa (na kome su ovi činioci i prisutni).³⁷ Naposljetku, da kažemo da

³⁴ Taras Kuzio & Paul D'Anieri, „The Sources of Russia's Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order“, 5, 18.

³⁵ Videti: Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Plimouth, 2010.

³⁶ To važi i za Naja, koji, iako lično liberal, vrlo korektno predstavlja i druge škole mišljenja i njihovu podesnost za analizu različitih međunarodnih problema. Videti: Joseph S. Nye, „Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History“, 4–8.

³⁷ O neoklasičnom realizmu videti: Gideon Rose, „Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy“, *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1998, 144–172; Vladimir Trapara,

teorije međunarodnih odnosa, čak i kada se efikasno kombinuju, nisu svemoćne, te da postoji opasnost udaljavanja od stvarnosti ukoliko se bude robovalo neophodnosti opredeljenja za neku od etabliranih teorija (ili više njih). U društvenim naukama razboritost, zdrav razum i intuicija katkad umeju da budu korisniji za razumevanje stvarnosti od teorije.³⁸

Istorijski i aistorijski pristup

Poslednja podela bila bi na osnovu istorijskog i aistorijskog pristupa. U suštini je analizi svakog međunarodnog sukoba moguće pristupiti na dva načina: razmatranjem isključivo činilaca koji na njega deluju u sadašnjosti; vraćanjem u bližu ili dalju prošlost, kako bi se analizirala i njihova geneza, ili ustanovili i neki drugi činioци koji su, iako je njihovo dejstvo u međuvremenu prestalo, oblikovali putanju sukoba u pitanju. Logično je da će istoričari, poput Plohog, Kuzija ili Subotića, primenjivati istorijski pristup, ali će njima često nedostajati dubina analize kojom se odlikuju politikolozi. Politikološke analize rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, međutim, često pate od aistorijskog pristupa, odnosno tek sporadičnog i selektivnog potezanja istorijskih činilaca, što se posebno odnosi na Sakvu i Vilsona, dok Čarap, Kolton i Miršajmer gotovo i da nemaju istorijske činioce u svojim analizama ovog sukoba. Prelazni slučaj je D'Anijeri, koji zapravo otvoreno kritikuje autore koji svoje analize počinju u 2013. godini (kada je počela prva ukrajinska kriza) i selektivno razmatraju ranije događaje, ali se i sâm u prošlost vraća samo do 1991, odnosno do raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, tako da je pitanje može li se i njegov pristup nazvati istorijskim.³⁹

Analiza rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba morala bi da bude istorijska u najpunijem mogućem smislu, te da ode unazad u prošlost sve do 9. veka i osnivanja Kijevske Rus, na čije se nasleđe danas pozivaju i Rusija i Ukrajina. Ovo zato što „jedinstvenost savremenog rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, u odnosu na verovatno bilo koji drugi slučaj gde se jedna politička jedinica odupire dominaciji druge, jeste u tome što se obe pozivaju na potpuno istu političku jedinicu kao kolevku svoje državnosti“.⁴⁰ Nije neophodno da autor bude istoričar da bi primenio istorijski pristup – bitno je da iz istorije uzme elemente koje shodno ostalim, pre svega teorijskim aspektima primenjenog pristupa, smatra relevantnim za aktuelni sukob. Takva analiza predstavlja bi svojevrstni „dijalog između teorije i istorije“,

„Neoklasični realizam – realizam za 21. vek“, *Međunarodni problemi*, God. 69, Br. 2-3, 2017, 227-246.

³⁸ Videti: Slobodan Janković, *Angloamerička obmana: da li je izučavanje međunarodnih odnosa u sukobu sa stvarnošću?*, Catena Mundi, Beograd, 2017.

³⁹ Videti: Paul D'Anieri, "Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War", 4-6.

⁴⁰ Vladimir Trapara, „Rusija i Ukrajina: poreklo jedne tragedije“, 47.

što je briljantna sintagma koju je Naj upotrebio za opis svoje knjige.⁴¹ Dva su načina na koje istorijski činioци mogu da budu relevantni: jedan je direktna relevantnost, tj. uticaj konkretnih istorijskih događaja i procesa na savremene; drugi je indirektna relevantnost, posredstvom tzv. „politike istorije“, odnosno savremenih narativa o prošlosti koji se formulišu u službi aktuelnih političkih ciljeva.⁴² Istorijski pristup podrazumeva korišćenje alata poput analogija, protivčinjeničnog rezonovanja i „levka izbora“. Analogije – upadljive sličnosti među vremenski udaljenim istorijskim događajima i procesima – se najčešće same nameću u toku proučavanja istorije, ali s njima treba biti oprezan usled razlike u kontekstu kod različitih epoha. Pri analogiji Rusko-ukrajinskog s nekim ratovima iz nešto dalje prošlosti (recimo Krimskim ili Rusko-japanskim), recimo, treba povesti računa o tome što su se oni dogodili pre 1945, kada je Poveljom UN zabranjena upotreba sile kao sredstvo rešavanja sporova i sticanja teritorija.⁴³ Protivčinjenično rezonovanje (*counterfactuals*), odnosno „šta bi bilo da je bilo“, podrazumeva misaoni eksperiment koristan za utvrđivanje uzroka sukoba jer polazi od pretpostavke da se neki događaj drugačije odigrao ili nije uopšte, pa onda razmatra kakav bi u tom slučaju bio dalji sled događaja.⁴⁴ Napokon, kako je uz utvrđivanje uzroka rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba bitno utvrditi i putanju dolaska do njegove tragične eskalacije, korisno sredstvo je i levak izbora (*funnel of choices*), odnosno opseg opcija na raspolaganju političkim odlučiocima, koji se u toku vremena može smanjivati (sužavanje levka), što povećava verovatnoću eskalacije sukoba, ili povećavati (širenje levka), što bi pružilo šansu da se izbegne eskalacija.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Joseph S. Nye, „Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History“, 11.

⁴² Milan Subotić nudi definiciju „politike istorije“ kao „zloupotrebe istorije kao sredstva za održanje ili sticanje političke vlasti, za njenu legitimizaciju, kao i za političku mobilizaciju stanovništva“, a rat u Ukrajini smatra „nastavkom ‘politike istorije’ drugim sredstvima“. Милан Суботић, „Napred, u prošlost: studije o politici istorije u Poljskoj, Ukrajini i Rusiji“, 12, 96.

⁴³ Jedno od rešenja kojima autori pribegavaju je da svoje analogije ne izvode eksplicitno, već ih nagoveštavaju „između redova“. Tako npr. Plohi u jednoj od svojih ranijih knjiga navodi epizodu o brutalnom moskovskom uništenju Novgorodske republike bez eksplicitnog izvođenja iz nje zaključka relevantnog za sadašnjost, da bi u svojoj novoj knjizi to ipak učinio, rekavši da je „nezavisna ruska država, rođena iz borbe Moskve i Novgoroda, proizašla iz pobeде autokratije nad demokratijom“. Serhii Ploky, „Lost Kingdom: A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin“, 20–22; Serhii Ploky, „The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History“, 5.

⁴⁴ Prema Naju, za uspešno protivčinjenično rezonovanje bitno je zadovoljiti četiri kriterijuma: izvodljivost (ne može se pretpostavljati nemoguće), bliskost u vremenu (što su događaji međusobno vremenski udaljeniji, veći je i opseg mogućih scenarija koji bi se odigrali u međuvremenu), odnos s teorijom i zasnovanost na činjenicama. Joseph S. Nye, „Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History“, 50–53.

⁴⁵ Videti: Ibid., 78–79.

Geopolitički pristup

Na kraju ostaje da razmotrimo i pristup koji ostaje izvan navedenih podela, jer ga u manjoj ili većoj meri koriste gotovo svi autori koji se bave rusko-ukrajinskim sukobom, nezavisno od toga na kojoj se strani u tim podelama nalaze.⁴⁶ Geopolitički pristup u najopštijem smislu podrazumeva analizu uticaja geografskih činilaca na političke fenomene, a za rusko-ukrajinski sukob je naročito značajan usled specifičnog geografskog položaja koji kroz istoriju i danas zauzima Ukrajina, a pomoću kog značajnim delom mogu da se objasne sukobi koji su se vodili i vode na njenoj teritoriji i oko nje. Već i sam naziv Ukrajina doslovno znači „granična zemlja“. Ona je ulogu granice u geopolitičkom smislu, oko koje su se vodile borbe imperija, velikih sila i organizovanih religija za sfere uticaja, igrala u najvećem delu svog postojanja (sem možda za vreme Hladnog rata, kada se Ukrajinska SSR našla duboko u pozadini „gvozdene zavese“ koja je delila istočnu i zapadnu sferu uticaja).⁴⁷ Klasik geopolitike, čija je koncepcija najpodesnija za analizu savremenog rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba, jeste Halford Makinder (*Halford J. Mackinder*). On je po završetku Prvog svetskog rata područje Istočne Evrope (spoj baltičkog i crnomorskog sliva) označio kao prečicu za ovladavanje „predelom srca“ (*Heartland*) evroazijskog kopna, a nakon toga i svetom. Sprečavanje bilo Nemačke bilo Rusije da u potpunosti ovlada područjem Istočne Evrope, prema Makinderu trebalo je da bude osnovni zadatak pomorskih sila (Velike Britanije i SAD), te je stoga predložio formiranje niza manjih država na tom području (među njima i Ukrajine, čija teritorija leži upravo u njegovom središtu), koje bi razdvojile ova dva evropska kontinentalna kolosa.⁴⁸ Ako ovu koncepciju primenimo na savremeni rusko-ukrajinski i rusko-zapadni sukob oko Ukrajine, dolazimo do toga da deo objašnjenja ovih sukoba leži u borbi Rusije i političkog Zapada oko kontrole nad Istočnom Evropom, odnosno u želji Rusije da spreči američko/zapadno ovladavanje Ukrajinom kao središnjom zemljom Istočne Evrope, koje bi poslužilo kao prečica za njenu kasniju kontrolu i same Rusije (koja se prostire preko

⁴⁶ U tome od onih koje smo pominjali prednjače Bžežinski, Hantington, Miršajmer, Plohi, Sakva, Čarap i Kolton, kao i Trapara. Bžežinski je, recimo, 90-ih godina prošlog veka Ukrajinu svrstao među „geopolitičke stožere“ – države osetljivog geografskog položaja koje mogu da utiču na ponašanje većih sila („geostrateških igrača“). Zbignjev Bžežinski, „Velika šahovska tabla“, 42, 47.

⁴⁷ Zapravo je njena teritorija poimana kao granica „civilizacije“ i „varvarstva“ još u doba antičke Grčke i Rima, dakle mnogo pre nastanka Ukrajine, Rusije, odnosno Kijevske Rus kao njihove preteče. Videti: Serhii Plokyh, „The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine“, 3–12. Za analizu Ukrajine kao granice u geopolitičkom smislu. Videti: Vladimir Trapara, „Rusija i Ukrajina: poreklo jedne tragedije“, 31–34.

⁴⁸ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Faber and Faber, 2009 (1919), 120–121, 148–166.

najvećeg dela evroazijskog „predela srca“, kao prečice ka ovladavanju čitavim svetom).⁴⁹ Naravno, koliko god da se čini logičnim i korisnim, geopolitički pristup nikako ne bi smeo da bude jedini oslonac u razumevanju rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba (što bi onda bio tzv. geografski determinizam), već ga treba uklopiti sa nekim od ostalih pristupa koje smo naveli i analizirali.

Zaključak

Shodno izvedenom razmatranju različitih pristupa rusko-ukrajinskom sukobu, možemo da sugerišemo da bi se optimalan pristup razumevanju ove goruće teme sastojao od pet elemenata. Prvo – ne bi *a priori* „dodelio krivicu“ nijednoj od strana, već bi ustanovio elemente odgovornosti kod svake od njih, razvijene u toku geneze sukoba, ali bi ostavio mogućnost da analiza pokaže da je jedna strana „odgovornija“ od druge, dok bi ujedno dozvolio „koegzistenciju“ odgovornosti samih aktera i sistemskih činilaca nezavisnih od njihove volje. Drugo – uzeo bi u obzir sva tri nivoa analize, uz dozu skepse prema pojedinačnom, što bi podrazumevalo da se adekvatno istraži da li širi kontekst omogućava pojedincu – političkom odlučiocu dovoljnu slobodu delovanja da bi se ono moglo posmatrati kao nezavisan uzrok sukoba. Treće – favorizovao bi realizam kao najpodesniju školu mišljenja za analizu pomenutog sukoba, što ni u kom slučaju ne bi isključilo i koncepte razvijene u drugim školama, a za takvu kombinaciju najbolji bi bio neoklasični realizam kao pravac. Četvrto – pristup razumevanju rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba morao bi da bude istorijski u punom smislu te reči, te da se upusti u dublje proučavanje rusko-ukrajinske istorije, sve do srednjovekovne Rus kao preteče današnjih sukobljenih država. I peto – pristup bi morao da bude i geopolitički, ali bez geografskog determinizma, već uz uklapanje klasičnih geopolitičkih koncepata (pre svega Makiderovog) u matricu drugih navedenih pristupa. Ponovićemo i da je za pravilno razumevanje nužno razlikovati aktuelni Rusko-ukrajinski rat od dugotrajnijeg rusko-ukrajinskog sukoba čiji je ovaj samo kulminacija, jer svaki od njih ima svoje uzroke, koji se ne moraju poklapati, a i ako se poklapaju mogu imati različitu „težinu“ u svakom od slučajeva. Zašto su se Rusija i Ukrajina našle u sukobu, i zašto je izbio ovaj i ovakav Rusko-ukrajinski rat su, dakle, dva odvojena (mada usko povezana) istraživačka pitanja. Za sam kraj, ukazali bismo i na to da bi pri razumevanju sukoba trebalo napraviti razliku između njegovih neposrednih povoda i dubljih uzroka, odnosno njegovih različitih faza, uključujući i aktuelni rat. Ovo je bitno kako bi se odgovorilo na pitanja

⁴⁹ Videti: Vladimir Trapara, „Savremeni značaj Makiderovog koncepta Istočne Evrope: slučaj ukrajinske krize“, *Međunarodna politika*, God. 65, Br. 1155–1156, 2014, 26–43.

poput onog je li sukob/rat bio neizbežan i – u praktičnom smislu još važnijeg – šta je potrebno da se on prevaziđe, jer je uticaj dubljih uzroka teže izbeći i otkloniti nego kada je reč o konkretnim povodima.⁵⁰

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⁵⁰ O dubljim i srednjim uzrocima, te neposrednim povodima sukoba, videti: Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, op. cit., p. 74.

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Evropska politička zajednica: između horizontalnog povezivanja i potrebe za dubljom integracijom na kontinentu

SAŽETAK

U ovom radu autori istražuju razvoj i domete Evropske političke zajednice kao nove inicijative Evropske unije. Uspostavljanje Evropske političke zajednice sagledava se u izmenjenom geopolitičkom kontekstu nastalom kao posledica invazije na Ukrajinu. Evropska unija teži da demonstrira spremnost u sposobnost da odlučujuće utiče na prilike na čitavom kontinentu, posebno u okolnostima strateškog rivalstva sa Rusijom. Međutim, dugoročniji ciljevi, pa samim time i ishodi Evropske političke zajednice nisu do kraja jasni, budući da se radi o inicijativi koja postoji tek od Praškog samita (druga polovina 2022. godine). Autori se rukovode pre svega istorijskom analizom (hronološkim pregledom razvoja Inicijative) i elementima liberalnog međuvladinog pristupa. U radu se polemiše da, ukoliko se inicijativa posmatra kao format za povremeno okupljanje državnih rukovodstava svih evropskih zemalja (koje se protive agresiji na Ukrajinu), ona se može posmatrati kao uglavnom uspešna, što pokazuje i nekoliko održanih skupova u najširem formatu. Međutim, ukoliko se ona posmatra kao nukleus nove međunarodne organizacije ili institucionalizovane platforme za saradnju u Evropi, tu se uočavaju brojni izazovi, počevši od

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toga da brojna slična tela već postoje (Savet Evrope, Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju itd.), do toga da brojni kandidati za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji imaju rezerve oko učešća u inicijativi koja, hipotetički, može da posluži i kao alternativa za punopravno članstvo. U tom smislu, razmatra se aspekt institucionalnog identiteta, tj. specifičnog polja delovanja, pa posledično i svrhe takve inicijative, imajući u vidu gorepomenute izazove.

Ključne reči: saradnja, susedstvo, Evropska unija, Rusija, inicijativa, dijalog, rat.

European Political Community: Between Horizontal Connectiveness and the Need for Deeper Integration on the Continent

SUMMARY

In this paper, the authors investigate the development and scope of the European Political Community as a new initiative of the European Union. The establishment of the European Political Community will be examined in the changed geopolitical context created by the invasion of Ukraine. The European Union aspires to demonstrate its readiness and ability to decisively influence opportunities on the entire continent, especially in circumstances of strategic rivalry with Russia. However, the longer-term goals, and therefore the outcomes of the European Political Community, are not completely clear since the initiative has only existed since the Prague Summit (second half of 2022). The authors are primarily guided by historical analysis (a chronological overview of the development of the initiative) and elements of a liberal intergovernmental approach. The paper argues that if the Initiative is viewed as a format for the occasional gathering of state leaders of all European countries (opposed to aggression against Ukraine), it can be viewed as primarily successful, as evidenced by several summits attended by many European leaders. However, if it is seen as the nucleus of a new international organisation or institutionalised platform for cooperation in Europe, there are many challenges, starting from the fact that many similar bodies already exist (the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, etc.) to the fact that numerous candidates for EU membership have reservations about participating in a format that, hypothetically, can serve as an alternative for full membership. In this sense, the aspect of institutional identity, i.e., the specific field of action, is considered and, consequently, the purpose of such an initiative, bearing in mind the above-mentioned challenges.

Keywords: cooperation, neighbourhood, European Union, Russia, Initiative, dialogue, war.

Uvod

U poslednjoj nedelji februara 2022. godine dogodilo se nezamislivo: sveobuhvatna ruska kopnena, pomorska i vazдушna invazija na Ukrajinu, koja je dovela rat do samih granica Evropske unije. Osuda je odmah usledila iz Francuske, ne samo u ime predsednika te države Emanuela Makrona (*Emmanuel Macron*), koji je u prethodnom periodu bio angažovan u dijalogu sa ruskim predsednikom Vladimirom Putinom (*Владимир Владимирович Путин*), već i u ime Unije. Naime, upravo u tom periodu, koji se u Nemačkoj vezuje za koncept *Zeitenwende* („smena epoha“),³ Francuska je imala dvostruku političku odgovornost: kao jedna od dve najuticajnije države-članice i kao zemlja koja je u tom trenutku imala šestomesečni mandat predsedavanja Savetom Evropske unije. Odgovor Evropske unije bio je obuhvatan, ekspeditivan i prilično monolitan, uprkos drugačijim očekivanjima; uvedeno je nekoliko paketa sveobuhvatnih sankcija prema Rusiji; počelo se sa isporukom vojne pomoći Ukrajini; materijalna, finansijska, humanitarna i druga pomoć je usledila, uključujući i pomoć u zbrinjavanju miliona izbeglih lica iz jedne od najnaseljenijih evropskih zemalja; takođe, primljena je i aplikacija Ukrajine za članstvo u Uniji, čemu su usledili i zahtevi Moldavije i Gruzije.⁴

Devetog maja 2022. Emanuel Makron, kao predsedavajući Savetom Evropske unije, izneo je ideju o uspostavljanju Evropske političke zajednice.⁵ To je bilo završno izlaganje na Konferenciji o budućnosti Evrope – višemesečnom konsultativnom procesu koji je imao za cilj razmatranje razvojnih ideja i smernica u Evropskoj uniji. Govor je održan na Dan Evrope – datum sećanja na pobedu nad fašizmom i godišnjica Šumanove deklaracije iz 1950, kojom je ozvaničen početak evropskih integracija. Evociranje istorijskih datuma u jeku invazije na jednu od najvećih evropskih zemalja, uz predloge za dublje (ili barem geografski „šire“) povezivanje na evropskom nivou, predstavlja širi kontekst u okviru kojeg je funkcionisanje otpočela Evropska politička zajednica kao nova inicijativa za evropsko povezivanje. Pored toga, metaforično je i to što je Evropska politička zajednica ponela ime institucije koja je predložena tačno sedamdeset godina ranije (1952), a koja nikada nije formirana zbog protivljenja zapadnoevropskih država.⁶

³ Za obrt u nemačkoj spoljnoj politici konsultovati: Marina Kostić Šulejić, „Zeitenwende and the German National Security Policy: Analysis of the First National Security Strategy“, *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1188, 2023, 79-105, DOI: 10.18485/iipe_ria.2023.74.1188.4.

⁴ Miloš Petrović, Maja Kovačević & Ivana Radić Milosavljević, *Srbija i Evropska unija dve decenije nakon Solunskog samita*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2023.

⁵ „European Political Community: a forum to promote dialogue and cooperation“, Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, <https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/european-political-community-granada-summit/>, 24/11/2023.

⁶ Doduše, osim imena, sličnosti tu uglavnom prestaju, budući da je Evropska politička zajednica trebalo da bude kruna institucionalnog razvoja evropskog zajedništva, sa

U ovom radu autori analiziraju razvojne domete, mogućnosti i perspektive Evropske političke zajednice. U radu se postavlja hipoteza da Evropska politička zajednica ima ambivalentne ishode: s jedne strane, ona doprinosi osećaju kohezije i evropskog jedinstva u svetlu geopolitičke krize, dok, s druge strane, njeni dalji razvojni dometi nisu do kraja jasni, što izaziva nedoumice među pojedinim zemljama – posebno onima koje se nadaju članstvu u Evropskoj uniji. Struktura rada sastoji se od hronološkog pregleda inicijative Evropske političke zajednice, teorijsko-konceptualnog okvira, analize odnosa sa drugim međunarodnim organizacijama i inicijativama, kao i zaključnog dela.

Hronologija razvoja Evropske političke zajednice

U nedeljama nakon Dana Evrope 2022. godine ubrzale su se aktivnosti u pravcu skiciranja Evropske političke zajednice. Već 19. maja, na sednici Ekonomskog i socijalnog komiteta – konsultativnog tela koje zastupa različite privredne i društvene grupacije – Šarl Mišel (*Charles Michel*), predsednik Evropskog saveta, pružio je podršku uspostavljanju inicijative pod imenom Evropska geopolitička zajednica (EGZ), kao odgovor na „očekivanja suseda koji žele nove odnose“ sa Unijom, a koja bi se „prostirala od Rejkjavika do Bakua ili Jerevana, te od Osla do Ankare“, uz napomenu da inicijativa „ni na koji način nema nameru da zameni članstvo, niti da omogući nove izgovore za odlaganja“, kao što ni „ne pruža garanciju učesnicima da će jednog dana biti članice Evropske unije“.⁷ Među ciljeve EGZ ubrajaju se podsticanje konvergencije (približavanja) i produblivanje operativne saradnje, te promovisanje mira, stabilnosti i sigurnosti (naročito za Zapadni Balkan i Istočno partnerstvo), a posebno u domenu spoljne politike; državna rukovodstva bi se sastajala barem dvaput godišnje; ministri spoljnih poslova bi redovno učestvovali u sastancima Saveta za spoljne poslove Evropske unije (premda njihova uloga na tim sastancima nije definisana – da li je samo posmatračka ili nešto više, prim. aut.), uz slične mogućnosti učešća i u drugim telima.⁸

dokumentom koji se naziva i prvim evropskim ustavom. Према: Richard T. Griffiths, "Europe's First Constitution: The European Political Community, 1952-1954", in: Stephen Martin (ed), *The Construction of Europe*, Springer, Dordrecht, 1994, 19-39, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8368-8_2. За радни документ тог акта видети: "Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community", Ad hoc assembly instructed to work out a draft treaty setting up a European Political Community, Secretariat of the Constitutional Committee, Paris, October 1952-April 1953.

⁷ "Speech by President Charles Michel at the plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee", European Council, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/18/discours-du-president-charles-michel-lors-de-la-session-pleniere-du-comite-economique-et-social-europeen/>, 26/11/2023.

⁸ Ibid.

Tokom junskog zasedanja Evropskog saveta iste godine usvojeni su zaključci koji su se, između ostalog, ticali i uspostavljanja Evropske političke zajednice. U zaključcima od 23. i 24. juna 2022. izložen je koncept Evropske političke zajednice koji se oslanja na prethodno navedene ideje; kao cilj se navodi stvaranje platforme za političku koordinaciju svih evropskih zemalja s kojima Unija ima bliske odnose, radi podsticanja političkog dijaloga i saradnje u pitanjima od zajedničkog interesa (jačanje bezbednosti, stabilnosti i prosperiteta); dalje se navodi da tako postavljen okvir nema nameru da zameni postojeće politike i instrumente Evropske unije, a posebno ne segment proširenja.⁹ U tom pogledu, ideja o Evropskoj političkoj zajednici podudarna je sa Mišelovim predlogom o Evropskoj geopolitičkoj zajednici – glavna razlika ogleđa se u imenu, premda je i u slučaju političke zajednice argumentacija obojena geopolitičkim razmatranjima. U istim zaključcima Evropskog saveta podvlači se istorijska odluka za istočne susede u vidu zvaničnog prepoznavanja perspektive prijema Ukrajine, Moldavije i Gruzije, dok se za prve dve države ujedno dodeljuje i status kandidata za članstvo u EU.¹⁰ Što se Zapadnog Balkana tiče, najveća vrednost zaključaka francuskog predsedavanja Svetom ogleđa se u tački br. 15, gde se izražava „puna i nedvosmislena podrška perspektivi članstva“, pozivajući na ubrzanje pristupnog procesa (premda je samo Bosna i Hercegovina dobila preliminarnu preporuku za sticanje statusa kandidata za članstvo, čak šest godina nakon podnetog zahteva).¹¹ Premda se ne može meriti sa ekspeditivnom obradom zahteva istočnih suseda, ova formulacija je značajna imajući u vidu terminologiju prethodnih akata Evropske unije u kojima je spomen pristupanja bio izbegavan. Petrović i Kovačević tako primećuju da u Deklaraciji iz Brda (2021) ključni pojmovi poput „članstva“ i „pristupanja“ nisu spomenuti ni jedan jedini put, te i da je u deklaracijama i aktima koji su prethodili radije upotrebljavan širi i višesmisleni termin „evropska perspektiva“, koji se odnosio i na istočno susedstvo.¹²

Uprkos napomenama donosioca odluka da EPZ i politika proširenja Evropske unije nisu međusobno isključive, već se pre mogu smatrati komplementarnim, indikativno je da su zaključcima francuskog predsedavanja Svetom Unije iz 2022. oba ta domena istovremeno apostrofirana kao deo rešenja za postizanje veće bezbednosti i saradnje na kontinentu. Intenziviranje saradnje sa Evropskom unijom, kroz jedan ili oba

⁹ “EUCO 24/22”, European Council, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf>, 26/11/2023.

¹⁰ Ibid., 1–4.

¹¹ Ibid., 4–5.

¹² Miloš Petrović & Maja Kovačević, “EU Enlargement Policy Meets Eastern Partnership: A Cause for Concern?”, in: SEE | EU Cluster of Excellence in European and International Law (ed.), *South Eastern Europe and the European Union – Legal Developments*, Verlag Alma Mater, Saarbrücken, 2023, 66, DOI: 10.1093/0198297572.003.00.

mehanizma, imponuje Uniji kao regionalnoj i normativnoj sili, ali nije izvesno u kojoj meri odgovara zemljama koje duže od dvadeset godina sprovode reformske procese sa željom da postanu punopravni deo Unije. U daljim segmentima ovog poglavlja biće analizirani ishodi do sada održanih međunarodnih skupova u okviru inicijative Evropske političke zajednice.

Samit u Pragu

Prvi sastanak Evropske političke zajednice usledio je u Pragu u oktobru 2022. godine. Na poziv EU (i Češke kao predsedavajuće Savetom) sastanku su prisustvovali lideri više od 40 evropskih država, sa izuzetkom Rusije i Belorusije, zbog njihove uloge u invaziji na Ukrajinu. U tom pogledu, EPZ se može posmatrati kao demonstracija izolovanosti Rusije (i Belorusije) u odnosu na matični kontinent. Lista zemalja koje su prisustvovala osnivačkom samitu Evropske političke zajednice gotovo potpuno odgovara članstvu u Savetu Evrope. Mark Pierini (*Marc Pierini*) navodi kako je okupljanje praktično svih evropskih lidera (koji se protive invaziji na Ukrajinu, prim. aut.) samo po sebi nesporan uspeh, premda polemise i da li su „realpolitika i diplomatija okupljanja“ prevagnule u odnosu na evropske vrednosti i principe, s obzirom na učešće Turske i drugih zemalja u kojima se beleži demokratsko nazadovanje.¹³ U napomenama uoči sastanka, predsednik Evropskog saveta naveo je da je poziv dobilo 44 evropska lidera, koji „dele isti kontinent i suočavaju se sa istim izazovima oko stabilnosti, bezbednosti, energije, kao i migracija i mobilnosti“.¹⁴ U tom smislu, samit je preneo jaku simboličku poruku evropskih lidera koji se protive ratu i narušavanju suvereniteta Ukrajine. Pored predstavnika gotovo svih evropskih zemalja, sastanku su prisustvovali i najviši zvaničnici Unije – Ursula fon der Lajen (*Ursula von der Leyen*), predsednica Evropske komisije; Šarl Mišel, predsednik Evropskog saveta i Žozep Borelj (*Josep Borrell*), visoki predstavnik Evropske unije za spoljnu politiku i bezbednost. Imajući u vidu navedeno, u pogledu odziva i učešća, skup se može smatrati vrlo uspešnim.

Praški samit EPZ nije za rezultat imao usvajanje zajedničke deklaracije, niti drugih pisanih dokumenata – to nije bila ni namera.¹⁵ Primarna svrha skupa bila je da više desetina lidera pošalje zajedničku poruku o zalaganju

¹³ Marc Pierini, “Five Takeaways From the European Political Community Summit”, Carnegie Europe, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/88189>, 26/11/2023.

¹⁴ “Remarks by President Charles Michel ahead of the first European Political Community Meeting”, European Council, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/06/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-ahead-of-the-first-european-political-community-meeting/>, 26/11/2023.

¹⁵ Charles Michel, Invitation to the EPC and the informal European Council”, European Council <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/59328/invitation-to-the-epc-and-the-informal-european-council.pdf>, 26/11/2023.

za mir, uz nagoveštavanje mogućnosti koordinisanja stavova o različitim evropskim pitanjima, uz bilateralne i multilateralne susrete s kolegama iz drugih zemalja. U tom pogledu, platforma je poslužila dijalogu između lidera zemalja koje nemaju diplomatske odnose (susret Redžepa Tajipa Erdogana (*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*), predsednika Turske, sa Nikolom Pašinjanom (*Նիկոլ Վրթեսյանի Փաշինյան*), premijerom Jermenije, kao i susret potonjeg lidera sa Ilhamom Alijevom (*İlham Heydər oğlu Əliyev*), predsednikom Azerbejdžana).¹⁶ Isticanje političkog dijaloga kao važnog mehanizma panevropske saradnje u okolnostima rata velikog opsega na istoku kontinenta nije zanemarljiva stavka. Dodatno, horizontalni karakter inicijative omogućio je komunikaciju između evropskih lidera na jednakim osnovama.

Međutim, osim trenutnog doprinosa deeskalaciji na Kavkazu kroz politički dijalog i slanja privremene civilne misije EU na jermensko-azerbejdžansku granicu, nažalost, nije bilo trajnih vidljivih ishoda.¹⁷ Naime, samit EPZ u Granadi godinu dana kasnije protekao je u znaku humanitarne zabrinutosti u svetlu azerbejdžanske intervencije u Gorskom Karabahu (Nagorno-Karabakh), koja je ishodovala padom te enklave pod punu vlast Bakua, te masovnim migracijama gotovo celokupnog lokalnog jermenskog stanovništva.¹⁸ Taj je konflikt pokazao suprotno od onoga što je EPZ želela da pokaže, a to je da se vojno-oružanim putem ne mogu menjati prilike u Evropi. Da stvar bude gora, na dinamiku događaja na najdaljoj jugoistočnoj periferiji kontinenta znatno su uticali akteri koji su ili konkurenti (poput Rusije, donekle i Iran), ili nedovoljno pouzdani partneri (Turska).¹⁹

Tokom Praškog samita najavljeno je da će sledeći skupovi tog formata biti održani u Moldaviji (u prvom delu 2023. godine) i Španiji (kao predsedavajućoj Savetom Evropske unije u drugom delu 2023. godine). Radi se o političkom simbolizmu karakterističnom za prikazivanje meke moći Evropske unije. Prvi samit EPZ održan je tokom predsedavanja Savetom Češke – jedne od ekonomski najnaprednijih srednjoevropskih država i nekadašnje članice KOMENKON-a, koja je bila podvrgnuta invaziji 1968.

¹⁶ Alexandra Brzozowski, "Prague talks raise hopes for Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process", *Euractiv*, October 7, 2022.

¹⁷ "Statement following quadrilateral meeting between President Aliyev, Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel, 6 October 2022", European Council, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/statement-following-quadrilateral-meeting-between-president-aliyev-prime-minister-pashinyan-president-macron-and-president-michel-6-october-2022/>, 27/11/2023.

¹⁸ Luigi Scazzieri, "Can the European Political Community survive?", Centre for European Reform, <https://www.cer.eu/insights/can-european-political-community-survive>, 27/11/2023.

¹⁹ Za ulogu Turske u dinamici spora konsultovati: Ana Jović-Lazić, "The role of Turkey in the second Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as a reflection of continuity and change in its foreign policy", *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2022, 29-49, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2201029J>.

zbog ideoloških neslaganja sa Moskvom i koja važi za zagovarača produbljivanja veza sa Ukrajinom. Moldavija je članica Istočnog partnerstva, najbliži sused Ukrajine, zemlja koja je prepoznata kao buduća članica, kandidat za članstvo u Uniji i država koja je pružila utočište za najviše ukrajinskih izbeglica spram svoje veličine; takođe, ta zemlja se zbog teritorijalnog spora u Pridnjestrovlju smatra veoma izloženom u slučaju proširivanja sukoba izvan Ukrajine.²⁰ Španija je automatski odabrana kao predsedavajuća Savetom Evropske unije u drugoj polovini 2023. godine.

Samit u Kišinjevu

Drugi samit EPZ održan je 1. juna 2023. godine u dvorcu Mimi nadomak Kišinjeva, glavnog grada Moldavije. Prisustvovalo je 45 evropskih lidera, među kojima su bili i čelnici EU, kao i predsednik Ukrajine Volodimir Zelenski (*Володимир Олександрович Зеленський*). Glavne teme sastanka su bile mir i bezbednost, energetska otpornost, te povezanost i pokretljivost u Evropi,²¹ ali se nametnula i tema proširenja EU koje je godinama u krizi.²² Samit u Kišinjevu je prvi sastanak ovog formata u državi-nečlanici Unije, čime je poslata poruka njihove uključenosti u glavne evropske političke tokove. Predsednica Moldavije Maja Sandu (*Maia Sandu*) istakla je da Evropska politička zajednica „omogućava malim i velikim zemljama, kako unutar tako i van Evropske unije, jednak glas tokom diskusija“.²³ Visoki predstavnik Evropske unije za spoljnu politiku i bezbednost Žozep Borelj optimistično je izjavio da je „po uzoru na Kipar – pristupanje moguće čak i bez reintegracije Pridnjestrovlja“.²⁴

²⁰ Violeta Wagner, „Temporary protection for Ukrainians in Moldova: Achievements and challenges“, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, <https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2023/temporary-protection-for-ukrainians-in-moldova-achievements-and-challenges>, 27/11/2023.

²¹ „Meeting of the European Political Community, 1 June 2023“, European Council, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2023/06/01/28/11/2023>.

²² Slobodan Samardžić, „Evropska unija između krize i dezintegracije“, *Pravo i društvo*, Br. 1, 2012, 9–26. Kriza u politici proširenja se manifestuje kako na strani EU tako i kod kandidata za članstvo, koji obiluju izazovima – od problema slabe državnosti, manjkave demokratske tradicije, nedovoljno autonomnih i efikasnih institucija, preko problema sa korupcijom i organizovanim kriminalom, do podeljenih društava, etničkih i teritorijalnih sporova. Videti: Maja Kovačević, „Politika proširenja Evropske unije u potrazi za reformom“, *Politička revija*, Vol. 64, Br. 2, 2020, 137, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.6422020.6>.

²³ „About the Summit“, EPC, <https://www.epcsummit2023.md/>, 26/11/2023.

²⁴ Jakub Pieńkowski & Tomasz Żornaczuk, „Moldova Hosts 2nd European Political Community Summit“, PISM – Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, <https://pism.pl/publications/moldova-hosts-2nd-european-political-community-summit>, 27/11/2023.

Istorija Moldavije od sticanja nezavisnosti 1991. godine do danas obeležena je, kao u slučaju Ukrajine, sučeljavanjem (pro)evropskih i (pro)ruskih stavova i interesa. Predsednica Moldavije je ranije te godine optužila Rusiju da planira da, posredstvom stranih sabotera, izvrši državni udar u Moldaviji i postavi lojalnu vladu kako bi osujetila evropski put Moldavije.²⁵ O tome da je Moldavija poprište geopolitičkog nadmetanja Rusije i EU govori i energetska kriza koja traje u ovoj zemlji od početka rata, kao i pokušaj obeju strana (ruske i evropske) da utiču na nerešeni status Pridnjestrovlja.²⁶ Usled hibridnih pretnji po bezbednost Moldavije, EU je odlučila da pošalje civilnu misiju u okviru Zajedničke bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, što je potvrđeno na Kišinjevskom samitu.

Ni na drugom samitu EPZ nije usvojena zajednička deklaracija ili izjava evropskih lidera. Bezbednosna pitanja bila su prioritetna tema, naročito zbog prisustva ukrajinskog predsednika. Kada je u pitanju Ukrajina, Zelenski nije postavio pitanja samo o evropskoj perspektivi Ukrajine i pomoći u ratu, već se založio i za „snažan signal NATO-a na predstojećem samitu Alijanse u Viljnusu 11. jula 2023, kako u vezi sa pristupanjem Ukrajine tako i u vezi sa bezbednosnim garancijama na putu ka članstvu“.²⁷ U tom pogledu, vidljivo je dodatno preklapanje između EPZ i evroatlantskih inicijativa, kao posledica aktuelne geostrateške krize. U sklopu samita održan je poseban sastanak povodom situacije u Gorskom Karabahu, kom su prisustvovali predsednik Evropskog saveta, predsednik Azerbejdžana, predsednik vlade Jermenije, kancelar Nemačke Olaf Šolc (*Olaf Scholz*) i predsednik Francuske. U izjavi nakon sastanka, Mišel je rekao da su imali dobar sastanak o „povezanosti, bezbednosti i pravima, razgraničenju, (i) mirovnom ugovoru“,²⁸ ali vidljive posledice su izostale usled azerbejdžanskog zauzimanja teritorije i egzodusa jermenskog stanovništva iz Gorskog Karabaha nekoliko meseci kasnije.

Tokom ovog samita posebna pažnja posvećena je i iznenadnoj krizi na Kosovu i Metohiji. Zbog separatizma u oblasti Pridnjestrovlja, Moldavija nije priznala jednostrano proglašenu nezavisnost tzv. „Kosova“. Posledično, predstavnici prištinskih institucija nisu mogli da uđu u Moldaviju zbog

²⁵ „Predsednica Moldavije objavila ‘ruski plan’ za rušenje vlasti, pominje i državljane Srbije i Crne Gore“, *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, 13. februar 2023.

²⁶ Evropska unija je pojačano angažovana u Moldaviji kroz misiju EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) još od prve decenije ovog veka. Videti: Daria Isachenko, „The EU border mission at work around Transdnistria: a win-win case?“, *Sociétés politiques comparées*, No. 21, 2010, 2–3.

²⁷ „Outcome of the European Political Community meeting in Bulboaca, Moldova, on 1 June 2023“, European Parliament, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747431/EPRS_BRI\(2023\)747431_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747431/EPRS_BRI(2023)747431_EN.pdf), 1, 27/11/2023.

²⁸ „Remarks by President Charles Michel after his meeting with the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France and Germany“, European Council, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-after-his-meeting-with-the-leaders-of-armenia-azerbaijan-france-and-germany/>, 27/11/2023.

nepriznavanja njihovih putnih isprava. Zato je, neposredno pred održavanje samita, izmenjen zakon kako bi se ta dokumenta priznala.²⁹ Usled krize u tom području, francuski predsednik i nemački kancelar su organizovali sastanak između Aleksandra Vučića (*Александра Вучића*) i Vjose Osmani (*Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu*), predloživši im plan deeskalacije sukoba koji je podrazumevao održavanje izbora na severu Kosova i Metohije na kom bi učestvovalo srpsko stanovništvo. Međutim, nije došlo do dogovora tokom Kišinjevskog samita.³⁰ U tom pogledu, demonstrirana su ograničenja u pogledu doprinosa EPZ rešavanju sporova u perifernim regionima Evrope, premda određeni doprinos trenutnoj deeskalaciji kroz organizovanje dijaloga verovatno postoji.

Prethodno je najavljeno prisustvo 47 evropskih lidera, ali su predsednik Turske, Redžep Tajip Erdogan, i državni sekretar za spoljnu politiku San Marina, Luka Bečari (*Luca Beccari*), otkazali prisustvo. Neobrazloženi izostanak turskog predsednika je indikativan ako se ima u vidu specifična pozicija Turske prema ratu u Ukrajini, kao i u kontekstu karabaškog sukoba, te s obzirom na samu viziju EPZ kao foruma za dijalog i sa bezbednosnim akterima i partnerima van Evropske unije.³¹

Samit u Granadi

Petog oktobra 2023. godine održan je naredni, treći samit EPZ u Granadi. I ovom skupu prisustvovalo je pedesetak evropskih lidera, uključujući ukrajinskog predsednika, kao i rukovodiocice institucija Unije – predsednicu Evropske komisije, predsednika Evropskog saveta i predsednicu Evropskog parlamenta Robertu Metsolu (*Roberta Metsola*).³² Fokus je bio na domenima digitalizacije, energije, klimatske politike, rata u Ukrajini i multilateralizma.³³ Kao što je prethodno spomenuto, samit je protekao u znaku razmatranja posledica azerbejdžanske intervencije u Gorskom Karabahu i posledica u kontekstu regionalne i evropske stabilnosti. Predsednik Turske ponovo je

²⁹ Jakub Pieńkowski & Tomasz Żornaczuk, "Moldova Hosts 2nd European Political Community Summit".

³⁰ Andrew Gray & John Irish, "Kosovo, Serbia presidents meet under EU pressure to defuse crisis", *Reuters*, June 1, 2023.

³¹ Vessela Tcherneva, "The future of the European Political Community", European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/article/the-future-of-the-european-political-community/>, 28/11/2023.

³² "Meeting of the European Political Community", Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, <https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/events/meeting-of-the-european-political-community/>, 26/11/2023.

³³ "The European Political Community and EU leaders discuss the EU's future strategy in Granada", Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, <https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/highlights-agenda-european-political-community-euco-informal-meeting-heads-state-government-granada/>, 26/11/2023.

izostao sa samita, što je ilustrativno za višegodišnje narušene veze između Ankare i Brisela, od kad se beleži ubrzano demokratsko nazadovanje te zemlje. I predsednik Azerbejdžana izostao je sa skupa. Pored toga, neformalni dijalog između Beograda i Prištine nije realizovan zbog odbijanja potonje da u njemu učestvuje.³⁴ Time su ponovljeni neuspesi drugog samita, verovatno čak i u većoj meri, s obzirom na to da do sastanka dve strane čak nije ni došlo. Na sastanku je bilo reči i o podršci otvaranju pristupnih pregovora za Ukrajinu (kao i evropskom putu Moldavije i Gruzije). Time je nastavljeno preklapanje između EPZ i politike proširenja Evropske unije, iako dva domena nisu ni u kakvoj organskoj vezi, osim u krajnje posrednom smislu.

Autori poput Luiđija Skacierija (*Luigi Scazzieri*) napominju da su rezultati samita, iako nije sve potpuno „crno“, bili razočaravajući, imajući u vidu nemogućnost da se odlučujuće utiče na (tada) aktuelni spor u Gorskom Karabahu, kao i na dijalog između Beograda i Prištine, zatim izostanak nekoliko evropskih lidera (uključujući i Erdogana kao važnog strateškog partnera Unije), kao i spor između aktuelnog i predstojećeg domaćina skupa – Španije i Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva – oko uvrštavanja migracija u agendu, što je rezultovalo i formalnim otkazivanjem konferencije za novinare.³⁵

U međuvremenu je bilo i predloga za stvaranje institucionalne strukture Zajednice, koji, međutim, nije imao podršku učesnika.³⁶ U okolnostima kada to ostaje forum međuvladinog karaktera, težište odluka i ishoda prenosi se direktno na same učesnike (i inicijatore/organizatore). Takvi okviri pružaju priliku za direktnu komunikaciju i razmenu stavova između lidera, kao i za pojačano usklađivanje, što zapravo predstavlja njenu najveću vrednost. Međutim, imajući u vidu da se radi o platformi koja okuplja pedesetak zemalja, čak i definisanje minimalnog zajedničkog interesa predstavlja izazov, a posebno za one zemlje koje se nalaze na istočnim rubovima Zajednice, poput npr. Turske, Azerbejdžana, pa i Jermenije. Kako navodi Kamij Grand (*Camille Grand*) u svom tekstu „nema procedura – nema problema...“, EEPZ nije grupa istomišljenika i ne treba je tako ni tretirati, već činiti suprotno: iskoristiti najviše od njene fleksibilnosti, neformalnosti i širokog obuhvata, npr. u pravcu stvaranja spontanih koalicija po različitim (bezbednosnim i drugim) pitanjima.³⁷ Drugim rečima, osim zalaganja za mir i stabilnost kao univerzalnim principima, treba imati ograničena očekivanja

³⁴ Sarah Anne Aarup, Clea Caulcutt & Nicholas Vinocur, “Sanction Serbia’s Vučić or I won’t meet him, Kosovo’s president says”, *Politico*, October 5, 2023.

³⁵ Luigi Scazzieri, “Can the European Political Community survive?”.

³⁶ Vessela Tcherneva, “The future of the European Political Community”.

³⁷ Camille Grand, “No procedures, no problem: The European Political Community as a platform for security dialogue”, European Council on Foreign Relations, <https://ecfr.eu/article/no-procedures-no-problem-the-european-political-community-as-a-platform-for-security-dialogue/>, 26/11/2023.

od Evropske političke zajednice kao platforme za prenos normativnog uticaja EU, osim u slučaju zemalja koje nameravaju da prodube veze sa Briselom.

Teorijsko-konceptualna razmatranja

Za razumevanje spoljnog delovanja Evropske unije i konteksta evropskih integracija u kontekstu ovog rada, u značajnoj meri može poslužiti liberalni međuvladin pristup. Prema Endruu Moravčiku (*Andrew Moravcsik*) i Kasandri Emons (*Cassandra Emmons*), „liberalni međuvladin pristup predstavlja prepoznati osnovni teorijski okvir za analiziranje evropskih integracija“, čije se delovanje može pratiti kroz tri faze: (1) definisanje preferencija nacionalnih vlada u skladu sa zahtevima državnih i društvenih aktera za (bližom) međunarodnom/prekograničnom saradnjom; (2) pregovaranje predstavnika država oko zahteva kako bi se postavila bolja koordinacija politika; (3) stvaranje formalne ili neformalne institucije na međunarodnom (evropskom) nivou, i/ili domaće zamenske ustanove u cilju prevazilaženja izazova u željenom pravcu.³⁸ Dalje (a važno u kontekstu Evropske političke zajednice, prim. aut.) navodi se da saradnja ne podrazumeva nužno centralizaciju, te da su institucionalni nivoi i kompetencije neujednačeni budući da održavaju i raznolikost percepcija zajedničkog interesa, kao i nivoa nesaglasnosti u određenim poljima.³⁹ Dakle, odluke u domenu spoljne politike mogu se posmatrati kao odraz najmanjih zajedničkih interesa država-članica. Od 2022. godine naovamo, invazija na Ukrajinu ishodovala je dubokom geopolitičkom krizom koja je uticala na značajnu izmenu stavova unutar Unije o potrebi da se (što pre je to izvodljivo) osnaže veze sa susednim geografskim regionima. To je očigledno kroz dva domena: politiku proširenja (koja je podvrgnuta velikim izmenama, od prepoznavanja perspektive članstva za tri postsovjetske zemlje, do podsticanja jače dinamike za „stare“ zapadnobalkanske kandidate), kao i Evropsku političku zajednicu, kao forum za saradnju s tim, kao i preostalim evropskim zemljama.

Moravčik i Šimelfenig (*Frank Schimmelfennig*) smatraju da je liberalni međuvladin pristup „ključan u studijama regionalne integracije“, te da na najosnovnijem nivou počiva na pretpostavci da države predstavljaju suštinski važne aktere u međunarodnoj politici, koji delaju usmereno, i barem donekle racionalno.⁴⁰ Ovi autori navode da države biraju da

³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik & Cassandra Emmons, „Liberal Intergovernmentalism and EU External Action“, in: Sieglinde Gstöhl & Simon Schunz (eds.), *The External Action of the European Union: Concepts, Approaches, Theories*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 193.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Andrew Moravcsik & Frank Schimmelfennig, „Liberal Intergovernmentalism“, in: Antje Wiener, Tanja Boerzel & Thomas Risse (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 64–65.

produbljuju međunarodnu saradnju kako bi usmerile spoljne uticaje, odnosno umanjile one nepovoljne; da su preferencije država u kontekstu evropskih integracija usko povezane sa pojedinačnim interesima domaćih aktera, kao i da regionalne institucije predstavljaju odraz obaveza i kredibilitnosti država koje u njima učestvuju.⁴¹ U pogledu uspostavljanja EPZ mogu se, u izvesnoj meri, uočiti sva tri navedena elementa. Kao prvo – Evropska politička zajednica se uspostavlja kao simbol produbljiivanja saradnje između država-članica Evropske unije, s jedne strane, i drugih evropskih država, a u cilju ograničavanja posledica geostrateške krize na kontinentu. Drugo – interesi domaćih političkih elita povezani su sa preferencijama država, što pokazuje primer Emanuela Makrona i spleta okolnosti u kojima je njegova uloga ojačana u poslednjih nekoliko godina. Nakon smene vlasti i završetka mandata dugogodišnje kancelarke Nemačke Angele Merkel (*Angela Merkel*), francuski predsednik, kao lider druge najveće i najuticajnije članice EU, krajem 2021. prerastao je u možda najprominentniju političku figuru iz redova država-članica. Većoj vidljivosti Makrona na evropskom nivou doprinelo je i pogoršavanje situacije na rusko-ukrajinskim granicama, volji ruskog predsednika da sa francuskim predsednikom o tome razgovara, kao i činjenica da je Pariz upravo u prvoj polovini 2022. godine preuzeo predsedavanje Savetom Evropske unije. Činjenica da Francuska ima polupredsednički sistem sa izraženom ulogom predsednika,⁴² takođe je doprinela mogućnosti uticaja na spoljnopolitičke prilike i inicijative. Kao rezultat navedenih stavki, i na nivou Francuske i na nivou Evropske unije postojala su pojačana očekivanja od predsednika Makrona u kontekstu evropske krize.

Imajući to u vidu, dolazi se i do trećeg aspekta koji su prepoznali Moravčik i Šimelfenig, da međunarodne institucije predstavljaju i odraz odgovornosti država da u njima učestvuju, kao i verodostojnosti njihovih rukovodstava. U kontekstu međuvladinog pristupa, premda se Evropska politička zajednica ne može smatrati institucijom već pre formatom za međunarodnu saradnju, radi se o inicijativi koja je, na predlog Francuske, prerasla u visokopolitičku inicijativu čitave Evropske unije. Francuska je iskoristila kontekst predsedavanja Savetom Evropske unije da predloži uspostavljanje Evropske političke zajednice. Uspostavljanje inicijative je usmereno ka podvlačenju uticaja kako Francuske tako i EU, na kontinentalne prilike, barem u pogledu nastojanja da se koordinišu stavovi o važnim spoljnopolitičkim i drugim pitanjima na kontinentu, uključujući i ona koja promovišu mirnodopsku saradnju. Formiranje Evropske političke zajednice

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 70.

⁴² Pavle Nedić, „Kohabitacija u Francuskoj kao posledica polupredsedničkog sistema“, *Politički život*, br. 20, 2021, 35–49.

ne služi samo pojačavanju evropske uloge u susedstvu, već i kao dokaz postignuća francuskog predsedavanja Evropskom unijom.

Članice produbljuju integracije kako bi kroz evropske institucije i modele saradnje postigle ono što ne mogu kao nečlanice. I obratno: u dinamici evropskih integracija glavnu reč daju države (npr. u pogledu dometa, opsega, dubine i drugih aspekata). Na inicijativu predsednika Francuske, kao jedne od najuticajnijih evropskih političkih figura, ideja o Evropskoj političkoj zajednici je podržana od strane drugih članica, premda nekadašnji visokorangirani zvaničnik Evropske službe za spoljne poslove, Pjer Vimont (*Pierre Vimont*), navodi da većina zemalja EU tek „obazrivo podržava“ tu inicijativu zbog brojnih nepoznanica u vezi s njenim funkcionisanjem.⁴³ U tom smislu, može se uočiti nastojanje da se kroz oblik fleksibilnog povezivanja unapredi interes kako Francuske tako i Evropske unije. Imajući u vidu višegodišnju ambivalenciju Francuske da podrži različite aspekte u okviru politike proširenja (npr. veto na otvaranje pregovora sa Severnom Makedonijom i Albanijom 2019. godine, prolongirano formulisanje revidirane metodologije pristupnih pregovora, koji nije ishodio vidljivim promenama itd.), možda se može polemisati da predlog za uspostavljanjem EPZ predstavlja još jedan način da se pokaže politička privrženost evropskom jedinstvu, ali bez preduzimanja dubokih reformskih procesa koji su nužni za poboljšanje kapaciteta Unije da prihvati nove članice. U tom pogledu se može uočiti još jedna poveznica između politike proširenja i EPZ, iako one nisu direktno povezane.

Međutim, fokus Moravčikovog pristupa prvenstveno je na ekonomskim interesima, dok je primena liberalne teorije međuvladinih odnosa na domen spoljne i bezbednosne politike manje prioritetan, s obzirom na „sekundarni“ značaj tih oblasti u procesu evropske integracije.⁴⁴ D. Vukasović navodi da izuzetak u tom pogledu predstavlja Robert Dover, koji kroz analizu evropeizacije evropske odbrambene politike nastoji da pokaže validnost ove teorije u oblasti spoljne i bezbednosne politike EU, napominjući da je ona rezultat „najmanjeg zajedničkog imenioca“ između država-članica Unije, posebno onih uticajnijih, poput npr. Francuske i drugih zemalja.⁴⁵ Ipak, iako je ZSBP manje prioritetan domen istraživanja zastupnika liberalne teorije međunarodnih odnosa, artikulisanje zajedničkih stavova u tim oblastima postaje sve važnija stavka, ne samo unutar Unije, već i pri evaluaciji napretka kandidata za članstvo, kao i drugih zemalja koje žele

⁴³ Pierre Vimont, „The European Political Community: Moving ahead but to where?“, *Encompass*, <https://encompass-europe.com/comment/the-european-political-community-moving-ahead-but-to-where>, 5/2/2024.

⁴⁴ Dejana Vukčević, „Doprinos liberalne teorije međuvladinih odnosa u izučavanju procesa evropske integracije“, *Politička revija*, (XXIII), Vol. 27, Br. 1, 2011, 338–340, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.2712011.18>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

bliske odnose sa Unijom. To predstavlja i odraz duboke geopolitičke krize izazvane ruskom invazijom na Ukrajinu. Formiranje EPZ predstavlja nastojanje Unije da se na nivou čitavog kontinenta uspostavi forum za dijalog, razmenu mišljenja, i u idealnom slučaju, koordinisanja i usaglašavanja stavova o spoljno-bezbednosnim pitanjima. U tom smislu se domen ZSBP plasira kao višestruko relevantan: (1) za države-članice; (2) za kandidate za članstvo koji su se obavezali na postupno usklađivanje sa ZSBP do stupanja u članstvo; (3) za treće zemlje: članice Evropske asocijacije za slobodnu trgovinu, istočne susede koji nisu uključeni u politiku proširenja, Tursku i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo. Evropska politička zajednica se u tom smislu može posmatrati kao inicijativa koja podupire proces evropskih integracija kroz promovisanje ZSBP, zavisno od preferencija i ambicija zemalja u pogledu njihovih odnosa sa EU.

Pored navedenog, iz perspektive liberalnog institucionalizma, Evropska unija predstavlja i aktera koji se u velikoj meri oslanja na „meku moć“. Ovo „drugo lice moći“, prema Džozefu Najju (*Joseph Nye*), počiva na sposobnost aktera da utiče i oblikuje preferencije drugih bez prisile (kroz ubeđivanje, privlačnu snagu i druge mehanizme).⁴⁶ U meki spektar uticaja spada uticaj na postavljanje agende tj. planiranje, privlačnost i na kraju, kooptiranje, što se najčešće vrši kroz institucije, odnosno, vrednosti, kulturu i politike.⁴⁷ Evropska unija je u spoljnopolitičkom pogledu formulisala nekoliko inicijativa za svoje geografsko susedstvo pomoću kojih nastoji da podvuče svoj regionalni uticaj. Tu se ubrajaju inicijative u okviru susedske politike (Istočno partnerstvo), kao i Mediteranska unija. U sličnom kontekstu se može posmatrati i osnivanje Evropske političke zajednice, kao manje institucionalizovanog, ali geografski obuhvatnijeg oblika saradnje koji je namenjen prenosu uticaja Evropske unije u svom neposrednom susedstvu (bez obzira da li se radi o kandidatima za članstvo, istočnim susedima, ili članicama Evropske asocijacije za slobodnu trgovinu).

EPZ je osmišljen kao forum za izgradnju najšireg kontinentalnog konsenzusa o pitanjima od zajedničkog interesa, pri čemu Unija ima ulogu osnivača, moderatora, organizatora, kao i fasilitatora. EPZ se koristi za potrebe promovisanja stavova Evropske unije i zagovaranje drugih zemalja da se s njima koordinišu ili usklade. EU putem Evropske političke zajednice promoviše svoje politike (npr. politiku proširenja, politiku susedstva i druge), svoje stavove (npr. u domenu zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike, poput onih koji se tiču osude ruske invazije na Ukrajinu), vrednosti i norme (zagovarajući demokratizaciju u svim krajevima Evrope). Činjenica da su na dosadašnjim samitima EPZ učestvovali gotovo svi evropski lideri koji su bili

⁴⁶ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Konsultovati tabelu na str. 8.

pozvani govori u prilog privlačnosti, tj. prihvatljivosti Evropske unije i njenih inicijativa u pravcu izgradnje panevropskog političkog konsenzusa, kao i o tome da i vlade evropskih država nečlanica Unije vide korist u saradnji u tom obliku, bez obzira o tome koliko su opsežne njihove ambicije u pogledu produbljivanja bilateralnih veza sa EU. U tom smislu, uspostavljanje EPZ i njegovo dosadašnje funkcionisanje se može posmatrati kao manifestacija „meke moći“ Evropske unije. Ta moć stoji u kontrastu sa „tvrdom moći“, tj. prisili i pribegavanju vojno-oružanim sredstvima koja Rusija upotrebljava u Ukrajini već dve godine, čime se dodatno naglašava mirnodopska uloga Unije na kontinentu i jača njen kredibilitet u tom pogledu.

Majkl Dojl (*Michael Doyle*) ne ubraja se u zastupnike liberalnog međuvladinog pristupa, premda njegova razmatranja imaju dodirnih tačaka s liberalnim idejama. Iako prepoznaje da je teško naći univerzalno prihvaćenu definiciju liberalizma, kao i sisteme koje poseduju sve elemente, Dojl navodi da teoretičari liberalizma poistovećuju s pojedinačnim slobodama, posebno u domenu moralne slobode, – pravo da se bude tretiran i da se drugi tretiraju, kao pojedinačni etički subjekti, a ne (samo) kao objekti ili instrumenti u tom pogledu.⁴⁸ Analizirajući liberalni demokratski mir kao evroatlantsku tekovinu s posebnim setom sloboda i drugih privilegija građana i društava, Dojl prepoznaje problem zatvorenosti tog skupa nacija kao prepreku u naporima da se proces demokratizacije po tom modelu proširi u svetskim okvirima.⁴⁹ U izvesnoj meri, primenjeno na ovaj rad, taj ekskluzivitet je uočljiv i u kontekstu dugogodišnje nespemnosti Evropske unije da u kratkom roku primi nove države u članstvo, te se u tom pogledu prate alternativni načini povezivanja, kroz politiku susedstva, različite programe i inicijative, kako bi se veze razvijale uprkos nedostatku strateških političkih ishoda (poput članstva u Uniji).

Osnovna polazišta demokratskog mira jesu da liberalne države međusobno ne ratuju, dok zasebni mir omogućuje fokusiranje na rast blagostanja kroz ekonomsku saradnju.⁵⁰ To se može primeniti i na Evropsku uniju kao zajednicu liberalnih vrednosti i principa, čije privilegije mirnodopskog razvoja važe unutar njenih granica. Takođe, EU nastoji da proširi svoju sferu uticaja u susednim područjima, promovisanjem demokratskih vrednosti i principa. Međutim, nastojanja Evropske unije da proširi političku moć izvan svojih granica (npr. kroz domene proširenja, susedstva itd.) ne manifestuje se samo u nastojanju da se susedstvo (pre)oblikuje, već podrazumeva i određeni nivo odgovornosti tj. podrške u tom pravcu. Kada je napadnuta Ukrajina 2022. godine, kao jedan od najbližih

⁴⁸ Michael Doyle, *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays*, Routledge, London & New York, 2012, 4.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 165-179.

⁵⁰ Videti fusnotu 10 u: Josip Pandžić, „Križa međunarodnog liberalnog poretka i permanentni hegemonski rat“, *Polemos*, Vol. 17, No. 33-34, 2014, 89-90.

strateških partnera Unije koji preoblikuje svoj politički i ekonomski sistem prema evropskom, Evropska unija je odlučila da podrži Kijev. U tom pogledu, reakcija Evropske unije na napad na Ukrajinu može biti sagledana u kontekstu sveobuhvatne podrške Brisela toj zemlji (političkoj, humanitarnoj, finansijskoj, vojnoj), kao i njenog uvrštavanja u politiku proširenja (čime je viđena kao buduća članica koja učestvuje u privilegijama poput demokratskog mira). Pomaganjem Ukrajini, Evropska unija pomaže i očuvanju sopstvenih vrednosti i normi, kao i svog uticaja u susedstvu.

Države-članice su u obavezi da priteknu u pomoć u slučaju spoljnog napada na bilo koju od njih, prema članu 42. Ugovora o Evropskoj uniji (klauzula o uzajamnoj odbrani).⁵¹ To se ne odnosi na Ukrajinu, budući da ona nije članica. Međutim, uplitanje liberalnih država (pa i skupa država, poput Evropske unije) u međunarodne sukobe, može biti pravdano odbranom njihovih sloboda.⁵² Ukrajina je od 2013/2014. godine na osnovu sporazuma o pridruživanju i u pravnom smislu prerasla u jednog od glavnih strateških partnera Evropske unije u geografskom susedstvu. Napad na Ukrajinu sa evropske strane valorizovan je u smislu zvaničnog prepoznavanja Ukrajine kao buduće članice jednog od najprosperitetnijih tržišta na svetu. Na taj način je, barem u deklarativnom smislu, poslata poruka da bi u slučaju hipotetičkog budućeg napada na Ukrajinu kao članicu bila aktivirana odredba o uzajamnoj odbrani. U tom pogledu dotičnu klauzulu, koja je važna u garantovanju opstanka koncepta demokratskog tj. separatnog mira, treba posmatrati i kao sredstvo za odvraćanje budućih napada i najave direktnog angažmana država-članica u odbrani Ukrajine u krajnjem scenariju, a sve s namerom da se po svaku cenu očuva mir kao osnov za funkcionisanje Evropske unije.

Međutim, kako to predstavlja dugoročni cilj (imajući u vidu dinamiku politike proširenja), u kratkom roku, Evropska unija odlučila je da uspostavi okvir za saradnju prvenstveno posvećen očuvanju mira. U tom smislu, zarad osiguranja opstanka svojih bezbednosnih (političkih, i drugih) privilegija, tj. statusa separatnog mira zapadno od ukrajinskih granica, uspostavljena je i Evropska politička zajednica, kao forum u okviru kojeg Evropska unija saraduje sa svim evropskim zemljama, osim sa onima koji su ugrozili mir kao imperativ za razvoj EU. Dijalog o izazovima koji opterećuju različite delove evropskog kontinenta, kao i koordinacija stavova o pitanjima gde je moguće naći osnov za povezivanje, treba posmatrati kao nastojanje da se u okviru EPZ doprinese promovisanju mira i neširenju konflikta u geopolitički osetljivim vremenima.

⁵¹ "Mutual defence clause", EUR-Lex, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/mutual-defence-clause.html>, 30/01/2024.

⁵² Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1983, 235.

Odnos sa drugim međunarodnim inicijativama

Evropsku političku zajednicu treba razumeti kao stratešku inicijativu Evropske unije za čitav kontinent. Kao što je već konstatovano, Evropska politička zajednica nije direktno povezana sa politikom proširenja, premda je pojedini autori (Mojer (*Jason C. Moyer*), Ocvirk (*Masa Ocvirk*)) karakterišu kao „neformalnu putanju ka članstvu u EU“, tako da određeni nivo korelacije postoji.⁵³ Uprkos nevelikim dosadašnjim dometima (osim jake političke simbolike), na nivou Unije se razmatra način na koji se taj format može bliže i trajnije uvezati sa Briselom, a sve u cilju osiguranja i/ili uvećanja normativne i druge moći na kontinentu.

Da se na nivou Evropske unije ozbiljnije nego pre 2022. razmatra način kako da se ojača vlastita otpornost i uticaj kroz klasično proširenje, kao i druge modele, pokazuje i uspostavljanje francusko-nemačke radne grupe o institucionalnoj reformi Evropske unije, koja je uoči Samita u Granadi objavila svoj izveštaj.⁵⁴ Rešenje za budućnost se vidi u pojačanoj ciljanoj diferencijaciji, koja bi podrazumevala izmene osnivačkih ugovora, uz izuzeća samo pri produbljivanju integracije ili širenju kvalifikovanog većinskog glasanja (ali ne i za osnovne vrednosti Unije); takva diferencijacija vodila bi u pravcu četiri kruga evropskih integracija: unutrašnji krug (duboka integracija – npr. evrozona, Šengen); zatim, sve članice Unije; potom, krug pridruženih zemalja (uključujući i učešće u jedinstvenom tržištu i poštovanju osnovnih načela), te, naposljetku, Evropska politička zajednica kao spoljni krug političke saradnje, bez obaveza u smislu usklađivanja sa komunitarnim odredbama.⁵⁵ U tom pogledu, uloga Evropske političke zajednice posmatra se u kontekstu spoljne periferije, što donekle nalikuje željenoj svrsi evropske susedske politike – da se stvori pojas „dobro uređenih, prijateljskih zemalja“ duž granice Evropske unije.⁵⁶ Takav spoljni pojas bi predstavljao region pojačanog političkog uticaja Evropske unije, a njegova forma bi bila takva da bude usmerena ka održavanju bliskosti s tim zemljama i regionima, pre nego na nastojanju da se one izmene po obrascu viđenom u srednjoj, istočnoj i jugoistočnoj Evropi. U tom kontekstu se dodatno postavlja pitanje o budućoj svrsi Istočnog partnerstva, kao inicijative susedske politike koja se nalazi na raskrsnici: polovina njenih članica

⁵³ Jason C. Moyer & Masa Ocvirk, “The Third European Political Community Summit and the Four Rings of European Integration”, Wilson Center Afganistan, <https://afghanistan.wilsoncenter.org/article/third-european-political-community-summit-and-four-rings-european-integration>, 26/11/2023.

⁵⁴ Olivier Costa & Daniela Schwarzer, *Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st Century*, Report of the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, September 18, 2023.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 6–7.

⁵⁶ Konsultovati: Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith & Michael Baun (eds.), *Governing Europe's neighbourhood: Partners or periphery? (Europe in Change)*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2015.

faktički je prešla u domen politike proširenja, Belorusija je samosuspendovala svoje učešće, dok preostale dve zemlje – Jermenija i Azerbejdžan⁵⁷ – imaju duboke i razgranate veze sa Rusijom, odnosno Turskom, koje su ili strateški rivali ili nedovoljno pouzdani partneri za Evropsku uniju.

Što se tiče drugih tela u Evropi, sve članice Saveta Evrope učestvuju u Evropskoj političkoj zajednici i obratno: Evropska politička zajednica gotovo isključivo se sastoji od članica Saveta Evrope, kojih ima 46.⁵⁸ Kao prvi aktuelni prioritet Saveta Evrope navedena je podrška Ukrajini, koja se ogleda kako u isključivanju Rusije iz rada organizacije tako i kroz finansijsku, političku i drugu pomoć.⁵⁹ U tom pogledu, može se konstatovati da oba navedena entiteta kao primarni prioritet imaju pomoć Ukrajini, te da obe strane osuđuju štetne aktivnosti Rusije u susjednoj zemlji. Međutim, osnovne sličnosti se tu mahom završavaju. Fokus Saveta Evrope je na ljudskim pravima, demokratiji i vladavini prava, dok je naglasak Evropske političke zajednice na stabilnosti, bezbednosti i sa time povezanim pitanjima. Pored toga, Savet Evrope je višedecenijska međunarodna organizacija, sa razgranatom strukturom koja obuhvata Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Savet ministara, Generalnog sekretara, Parlamentarnu skupštinu, Kongres lokalnih i regionalnih vlasti i Komesara za ljudska prava.⁶⁰ Ovi aspekti značajno odudaraju od neformalnog karaktera i fleksibilnih okvira Evropske političke zajednice. Međutim, dva entiteta, zajedno sa Evropskom unijom, deluju u sinergiji, u nastojanju da se prevaziđu izazovi vezani sa rat u Ukrajini.

Dodatno, u širem smislu postoji i određeno preklapanje sa radom Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS). Već iz samog imena je jasno da, u kontekstu fokusa na sigurnost, stabilnost i saradnju, postoji podudarnost sa inicijativom Evropske političke zajednice. Međutim, osim te činjenice, kao i toga da ukrajinska kriza predstavlja važan kontekst njenog aktuelnog rada, nema puno drugih sličnosti. OEBS je uspostavljen u toku Hladnog rata i broji 57 članica. Sve članice Evropske političke zajednice su članice OEBS-a, ali tu organizaciju ne sačinjavaju isključivo evropske zemlje, već se tu nalaze i severnoameričke nacije poput SAD i Kanade, kao i srednjoazijske zemlje, mahom nekadašnje članice SSSR-a.⁶¹ Struktura OEBS-a,

⁵⁷ Iako su Jermenija i Azerbejdžan deo Zajednice nezavisnih država, a Jermenija je članica i Evroazijske unije, obe države blisko sarađuju i sa Unijom: Jermenija kroz tzv. Sveobuhvatni i uvećani partnerski sporazum (2017), a Azerbejdžan kroz stariji partnerski sporazum (1996).

⁵⁸ "46 Member States", Council of Europe, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/46-members-states>, 26/11/2023. Osnovna nepodudarnost se ogleda u prisustvu tzv. kosovskih zvaničnika na skupovima Evropske političke zajednice, čak i na onima u Moldaviji i Španiji, koje ne priznaju otcpljenje te teritorije od Srbije.

⁵⁹ "The Council of Europe: key facts", Council of Europe, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/the-council-of-europe-key-facts>, 26/11/2023.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ "Participating States", Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, <https://www.osce.org/participating-states>, 26/11/2023.

za razliku od Evropske političke zajednice a slično Savetu Evrope, prilično je razgranata i sadrži tela poput Ministarskog saveta, Stalnog saveta, Forumu za bezbednosnu saradnju, Parlamentarnu skupštinu itd.⁶² Takođe, dok je Evropska politička zajednica usmerena ka prevazilaženju napetosti u kontekstu invazije na Ukrajinu, s druge strane, imajući u vidu da u radu OEBS-a učestvuje i Rusija, kao i njeni pojedini partneri sa postsovjetskog prostora, radi se o telu čiji se aktuelni fokus ne može poistovetiti sa protivljenjem invaziji i osudi Moskve. Imajući u vidu razmimoilaženja, rad OEBS-a je od 2022. godine naovamo opterećen nesaglasnostima i smanjenom funkcionalošću. Tako je prvi put ikada u decembru 2022. godine godišnji Ministarski sastanak (održan u Lođu, u Poljskoj) završen bez usvojenih odluka, uključujući i neusvajanje budžeta u iznosu od 143 miliona američkih dolara (kao posledica blokade od strane Rusije, Jermenije i Azerbejdžana), sprečavanje izbora predsedavajućeg za 2024. godinu, kao i posebne nadzorne misije za Ukrajinu, što stoji u korelaciji sa neizdavanjem vize Sergeju Lavrovu, ministru spoljnih poslova Rusije, što se takođe dogodilo prvi put.⁶³ Imajući u vidu činjenicu da je rad OEBS-a otežan usled nesaglasnosti među njenim članicama, dodatna inicijativa koja razmatra bezbednosna pitanja u Evropi – Evropska politička zajednica – ima funkciju da podstakne i omogući najširi dijalog među evropskim državama o aktuelnim izazovima. Međutim, imajući u vidu dosadašnji rad, kao i činjenicu da se radi o relativno novom konceptu, njene domete ne treba precenjivati niti posmatrati kao zamenu za bilo koje postojeće telo, tim pre što Evropska politička zajednica nije organizacija, već platforma za dijalog među evropskim državama.

Zaključak

Dosadašnji razvoj Evropske političke zajednice upućuje da se radi o forumu evropskih lidera za koordinaciju politika i stavova u domenima evropske bezbednosti i stabilnosti u najširem mogućem smislu. Budući da je horizontalnog tipa i da nema stalne organe upravljanja (poput npr. sekretarijata, niti bilo čega sličnog), ona predstavlja fleksibilan okvir za razmenu stavova, mišljenja, razmatranje izazova i perspektiva, kao i stvaranje grupnih partnerstava po različitim pitanjima. Njen značaj u aktuelnim geopolitičkim okolnostima ne treba potcenjivati, premda ne treba ni imati visoka očekivanja, osim u pogledu koordinacije stavova o zajedničkim pitanjima. Dosadašnje funkcionisanje Inicijative je pokazalo da, s obzirom na njen neformalni karakter, Evropska politička zajednica u značajnoj meri zavisi i od političke volje lidera da u njoj učestvuju, što najbolje

⁶² "Who we are", Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, <https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce>, 26/11/2023.

⁶³ Gabriela Rosa Hernández, "OSCE in Crisis Over Russian War on Ukraine", <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-01/news/osce-crisis-over-russian-war-ukraine>, 26/11/2023.

pokazuje primer predsednika Turske (koji je odsustvovao sa dva od dosadašnja tri samita).

Njena osnovna vrednost je u njenom geografskom obuhvatu i potencijalu za usklađivanje stavova i saradnju sa udaljenim krajevima kontinenta. Evropska unija u Evropskoj političkoj zajednici učestvuje i posredno, kroz svojih dvadeset sedam članica, i neposredno, kroz podršku organizaciji i realizaciji skupova (koji se naizmenično organizuju u predsedavajućoj zemlji Savetom Evropske unije, i/ili u državi-nečlanici koja se smatra za strateškog partnera – kandidat za članstvo, članice Evropske asocijacije za slobodnu trgovinu itd.), kao i kroz prisustvo lidera institucija Unije. Rukovođena idejom da radi na što opsežnijoj izgradnji panevropskog konsenzusa, Evropska unija pomoću Zajednice nastoji da se pokaže kao stožer panevropskog okupljanja, kao vodeća politička sila koja pruža miroljubiv odgovor u kontekstu napada na Ukrajinu. To je u skladu i sa mekom moći Unije koja je i do sada karakterisala putanju i opseg njenog vlastitog razvoja.

Iako postoji bojazan da inicijativa može poslužiti za trajno ukalupljivanje Zapadnog Balkana na evropskoj periferiji, s druge strane, učešće celog regiona pokazuje da postoji interes za dodatnim oblicima saradnje u jeku rata u Ukrajini. U slučaju Zapadnog Balkana naročito je važna vidljivost i prilika da se sa evropskim partnerima (posebno onima u Evropskoj uniji, koji zapravo čine i numeričku većinu u Evropskoj političkoj zajednici) razgovara o pitanjima i mogućnostima za pospešivanje evropskih integracija. Evropska politička zajednica je u skladu sa načelom da se saradnja na evropskom kontinentu može dozirati po različitim pitanjima i nudi mogućnost da se to čini na fleksibilan način, čime se zaobilaze komplikovani mehanizmi odlučivanja i planiranja tipični za evropske institucije. Drugim rečima, omogućuje se diferencijacija zemalja u skladu s njihovim vlastitim ciljevima i interesima u razvoju veza sa Unijom (i međusobno). Interes Zapadnog Balkana u tom pogledu nije da se strahuje od razvodnjavanja evropske perspektive kroz jedan novi mehanizam, već da se iskoriste mogućnosti koje Evropska politička zajednica nudi, a kako bi se strateški cilj članstva što skorije ostvario. Učešće u Evropskoj političkoj zajednici je dosta manje zahtevno od evropeizacije i zahtevnih transformativnih mera koje se preduzimaju zbog članstva u Evropskoj uniji. Zemlje već decenijama preduzimaju sveobuhvatne reforme zarad ostvarivanja strateškog cilja pristupanja, kao što je slučaj na Zapadnom Balkanu, a posebno Srbija treba da iskoristi taj forum da ukaže na svoja postignuća i pospeši prilike za što skorije pristupanje Uniji. U slučaju zemalja regiona, aktuelni geopolitički momenat može biti iskorišćen kako bi se region dodatno izdvojio kao bezbednosno sigurniji (spram evropskog istoka i spram svoje vlastite skorije prošlosti) i politički spremniji za članstvo od tog regiona (imajući u vidu dugogodišnje pripreme u tom pravcu).

Premda učešće u Evropskoj političkoj zajednici ne predstavlja garanciju za što skorije pristupanje Zapadnog Balkana, već se pre može tumačiti kao

pomoćno sredstvo u tom pogledu, ono može imati određenu ulogu u pospešivanju komunikacije, vidljivosti i usklađivanja sa Unijom. S druge strane, Unija bi trebalo da dodatno prepozna i aktivnosti kandidata u pogledu doprinosa radu Evropske političke zajednice kao najnovije inicijative usmerene ka osiguranju evropskih interesa. Paralelno s tim procesom, a u skladu i sa idejama iznetim i od strane francusko-nemačke radne grupe za institucionalnu reformu, Unija bi trebalo da pristupa koracima u tom pravcu kako bi mogla da se pripremi za proširenje svojih ustanova. Premda Evropska politička zajednica i politika proširenja nisu direktno povezane, one se u brojnim domenima preklapaju, a i od kandidata i od Unije zavisi u kojoj meri će sinergija između dva domena biti iskorišćena za unapređenje pristupne perspektive i starih i novih geopolitičkih kandidata za članstvo.

Rad je nastao u okviru naučnoistraživačkog projekta „Srbija i izazovi u međunarodnim odnosima 2024. godine“, koji finansira Ministarstvo nauke, tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije, a realizuje Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu tokom 2024. godine.

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Separatizam u departmanu Santa Kruz kao faktor destabilizacije Bolivije

SAŽETAK

Predmet istraživanja ovog rada jeste analiza uticaja koji separatizam u departmanu Santa Kruz u Boliviji ima na destabilizaciju ove zemlje, pre svega kroz studiju dva slučaja – višemesečne pobune bogatih i ravničarskih istočnih departmana predvođenih Santa Kruzom protiv centralne vlade 2008. godine i uloge koju su separatističke političke snage iz Santa Kruza imale u izvođenju državnog udara protiv Eva Moralesa 2019. godine. Cilj istraživanja jeste da dokažemo polaznu hipotezu prema kojoj je santakruzijski separatizam istorijska kategorija i da isti generiše ne samo političke i bezbednosne već i ekonomske i društvene tenzije između dva geografski i kulturološki različita dela Bolivije – zapadnog i istočnog. Rezultati istraživanja pokazali su da separatizam u departmanu Santa Kruz predstavlja jedan od ključnih faktora destabilizacije Bolivije, jer u istom postoje krajnje desno orijentisane političke partije i pokreti, ali i političari i uticajni bogataši koji su izrazito protiv levičarskog režima i koji žele da na tlu ovog departmana stvore nezavisnu državu. Zaključak istraživanja ide u pravcu ukazivanja na istorijski rivalitet istočnog i zapadnog dela Bolivije, ali i na potrebu da isti bude prevaziđen dijalogom i demistifikacijom supremacije santakruzijskog identiteta naspram urođeničkih identiteta. Tokom istraživanja koristili smo se istorijskom metodom, metodom studije slučaja i metodom komparativne analize.

Ključne reči: Bolivija, Santa Kruz, separatizam, državni udar, identitetska supremacija.

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Separatism in the Department of Santa Cruz as a Factor in the Destabilisation of Bolivia

SUMMARY

The subject of this research is the analysis of the impact that separatism in the department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia has on the destabilisation of this country, primarily through the study of two cases: the months-long rebellion of the rich and lowland eastern departments led by Santa Cruz against the central government in 2008 and the role played by separatist political forces from Santa Cruz in carrying out the coup d'état against Evo Morales in 2019. The research aims to validate the first hypothesis, which holds that Santa Cruz separatism is a historical category and that it causes social, political, and economic tensions between the western and eastern regions of Bolivia, which are geographically and culturally distinct from one another. The results of the research showed that separatism in the department of Santa Cruz is one of the key factors in the destabilisation of Bolivia because there are far right-oriented political parties and movements, as well as politicians and influential rich people who are strongly against the left-wing regime and who want to create an independent state on the soil of this department. The research's conclusion highlights the historical rivalry between Bolivia's eastern and western parts while also emphasising the necessity of demystifying the superiority of the Santa Cruz identity over native identities and fostering dialogue to end it. We employed historical, case study, and comparative analytic methods during the research.

Keywords: Bolivia, Santa Cruz, separatism, coup d'état, identity supremacy.

Uvod: istorijski osvrt na nastanak i razvoj Bolivije

Da bismo razumeli savremene političke prilike u Boliviji, kao i izazove i probleme sa kojima se ova zemlja danas suočava, uključujući i separatizam u njenom departmanu Santa Kruz čijim ćemo se uzrocima i posledicama detaljnije baviti, najpre ćemo napraviti kratak osvrt na nastanak i razvoj ove južnoameričke zemlje. Bolivijaska istorija je bila istovremeno i bogata i bolna. S druge strane, santakruzijski separatizam i te kako ima veze sa istorijskim, političkim, ekonomskim, kulturnim, verskim i jezičkim nasleđem posmatranog prostora.

Prve civilizacije na teritoriji današnje Bolivije nastale su na njenom istočnom delu, preciznije oko jezera Titikaka i na visoravnima Anda. Posmatrani prostor u pretkolumbovskom vremenu dostiže vrhunac za vreme vladavine Carstva Inka (1470–1540) čija država je bila militaristički ustrojena, podeljena po kastinskim osnovama, te koja se širila na račun asimilacije okolnih naroda. U tom smislu važno je demistifikovati taj period bolivijske istorije kao period harmoničnog života urođeničkih naroda, s obzirom na to

da je među istima vladao rivalitet koji je neretko išao do potpunog istrebljenja onih slabijih. Dolazak španskih konkvistadora, među kojima su se na počecima osvajanja istakli Dijego de Almagro (*Diego de Almagro*), Gonsalo Pisaro (*Gonzalo Pizarro*) i Pedro Ansuere (*Pedro Anzúrez*), na prostor današnje Bolivije 1530-ih doneo je samo još više nasilja i društvenog raslojavanja budući da oni vrše pokolj nad vladarskim urođeničkim porodicama, dok pripadnike nižih društvenih slojeva prevode u hrišćanstvo i koriste ih kao robovsku radnu snagu na enkomijendama. Nakon što je došlo do rasnog i kulturnog mešanja (*mezcla*) Španaca sa urođeničkim ženama dolazi do uspostavljanja tzv. sistema pigmentokratije, prema kome su Španci iz Španije bili na vrhu društvene piramide, a urođenici, bez obzira na plemensku pripadnost (Kečue, Ajmare, Gvarani itd.) na samom dnu i potpuno obespravljani i obezvređeni. Bolivija, u vreme kolonijalne vlasti zvana i Gornji Peru, bila je u administrativnom smislu najpre deo Vicekraljevstva Peru, zatim posebna upravna teritorija pod imenom Kraljevska audijencija Čarkas, da bi kasnije bila pridodata Vicekraljevstvu Rio de la Plata. Period postojanja Kraljevske audijencije Čarkas (1559–1825) bio je od posebnog značaja za kasnije formiranje bolivijskog nacionalnog i državnog identiteta, s obzirom na to da se ista prostirala na zapadu današnje Bolivije, sa sedištem u gradu La Plati (današnji Sukre koji je „ustavna prestonica“ Bolivije). Zapad današnje Bolivije (potez od La Paza na severu do Potosija na jugu) imao je u to vreme daleko veći politički, ali i ekonomski značaj (zbog bogatih rudnika srebra u Potosiju), negoli njen istočni deo.² Važnu ulogu u oblikovanju nacionalne svesti Bolivijaca i formiranje tamošnjeg specifičnog identiteta imale su brojne pobune urođenika protiv španske Krune, od kojih je čuvena (geografski najšira) ona iz 1781. godine kada je Tupak Katari (*Túpac Katari*) poveo pripadnike Ajmara naroda iz Gornjeg Perua protiv vojnih i civilnih vlasti u gradu La Pazu, a kojoj se kasnije pridružuju i Tomas Katari (*Tomás Katari*) i Tupak Amaru II (*Túpac Amaru II*) kao već prethodno osvedočeni borci za domorodačka prava. Iako su Španci ovu pobunu ugušili nakon nekoliko meseci, a njene predvodnike pogubili, obespravljeno urođeničko stanovništvo pokazalo je da je sposobno da se oružanim putem bori za svoja prava. Važan momenat predstavljala je činjenica da u ovoj pobuni lokalni kreoli (Španci rođeni na tom podneblju) nisu stali na stranu urođenika, naprotiv, ostali su verni španskoj Kruni i dali veliki doprinos u rušenju ove pobune.³

Borba za konačno osamostaljenje današnje Bolivije od Španske imperije, ovoga puta ne samo podržana već i predvođena istaknutim lokalnim kreolima, počela je 1809. godine kada su patriotske snage (*patriotas*) kratkotrajno isterale rojaliste (*realistas*) iz La Paza i Čikisakija. Nakon velikih

² Rajko Petrović, *Politički sistemi zemalja Latinske Amerike*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića i Institut za evropske studije, Sremski Karlovci, 2023, 248–250.

³ María Luisa Soux, *Bolivia, su Historia. Tomo III. Reformas, rebeliones e independencia 1700–1825*, Coordinadora de Historia, La Paz, 2015, 106–119.

borbi za oslobođenje, u kojima su posebno važan doprinos dale trupe Hose de San Martina (*José de San Martín*) sa juga i Simona Bolivara (*Simón Bolívar*) sa severa, Bolivija je 1825. godine konačno i stekla svoju samostalnost. Zemlja je kasnije ime ponela po samom Bolívaru, dok je Čikisaki preimenovan u Sukre u čast jednom od oslobodilaca Antonija Hose de Sukrea (*Antonio José de Sucre*). Usledio je period nastojanja da se Bolivija demokratizuje i izgradi neophodne institucije, ali i da zaštiti svoju teritoriju od okolnih zemalja. Uporedo s tim tekla je i borba između liberalnih (*liberales*) i konzervativnih (*conservadores*) snaga unutar same Bolivije. Posebno traumatični bili su vojni sukobi Bolivije sa susednim Čileom, najpre od 1836. do 1839. (Rat konfederacija), a potom i od 1879. do 1883. (Pacifički rat) iz kojih je izašla poražena, a nakon Pacifičkog rata i bez izlaza na more. Bio je to za Boliviju, međutim, samo početak dugog procesa gubitka gotovo polovine svoje prvobitne teritorije, s obzirom na to da 1893. godine ustupa krajnji jug Argentini, 1903. godine predaje bogatu oblast Akre Brazilu, a nakon Rata za Čako 1935. godine Paragvaj joj uzima takođe bogatu teritoriju Čako. Sve ove okolnosti uticale su na to da Bolivija u 21. vek zakorači kao politički nestabilna i ekonomski nerazvijena država. Tokom proteklog veka posebno je bio izražen sukob između desničarskih i militarističkih režima, s jedne strane, i komunista i drugih levičara (uključujući i gerilske grupe), s druge strane. Oličenje ultranacionalističkog i antikomunističkog režima bio je bolivijski diktator Rene Barrientos (*René Barrientos*) koji je za vreme svog mandata (1966–1969) surovo progonio bolivijske levičare, te ostao upamćen kao čovek koji je zapovedao akcijom hapšenja i likvidacije Ernesta Če Gevare (*Ernesto Che Guevarra*). Ništa manje to nije bio ni Ugo Banser (*Hugo Banzer*) koji je vladao diktatorski od 1971. do 1978. godine, a potom od 1997. do 2001. godine nakon što je izabran demokratskim putem, budući da je Bolivija prethodno tokom 1980-ih zakoračila u proces istinske demokratizacije i izgradnje sistema vladavine prava.⁴

Pred Bolivijom je stajalo puno izazova i na početku 21. veka, s obzirom na to da je ekonomska i socijalna situacija u zemlji bila izuzetno nepovoljna. Posebno su nezadovoljni bili radnici, sindikalci i pripadnici urođeničkog naroda među kojima je siromaštvo bilo najizraženije. Na talasu tog nezadovoljstva na predsedničkim izborima 2005. godine vlast osvaja Evo Morales (*Evo Morales*), vođa Pokreta ka socijalizmu (*Movimiento al Socialismo*) i prvi pripadnik urođeničkog naroda Ajmara koji je došao na mesto prvog čoveka države, porazivši bivšeg predsednika Bolivije Karlosa Mesu (*Carlos Mesa*). Morales je ostao na vlasti sve do 2019. godine, te se ovaj period bolivijske istorije opisuje kao doba evizma (*evismo*) u okviru koga su postignuti značajni uspesi, među kojima se ističu: na polju ekonomije (nacionalizacija strateški važnih resursa, drastično smanjenje stope siromaštva, udvostručenje BDP-a po glavi stanovnika), na polju spoljne

⁴ Rajko Petrović, „Politički sistemi zemalja Latinske Amerike“, 252–257.

politike (uključivanje Bolivije u procese latinoameričkih integracija, uspostavljanje tešnje saradnje sa Rusijom i Kinom, suzbijanje uticaja Sjedinjenih Američkih Država na unutrašnje procese u Boliviji), te u društvenoj sferi (porast pismenosti stanovništva, emancipacija urođeničkih naroda gde Bolivija ustavom iz 2009. godine postaje Višenacionalna Država Bolivija sa preko 20 zvaničnih jezika).⁵

Koreni santakruzijskog separatizma, njegov razvoj i osnovne karakteristike

Santa Kruz je najveći departman u Boliviji (ima ih ukupno devet) sa istoimenim gradom kao svojim administrativnim i političkim sedištem. Zauzima gotovo čitav prostor istočne Bolivije sa površinom preko 370.000 kvadratnih kilometara (što znači da je veći npr. od jedne Nemačke, a čini jednu trećinu ukupne bolivijske teritorije) i nešto više od 3,3 miliona stanovnika što ga čini retko naseljenim, ali ipak najmnogoljudnijim bolivijskim departmanom (27% ukupne bolivijske populacije). Uprkos tome što je teritorija današnjeg departmana Santa Kruz smeštena u unutrašnjosti Južne Amerike, Portugalci i Španci je osvajaju već tokom treće decenije 16. veka. Iako je kasnije ulazila u sastav već pomenute Kraljevske audijencije Čarkas, za oblikovanje identiteta stanovništva ovog prostora od velikog značaja bilo je postojanje Provincije Santa Kruz (koja je menjala svoja imena, ali je okosnicu naziva uvek činila sintagma Santa Kruz), ali i uticaj koji je ista trpela od susednih teritorija – one sa sedištem u Asunsionu (današnji Paragvaj) i brazilske pod kontrolom Portugalaca. Uprkos tome što je dobar deo stanovništva Santa Kruza iskazivao lojalnost španskoj Kruni, patriotske snage predvođene Ignasijom Varnesom (*Ignacio Warnes*) već 1813. godine dižu ustanak protiv rojalista formirajući tzv. Republicicu Santa Kruz (*Republiqueta de Santa Cruz*) koja je opstala sve do 1825. godine kada postaje jedan od pet departmana novonastale nezavisne bolivijske države. Ekonomska snaga departmana Santa Kruz je ogromna, budući da na njega otpada oko 30% ukupne bolivijske ekonomije.⁶ Zahvaljujući konstantnoj modernizaciji, sistemu javnih radova, stalnim zahtevima centralnoj vlasti za povećanje obima nadležnosti u sferi ekonomije i finansija, postojanju razvojnih korporacija, te snažnoj izvoznoj ekonomiji, departman Santa Kruz već decenijama predstavlja uspešnu priču ekonomske i institucionalne transformacije i primer koji mnogi bolivijski departmani žele da slede.⁷

⁵ Rajko Petrović, *Političke ideologije u Latinskoj Americi*, Poredak, Institut za evropske studije i Društvo hispanista, Beograd, 2020, 28–29.

⁶ Rajko Petrović, „Politički sistemi zemalja Latinske Amerike“, 286.

⁷ Ana Carola Traverso-Krejcarek, „Origenes del modelo de desarrollo cruceño: el Comité de Obras Públicas y la Corporación de Desarrollo de Santa Cruz“, *Ciencia y Cultura*, No. 48, 2022, 11–36.

U političkom smislu, kao što smo već rekli, departman Santa Kruz predstavlja jedan od devet bolivijskih departmana, a svaki od departmana je podeljen na provincije koje se sastoje od opština. Svaki departman, uključujući i Santa Kruz, ima nizak stepen autonomije, te se mogu smatrati oblikom lokalne samouprave i decentralizacije, ali daleko bliže regionima u unitarnim državama (što Bolivija i zvanično jeste) negoli federalnim jedinicama u federacijama ili autonomnim jedinicama u regionalnim državama. Ipak, svi bolivijski departmani imaju određeni stepen normativnih, administrativnih i fiskalnih nadležnosti.⁸ U Statutu o autonomiji Santa Kruza naznačeno je postojanje departmanske autonomne vlade (*Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Santa Cruz*) na čijem čelu se nalazi guverner (gobernador), ali koja u svom radu mora biti potčinjena vladi i ustavu Bolivije.⁹

Priča o separatizmu u današnjem departmanu Santa Kruz ima duboke korene koji sežu još u period s kraja 19. veka. Naime, u to vreme važan politički akter u tom delu Bolivije bio je Andres Ibanjes (*Andrés Ibáñez*), koji se zalagao za federalizaciju države gde bi Santa Kruz uživao visok stepen autonomije. Iako je Ibanjes studirao u Sukreu, nikada se nije odrekao svog regionalizma, štaviše, studije u udaljenom zapadu Bolivije samo su ga još više podstakle da ojača santakruzijski identitet u sebi, ali i da ga proširi među svojim zemljacima. Tako je Ibanjes bio odgovoran za stvaranje santakruzijске zeleno-bele-zelene zastave koja je i danas u upotrebi, a predstavljao je svoj departman u nacionalnom parlamentu pune tri godine. Tu se Ibanjes, međutim, nije zaustavio, već je od 1876. do 1877. godine bio ključna figura u vođenju revolucije, odnosno svojevršne pobune protiv centralne vlade koja je rezultirala privremenim stvaranjem Istočne Federalne Države (*Estado Federativo Oriental*) kojom je Ibanjes rukovodio.¹⁰ Nakon što je 1877. godine zarobljen od strane centralne vlasti, Ibanjes je iste godine osuđen pred bolivijskim vojnim sudom na smrt streljanjem, što je odmah i izvršeno. Iza Ibanjesa je ostalo snažno federalističko nasleđe, ali i ideja o posebnosti tzv. Kamba nacije (*Nación Camba*) koja obuhvata celokupni bolivijski istok.

Tokom već pominjanog Rata za Čako, između Bolivije i susednog Paragvaja, postojala je ideja da se Santa Kruz odvoji od Bolivije i proglasi nezavisnom državom. Deo intelektualne i političke elite Santa Kruza branio je ovu ideju tezom da su Paragvajci bliži stanovnicima Santa Kruza negoli ostatak Bolivije zbog zajedničkog gvarani porekla, te su, pored etničke, koristili i istorijske i geografske razlike između istoka i zapada Bolivije kao argument za stvaranje sopstvene države. Paragvaju je takva ideja odgovarala

⁸ "Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia", Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia, El Alto, 2009, 269–296.

⁹ "Estatuto Autonómico de Santa Cruz", Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, 2018, 1–4.

¹⁰ Paula Peña Hasbún, *La Permanente Construcción de lo Cruceño: Un Estudio Sobre la Identidad en Santa Cruz de la Sierra*, Fundación PIEB, La Paz, 2003, 59.

jer je slabila ukupne pozicije Bolivije na frontu, ali je veliku branu njenoj realizaciji predstavljao drugi deo intelektualne i političke elite tog departmana sa snažnim bolivijskim integralističkim sentimentima, a koji je takođe razvio istorijsku, političku, ali i etničku argumentaciju negirajući gvaransko poreklo Santakruzijaca insistirajući na njihovoj „beloj rasnoj čistoći“. Iako ideja o nezavisnoj Republici Santa Kruz nikada nije realizovana, pristalice santakruzijskog regionalizma sa snažnim separatističkim primesama formirali su nakon Rata za Čako Istočnu socijalističku partiju (*Partido Oriental Socialista*). U međuvremenu je došlo do evolucije unutar teorije o rasnoj razlici između Santakruzijaca i ostatka Bolivijaca, gde je odbačena teza o gvaranskom poreklu i prihvaćena ona prema kojoj se Santakruzijcima smatraju samo oni koji su potomci španskih osvajača koji su u 15. veku zaposeli te prostore. Takođe, treba dodati da je u to vreme počela da se razvija teza o uticaju geografske razlike i njenih društvenih posledica, s obzirom na to da je istok Bolivije ravničarski i sa džunglama, dok na zapadu dominiraju Andi.¹¹ U nastavku 20. veka fokus je sve više pomeran na teze o potpuno različitom istorijskom razvojnom putu između istočne i zapadne Bolivije, o snažnim kulturološkim razlikama među njima, kao i o nefunkcionalnosti Bolivije kao države još od sticanja nezavisnosti, s obzirom na raspolućenost iste na dva dela i snažnih centrifugalnih sila na istoku. U prvi plan vremenom izbija i argumentacija o značajnim ekonomskim razlikama između bolivijskog istoka i zapada, Santa Kruza i Potosija pre svih, s obzirom na to da su u Santa Kruzu dominirali poljoprivredna proizvodnja, stočarstvo i trgovina, a u Potosiju rudarstvo. Santa Kruz je daleko prednjačio od ostatka zemlje kada je reč o količinama obnovljivih izvora energije kojima je raspolagao, ali je sve do 1950-ih zaostajao u infrastrukturnom smislu budući da je u zapadnom delu Bolivije, čak i u liberalnim krugovima, vladao zazor od Santakruzijaca kao državi nedovoljno lojalnog i neintegrisanog dela bolivijske nacije. Prodor kapitalizma u Boliviju tokom druge polovine 20. veka doneo je Santa Kruzu ubrzani ekonomski i infrastrukturni razvoj, kao i visok stepen ekonomske i finansijske samodovoljnosti, što je bio motiv više za jačanje ideje o stvaranju sopstvene nezavisne republike.¹²

Tri važna politička činioca, na početku 21. veka, vratili su u život ideju o stvaranju nezavisne države na prostoru istočne Bolivije – Pokret Kamba nacija za oslobođenje (*Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación*), Građanski komitet za Santa Kruz (*Comité Cívico de Santa Cruz*) i Luis Fernando Kamačo (*Luis Fernando Camacho*). Pokret Kamba nacija za oslobođenje važan je jer

¹¹ Hernán Pruden, “Santa Cruz de la Sierra: de campañas separatistas y proyectos integracionistas, entre las postrimerías y la posguerra del Chaco (1935–1939)”, *Res Gesta*, No. 54, 2018, 79–102.

¹² Gustavo Pedraza, “De la cruceñidad periférica a la cruceñidad nacional”, en: Víctor Orduna (ed.), *La cuestión cruceña*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung en Bolivia, La Paz, 2023, 173–181.

predstavlja ultranacionalistički, fašistički i separatistički društveni pokret koji ima za cilj odvajanje Santa Kruza od Bolivije, odnosno formiranje nezavisne države koju je, sudeći po njegovim pripadnicima, moguće izdejtstvovati kroz davanje Santakruzijcima prava na samoopredeljenje. Ovaj pokret važan je i zbog tri ideološke teze koje je razvio: prvo – da postoji unutrašnji kolonijalizam u Boliviji, odnosno da zapadni andski deo eksploatiše Santa Kruz; drugo – da kultura uzgajanja i upotrebe koke u svakodnevnom životu predstavlja deo tradicije naroda na Andima, te da ne postoji u Santa Kruz i protivna je tamošnjem kulturno-istorijskom nasleđu i sistemu vrednosti; i treće – da postoji tzv. Kamba nacija koja obuhvata širi prostor istočne Bolivije, a ne samo departman Santa Kruz, te da je ta nacija etničkog, a ne samo političkog karaktera.¹³ Građanski komitet za Santa Kruz, koji je osnovan 1950. godine, ima daleko dužu tradiciju i razvijeniju infrastrukturu negoli Pokret kamba nacija za oslobođenje. Iako je nastao iz potrebe da se ukaže na infrastrukturne i razvojne probleme koje je u to vreme imao departman Santa Kruz, vremenom je izrastao u važan društveni i politički činilac koji se isključivo bavi lokalnim problemima, od materijalnih pa sve do onih vrednosnog karaktera. Kolika je njegova snaga bila u praksi govori činjenica da je od strane režima Eva Moralesa dugo godina bio označen kao njegov najveći opozicioni rival. Iako je, načelno, reč o organizaciji koja se zalaže za decentralizaciju i federalizaciju Bolivije, ali ne i za odvajanje Santa Kruza, Građanski komitet za Santa Kruz čini sve što je u njegovoj moći da ojača santakruzijske institucionalne i ekonomske kapacitete, praveći od sebe avangardu u odnosu ne samo na ostatak Bolivije već i Latinske Amerike uopšte.¹⁴ Konačno, Luis Fernando Kamačo, santakruzijski nacionalista, ultradesničar i čovek koji u političkom i društvenom delovanju „kokerira“ sa nacizmom, jedan je od simbola savremenog separatizma u ovom bogatom bolivijskom regionu. S obzirom na to da ćemo se kasnije baviti analizom događaja u kojima je Kamačo bio akter, najpre ćemo ukratko izložiti njegove biografske podatke. Reč je o 44-godišnjem pravniku, biznismenu i aktuelnom guverneru provincije Santa Kruz (od 2021. godine), a trenutno je i na čelu „Verujemo“ (*Creemos*), krajnje desne opozicione koalicije u bolivijskom parlamentu. Pored toga što je pristalica nezavisnosti provincije Santa Kruz, ali i celokupne istočne polovine Bolivije, Kamačo je poznat i kao vatreni rimokatolik, protivnik urođeničkih tradicija i kultura, homofob i proamerički nastrojen političar. Učestvovao je kao kandidat na predsedničkim izborima u Boliviji 2020. godine na kojima je sa 14% osvojenih glasova zauzeo treće mesto, dok je njegova već pomenuta koalicija osvojila četiri senatorska mesta i 16 poslaničkih u nacionalnom parlamentu. Međutim, ovde je važno istaći

¹³ Eduardo Paz Gonzales, “Exclusividad e inclusividad del nacionalismo cambia”, *Revista de Investigaciones sobre Bolivia*, No. 1, 2012, 146.

¹⁴ “Modelo de Desarrollo Cruceño. A 110 años del Memorándum de 1904”, Comité Cívico de Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, 2014, 98–103.

činjenicu da su na pomenutim izborima i Kamačo i njegova koalicija „jedino“ osvojili većinu upravo u provinciji Santa Kruz, ali su ostvarili i istorijski visok rezultat u Beniju, jednoj od provincija „bolivijskog polumeseca“.¹⁵

Pobuna „Bolivijskog polumeseca“ protiv centralne vlasti 2008. godine

Bolivija je 2008. godine ušla u jednu od najtežih političkih i društvenih kriza u svojoj istoriji, koja je u značajnoj meri okupirala i širu latinoameričku i međunarodnu javnost, te koja je pretela da preraste u građanski rat sa nesagledivim posledicama. Naime, najavljeno usvajanje novog bolivijskog ustava, a koji je trebao da ojača plurinacionalni karakter zemlje i kompetencije centralne vlasti (sa posebno osetljivim pitanjem povećanja državne intervencije u ekonomske tokove) pokrenulo je seriju protesta i nemira na prostoru već pominjanog „bolivijskog polumeseca“, odnosno departmana Panda, Benija, Tarihe i Santa Kruza, čiji nezadovoljni građani su najpre tražili da im ustav garantuje političku, ekonomsku i finansijsku autonomiju, a potom i da dobiju pravo na samoopredeljenje, odnosno da proglase nezavisnost ovih departmana slobodnim glasanjem njihovih građana na referendumima. Polarizacija u društvu bila je veoma izražena i u to vreme moglo se govoriti o postojanju dva suprotstavljena tabora – seljaka (*campesinos*) uglavnom urođeničkog porekla i odanih predsedniku Moralesu, s jedne strane, i građanstva (*cívicos*), odnosno autonomaša i separatista, s druge strane. Dva tabora su se i fizički obračunavala, sa tridesetak mrtvih kao poražavajućim rezultatom. Koliko je Bolivija tokom tih meseci bila na ivici građanskog rata govori podatak da je desničarska vlast u departmanu Pando, zajedno sa paravojsnim organizacijama pod njenom kontrolom, bila odgovorna za organizovanje zasede protiv urođenika pristalica Moralesa u gradu Porveniru u kojoj je izvršen masakr nad njih 12.¹⁶

U centru pažnje tokom ovih nemira, a koji su trajali i od 19. avgusta do 28. oktobra, nalazio se, naravno, najbogatiji i najmnogoljudniji departman unutar „bolivijskog polumeseca“ – Santa Kruz. Neformalni predvodnik koji je pozivao na građansku neposlušnost i blokadu rada državnih institucija bio je tadašnji guverner ovog departmana Ruben Kostas (*Rubén Costas*). Upravo je on bio jedan od ključnih vođa kampanje za glasanje za opoziv Evu Moralesu i članovima njegove vlade koji je organizovan nešto ranije 10. avgusta 2008. godine. Opoziv nije uspeo, ali je poslata snažna politička poruka – da su svi departmani „bolivijskog polumeseca“, sem Panda, većinski glasali za Moralesov opoziv. Ovo glasanje je, isto tako, potvrdilo

¹⁵ Mayumi Yasunaga Kumano, „La Media Luna boliviana como factor de inestabilidad“, *Documento Opinión*, No. 54, 2021, 493–494.

¹⁶ Rajko Petrović, „Politički sistemi zemalja Latinske Amerike“, 287–288.

rezultate konsultativnog referenduma o autonomiji departmana Santa Kruz organizovanog 4. maja 2008. godine na kome je preko 85% izašlih birača (njih 477.000) glasalo za autonomiju. Iako je Moralesova vlada taj referendum proglasila ilegalnim, kasnija dešavanja su pokazala da je politička volja za autonomijom na posmatranom prostoru bila toliko snažna da je već u junu iste godine organizovan niz takvih referenduma u Pandu, Beniju i Tarihi. S druge strane, centralna vlast imala je u planu da, u dogovoru sa predstavnicima Gvarani autohtonog naroda, formira poseban departman Čako u kome bi oni bili većina, a koji bi se prostirao na delovima Santa Kruza i Benija, što je naišlo na žestoku reakciju tamošnjih autonomaša i dodatno podgrejavalo tezu o političkom autoritarizmu i ekonomskoj eksploataciji koja dolazi iz La Paza. Pored svakodnevnih štrajkova, građanisti su pokušali da parališu funkcionisanje države presecanjem puteva, upadanjem u pojedine državne institucije van glavnog grada, kao i kontrolom protoka gasa i drugih strateški važnih dobara. U samom gradu Santa Kruz bilo je višestrukih izliva rasizma prema tamošnjim urođenicima, ali i vršenja nasilja nad istima u kome se isticala ultradesničarska neonacistička grupa pod imenom Omladinska unija Santa Kruza (*Unión Juvenil Cruceñista*).¹⁷

Da je Boliviji pretila opasnost izbijanja građanskog rata, ali i nasilnog otepljenja Santa Kruza i ostalih regiona „bolivijskog polumeseca“ govori i zvanično saopštenje Eva Moralesa i bolivijske Vlade, iz septembra 2008. godine, u kome se osuđuju pobunjenici iz pet departmana podržani od strane SAD, optuženi da su izazvali nasilje i pljačku javnih preduzeća s ciljem izazivanja građanskog rata i rasparčavanja Bolivije. Štaviše, Morales je naredio da američki ambasador u Boliviji Filip Goldberg (*Philip Goldberg*) bude proteran iz zemlje kao glavni generator separatizma i nasilja.¹⁸ Retorika građanista u Santa Kruz tokom tih napetih meseci 2008. godine nije bila ništa manje oštra i uznemirujuća za širu bolivijsku javnost. Naime, od početka te godine krajnje desna grupa „La Tore“ (*La Torre*), podržana od strane američke ambasade u Boliviji, okupljala je uticajne političare, društvene delatnike i biznismene, između ostalih i tadašnje prefekte¹⁹ departmana Santa Kruz, Beni, Pando i Tariha. Rezultati skupova, seminara, publikacija i drugih oblika aktivnosti „La Tore“ nisu bili samo pozivi na dobijanje autonomnog statusa za posmatrane regione već i apeli da isti postanu nezavisni, a što se posebno odnosilo na departman Santa Kruz za koji je traženo da postane samostalna Republika Santa Kruz. Ekonomska elita Santa Kruza (pre svega nosioci finansijskog i agroindustrijskog kapitala),

¹⁷ *Bolivia: El respeto a los derechos humanos es fundamental para parar la escalada de violencia*, Amnistía Internacional, 12 de Septiembre de 2008, <https://web.archive.org/web/20080918005029/http://bolivia.indymedia.org/node/19421>, 23/12/2023

¹⁸ „El gobierno boliviano alertó sobre la posibilidad de una guerra civil“, *El Litoral*, 11 de Septiembre de 2008.

¹⁹ U to vreme su današnji guverneri departmana nosili titulu prefekta.

s druge strane, planirala je izvršenje tzv. „Plana atentata“ (*Plan de Magnicidio*) nad Evom Moralesom i članovima njegove Vlade uz pomoć dokazanih terorista poput Eduarda Rose (*Eduardo Rosza*), a pod dirigentskom palicom tadašnjeg predsednika Građanskog komiteta Santa Kruza Branka Marinkovića.²⁰ On je posebno interesantna figura kojoj treba posvetiti punu pažnju kada je reč o analizi destabilizirajućih faktora u Boliviji. Branko Marinković Jovičević rođen je u Santa Kruz 1967. godine i ima hrvatsko-crnogorsko poreklo. Reč je o latifundisti i multimilijarderu, jednom od najbogatijih ljudi u Boliviji poznatom pod nadimkom „kralj soje“, ali i krajnjem desničaru. Dugo godina je upravo Marinković važio za najvišeg pripadnika bolivijske sive eminencije i čoveka koji je otvoreno finansirao i javno podržavao ideju proglašenja nezavisnosti departmana Santa Kruz. Morales ga je lično optuživao da planira da razbije Boliviju po uzoru na otepljenje Hrvatske od Jugoslavije 1990-ih, te ga je 2009. godine proterao iz zemlje pod optužbom da je planirao atentat na njega, da bi potom Marinković našao utočište u SAD u kojima je svojevremeno završio studije. Interesantan je podatak da su pripadnici hrvatske emigracije u Boliviji, mahom dobrostojeći ljudi i pripadnici viših društvenih slojeva, jedni od najvatrenijih pristalica nezavisnosti departmana Santa Kruz.²¹

Državni udar 2019. godine

Jedanaest godina kasnije Bolivija se ponovo našla u velikoj institucionalnoj, političkoj i društvenoj krizi u kojoj su pristalice nezavisnosti Santa Kruza i „bolivijskog polumeseca“ uopšte imali važnu ulogu. Naime, 20. oktobra 2019. godine održani su predsednički i parlamentarni izbori u Boliviji, koji su i pre samog dana glasanja izazivali negodovanja i ogorčenje dela bolivijske javnosti budući da je Evo Morales, mimo Ustava Bolivije, odlučio da se četvrti put uzastopno kandiduje za mesto šefa države. Građani Bolivije su se još na referendumu održanom 2016. godine izjasnili protiv Moralesove kandidature, ali je Ustavni sud Bolivije dozvolio Moralesu da se ipak ponovo kandiduje. Na posmatranim izborima iznova su se suočili stari rivali Evo Morales, kao kandidat Pokreta ka socijalizmu, i Karlos Mesa ispred Građanske zajednice. Ovde je važno naglasiti da je prema bolivijskom izbornom zakonodavstvu pobjednik predsedničkih izbora onaj kandidat koji osvoji preko 50% glasova ili onaj koji osvoji bar 40% glasova uz prednost ne manju od 10% u odnosu na drugoplasiranog kandidata. Rezultati izbora, međutim, bili su krajnje kontroverzni s obzirom na to da je, prema zvaničnim podacima bolivijske izborne komisije, Morales osvojio 47,08% glasova, sa prednošću od 10,5% u odnosu na drugoplasiranog Mesu (36,51%), dok je,

²⁰ Galo Amusquivar, „Separatismo 2.0 en Bolivia, Santa Cruz intenta separarse“, *SURCOS*, 15 de noviembre de 2022.

²¹ Pajko Petrović, „Politički sistemi zemalja Latinske Amerike“, 288–289.

sudeći po izveštajima inostranih posmatrača, uključujući i Organizaciju američkih država, celokupan izborni proces bio upitan zbog niza izbornih krađa i manipulacija.²²

Usledili su jedni od najturbulentnijih i najkrvavijih dana u istoriji Bolivije. Nezadovoljni opozicionari, sa centrom u Santa Kruzu, pokrenuli su masovne proteste građana protiv izbornih rezultata, a koji su ubrzo poprimili nasilan karakter kroz direktne fizičke okršaje demonstranata i policije, s jedne strane, i demonstranata i pristalica Moralesa, s druge strane, u kojima je bilo mrtvih. Nakon što su mu policija i vojska otkazali poslušnost, Morales je u strahu da će biti uhapšen najpre obećao ponavljanje izbora, a potom i napustio Boliviju, te kasnije dobija azil u Meksiku. Na mesto predsednika države privremeno je došla dotadašnja druga potpredsednica bolivijskog senata Đanin Anjes (*Jeanine Áñez*). Međutim, već tada se kao snažna opoziciona antievistička figura nametnuo Luis Fernando Kamačo.²³ On je, kao guverner departmana Santa Kruz, imao niz prednosti u odnosu na ostale opozicione kandidate tokom perioda međuvlašća – razrađenu ideologiju od autonomije do nezavisnosti tzv. Republike Santa Kruz kao snažan mobilizatorski faktor, zatim institucionalnu prednost unutar departmana Santa Kruz, partijsku infrastrukturu koalicije „Verujemo“ čiji je predvodnik bio, ekonomsku podršku u vidu krupnih kapitalista koji su finansirali njegovu kampanju, te ekstremizovane i vojnički ustrojene ultradesničarske grupacije poput već pominjane Omladinske unije Santa Kruza, Bolivijske socijalističke falange (*Falange Socialista Boliviana*) i slično. Važnu ulogu u Kamačovoj kampanji igrao je i Marko Pumari (*Marco Pumari*), vođa sindikalaca i veoma popularan u Santa Kruzu iako je kečuanskog urođeničkog porekla iz rivalskog departmana Potosija. Kamačo je, kao što smo već pomenuli, na novim predsedničkim izborima 2020. godine osvojio „tek“ treće mesto iza evističkog kandidata Luisa Arsea (*Luis Arce*) i Karlosa Mese, osvojivši većinu glasova jedino u departmanu Santa Kruz. S druge strane, Arse je osvojio čak 55% glasova i pokazao da evisti u Boliviji ne samo da nisu na kolenima već i da su nikad jači.²⁴

Za organizatore državnog udara iz oktobra 2019. godine, uključujući i Kamaća i druge santakruzijske separatiste i ultranacionaliste, usledio je težak period nakon poraza na predsedničkim i parlamentarnim izborima. Nakon hapšenja Anjesove u martu 2021, te nakon što je osuđena 2022. godine na kaznu zatvora od deset godina zbog organizovanja državnog udara 2019. godine, bilo je jasno da slična sudbina čeka i Kamaća, daleko popularnijeg i po evistički režim opasnijeg političkog protivnika. Pored već navedenih Kamačovih aktivnosti tokom i nakon državnog udara, treba dodati i to da je

²² Rajko Petrović, „Političke promene u Latinskoj Americi u 2019. godini“, *Međunarodna politika*, br. 1178, 2020, 28–29.

²³ Pablo Stefanoni, „Bolivia-después de Evo“, *Análisis Carolina*, Núm. 29, 2019, 8–10.

²⁴ Rajko Petrović, „Politički sistemi zemalja Latinske Amerike“, 283–285.

on tokom istog otvoreno pozivao vojsku i policiju da otkazu poslušnost Moralesu, zatim da je lično organizovao zastoj rada departmana Santa Kruz (npr. avio letova), te da je otvoreno vređao i diskriminisao pripadnike urođeničkih naroda tako što je upao u zgradu bolivijanske vlade unoseći Bibliju i ističući da u Boliviji nikada više neće biti obožavan urođenički kult Pačamame (majke prirode). Krajem decembra 2022. godine bolivijanska policija uhapsila je Kamaća pod optužbom za terorizam, zbog predvođenja antivladinog štrajka u Santa Kruz u 2019. godine. Kamaćove pristalice, međutim, žestoko su se usprotivile takvoj odluci smatrajući da je on otet, a ne uhapšen, te da je žrtva političkog progona. Pored učešća u državnom udaru, Kamaćo je optužen i za vođenje nelegalnih štrajkova u trajanju od 36 dana (sa četiri poginule osobe) protiv sprovođenja popisa u departmanu Santa Kruz koji je bio predviđen za 2024. godinu. Protestanti su ubrzo zapalili kancelariju regionalnog tužilaštva u Santa Kruz, blokirali aerodrom Viru Viru u tom gradu i postavili barikade širom grada zahtevajući da se Kamaćo pusti na slobodu. Uprkos podršci celokupne opozicije, nevladinih organizacija i Stejt Departmenta, Kamaćo je sve do danas ostao u pritvoru.²⁵

Separatistički potencijali departmana Santa Kruz danas i demistifikacija santakruzijske supremacije

Evisti predvođeni Luisom Arseom vratili su se na vlast 2020. godine, vinovnici državnog udara iz 2019. godine, uključujući i Luisa Fernanda Kamaća su uhapšeni, ali to ne znači da je santakruzijski separatizam mrtav. Naprotiv, protesti protiv hapšenja Kamaća, obeleženi nasiljem i novim suprotstavljanjima državnim vlastima od strane građana Santa Kruza, govore u prilog tome da je isti i dalje ne samo vitalan već i agresivan i dobro organizovan. Ipak je reč o istorijskoj kategoriji koja je tokom prethodnih vek i po razvila ideologiju kojom uspeva da opravda svrhu svog postojanja, bez obzira na to koliko je ona zasnovana na činjeničnom stanju.

Ugledni bolivijanski politikolog Fernando Untoha (*Fernando Untoja*) dao je 2022. godine ocenu da separatizam u Santa Kruz, generisan od strane Kamaćove departmanske administracije, a prikriven zvaničnim zahtevima za federalizacijom zemlje, predstavlja veliki bezbednosni izazov za Boliviju. S druge strane, Untoha je upozorio na rasizam kao jedan od generatora santakruzijskog separatizma zasnovan na mitu da su tamošnji stanovnici belci za razliku od zapadnog dela Bolivije, dok činjenice govore sasvim drugačije – da je departman Santa Kruz multietnički i multikulturalan kao i ostatak Bolivije, budući da na njegovom severu žive Ajmare i Kečue.²⁶

²⁵ Vladimir Tanacković, „Hapšenje opozicionog lidera izazvalo nemire u Boliviji: Zbog protesta uhapšen pod optužbom za ‘terorizam’“, 24 sedam, 22 decembar 2022.

²⁶ “Alertan en Bolivia sobre plan separatista de Santa Cruz”, *Prensa Latina*, 28 de diciembre de 2022.

O otpornosti santakruzijskog separatizma danas svedoče mnogi događaji i izjave važnih političkih figura u Boliviji. Tako je predsednik Arse, 5. decembra 2022. godine, na proslavi Dana bolivijske mornarice poručio da Bolivija nikada više neće dozvoliti gubitak ni pedlja svoje zemlje, indirektno se obraćajući Kamaćovim pristalicama u Santa Kruzu, ali i svima koji na prostoru „bolivijskog polumeseca“ sanjaju snove o dezintegraciji Bolivije. Arse je, shodno tome, pokušaje federalizacije Bolivije okarakterisao kao uzroke smrti i boli u Boliviji, te naglasio da im u toj zemlji više nema mesta.²⁷

Romulo Kalvo (*Rómulo Calvo*), predsednik opozicionog Građanskog komiteta, javno je poručio da Bolivija ne želi Santa Kruz, koji treba da preispita svoje odnose sa centralnom vladom.²⁸

Ugledni santakruzijski novinar Marcelo Patsi (*Marcelo Patzi*) više puta je javno iznosio rezultate svog istraživačkog rada, prema kojima je ekonomska elita u tom departmanu skoro pa opsednuta idejom o stvaranju sopstvene nezavisne države. Prema njegovim navodima, posebno je važno razbiti mit o ekonomskoj održivosti potencijalno nezavisnog Santa Kruza, jer bez energenata sa zapada zemlje, a koje ogromne plantaže soje u Santa Kruzu dobijaju, bogatstvo ovog departmana bi bilo daleko manje. Još jedan mit koji je Patsi u svojim istraživanjima razbio jeste da su separatističke snage podjednako snažne u svim delovima departmana Santa Kruz, jer u stvarnosti samo urbani deo ovog departmana, posebno u samom gradu Santa Kruzu, zagovara odvajanje od Bolivije, dok, primera radi, samo 100 kilometara severno od tog grada, u San Hulišanu, seoska populacija lojalna je evističkom režimu, a isto važi i za Japakani smešten 150 kilometara zapadno od Santa Kruza. Ti ljudi su izričito protiv odvajanja departmana Santa Kruza od Bolivije. Konačno, Patsi podseća da ne treba zaboraviti ni to da oko 70% stanovnika ovog departmana vodi poreklo iz nekog drugog dela Bolivije i da mnogi od njih ne žele da prekinu veze sa svojim zavičajem.²⁹

Lisi Tehada (*Licy Tejada*), bolivijska sociološkinja i istraživačica, ukazuje na to da možemo očekivati da pitanje federalizacije Bolivije, ili čak otcepljenja departmana Santa Kruza, bude jedna od najvažnijih tema u političkom životu ove zemlje ubuduće, da će ista biti eksploatisana od strane ultradesničara u Santa Kruzu na svakim od predstojećih izbora, ali i da, s druge strane, ne postoji dovoljno snažna građanska i unificirajuća politička opcija sposobna da takve zahteve amortizuje. Isto tako Tehada je ukazala na sve agresivniji i nasilniji karakter delovanja Omladinske unije Santa Kruza, očekujući pritom nastavak njene dalje radikalizacije i instrumentalizacije od strane političkih i ekonomskih perjanica santakruzijskog separatizma.³⁰

²⁷ Sebastián Ochoa, „¿Hasta dónde se podría cumplir la amenaza de separar a Santa Cruz de Bolivia?“, *Sputnik*, 7 de diciembre de 2022.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

Konačno, teza o identitetskoj, odnosno etno-kulturološkoj supremaciji Santakruzijaca u odnosu na ostatak Bolivije, zaslužuje ozbiljnu i naučno utemeljenu demistifikaciju i mora biti jedna od polaznih osnova za punu demokratizaciju zemlje i očuvanje njene sveukupne bezbednosti. Prvo – savremena genetska istraživanja ne govore u prilog tezi da većina Santakruzijaca ima evropsko poreklo, naprotiv, većina njih (57,4%) imaju urođeničko poreklo protiv koga se suprematisti iz ovog departmana toliko bore. Evropsko poreklo ima njih 39%, što je visok procenat, ali je ono prisutno i u drugim bolivijskim regionima. Tako u Pandu živi 25,8% ljudi evropskog porekla, u Kočabambi ih je 23,9%, a u „rasno oklevetanom“ La Pazu ih je „pristojnih“ 18,5%.³¹ Drugo – već postoje kritički radovi unutar bolivijske akademske zajednice koji pokazuju da je konstruisanje santakruzijskog identiteta, kao bitno drugačijeg od identiteta ostatka Bolivijaca rezultat, između ostalog, i geopolitičkih interesa susednog Paragvaja i Argentine koji su težili da oslabe Boliviju stvaranjem nezavisne „Republike Santa Kruz“, što je bilo posebno izraženo tokom Rata za Čako.³² Treće – upotreba lista koke i ajauaske jeste zastupljena u andskom pojasu Bolivije, ali ona ne može biti posmatrana isključivo kao deo tradicije u kulturološkom ili identitetskom smislu, već pre svega u medicinskom kontekstu, s obzirom na nedostatak kiseonika u vazduhu zbog visoke nadmorske visine (npr. prestonica La Paz je smeštena na preko 3.600 metara nadmorske visine). Četvrto – teza o verskoj različitosti „čisto rimokatoličkog“ Santa Kruza (uz često isticanje simboličnog značenja samog njegovog imena – „sveti krst“ na španskom), nasuprot animizmu, totemizmu ili šamanizmu prisutnom na zapadu Bolivije, takođe je pre naglašena i potiče pre svega od činjenice da je Evo Morales više puta u javnosti isticao da, između ostalog, slavi i kult Pačamame, odnosno majke prirode kao kult svojih predaka Ajmara, ali i da je ulazio u sukobe sa samom Rimokatoličkom crkvom u Boliviji i godinama radio na sekularizaciji zemlje.³³ Ubedljivu većinu u Boliviji i dalje čine rimokatolici (76,8%), sve je više protestanata (7,9%), dok je ostalih, ne računajući ateiste i agnostike, tek 1,7%.

Još 1970-ih godina rimokatoličko sveštenstvo je u okvirima „teologije oslobođenja“ definisalo tešku latinoameričku društveno-ekonomsku stvarnost, koja je obuhvatala i „potlačena“ urođenička verovanja.³⁴ Ona su

³¹ Patricia Taboada-Echalar et al., „The Genetic Legacy of the Pre-Colonial Period in Contemporary Bolivians“, *PLoS ONE*, No. 3, 2013, 1–12.

³² Nelson Alberto Jordán Bazán, „Comentarios y Análisis a la obra de Enrique de Gandía: Santa Cruz de la Sierra, una nueva República en Sudamérica“, *APORTES*, No. 32, 2022, 99.

³³ Verushka Alvizuri, „Indianismo, política y religión en Bolivia (2006–2016)“, *Caravelle*, No. 108, 2017, 83.

³⁴ Opširnije o značaju teologije oslobođenja za Latinsku Ameriku: Dragica Luković Jablanović, *Papa Franja i Latinska Amerika: Nove dimenzije socijalno-ekonomskog i religijskog dijaloga*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2022, 144.

prisutna i danas u delovima bolivijskog društva, više kao posledica sinkretizma (npr. poistovećivanje Pačamame i Deve Marije) negoli mržnje prema hrišćanstvu.³⁵ Peto – tvrdnja da su različiti klimatski uslovi na istoku i zapadu Bolivije uticali na različit etnopsihološki razvoj njihovih žitelja je uistinu problematična, jer kako onda objasniti činjenicu da su npr. identitet Santakruzijaca i njihov istorijski razvoj bitno drugačiji od susednih Paragvajaca koji žive u sličnom klimatskom pojasu, ali i činjenicu da je bolivijski nacionalni identitet Kečua i Ajmara ono što ih je u istorijskom smislu bitno diferenciralo od njihovih saplemenika u Peruu. Očigledno se u slučaju ideologije santakruzijske identitetske supremacije nedovoljno uzima u obzir činjenica o viševekovnom zajedničkom istorijskom i kulturološkom iskustvu većine Bolivijaca u okvirima Kraljevske audijencije Čarkasa u vreme španskog kolonijalizma.

Zaključak

Separatizam u departmanu Santa Kruz danas nesumnjivo predstavlja jednu od najvećih bezbednosnih pretnji u Boliviji. U ovom radu fokusirali smo se na njegov značaj i ulogu u dvema studijama slučaja – političkoj krizi i pobuni iz 2008. godine i državnom udaru iz 2019. godine, kako bismo analizirali i objasnili realne domete santakruzijskog separatizma kao istorijske kategorije. Rezultati našeg istraživanja pokazali su da je isti, kako u ideološkom i konceptualnom smislu uopšte tako i u organizacionom i u smislu delovanja konkretnih društvenih i političkih činilaca, odnosno pokreta, partija i pojedinaca, igrao ključnu ulogu u dvema najvećim krizama u Boliviji u 21. veku, gde su obe ozbiljno ugrožavale opstanak ove države onakve kakvu je danas poznajemo. Rivalitet između zapadnog (andskog) dela Bolivije, koji je izrazito proevistički orijentisan, s jedne strane, i istočnog „bolivijskog polumeseca“, čiji ključni faktor je upravo santakruzijski separatizam neretko uvijen u zahteve za autonomijom, odnosno federalizacijom Bolivije, s druge strane, realnost je na savremenoj bolivijskoj političkoj sceni koja će bitno uticati na dinamiku društvenih, političkih i ekonomskih odnosa u njoj. Iako su ideološke osnove razlikovanja nosilaca santakruzijskog identiteta u odnosu na ostale stanovnike Bolivije krajnje površne i nenaučne, neretko i čisto (kultur)rasističke, one su očigledno u stanju da oblikuju političku volju značajnog dela građana departmana Santa Kruz u jasnom pravcu – dobijanje autonomije kao kratkoročni cilj i proglašenje nezavisnosti tzv. Republike Santa Kruz kao dugoročni cilj. Sa povratkom evista na vlast nakon državnog udara 2020. godine i snažnom centralističkom politikom novog bolivijskog predsednika Huana Arsea, s jedne strane, te hapšenjem Luisa Fernanda Kamaća, personifikacije

santakruzijskog ultranacionalizma 2022. godine, s druge strane, animoziteti između „dve Bolivije“ sve više rastu bez naznaka o argumentovanom dijalogu i nekoj vrsti nacionalnog pomirenja. Jedan od nužnih koraka u tom pravcu svakako bi morala biti i demistifikacija santakruzijske supremacije nad ostatkom bolivijskog življa, budući da ona predstavlja jedan od ključnih generatora centrifugalnih sila u tom departmanu Santa Cruz.

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Otvorena pitanja međunarodnog statusa Palestine

SAŽETAK

Rad analizira složeno mesto Palestine u modernoj međunarodnoj zajednici. Uvodne napomene stvaraju neophodan okvir unutar kojeg se u radu sprovodi analiza i sačinjene su od složenog istorijskog konteksta i osvrta na teorije priznanja u međunarodnom javnom pravu. Centralna analiza počiva na dve činjenice. Prva posmatra Palestinu u kontekstu multilateralne diplomatije – analizirajući njene odnose sa Ujedinjenim nacijama, Evropskom unijom, ali i UNESKOM. Druga je okrenuta složenoj sudskoj praksi na međunarodnom planu, pre svega kroz odnos sa Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom i implementacijom Rimskog statuta, kao i sa Međunarodnim sudom pravde, isključivo kroz predstojeći postupak donošenja savetodavnog mišljenja koje je zatražila Generalna skupština i koje će, neminovno, morati da posveti pažnju i pitanju međunarodnog statusa Palestine.

Ključne reči: Palestina, multilateralna diplomatija, Međunarodni krivični sud, Rimski statut, Međunarodni sud pravde.

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Open questions about the international legal status of Palestine

SUMMARY

The paper analyses the complex position of Palestine in the modern international community. Introductory remarks create the necessary framework within which the analysis is carried out, and they consist of both the complex historical context and references to theories of recognition in international public law. The central analysis rests on two facts. The first observes Palestine in the context of multilateral diplomacy, analysing its relations with the United Nations, the European Union, and UNESCO. The second focuses on complex judicial practice on the international level, primarily through the relationship with the International Criminal Court and the implementation of the Rome Statute, as well as with the International Court of Justice, exclusively through the upcoming procedure of issuing an advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly, which will inevitably have to pay attention to the question of the international legal status of Palestine.

Keywords: Palestine, multilateral diplomacy, International Criminal Court, Rome Statute, International Court of Justice.

Uvodne napomene

Međunarodnopravni status, naročito u modernoj međunarodnoj zajednici, možemo posmatrati iz dvojakog ugla: pozicije javnih međunarodnih organizacija kao oličenja multilateralne diplomatije i država članica međunarodne zajednice prema Palestini, ali i na drugom mestu sudske prakse u pogledu njenog statusa.

Palestina obuhvata istočne obale Sredozemnog mora, preciznije delove modernog Izraela, pojasa Gaze i Zapadne obale reke Jordan.² Reč je o regionu koji nosi posebno svetovno značenje za jevreje, hrišćane i muslimane.³ Zaključenjem mirovnog ugovora iz Lozane i raspadom Otomanskog carstva, između ostalog, formirani su Palestina, Irak i Sirija.⁴ Pojedine odredbe ugovora navedene teritorije označavale su kao države.⁵ Zanimljiv je član 9. XII protokola koji je obezbedio kontinuitet obaveza na osnovu koncesija koje su date od strane Otomanskog carstva, jer je išao u prilog tome da su se nad

² "Palestine", Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Palestine>, 24/10/2023.

³ Ibid.

⁴ John Quigley, "Palestine Statehood and International Law", https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/sites/default/files/Quigley%20-%20Palestine%20statehood%20and%20international%20law%2001.13_0.pdf, 24/10/2023, 1.

⁵ Ibid.

ovom teritorijom formirale države.⁶ Kasnije je tumačenje ovog člana bilo, između ostalog, predmet sporenja pred Stalnim sudom međunarodne pravde koji je potvrdio da je Palestina sukcesor Turske.⁷ Sud je jasno istakao da taj status nije promenjen ni činjenicom da je reč o teritoriji koja je pod mandatnom vlašću Velike Britanije na osnovu aranžmana sa Društvom naroda.⁸

Generalna skupština Organizacije Ujedinjenih nacija (OUN) 1947. godine donela je rezoluciju 181 (II) kojom je pozivala na stvaranje dve države na ovom geografskom području – Izraela i Palestine.⁹ Jerusolim je stavljen pod poseban međunarodnopravni režim.¹⁰ Režim je podrazumevao formiranje *corpus separatum*-a kojim će upravljati administrativna vlast Starateljskog saveta.¹¹ Rezolucija je predvidela formiranje posebne komisije od strane Generalne skupštine koja će, po dolasku u Palestinu i u skladu sa planom iznetim u rezoluciji, pristupiti implementaciji mera za kreiranje granica arapske i jevrejske države, ali i grada Jerusalima.¹² Takođe, predviđeno je da ista komisija, što je moguće pre, pristupi osnivanju i koordiniranju specijalnih tela, tzv. Privremenih državnih saveta u obe države.¹³ Ukoliko ovaj zadatak ne bude ostvaren do prvog aprila 1948. godine o tome će biti obavešten Savet bezbednosti.¹⁴ Komisija bi, po osnivanju ovih organa, naložila da pristupe osnivanju upravnih organa, kako državnih tako i lokalnih.¹⁵ Po ukidanju starateljske vlasti, navedeni organi bi privremeno i postepeno bili odgovorni za vršenje administrativne vlasti sve do uspostavljanja nezavisnosti država.¹⁶

Izrael je u dva navrata 1948. i 1967. godine okupirao i aneksirao delove teritorije koji obuhvataju upravo Zapadnu obalu, Pojas Gaze i Istočni Jerusolim – čime je nastao sukob sa Palestinom.¹⁷ Tokom novembra, godine 1988, Palestinska oslobodilačka organizacija i Nacionalno veće Palestine proklamovali su deklaraciju o nezavisnosti Palestine.¹⁸ Ova deklaracija bila

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Tanvi Bhargava & Rebecca Cardoso, "An examination of Palestine's statehood status through the lens of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber's decision and beyond", *New-York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol. 54, 2021, 1.

¹⁰ "Question of Palestine", General Assembly, <https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/general-assembly/>, 25/10/2023.

¹¹ A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Tanvi Bhargava & Rebecca Cardoso, "An Examination of Palestine's Statehood Status Through The Lens of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber's Decision and Beyond", 14.

¹⁸ John Quigley, "Palestine Statehood and International Law", 4.

je prihvaćena u Generalnoj skupštini OUN rezolucijom 43/177 od 15. decembra iste godine.¹⁹ Rezolucija je pozvala na hitno i pravično rešavanje arapsko-izarelskog sukoba.²⁰ Pored toga, izraelske snage morale su da se povuku sa teritorije Jerusalima koji je bio okupiran od 1967. godine, ali da se obezbedi garancija bezbednosnih aranžmana za sve države u regionu, uključujući i one iz rezolucije 181.²¹ Rezolucija je pozvala i na slobodan pristup svetovnim mestima, religijskim zdanjima i područjima.²² Generalna skupština je ovom rezolucijom tražila i od Saveta bezbednosti da preduzme mere radi održavanja posebne mirovne konferencije za Bliski istok.²³ Naročito podvlačimo da je ovim aktom termin „Palestinska oslobodilačka organizacija“ zamenjen terminom „Palestina“ u sistemu OUN.²⁴

Valja spomenuti i Deklaraciju principa iz 1993. godine koju su putem pregovora iznedrili Izrael i Palestinska oslobodilačka organizacija.²⁵ Ova deklaracija, između ostalih tačaka daljih pregovora, navodi i potrebu utvrđivanja granica – a koje se kao institut međunarodnog prava u prvom planu vezuju za razdvajanje suvereniteta država.²⁶ Naredne godine je oslobodilačka organizacija Palestine formirala posebno telo (Palestinsku nacionalnu samoupravu) sa zadatkom da preuzme administrativnu kontrolu nad teritorijama sa kojih su se izraelske snage povukle.

Prema podacima od aprila 2022. godine – Palestinu kao državu priznalo je 138 država članica OUN i jedan posmatrač.²⁷ Dakle, očigledno je da većina međunarodne zajednice, kako politički tako i pravno podržava status države Palestine.

Navedene okolnosti stvorile su jedan od najozbiljnijih izazova za moderni poredak koji pokušava da izgradi OUN.

Priznanje države u međunarodnom pravu, kao njegovog centralnog subjekta, predstavlja jedno od izuzetno složenih pravno-političkih pitanja savremene međunarodne zajednice, na koje ona do danas nije definitivno odgovorila upravo iz razloga što je to jedno od uporišta političko-normativnog sukoba u biću međunarodnih odnosa. U tom smislu, teorija priznanja je prožeta dvema teorijama – deklarativnom i konstitutivnom teorijom. Deklarativna teorija počiva na premisi da ukoliko entitet ima

¹⁹ A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ John Quigley, "Palestine Statehood and International Law", 2.

²⁶ Ibid., 2.

²⁷ "Countries that Recognize Palestine 2024", World Population Review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-palestine>, 25/10/2023.

elemente suverene vlasti, utvrđene teritorije i postojanog stanovništva, onda taj entitet prerasta u državu.²⁸ Akt priznanja je u tom smislu samo konstatacija nastanka nove države u skladu sa uslovima koje potvrđuje međunarodno pravo.²⁹ S druge strane, konstitutivna teorija ovim elementima pridodaje i akt priznanja od strane drugih država članica.³⁰ Ovo je rezultat realne politike i neprestane borbe država za realizaciju sopstvenih interesa. Ova teorija je potekla još od Ancilotija i Kelsena.³¹ Lauterpaht, međutim, konstruiše teoriju koja bi predstavljala neko srednje rešenje, a po kojoj onda kada države ispune uslove državnosti predviđene međunarodnim pravom, ostale države imaju obavezu da ih priznaju.³² Ova teorija, prožeta elementima obe prethodno navedene teorije, uvažava realnosti državotvornog procesa koji se nekada obavlja vanpravnim sredstvima i pokušava da ta sredstva podvrgne supremaciji međunarodnog prava.³³ U tom smislu, reč je o tzv. mešovitim ili kompromisnim teorijama.³⁴ Praksa, nažalost, svedoči o tome da su slučajevi u kojima države, pa čak i sama Organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija, uspeju da se izdignu iznad političkih interesa i ostanu u okvirima zakonitosti – retki.³⁵ Svakako, suverena vlast je osnovni konstitutivni element države, dok su teritorija i stanovništvo imanentni i nedržavnim entitetima.³⁶ U tom smislu, determinisanje ovog elementa državnosti je od presudne važnosti.

Nema dileme Palestina predstavlja gotovo školski primer entiteta koji je u svojevrsnom procepu – jer niti se može do kraja osloniti na deklarativnu teoriju koja je teorijski prihvatljivija jer postoje ozbiljna pitanja u pogledu suverene vlasti kao konstitutivnog, kvalifikatornog elementa državnosti, ali ni na konstitutivnu teoriju koja je posledica političke realnosti moderne međunarodne zajednice jer postoje jaki opozicionari njenoj državnosti – pre svega Sjedinjene Američke Države (SAD). Primena Lauterpahtovog pristupa samo još više podvlači navedene nedostatke i stavlja ih u jedan odnos u

²⁸ Videti: Milenko Kreća, *Međunarodno javno pravo*, Pravni fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, 2023, 193.

²⁹ Ibid., 193.

³⁰ Ibid., 193.

³¹ Adhiraj Lath & Abhinav Jena, "The Lauterpacht Doctrine: An Objective Attempt Towards State Recognition?", *Berkley Journal of International Law*, <https://www.berkeleyjournalofinternationalallaw.com/post/the-lauterpacht-doctrine-an-objective-attempt-towards-state-recognition#:~:text=Lauterpacht%20formulated%20an%20intermediate%20position,a%20duty%20to%20grant%20recognition,25/10/2023>.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Milenko Kreća, *Međunarodno javno pravo*, 194.

³⁵ Ibid., 196.

³⁶ Ibid., 159.

kojem se oni samo međusobno naglašavaju, udaljavajući Palestinu od jasnog odgovora na statusno pitanje.

Očigledno je posredi vrlo složeno pitanje, kako za teoriju tako i praksu međunarodnog prava. Zbog specifičnog geopolitičkog položaja oba entiteta – od imperativnog je značaja bolje razumevanje pravnog statusa Palestine, njenog odnosa sa Izraelom, ali i najaktuelnijih koraka koje je međunarodna zajednica preduzela kako bi se ovaj kompleksan problem ne samo bolje razumeo u predvorju međunarodne zajednice već i kako bi se konačno razrešio, a međunarodni mir i bezbednost kao jedan od stubova poretka OUN očuvao. U nastavku rada autor će nastojati da razmotri ove činjenice, ostajući pritom u primarnom domenu međunarodnog statusa Palestine.

Status u kontekstu multilateralne diplomatije

Multilateralni kontekst, naročito u smislu pozicije i odnosa Palestine i OUN, u sebi integriše pitanje kreiranja država kao subjekata međunarodnog prava. Reč je u kreiranju država kroz delovanje međunarodnih organizacija i konvencija koje one zaključuju.³⁷

Zahtevi za članstvo u Svetskoj zdravstvenoj organizaciji i UNESCO-u koji su usledili po proglašenju nezavisnosti odbijeni su usled pretnji SAD-a o ukidanju doprinosa ovim organizacijama.³⁸ Međutim, uprkos pretnjama (koje su posle i ostvarene kroz ukidanje finansiranja) 2011. godine Palestina postaje član potonje organizacije.³⁹ Sa 107 glasova za, 14 protiv i 52 uzdržana – Palestina je postala 195. članica ove organizacije.⁴⁰ Ovaj čin sadrži specifičnu diplomatsku težinu i politički značaj. Naime, UNESCO ima posebnu proceduru različitih nivoa zaštite za mesta koja oceni kao deo svetskog kulturnog nasleđa.⁴¹ Reč je o proceduri koja se pokreće na zahtev država.⁴² SAD su glasale protiv i naposljetku istakle da je primanje Palestine u UNESCO preuranjeno i da podriva zajednički cilj postizanja mira na Bliskom istoku.⁴³ Ovi diplomatski potezi Palestine u funkciji su jačanja njenog položaja u kontekstu OUN, iako je reč o specijalizovanim agencijama koje, iako su formalno deo strukture UN, imaju efektivnu autonomiju i sopstvene

³⁷ Jure Vidmar, "Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood", *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 20, DOI: 10.1093/chinesejil/jmt011.

³⁸ John Quigley, "Palestine Statehood and International Law", 23.

³⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁰ Larry D. Johnson, "Palestine's Admission to UNESCO: Consequences within the United Nations", *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 118.

⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

⁴² Ibid., 5.

⁴³ Larry D. Johnson, "Palestine's Admission to UNESCO: Consequences within the United Nations", 118.

procedure prijema država članica.⁴⁴ Ustavni akt ove organizacije propisuje da države nečlanice OUN mogu biti primljene u organizaciju ukoliko, na preporuku Izvršnog odbora, imaju potvrđan glas od strane dve trećine država članica Generalne konferencije.⁴⁵ Po stupanju u članstvo UNESCO-a, Palestina je izjavila da će nastaviti sa naporima da stekne svojstvo člana i ostalim specijalizovanim agencijama.⁴⁶ Naravno, ključni uslov u ovom diplomatskom pohodu ležao je u dobijanju članstva u onim organizacijama gde status člana OUN nije bio jedan od uslova za prijem.⁴⁷ Međutim, ubrzo potom se od ovog diplomatskog kursa odustalo, a usled pretnji SAD da će UNESCO-u uskratiti finansiranje, ali i svakoj agenciji koja primi u članstvo Palestinu.⁴⁸ Zanimljivost je da su prilikom pristupanja Palestine ovoj agenciji SAD izjavile da nisu protiv državnosti Palestine kao takve, već da su protiv toga da se to pitanje rešava mimo bilateralnih pregovora sa Izraelom, a što nas vraća na uvodne napomene o odnosu konstitutivne i deklarativne teorije priznanja države.⁴⁹

OUN su rezolucijom 67/19 Generalne skupštine od 29. novembra 2012. godine, Palestini potvrdile status države posmatrača ne dovodeći u pitanje stečena prava, privilegije i ulogu Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije u Ujedinjenim nacijama kao predstavnika palestinskog naroda, u skladu sa njenim relevantnim rezolucijama i praksom, mada se neformalno taj status tretira gotovo kao status države članice.⁵⁰ Iako ovo nije prva rezolucija koja je nastavila da analizira pitanje statusa Palestine, u modernom kontekstu jeste izuzetno relevantna, te će fokus analize rezolucija upravo počivati na njoj.⁵¹

Predsednik Palestine Mahmud Abas (*Mahmoud Abbas*) o ovoj rezoluciji, između ostalog, rekao je da predstavlja „krštenicu“ Palestine kao države.⁵² Pored navedenog, ona je potvrdila pravo palestinskog naroda na samoopredeljenje i nezavisnost u okviru države Palestine.⁵³ Rezolucija je zadržala viziju dve države i apelovala na hitan nastavak pregovora u okviru mirovnog procesa na Bliskom istoku.⁵⁴ Apel je bio upućen i državama

⁴⁴ Brett D. Schaefer, „What Palestinian Membership Means for UNESCO and the Rest of the United Nations”, The Heritage Foundation, https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2633.pdf, 26/10/2023, 2.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 4-5.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁵⁰ John Quigley, „Palestine Statehood and International Law”, 6.

⁵¹ „Question of Palestine”.

⁵² Jure Vidmar, „Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood”, 19.

⁵³ A/RES/67/19, 29 November 2012.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

članicama, ali i specijalizovanim agencijama da pruže neophodnu podršku narodu Palestine u procesu ostvarivanja prava na samoopredeljenje, nezavisnost i slobodu.⁵⁵

Međutim, dovođenjem Palestine u odnos sa ostalim državama i stvaranjem mogućnosti da se preduzimaju radnje koje su karakteristične za države – ne znači automatski da je reč o državi.⁵⁶ Ovim je samo izvršena formalizacija statusa kakav je Palestini priznat ranije u praksi.⁵⁷ Sticanju statusa posmatrača prethodio je neuspešni pokušaj Palestine da postane članica OUN. Naime, SAD su bile oštro protiv toga i u okviru Saveta bezbednosti zaustavile su postupak prijema.⁵⁸ Međutim, nesporno je da Savet bezbednosti ima viziju postojanja dve države na ovom području – Izraela i Palestine, a što je potvrđeno još rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti 1397 od 12. marta 2002. godine.⁵⁹ Vrlo je važno spomenuti i rezoluciju 2334 od 23. decembra 2016. godine kojom je Savet bezbednosti označio formiranje izraelskih naselja na okupiranoj teritoriji Palestine za tešku povredu međunarodnog prava.⁶⁰ Formiranje ovih naselja smatrano je kao destabilišući faktor mirovnog procesa, ali i procesa formiranja države Palestine.⁶¹ Po samom donošenju prethodno navedene rezolucije Generalne skupštine, ali i neposredno nakon njenog usvajanja, u ovom organu se povela debata oko njene uloge u kontekstu diplomatskih pregovora između Palestine i Izraela.⁶²

Rezolucija 67/19 Generalne skupštine nije pravno obavezujući akt, ali raspolaže značajnim stepenom autoriteta i političkog uticaja. Međutim, u slučaju Palestine taj neformalni segment koji obitava u diplomatskoj areni nije toliko vezan za samu rezoluciju jer je i pre nje 132 države priznalo Palestinu kao suverenu državu.⁶³

Interesantan, ali i vrlo relevantan jeste i odnos Palestine sa Evropskom unijom (EU) kao supranacionalnom organizacijom. Gotovo pola veka EU je bila među vodećim akterima na međunarodnoj sceni koji su se zalagali za diplomatsko rešenje izraelsko-palestinskog konflikta.⁶⁴ Reč je o diplomatskim

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Jure Vidmar, "Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood", 40.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 40.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 40.

⁵⁹ "Background: The question of Palestine", UNCTAD: <https://unctad.org/topic/palestinian-people/The-question-of-Palestine>, 29/10/2023.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² John Quigley, "Palestine Statehood and International Law", 1.

⁶³ Jure Vidmar, "Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood", 41.

⁶⁴ Lisa Strömbom & Anders Persson, "The two-state impasse in Israel/Palestine – The EU caught between egalitarian norms and expansionist realpolitik", *Frontiers in Political Science*, Vol. 5, 2023, DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2023.1049938.

aktivnostima koje se vezuju još za Evropske zajednice.⁶⁵ Venecijanskom deklaracijom iz 1980. godine – Evropska unija je podržala koncept prava na samoopredeljenje palestinskog naroda.⁶⁶ Deklaracija je istakla da je došlo vreme za promociju i priznanje kako Izraela tako i legitimnih prava palestinskog naroda.⁶⁷ Ona je takođe videla važnu ulogu Palestinske oslobodilačke organizacije u pregovaračkom procesu.⁶⁸ Zalagala se za ideje međusobnog priznanja i za mir, a što je našlo svoje mesto u ključnim principima procesa iz Osla.⁶⁹ Ona je takođe u periodu od 1993. godine do 1997. godine bila najveći zasebni finansijer projekata namenjenih izgradnji demokratskih institucija na ovoj teritoriji.⁷⁰ Evropska unija je u tom smislu svoje spoljno delovanje usmerila u pravcu konstituisanja demokratskog režima koji neće dati povoda ni Izraelu, ali ni SAD kao njegovom najvećem savezniku, da ne učestvuje u pregovaračkom procesu.⁷¹ U tom smislu, diplomatski aparat EU je još od početka ovoga veka aktivan u odnosima sa Palestinom, kako posredstvom Visokog predstavnika, Specijalnog izaslanika tako i brojnih pojedinačnih inicijativa država članica EU.⁷² Normativni uticaj EU je bio toliko prisutan da se odrazio i na pristup i instrumente koje su implementirale i same SAD.⁷³ Iako je EU često zamerano da je ona pre bila finansijer nego aktivni diplomatski akter, ne može se osporiti njen značaj u celokupnom procesu.⁷⁴ Uostalom, 1999. godine je u Deklaraciji iz Berlina eksplicitno podržala ideju palestinske države koja počiva na pravu na samoopredeljenje.⁷⁵ Tri godine kasnije, Deklaracijom iz Sevilje, ona je po prvi put podržala rešenje dve države koje će počivati na granicama iz 1967. godine uz manje ispravke, ukoliko su stranke saglasne i to bude neophodno.⁷⁶ Ovim aktom je prvi put EU adresirala pitanje konačnog statusa

⁶⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁶⁶ Sanford R. Silverberg, "Diplomatic Recognition of States in Statu Nascendi: The Case of Palestine", *Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L.*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 21.

⁶⁷ "Venice declaration on the Middle East", United Nations, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209872/>, 25/10/2023.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Lisa Strömbom & Anders Persson, "The two-state impasse in Israel/Palestine – The EU caught between egalitarian norms and expansionist realpolitik", 5.

⁷⁰ Sanford R. Silverberg, "Diplomatic Recognition of States in Statu Nascendi: The Case of Palestine", 42.

⁷¹ Natalie Tocci, "Does the EU Promote Democracy in Palestine?", in: *Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood*, Michael Emerson (ed.), Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, 133.

⁷² Ibid., 135.

⁷³ Lisa Strömbom & Anders Persson, "The two-state impasse in Israel/Palestine – The EU caught between egalitarian norms and expansionist realpolitik", 5.

⁷⁴ Pogledati: Ibid., 5.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 5–6.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 6.

Jerusalima.⁷⁷ Godine 2009. Evropski savet je pozvao na imenovanje Jerusalima kao prestonice buduće palestinske države.⁷⁸ Međutim, kada je 2011. godine Palestina pokušala da postane članica OUN, brojne države članice nisu tu podršku prenele sa nivoa EU na nivo OUN – ona je zakazala.⁷⁹ Iako koncept „dve države“ deluje sve neubedljivije kako vreme odmiče, EU još uvek zastupa ovo rešenje.⁸⁰ Reč je o stavu koji je pronašao svoje mesto i u novoj diplomatskoj konstelaciji diplomatskog sistema Evropske unije oličene u pojačanoj ulozi Visokog predstavnika i Evropske službe za spoljnu akciju.⁸¹

Ukoliko bi putem članstva u međunarodnim organizacijama bilo moguće sticanje statusa države, onda bi se sprovodio svojevrstan „obrnuti inženjering“ u pogledu kreacije država i jedan proces koji se mora vezivati za deklarativnu teoriju, inherentno bi se otrgnuo ka konstitutivnoj teoriji i političkom procesu glasanja unutar međunarodnih organizacija, a što je slučaj kako u OUN tako i Unesku kao referentnim primerima.⁸² Ovo je vrlo opasno jer bi se onda entiteti koji ispunjavaju uslove predviđene deklarativnom teorijom mogli vrlo lako uskratiti za svoj status, a entiteti čiji su elementi državnosti sporni mogli uključiti kao subjekti, ili nešto vrlo blizu njima, u okvire moderne multilateralne diplomatije. Palestina je upravo dokaz ove realnosti.

Sudska praksa o međunarodnom statusu Palestine

Stalni sud međunarodne pravde Palestinu je označio kao sukcesora na istoimenoj teritoriji.⁸³

Međutim, od presudnog značaja ovde jeste odnos Palestine sa Međunarodnim krivičnom sudom, ali i odskora sa Međunarodnim sudom pravde. Palestinsko nacionalno telo, koje smo spominjali u prethodnim pasusima, 2009. godine je na osnovu člana 12(3) Rimskog statuta (Statut) putem deklaracije prihvatila nadležnost Međunarodnog krivičnog suda.⁸⁴ Navedeni član omogućava državi koja nije članica Statuta da retroaktivno

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 5–6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 5–6.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 5–6.

⁸¹ “The European Union and Palestinians”, The Office of the European Union Representative of West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/palestine/european-union-and-palestine_en?s=206, 27/10/2023.

⁸² Jure Vidmar, “Palestine and the Conceptual Problem of Implicit Statehood”, 40.

⁸³ John Quigley, “Palestine Statehood and International Law”, 1.

⁸⁴ Sajjad Abbasi, “The Decision of the International Criminal Court in the Palestine Situation: A Beginning in the Prevention of Impunity for Israeli Crimes”, *Iranian Review for UN Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2023, DOI: 10.22034/IRUNS.2023.168478, 24.

prihvati njegovu nadležnost.⁸⁵ Ovaj potez je usledio kao odgovor na prvi rat u pojasu Gaze tokom 2008. i 2009. godine.⁸⁶

Nakon što je ovaj tribunal odbio 2012. godine da preuzme nadležnost budući da Palestina nije član OUN,⁸⁷ ona je ponovila ovaj korak i 2015. godine referišući istom sudu u pogledu navodnih izraelskih zločina na teritoriji Palestine u periodu od 2014. godine.⁸⁸ Takođe, u skladu sa članom 125(2) Statuta deponovala je instrument i kod Generalnog sekretara UN.⁸⁹ Nakon ove deklaracije, iako nije uspostavljena obaveza u pogledu pridruživanja države Rimskom statutu, definitivno jeste u pogledu neophodne istrage situacije sadržane u deklaraciji.⁹⁰ Do kraja 2019. godine tužilac je utvrdio da su svi kriterijumi za utvrđivanje nadležnosti, a koji su postavljeni Statutom – ispunjeni.⁹¹ Međutim, tužilac je s obzirom na nedeterminisan status Palestine, na osnovu člana 19(3) zatražio mišljenje Sudećeg i Veća za vođenje prethodnog postupka.⁹² Ovaj zahtev se temeljio na brojnim pravnim i faktičkim problemima vezanim za ovu situaciju.⁹³ Reč je o stavu koji autor deli, te da jeste bio potreban viši normativni, ali uostalom i politički autoritet oličan u organima Suda koje smo naveli.

Sud je prihvatio nadležnost 2021. godine i utvrdio da Palestina, na osnovu rezolucije Generalne skupštine koju smo pominjali, i prava palestinskog naroda na samoopredeljenje, ali i činjenice da je u konkretnom slučaju reč o teritoriji koja potpada pod vlast države koja se obratila sudu – ima pravo da se pozove na član 12 Statuta.⁹⁴ Time je proces obraćanja Međunarodnom krivičnom sudu dug dvanaest godina okončan, a istraga o navodnim ratnim zločinima inicirana.⁹⁵ Ova odluka počiva upravo na

⁸⁵ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁶ Hakim Lamri, "Palestine and International Criminal Court, Prospects and Challenges for 2023", *Revue Européenne du Droit Social*, Vol. 59, No. 2, 98, DOI: 10.53373/ REDS.2023.59.2.015.

⁸⁷ Sajjad Abbasi, "The Decision of the International Criminal Court in the Palestine Situation: A Beginning in the Prevention of Impunity for Israeli Crimes", 26.

⁸⁸ Margot Devlaminck, "The Israeli-Palestinian question Before The International Criminal Court: Does The Court have Jurisdiction?", Master Thesis, Ghent University, 2023.

⁸⁹ Sajjad Abbasi, "The Decision of the International Criminal Court in the Palestine Situation: A Beginning in the Prevention of Impunity for Israeli Crimes", 24.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 24.

⁹¹ Hakim Lamri, "Palestine and International Criminal Court, Prospects and Challenges for 2023", 97.

⁹² Sajjad Abbasi, "The Decision of the International Criminal Court in the Palestine Situation: A Beginning in the Prevention of Impunity for Israeli Crimes", 47.

⁹³ Hakim Lamri, "Palestine and International Criminal Court, Prospects and Challenges for 2023", 97.

⁹⁴ Sajjad Abbasi, "The Decision of the International Criminal Court in the Palestine Situation: A Beginning in the Prevention of Impunity for Israeli Crimes", 47.

⁹⁵ Hakim Lamri, "Palestine and International Criminal Court, Prospects and Challenges for 2023", 100.

premissi da je Palestina odista država.⁹⁶ Vrlo važna napomena leži u rezonovanju suda da se njegova nadležnost prostire nad teritorijom pod istragom, iako Palestina nad tom teritorijom ne raspolaže suverenom vlašću.⁹⁷ Ono što je vrlo zanimljivo u ovom kontekstu, ali i apsolutno očekivano, jeste da je Izrael odbio da sarađuje sa Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom, iako je dobio zvanično pismo od strane tužioca, pozivajući se na činjenicu da on nije država članica Rimskog statuta.⁹⁸

Vrlo zanimljivo i aktuelno pitanje jeste i pitanje Međunarodnog suda (Sud) pravde u ovom kontekstu. U avgustu ove godine, Sud je uputio zahtev Generalne skupštine OUN za donošenje savetodavnog mišljenja u vezi pravnih posledica okupacije palestinskih teritorija od strane Izraela.⁹⁹ Naime, Generalna skupština je donela rezoluciju A/RES/77/247 u decembru prošle godine i postavila sledeća pitanja Međunarodnom sudu pravde: „Koje su pravne posledice kontinuirane povrede prava naroda Palestine na samoopredeljenje, a koje vrši Izrael, njegove prolongirane okupacije, naseljavanja i aneksije palestinske teritorije okupirane od 1967. godine, uključujući i mere usmerene na promenu demografske kompozicije, karaktera i statusa svetog grada Jerusalima i usvajanja povezane diskriminatorne legislative i mera?“¹⁰⁰ U tački (b), Generalna skupština nastavlja sa svojim pitanjem: „Kako pravne posledice politika i mera koje sprovodi Izrael utiču na pravni status okupacije i koje pravne posledice proizlaze za sve države i Ujedinjene nacije iz ovakvog statusa?“. Do 25. jula (do kada je bio utvrđen inicijalan rok), 55 država je poslalo svoje izjave povodom ovog pitanja, a sud je dozvolio još Senegalu i Zambiji da preda svoja mišljenja 28. jula i 3. avgusta. Ovo će biti jedno vrlo važno poglavlje u praksi Međunarodnog suda pravde koji se pitanjem Izraela i Palestine bavio poslednji put 2004. godine kada je utvrdio da su izraelske barikade bespravno postavljene, a naselja oformljena u suprotnosti sa međunarodnim pravom.¹⁰¹ Reč je o koraku o kojem se razmišljalo već nekoliko godina

⁹⁶ Sajjad Abbasi, "The Decision of the International Criminal Court in the Palestine Situation: A Beginning in the Prevention of Impunity for Israeli Crimes", 47.

⁹⁷ Michelle Staggs Kelsall, "Between false messiah and symbolic politics: The International Criminal Court and the 'Situation in the State of Palestine'", *The Palestine Yearbook of International Law Online*, Vol, 23, No. 1, 2022, DOI: 10.1163/22116141_023010_005.

⁹⁸ Hakim Lamri, "Palestine and International Criminal Court, Prospects and Challenges for 2023", 102.

⁹⁹ "World Court says it has received U.N. request for opinion on Israel occupation", *Reuters*, 20 January 2023.

¹⁰⁰ "Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (Request for Advisory Opinion No. 2023/55)", 23 October 2023.

¹⁰¹ "World Court says it has received U.N. request for opinion on Israel occupation".

unazad, ali koji je došao do tačke kuljanja usled diplomatske inertnosti, isključenosti SAD-a i izbora desno-orijentisane vlade u Izraelu.¹⁰²

O složenosti celokupne situacije i mestu Međunarodnog suda pravde u njoj možda i najplastičnije svedoče izjave stalnog posmatrača za Palestinu Rijada Mansoura (Riyad Mansour) koji smatra da je Izrael poprilično oštar prema Palestincima i da su oni kontinuirano meta njihovih napada i žrtve njihovih zločina.¹⁰³ U pogledu predmetnog savetodavnog mišljenja, između ostalog, izjavio je da se njegova delegacija intenzivno priprema za podnošenje dodatnih dokumenata Sudu.¹⁰⁴ Za 25. oktobar priprema se replika za Sud povodom nekoliko izjava da se Sud u ovaj proces ne treba mešati u nešto što je očigledno politički, a ne pravni proces.¹⁰⁵

Takođe, Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo (UK) se oštro usprotivilo savetodavnom postupku u pogledu Palestine i Izraela. Napisano na više od četrdeset strana, pravno mišljenje je oštro protiv izjašnjavanja Suda.¹⁰⁶ Između ostalog, UK je istakla da bi donošenje savetodavnog mišljenja negativno uticalo na spor koji je u suštini bilateralne prirode jer bi se o pitanju odlučivalo bez saglasnosti jedne od država u pitanju.¹⁰⁷ Potom, Sud nije opremljen neophodnim sredstvima kako bi mogao da prouči širok spektar složenih činjeničnih problema koji se odnose na celokupnu istoriju sukoba stranaka.¹⁰⁸ Dalje, savetodavno mišljenje bilo bi u suprotnosti sa postojećim sporazumima između stranaka u okvirima pregovora koje zastupaju UN.¹⁰⁹ Zatim, sam zahtev nije primeren jer postavlja pitanje tako da formira pretpostavku nelegalnog ponašanja Izraela.¹¹⁰ Autor deli mišljenje velikog dela međunarodne zajednice da je reč o mišljenju koje je, pre svega, politički motivisano. Naime, pitanje odnosa Izraela i Palestine jako dugo nije pitanje koje se svodi na bilateralni sukob već, kao što smo videli, privlači budnu i kontinuiranu pažnju čitave međunarodne zajednice. Potom, ne sme se izgubiti iz vida da je reč o savetodavnom mišljenju, te sud nije vezan klasičnim postulatima fakultativnog sudstva, jer nije reč o sudskom već

¹⁰² Hugh Lovatt, "After years of diplomatic inertia, what can the ICJ offer Palestinians?", <https://www.972mag.com/israel-icj-palestinians-occupation/>, 25/10/2023.

¹⁰³ Prema podacima Komiteta za neotuđiva prava palestinskog naroda. "Case Before International Court of Justice Will Expose Israel's Prolonged Illegal Policies, Permanent Observer Tells Palestinian Rights Committee", <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gapal1454.doc.htm>, 28/10/2023.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Bethan McKernan, "UK 'seeking to block ICJ ruling' on Israeli occupation of Palestine", *Guardian*, 24 August 2023.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

savetodavnom postupku. Zatim, upitivati opremljenost i stručnost glavnog sudskog organa najveće svetske organizacije, čini se gotovo neumesnim. Ova teza dobija na posebnoj težini kada se uvaži činjenica da je plenarni organ OUN uputio ovo pitanje Sudu. Reč je o instituciji koja raspolaže izuzetnim stepenom formalnog i materijalnog autoriteta jer, s jedne strane, Poveljom je u članu 92 predviđen kao glavni sudski organ organizacije UN,¹¹¹ odnosno okuplja izuzetne stručnjake iz oblasti međunarodnog prava. Što se tiče kvaliteta i kompatibiliteta postojećih sporazuma između dva entiteta, očigledno je da se oni nisu pokazali kao efektivno sredstvo. Konačno, autor uviđa da postoji linija argumentacije u pogledu pretpostavke nelegalnog ponašanja Izraela, te je u tom smislu poželjno postavljati pitanja što je moguće neutralnije, jer se time pruža ne samo neophodan stepen uvažavanja entiteta na međunarodnoj sceni već se i Sudu daje neophodna širina u postupku iznedrivanja savetodavnog mišljenja.

Svakako, priroda akta koji bi iznedrio Međunarodni sud je savetodavna, te se ne bi moglo reći da bi sud donosio presudu koja raspolaže obavezujućim dejstvom. Dakle, time sud ne bi „rešio“ eksplicitno ništa, ali bi rasvetlio situaciju koja je od značaja za celu međunarodnu zajednicu i aktuelizovao bi problem novim dešavanjima, kako na vanpravnom tako i na faktičkom planu. Autor smatra da je ovo naročito važno kada se uzme u obzir sve lošija situacija na terenu po oba entiteta koja više nije u okvirima samo diplomatskog i konzularnog i humanitarnog prava, već zadire i u same temelje očuvanja ljudskih prava. Reč je o instrumentalizaciji visokog stepena moralnog i političkog autoriteta sudija, i njegovo stavljanje u funkciju iznedrivanja temeljne pravne analize koja bi mogla poslužiti kao jasan i aktuelan osnov za preduzimanje konkretnih pravni radnji koje bi mogle imati neposrednije i direktnije dejstvo. Dalje, uvideli smo iz ranijih pasusa da je stepen političke zainteresovanosti za ovo pitanje izuzetan i da je Generalna skupština, kao oličenje demokratske međunarodne zajednice, ta koja upućuje ovaj zahtev, te autor doživljava ovo pre kao nastavak delovanja organa OUN po ovom pitanju nego zauzimanje dijametralno suprotnih stavova koji bi podrivali dosadašnji učinak. Međutim, autor deli mišljenje da je pitanje formulisano na takav način da ostavlja prostor da se lako sklizne u označavanje Izraela kao isključivog krivca. Autor smatra da međunarodni odnosi i međunarodno pravo, kako bi se otrgli od mnoštva političkih interesa koji ih prožimaju, moraju na nivou organizacije OUN biti postavljeni neutralno. Naime, države članice će uvek, sasvim prirodno, čak i opravdano, težiti ostvarenju sopstvenih nacionalnih interesa. Zbog toga je, između ostalog, nauka diplomatskog i konzularnog prava toliko zastupljena u teoriji i praksi kao ključni instrument ostvarivanja ovih interesa. Stoga, autor smatra da je pitanje, preciznije tačka pod (a) mogla biti postavljena možda na

¹¹¹ „Povelja Organizacije Ujedinjenih nacija“, čl. 92, https://ius.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/povelja_un.pdf, 25/10/2023.

neutralniji način jednim potezom – formulisanjem prvog dela pitanja kroz pravne i faktičke radnje Izraela ostavljajući Međunarodnom sudu pravde da ih ispita i njihovu prirodu utvrdi. Autor je, međutim, utiska da se ovakva formulacija nije iskoristila kako bi se jasno stavilo do znanja Sudu da mora direktno i precizno ući u navedene tačke.

Konačno, studija bivšeg specijalnog izvestiona Majkla Linka (*Michael Lynk*), koju je predstavio Komitetu za neotuđiva prava palestinskog naroda, iznosi tri peremptorne norme međunarodnog prava koje bi utvrdile da li je Izrael ilegalno okupirao palestinske teritorije. On je istakao da je reč o pitanju koje u međunarodnoj zajednici nije tretirano kao lako.¹¹² Pritom, iako su brojni aspekti okupacije sami po sebi nelegalni, centralni cilj studije leži u determinisanju da li je okupacija sama po sebi nelegalna, i ako jeste – koje su posledice po sam Izrael, međunarodnu zajednicu ali i OUN.¹¹³

Prva peremptorna norma na kojoj studija počiva tiče se davanja odgovora na pitanje da li je država okupant pribegla aneksiji delova okupirane teritorije; da li je povredila pravo naroda na toj teritoriji na samoopredeljenje i da li sprovodi politiku diskriminacije ili aparthejda na toj teritoriji?¹¹⁴ Povreda neke od ovih normi bila bi indikator nelegalnosti okupacije, a povreda svih – jasan dokaz iste.¹¹⁵ Studija je zaključila da prema svim navedenim osnovima Izrael jeste okupirao ove teritorije i da je reč o pitanjima koja će definitivno doći pred Sud.¹¹⁶ Ono što je dodatno zabrinjavajuće jeste da je, a kako je Link napomenuo, studija pronašla paralele između situacije u Izraelu i situacije u Namibiji i aparthejda koji je tamo sprovodila Južnoafrička republika.¹¹⁷ Nakon diskusije unutar ovog komiteta, nacrt godišnjeg izveštaja Generalnoj skupštini je odobren i biće prezentovan tokom diskusije o „Palestinskom pitanju“ 28. novembra ove godine.¹¹⁸

Zaključak

Međunarodnopravni status Palestine predstavlja jedno vrlo složeno pitanje, a koje se nalazi u razdoru između pravnih i političkih elemenata moderne međunarodne zajednice. Teorijski posmatrano, u čisto deklarativnom smislu teško da se može govoriti o državi primarno usled pitanja jasne suverene vlasti na pomenutim teritorijama. Međutim, čak iako bi uvažili političke realnosti i složenu dinamiku moderne diplomatije, te dali

¹¹² Prema podacima Komiteta za neotuđiva prava palestinskog naroda.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

i odgovarajući stepen značaja konstitutivnoj teoriji priznanja država u međunarodnom pravu, onda se argument u prilog državnosti Palestine nadograđuje jer, kao što smo rekli, veliki deo međunarodne zajednice jeste uvažio ovakav status Palestini, ako ništa kroz rezoluciju Generalne skupštine 67/19, ali i „viziju dve države“ Saveta bezbednosti. Saveznik ove vizije jeste i EU, iako je, nažalost, reč o podršci koja se, kao što smo videli, ne prenosi dobro sa nivoa EU na nivo njenih država članica.

Ukoliko bi se samo članstvo, ali i obim istog u međunarodnim organizacijama, uzelo kao presudan faktor u determinisanju država, onda bi se radilo o svojevrsnom obrnutom državotvornom inženjeringu koji je naročito opasan jer je plodno tlo za političke zloupotrebe i lobiranja.

Neretko se složena, politički osetljiva pitanja u međunarodnoj zajednici nametnu stvarnim životom i budu predmet prakse međunarodnog pravosuđa. Ni ovo pitanje nije izuzetak. U tom smislu, Međunarodni krivični sud jeste postavio premisu državnosti Palestine. Međutim, sve oči međunarodne zajednice će u narednom periodu biti uprte upravo u Međunarodni sud pravde i proces donošenja savetodavnog mišljenja o pitanju „Pravne posledice koje proizlaze iz praksi i politika Izraela na okupiranoj palestinskoj teritoriji, uključujući i istočni Jerusalim“. U ovom procesu, deluje da će Sud neminovno morati da se pozabavi i pitanjem međunarodnog statusa Palestine iz razloga što je reč o pitanju koje prožima gotovo sve aspekte egzistencije i funkcionisanja ovog entiteta, te da donošenje savetodavnog mišljenja neće moći da to pitanje zaobiđe. Čak i ukoliko se pitanje statusa otvori u manjoj meri, njegov značaj u savremenim okolnostima svakako nosi sa sobom izuzetnu težinu. Međutim, s druge strane, ne smemo izgubiti iz vida tradicionalnu podršku koju Izrael uživa od strane velikih svetskih sila, prvenstveno SAD-a. Sve dok je takav interes prisutan, predmetno pitanje biće izrazito prožeto političkim interesima koji, nažalost, nose sa sobom potencijal udaljavanja od poretka OUN.

Ovo, međutim, ne znači da Sud neće doneti savetodavno mišljenje u kojem dalje afirmiše status državnosti Palestine, jer za to postoje jasni presedani i stalnog Međunarodnog krivičnog suda, ali i pomenutog stava Generalne skupštine OUN, kao oličenja demokratske zajednice modernog čovečanstva. Uostalom, državnost Palestine leži i u samom konceptu i viziji „dve države“ koju zastupa Savet bezbednosti. Pritom, striktno teorijski posmatrano, nesporno je da postoje manjkavosti u pogledu konstitutivnih elemenata državnosti u slučaju Palestine, u protivnom bi pitanje njenog statusa bilo jasnije.

Zaključno, celokupan proces izraelsko-palestinskog pitanja mora se strogo vezati za institucije i mehanizme OUN, kako u pogledu rešavanja sukoba, a čime će se i konstitutivni elementi državnosti iskristalisati, tako i u kontekstu političke volje na nivou Saveta bezbednosti – da se proces prijema Palestine kao prisutnog diplomatskog aktera zaokruži statusom punopravnog člana.

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(Ne)mogućnost sekuritizacije nedostatka pijaće vode u slučaju Supsaharske Afrike

SAŽETAK

Voda i klimatske promene su nužno povezane jer klimatske promene usložnjavaju postojeće probleme pristupa čistoj vodi, poput građanskih sukoba kojima se otežava pristup izvorima vode, nedovoljno razvijena infrastruktura, prenaseljenost stanovništva i zagađenje otpadnim vodama. Oslanjajući se na osnovne činioce teorije sekuritizacije, rad nastoji da ispita mogućnosti procesa sekuritizacije u rešavanju problema koji velikim delom izazivaju klimatske promene. Za studiju slučaja uzete su ugrožene države Supsaharske Afrike, koje su analizirane kroz problem nedostatka pijaće vode. Nedostatak pijaće vode, čiji su uzročnici brojni, znači da su zahtevi za vodnim resursima i ljudska konzumacija u disproporciji. Dominantni problemi sa kojima se suočavaju afričke zemlje su suša, poplave i zagađenje vode, što je pokazano na primerima Južne Afrike, Tanzanije, Čada, Madagaskara, Kenije, Malavija i Gane. U radu se dolazi do zaključka da uprkos preduzetim merama i izvesnim pomacima, shodno datoj problematici, afričke države nemaju ispunjene sve uslove koje sekuritizacija sugerise, a uz to nemaju ni sredstava kojima bi finansirale takve poduhvate. U doglednoj budućnosti, smeštanje problema u regionalni okvir i saradnja afričkih država u tom formatu, pokazuju veći potencijal u rešavanju ovog kompleksnog problema.

Cljučne reči: sekuritizacija, politizacija, Afrika, Supsaharska Afrika, mere, nedostatak pijaće vode, klimatske promene, regionalna saradnja.

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(In) ability to securitize the lack of drinking water in the case of sub-Saharan Africa

SUMMARY

Water and climate change are inherently linked because climate change complicates existing problems related to access to clean water, such as civil conflicts hindering access to water sources, underdeveloped infrastructure, overpopulation, and wastewater pollution. Relying on the basic factors of securitization theory, the paper examines the possibilities of the securitization process in solving problems caused by climate change. For the case study, vulnerable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were selected and analysed in relation to the issue of insufficient drinking water. The lack of drinking water, caused by various factors, means that demands for water resources and human consumption are disproportionate. Dominant problems African countries face include drought, floods, and water pollution, as evidenced by examples from South Africa, Tanzania, Chad, Madagascar, Kenya, Malawi, and Ghana. The paper concludes that despite the measures taken and certain progress, African countries do not meet all the conditions suggested by securitization, and furthermore, they lack the means to finance such endeavours. In the foreseeable future, addressing the problem within a regional framework and cooperation among African countries in that format show greater potential for resolving this complex problem.

Keywords: securitization, politicisation, Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, measures, lack of drinking water, climate change, regional cooperation.

Uvod

Pojam bezbednosti se skoro do kraja 20. veka isključivo fokusirao na teme koje su podrazumevale vidljive i trenutne probleme, oličene prvenstveno u hladnoratovskim oružanim sukobima, pitanjima koja su se ticala rata i mira, ali ne i pitanjima zaštite životne sredine. Kako je vek odmicao postepeno je došlo do promene paradigme, koju je obeležilo prihvatanje uzajamnog odnosa ljudskih aktivnosti i životne sredine. Čovek se prema prirodi postavio kao kolonizator koji ne odgovara za svoje posledice, a dozvoljeno mu je da čini sve što je neophodno da se on oseća ispunjeno. Samo neki od problema sa kojima se Zemlja suočava su problem kiselih kiša, emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte, globalno, ozonske rupe, prekomerna eksploatacija prirodnih resursa i zagađenje vode, vazduha i zemljišta. U odsustvu adekvatnih poziva, konvencija ili akcija koje bi ekološki probudile društvo, političkom javnom diskursu je nedostajala volja za bavljenjem pitanjima koji su ocenjena kao „neprofitabilna“. Posledično, sve veće prisustvo bezbednosnih izazova, ispoljenih na globalnom, regionalnom i nacionalnom nivou, ukazalo je na potrebu izgradnje sistemskog pristupa

očuvanju društva i ekološke bezbednosti. Tek sa konferencijama Ujedinjenih nacija počinje postepeno podizanje svesti o važnosti načina na koji ljudi žive, ali i čovekovog uticaja na postojeće promene koje planeta Zemlja proživljava. Prva Konferencija Ujedinjenih nacija koja je posvećena životnoj (čovekovoj) sredini je održana tek 1972. godine u Stokholmu.²

Najveća bojazan današnjice su klimatske promene. To je samo jedan od fenomena koji ekologija izučava, ali je najzastupljenija tema u međunarodnim odnosima i u globalnom društvu. Globalna diplomatija ne može da zaobiđe klimatske promene koje pogađaju čitav svet. Kako se globalno društvo konstantno kretalo ka razvoju i napretku, pre svega tehnološkom i industrijskom, tako danas ono mora da vodi zajedničkoj akciji ka rešavanju samog uzroka i posledica koje su pre svega vidljive u klimatskim promenama.³ Iako klimatske promene izazivaju brojne posledice (zagrevanje planete, promena kvaliteta vode, zemljišta i vazduha, pojačane efekte El Ninja), rad će se usmeriti na problem pijaće vode u Supsaharskoj Africi.

Nedostatak pijaće vode možemo da definišemo kao disproporcionalan odnos između potrebe za vodom i dostupnih resursa. Prema podacima *Earth.org* ukoliko ne dođe do unapređenja i rešavanja problema nedostatka vode do 2030. godine oko 700 miliona ljudi će biti raseljeno.⁴ Takođe, uviđa se da je najveći problem Supsaharske Afrike ekonomski nedostatak vode, odnosno da ne postoji dobro upravljanje državama i adekvatna infrastruktura prilikom korišćenja resursa. Svetska zdravstvena organizacija je 2021. godine istakla da svega 3% vode na svetu predstavlja pijaća voda, a da oko 1.42 milijarde ljudi živi u vodeno-ugroženim područjima.⁵ Kao neke od glavnih uzročnika nedostatka pijaće vode možemo da identifikujemo ljudske aktivnosti kojima se izazivaju klimatske promene (zagrevanje Zemlje), prekomerna eksploatacija, urbanizacija i brz rast stanovništva u Africi (u Supsaharskoj Africi stanovništvo raste svake godine 2,7%).⁶ Takođe, kao uzročnici se mogu identifikovati i sukobi i migracije, jer se uviđa da raste broj incidenata povezanih sa vodom.⁷

Cilj ovog istraživanja je da se ispita da li je i u kojoj meri proces sekuritizacije efikasan u rešavanju problema nedostatka pijaće vode u

² "United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16 June 1972", <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/stockholm1972>, 15/11/2023.

³ Mizan R. Khan, "Climate Change, Adaptation and International Relations Theory", in: *Environment, Climate Change and International Relations*, Gustavo Sosa-Nunez & Ed Atkins (eds.), E-International Relations, 2016, 14.

⁴ Charlie Lai, "Water Scarcity in Africa: Causes, Effects, and Solutions", *Earth.org*, 8 July 2022.

⁵ "Reimagining WASH: Water security for all", United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), <https://www.unicef.org/media/95241/file/water-security-for-all.pdf>, 15/11/2023, 4.

⁶ "Africa's population will double by 2050", *The Economist*, 26 March 2020.

⁷ "Reimagining WASH: Water security for all", 9.

Supsaharskoj Africi. U tu svrhu, rad se oslanja na teorijski koncept sekuritizacije, razvijen u okviru Kopenhaške škole bezbednosti.

Prvi deo rada nastoji da pruži terminološko razlikovanje pojmova politizacije i sekuritizacije. U drugom delu rada analizira se problem pijaće vode izazvan delovanjem klimatskih promena. U nastavku rada, predstavlja se studija slučaja vezana za države Supsaharske Afrike, gde se na temelju raspoloživih izvora iznosi predviđanje da će do 2030. godine države ovog podneblja biti pokrivene sa 37% čiste pijaće vode. Na kraju rada, predstavljeni su mogući načini delovanja u cilju smanjenja ovog kompleksnog problema.

Pojmovno razlikovanje politizacije i sekuritizacije

Usložavanjem agende međunarodnih odnosa, tradicionalno viđenje koncepta bezbednosti i njegove suštine neminovno je postalo preusko. Sredinom 80-ih godina prošlog veka, uporedo sa razvojem diskusija o klimatskim promenama, Kopenhaški institut za istraživanje mira nastoji da proširi istraživački domen tradicionalnih studija bezbednosti, stavljajući u fokus nevojne pretnje, poput ekoloških pretnji. U tim okvirima, novorazvijena teorija sekuritizacije je u startu ispoljila potencijal, kako za objašnjavanje ekoloških problema tako i za mobilizaciju međunarodne zajednice u kolektivnoj akciji zaštite životne sredine. Idejni tvorac teorije sekuritizacije Ole Vejver (*Ole Wæver*) unosi značajnu distinkciju u odnosu na druge teorijske pravce, uz objašnjenje da su bezbednosne pretnje socijalno konstruisane tj. sekuritizovane, a sekuritizaciju definiše kao „čin kojim političke elite identifikuju pretnje, a od društva zahtevaju legitimitet za primenu specijalnih mera koje u normalnim uslovima ne bi bile prihvatljive“.⁸ Budući da ovaj okvir uključuje vanredne mere, koje se aktiviraju na proglašene egzistencijalne pretnje (po zajednicu), sekuritizacija se može posmatrati kao ekstremnija verzija politizacije.⁹ U osnovi teorije sekuritizacije je postavka da ukoliko su mere prihvaćene, sekuritizacija se smatra uspešnom.

Prema Filipu Ejdusu, razlikuju se četiri aspekta sekuritizacije, a *govorni čin* nameće kao prvi.¹⁰ Problem se mora predstaviti kao pretnja opstanku zajednice i da su potrebne posebne mere za rešavanje problema. Drugi aspekt čine *akteri* koji prenose pretnje, poput predsednika države, premijera, ministara, predstavnika vojske ili predstavnici opozicije i intelektualci. Treći

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, *Security: New Framework For Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1998, 23.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Filip Ejdus, *Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi*, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2017, 89.

element čine *specijalne mere* za odbranu zajednice, poput ekonomskih mera, vojne sile, ograničavanja ljudskih prava čijom upotrebom se izlazi iz normalnih okvira delovanja vlasti. Baš zato što se radi o specijalnim merama nije ih moguće navesti na jednom mestu, jer zavise od problema i okolnosti datog trenutka. Poslednji, četvrti segment čini *publika* – ili svi građani ili samo uzak krug ljudi, u zavisnosti od širine dometa informacija, koji prihvataju ili neprihvataju predlog mera.¹¹ Prema rečima Vejvera, specijalne mere treba da budu argumentovane i predstavljene preko posebne platforme preko koje će biti prihvaćene ili da se predstavljaju tako da upućuju da je pretnja egzistencijalne prirode. Uz to, potrebno je da postoji dovoljno saglasnosti za legitimizaciju i sprovođenje mera, jer bez prihvatanja ovo ostaje na nivou sekuritizujućeg poteza.¹²

Dok politizacija znači smeštanje određenog pitanja u domen politike i pravila koje je potrebno slediti, sekuritizacija naglašava egzistencijalnu važnost određenog pitanja, za čije rešenje su neophodne posebne (specijalne) mere. Tako, na primer, do politizacije dolazi kada stranke ili firme u svoje programe unose ekološke pretnje, dok sekuritizacija nastupa kada postoji predviđanje da će u budućnosti doći do problema.¹³ Ukoliko bi se pravovremeno politizovali ekološki problemi, ne bi bilo potrebe za sekuritizacijom, kao što je „Madridski protokol [...] zabranio rudarske aktivnosti na 50 godina“ i time su predupređene specijalne mere.¹⁴ Kako su ekološke pretnje kasno identifikovane kao pretnja, teško ih je pozicionirati ka politizaciji ili sekuritizaciji. Potrebno je da ekološke pretnje budu politizovane, jer države moraju aktivno da se bave rešavanjem problema izazvanih ljudskim aktivnostima (poput zagađenja, seče šuma i sl.), uključujući donošenje zakona kojima se zabranjuju delatnosti kojima se uništava životna sredina i ograničava i prevenira ekološka degradacija. S druge strane, sekuritizacija ekoloških problema može da podstakne sve aktere, od međunarodne zajednice do pojedinaca, da prihvate postojanje problema za koje je neophodno snositi odgovornost i obavezu pronalaska rešavanja. Ipak, veliki problem predstavlja nejednakost u određivanju odgovornosti, jer se ne mogu jednako posmatrati najveći zagađivači (multinacionalne kompanije ili države koje su najveći emiteri GHG) sa onima koji nisu dostigli isti nivo razvijenosti (zemlje Trećeg sveta i njihovo stanovništvo).¹⁵ Zato se pojavljuje pitanje – da li je neophodno donositi specijalne mere na međunarodnom nivou ili je potrebno pronaći drugo, konkretnije rešenje sa fokusom na određene regione?

¹¹ Ibid., 89–90.

¹² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, “Security: New Framework For Analysis”, 25.

¹³ Ibid., 74.

¹⁴ Ibid., 87.

¹⁵ GHG je skraćenica za gasove staklene bašte (*Greenhouse gas*)

Sekuritizacija se u javnom diskursu nametnula kao viša instanca, koja dovodi do širenja pitanja bezbednosti jer zahteva uvođenje specijalnih mera u okvirima međunarodnog regulisanja, kao način borbe protiv ekoloških pretnji. Odluke donete na globalnom novou moraju da obavežu države da ih sprovedu, jer čisto navođenje ili upozorenje da pretnje postoje nije dovoljno. U ovom slučaju bi to značilo uvođenje konkretnih zabrana poput upotrebe fosilnih goriva, krčenje šuma ili konkretni podsticaji za većim korišćenjem električnih automobila ili obnovljivih izvora energije poput instalacije solarnih panela. Međutim, veliki problem sekuritizacije je to što je ona ograničena u svom delovanju. Ne postoji globalni autoritet koji bi se obavezao da sprovodi nadzor nad implementacijom dogovora, pogotovo nad svetskim silama, koje najčešće blokiraju akcije koje će dovesti do pada njenog profita ili uticaja. Teško je odrediti koji su to urgentni problemi koji će dozvoliti sprovođenje specijalnih mera. Odluke treba da se donose na globalnom nivou, najčešće u međunarodnim organizacijama, a države da ih prihvataju i sprovode na lokalnom nivou. Ograničeni dometi sekuritizacije ekoloških pretnji posledica su nejednake pogođenosti država pretnjama, što nameće potrebu specifikacije globalnih odluka za konkretan region.

Među kritičarima sekuritizacije izdvajaju se pre svega državocentri, koji osporavaju postojanje pretnji iz ekološkog sektora. U okviru sekuritizujućeg diskursa i diskursa njegovih oponenta, NVO, države ili firme pojavljuju se kao glavni ulagači veta – koje deluju tako što blokiraju odluke.¹⁶ Mogu se navesti i neki poduhvati veto igrača, poput akcije Kine i Indije koje mogu da blokiraju odluku o ukidanju dalje upotrebe fosilnih goriva ili primer međunarodne akcije za zaštitu ozona koje su blokirale hemijske kompanije, poput kompanije Du Pont. Svakako, ne treba zanemariti i funkcionalne aktere: ekonomski sektor, hemijski sektor i naftnu industriju, koji su nužno povezani sa kvalitetom životne sredine i sa lukrativnim aktivnostima.¹⁷ Desekuritizujući akteri mogu da navode da su specijalne mere skupe i da postoje mnogo hitniji problemi na koje treba da se fokusira međunarodna aktivnost, poput rešavanja siromaštva ili gladi.

Problem pijaće vode izazvan klimatskim promenama

Klimatske promene su definisane 1992. godine u Konvenciji donetoj u Rio de Žaneiru, gde se kaže da one „znače promenu klime koja je direktno ili indirektno povezana sa ljudskom aktivnošću koja menja kompoziciju globalne atmosfere i koja je dodatak prirodnoj klimatskoj promenljivosti posmatrana u uporednim vremenskim periodima“.¹⁸ Pariski sporazum je

¹⁶ Ibid., 78.

¹⁷ Ibid., 79.

¹⁸ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/INFORMAL/84 GE.05-62220 (E) 200705, 28 June 2002.

2015. godine ustanovio glavni cilj da se globalno povećanje temperature ograniči ispod 2°C u odnosu na predindustrijski period, a postoje i napori da se rast ograniči na 1,5°C.¹⁹ Ipak, jedan od problema je nepostojanje adekvatnih mehanizama da se države nateraju na smanjenje emisije štetnih gasova, a samim time i globalnog zagrevanja. Sporazum, s druge strane, produbljuje problem klimatske pravde, ističući princip „zajedničke, ali izdiferencirane odgovornosti i odgovarajućih mogućnosti“, čime bi se isticale okolnosti i stanja pojedinačnih država pre utvrđivanja njihove odgovornosti u emisijama štetnih gasova i mogućnosti njihove adaptacije na klimatske promene.²⁰

Voda i klimatske promene su nužno povezane jer klimatske promene usložnjavaju i ovako postojeće probleme pristupa čistoj vodi.²¹ Ne postoji jedinstven pristup koji će obezbediti vodu svima, ali je neophodno utvrditi prioritete.²² Autori koji su istraživali svetski napredak od prve do druge konferencije posvećene vodi, kažu da se treba fokusirati na unapređenju vode, očuvanju i higijeni (*Water, Sanitation and Hygiene - WASH*). U problemu pijaće vode ključnu nesigurnost čine infrastruktura i pristup zalihama, ali i saradnja preko međunarodnih granica.²³ Prema Barnetu (*Jon Barnett*), tokom 1990-ih godina „osamdeset država u kojima živi 40% svetske populacije doživelo je tešku nestašicu vode“, dok je „polovina svetskih močvarnih područja nestala [...] tokom 20. veka“. ²⁴ Veliki problem predstavljaju varijacije u temperaturi vode u Africi. Ljudskim uticajem na produblјivanje klimatskih promena dolazi do rasta temperature vode sa 0,2°C na 3,2°C, u periodu od 1927. do 2014. godine. Kao posledice se javljaju promena kvaliteta vode i pogoršavanje zdravlja biljnog i životinjskog sveta. Promena temperature vode, količine padavina, brzine vetra negativno utiču na vodeni ekosistem, pa tako ne dolazi do dotoka dovoljno hranljivih materija koje se nalaze u dubokoj vodi jer se smanjila brzina vetra, dolazi do pojave insekata i uništavanja vodenih staništa.²⁵

¹⁹ Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, 12 December 2015, 3.

²⁰ Dragoljub Todić, „Klimatska pravda i Pariski sporazum o klimi u svetlu ciljeva smanjenja emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte“, *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. 72, Br. 3, 2020, 468, 474–475, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2003467T>.

²¹ “The Water Action Decade is up for Review”, *Nature Water* 1, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s44221-023-00054-z>, 14/11/2023, 1.

²² Ibid.

²³ Simon Dalby, *Environmental Security and Climate Change*, International Studies, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, 2020, 11.

²⁴ Džon Barnett, *Ekološka sigurnost*, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2010, 217.

²⁵ “Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/>, 14/11/2023, 1333.

Prva konferencija Ujedinjenih nacija o vodi održana je 1977. godine u Argentini s ciljem alarmiranja i podizanja svesti o potencijalnoj krizi vode do kraja 20. veka. Kriza nije sprečena, stanovništvo sveta i dalje ima problem pristupa pijaćoj vodi i sanitarnim uslovima. Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija je 2016. godine proglasila Dekadu akcije za vodu za održivi razvoj 2018–2028. godine (*Decade for Action on Water for Sustainable Development*), a ovom odlukom je utvrđeno da se prati razvoj i napredak pre završnice 2030. godine, da bi se pomoglo ispunjenju Ciljeva održivog razvoja (COR).²⁶

Kao šesti Cilj održivog razvoja (*Sustainable Development Goals – SDG*) navodi se *čista voda i higijena*, jer su „pristup čistoj vodi, kanalizacija i higijena najosnovnije ljudske potrebe za zdravlje i dobrobit“. U 2022. godini 703 miliona ljudi nije imalo pristup čistoj vodi, a čak 3,5 milijardi ljudi nema pristup higijenskim uslovima. Ovde postoje neki potciljevi koje treba dostići, a koji se čine nedostižnim, poput cilja da se do 2030. godine svima omogući pristup pijaćoj vodi, sanitarnim uslugama i higijeni, kao i da se efikasnije koristi voda i smanji zagađenje.²⁷

Konferencija Ujedinjenih nacija o klimatskim promenama (COP27) prvi put je na Konferenciji u Egiptu 2022. godine na agendu stavila odnos vode i globalnog zagrevanja.²⁸ U martu 2023. godine održana je druga u istoriji Konferencija Ujedinjenih nacija o vodi u Njujorku. Kako je navršena polovina decenije posvećena problemu vode, momenat održavanja Konferencije bio je pogodan za pravljenje preseka stanja i ostvarenih rezultata. Generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih nacija istakao je da je voda osnovni element postojanja sveta i da su ljudi ti koji zagađuju svoj izvor života. Istakao je vlade država kao aktere koji treba da kreiraju planove i agende za što bolji i čistiji pristup vodi, uz međusobnu saradnju i međunarodne dogovore država za efikasnije korišćenje vodnih resursa. Takođe, potrebno je da se aktivno ulaže u vodu i sanitarne sisteme, kao i u otpornost na krize kroz investiranje u novu infrastrukturu za korišćenje i skladištenje vode. I za kraj, Gutereš ističe nužnu uvezanost klimatskih promena i vode, posebno zbog potrebe ograničavanja zagrevanja Planete ispod 1.5°C.²⁹

Generalni sekretar u svom izlaganju naveo je i predlog „Pakt za klimatsku solidarnost“ (*Climate Solidarity Pact*) pozivajući najveće emitere da

²⁶ “International Decade for Action on Water for Sustainable Development, 2018–2028”, <https://www.un.org/en/events/waterdecade/>, 14/11/2023.

²⁷ Sustainable Development Goals, “Goal 6: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all”, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/water-and-sanitation/>, 14/11/2023.

²⁸ Sustainable Development Goals, “Water prominent on COP27 agenda”, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2022/11/water-prominent-on-cop27-agenda/>, 5/11/2023.

²⁹ “Bring the Water Action Agenda to Life”, Secretary-General Urges Conference, Calling for Game-Changing Commitments on World’s Most Important Resource”, SG/SM/21737, United Nation Press Release, 22 March 2023.

snose odgovornost za postignuto, apelujući na smanjenje štetne emisije, radi bržeg kretanja ka neto-nuli emisiji do 2050. godine (ako ne i ranije – do 2040. godine). Ovo je poziv koji Generalni sekretar upućuje zemljama G20 grupe. Urgira da se ne upotrebljava nov ugallj i da se postepeno ukida trenutna konzumacija do 2030. godine, kao i zaustavljanje širenja nove nafte i gasa, s tim da se okrene ka korišćenju obnovljive energije.³⁰

Na trećem interaktivnom dijalogu u okviru Konferencije Ujedinjenih nacija o vodi, došlo se do podatka da će u Južnoj Africi do 2030. godine doći do „praznog prostora“ od oko 17% između rasta populacije i efikasne upotrebe vode, ukoliko Vlada nešto ne učini po tom pitanju.³¹ Takođe, vrlo značajno izlaganje je na četvrtom interaktivnom panelu imala predstavnica DR Konga, koja je istakla statističke podatke o važnosti basena Nila, ali posebno basena Konga koji ima potencijalno 10% svetske čiste vode i njegovih šuma, a bez kojih ne bi bilo kiše u Sudanu, Egiptu i ostatku kontinenta. Predstavnik Mozambika je istakao vodu kao element mira i harmonije među narodima, posebno na jugu kontinenta.³²

Slučaj Supsaharske Afrike

Kontinent Afrike je svetski prostor koji je najpogođeniji klimatskim promenama. Postoji nekoliko uzročnika nedostatka vode i potrebno ih je zajedno posmatrati. Za dati slučaj, kao najrelevantniji problemi mogu se istaći suše, poplave, zagađenje vode (posebno zbog urbanizacije i poljoprivrede), kao i veći zahtevi za čistom vodom koji idu izvan dostupnih izvora zbog demografskog rasta. Nedostatak pijaće vode se više povezuje sa ekonomskim pre nego sa fizičkim nedostatkom, odnosno, države nemaju dovoljno finansijskih sredstava da na efikasan način koriste vodne resurse.³³

Prema navodima *Africa's Pulse* iz 2021. godine pokazano je kako klimatske promene utiču u Supsaharskoj Africi, poredeći 1970–1979. godine i 2010–2019. godine. U navedenom periodu, učestalost suša se povećala tri puta, oluje su se učestvostručile, a poplave su porasle deset puta.³⁴ Takođe, u periodu od

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ “At Conference’s Third Interactive Dialogue, Speakers, Highlighting Water, Climate Change, Disaster Nexus, Urge Renewed Commitment to Managing Imperiled Resource”, ENV/DEV/2055, United Nation Press Release, 23 March 2023.

³² “Highlighting Rise in Water Scarcity, Climate-Induced Disasters, Speakers at Global Conference Call for Transformational Change to Better Manage Aqua Resources”, ENV/DEV/2054, United Nation Press Release, 23 March 2023.

³³ Dušan Živanović, „Problemi nedostatka i kvaliteta vode za piće u Subsaharskoj Africi“, Diplomski rad, Fakultet bezbednosti, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2018, 19–20.

³⁴ “Africa’s pulse”, The World Bank Group, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/786721633587328307/pdf/Africa-s-Pulse-No-24-October-2021-An-Analysis-of-Issues-Shaping-Africa-s-Economic-Future.pdf>, 49.

40 godina dolazi do porasta stanovništva koje je pogođeno sušama i poplavama. Sušama je, sa 19,3 miliona pogođeno 115 miliona, a poplavama sa 3,5 miliona na 28,1 milion stanovnika.³⁵ Baš zato, oni koji su najranjiviji snosiće najveće posledice, jer suše dovode do nedostatka hrane i samim time poskupljenja, a poplave izazivaju prirodne katastrofe uništavajući kuće i useve. Prema *Aqueduct* interaktivnim mapama, možemo da vidimo koji su regioni ili države najugroženiji po zadatim parametrima. Kada se označi parametar rizika od suša za teritoriju koju pokriva Sahel nema podataka, ali za Supsaharski deo vidimo da su najugroženije Burkina-Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigerija, Sudan, deo Kenije i Ruande i Svazilenda. Ostale države koje nisu navedene su takođe ugrožene, ali su ipak pod manjim rizikom.³⁶

Prema radnoj grupi II koja je učestvovala u Šestom izveštaju o proceni Međuvladinog panela o klimatskim promenama (*Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - IPCC*) iz 2022. godine, većina vode u Africi se nalazi u podzemnim vodama i iznosi 660.000km³. Takođe, postoji 63 rečna basena kao i 33 jezera koja povezuju više država. Klimatske promene izazivaju periode suše, poplave, podizanje ili snižavanje nivoa mora, posebno zbog promene temperature. Istraživanje vršeno za period 1970–2010. godine pokazuje mešovite trendove: 51% vodenih površina je opadalo, a oko 11% raslo; ako bi se gledalo kao celina, južna Afrika je beležila trend opadanja, a istočna Afrika trend rasta. Iako je Afrika pretrpela najveći broj suša u svetu od 1990. godine do 2013. godine, smatra se da je veći strah i da su sada najveće posledice od poplava, utvrđeno za period 2010–2020. godine, a posebno su ugroženi priobalni gradovi zbog podizanja nivoa mora. Zbog poplave u delti Nigera 2012. godine tri miliona ljudi je moralo da se prisilno odseli iz svojih domova.³⁷

Supsaharsko stanovništvo zavisi od poljoprivredne aktivnosti, jer čak 95% prihoda dolazi od nje. Ukoliko imamo nepredvidljivo kretanje vode izazvano sušama, poplavama ili naglim promenama temperatura, možemo videti nastajanje egzistencijalne krize izazvane nedostatkom vode i jačanje potrebe za izgradnjom efikasnijih infrastrukturnih sistema.³⁸ Čista voda je ugroženi resurs, posebno uzimajući u obzir urbanističke i poljoprivredne aktivnosti na kontinentu. Voda se najčešće zagađuje zbog otpadnih voda iz

³⁵ Ibid., 57.

³⁶ "Water risk atlas", Aqueduct, https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/water-risk-atlas/#/?advanced=false&basemap=hydro&indicator=drr_cat&lat=-4.4077509891832705&lng=22.2890442609787&mapMode=view&month=1&opacity=0.5&ponderation=D&EF&predefined=false&projection=absolute&scenario=optimistic&scope=baseline&timeScale=annual&year=baseline&zoom=3,10/11/2023.

³⁷ "Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability", 1342–1344.

³⁸ Leo Holtz & Christina Golubski, "Addressing Africa's extreme water insecurity", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/addressing-africas-extreme-water-insecurity/>, 9/10/2023.

proizvodnje kompanija, kao i kontaminacijom zbog korišćenja različitih đubriva. Takođe, voda je najugroženija u najmanje razvijenim zemljama i stanovništvo takvih država najčešće koriste površinske vode, koje su često prljave, a samim time i visoko rizične zbog mogućnosti izbijanja zaraznih bolesti. Najčešće bolesti izazvane konzumacijom prljave vode su dijareja, kolera, tifus, bolest gvinejskog crva i dizanterija.³⁹

Količina vode dostupna po osobi u Africi je ispod globalnog proseka, sa tendencijom daljeg smanjenja.⁴⁰ Prema izveštaju Svetske banke iz 2013. godine, Supsaharska Afrika se suočava sa velikim raskolom između potrebe za vodom i njenom dostupnošću.⁴¹ Potreba za pijaćom vodom mnogo brže raste u odnosu na njenu dostupnost, što je delom uslovljeno najbržim rastom stanovništva u svetu, potrebom razvoja poljoprivrede i industrije, ali i zagađenjem vode. Odnosno, naš ekološki otisak je veći od biološkog kapaciteta i priroda ne može sama da se obnovi. Zbog velikog problema suša roga Afrike se suočava sa nedovoljno pijaće vode na površini, što upućuje na korišćenje podzemnih voda.⁴² Nedovoljno vode znači galopirajući strah za opstanak ljudi, poljoprivrede, ekonomije i infrastrukture. Neverovatan podatak je da je u regijama koje su pogođene sušama cena vode porasla i za 400%. Uz to, veliku pretnju po opstanak zajednica predstavlja i prenaseljenost, gde je u 2022. godini utvrđeno da u rogu Afrike živi oko 200 miliona ljudi, a predikcije su da će za nekoliko procenata porasti stanovništvo (između 1,3–2,9%) do 2025. godine.⁴³

Percepciju o Africi nužno prate problemi siromaštva, glad, nizak ekonomski razvoj, bolesti, suše i oružani sukobi (poput borbe protiv terorizma i građanskih ratova). Nažalost, zbog viševjekovnog eksploatisanja prirodnih resursa i zagađivanjem životne sredine u tom procesu, afričke države su morale da se okrenu pozajmicama, pre svega od Svetske banke, jer su se još tokom 20. veka istrošili resursi od kojih su države mogle da se ekonomski razvijaju. Finansijski zajmovi nerazvijenih afričkih država imaju indirektan uticaj na problem pijaće vode. Uvidom u podatke, evidentan je nedostatak finansijskih sredstava kojima bi afričke države rešile probleme poput efikasne infrastrukture (kanalizacija, cevi, rezervoari, mostovi), radne snage i uz to započele nove projekte za čišćenje vode ili pronalaženje uspešnih rešenja za datu zajednicu. Baš zbog velikih pozajmica ove države

³⁹ Dušan Živanović, *Problemi nedostatka i kvaliteta vode za piće u Subsaharskoj Africi*, 24, 26.

⁴⁰ Godišnje je po glavi stanovnika dostupno oko 4.000 kubnih metara, što je skoro pa duplo manje u odnosu na globalni prosek. Michael Webster, "Chapter 1", in: *The Future of Water in African Cities: Why Waste Water?*; Michael Jacobsen, Michael Webster & Kalanithy Vairavamoorthy (eds.), The World Bank, 2013, 25.

⁴¹ Ibid., 15.

⁴² "Water crisis in the Horn of Africa", United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), <https://www.unicef.org/media/126006/file/water-crisis-horn-africa-2022.pdf>, 11/11/2023, 2.

⁴³ Ibid., 2–3.

nisu samostalne u donošenju odluka i uslovljene su kreditorima. Banka je finansirala Afriku tokom postkolonijalnog perioda, perioda dužničke krize, pružala je pomoć u eliminisanju siromaštva ali i opraštala dugove. Posebno je važno investiranje u infrastrukturu i poljoprivredu – uključujući vodu, kanalizaciju, transport, energetiku, na šta je usmereno oko oko 30% ukupnih pozajmica banke.⁴⁴

Trenutno stanje i predikcije

Nepredvidivost klimatskih promena znači da se ne može predvideti ni bezbednost vode, poput pristupa, kvaliteta ili korišćenja. Klimatske promene dovešće do zavisnosti država Afrike od podzemnih voda, kao i od prikupljanja kišnice, desalinizacije voda, kao i unapređenje infrastrukture, poljoprivrede i dobrog upravljanja.⁴⁵

Analizirajući period od 2000. do 2020. godine, prema zajedničkom izveštaju WHO i UNICEF-a iz 2021. godine, u Supsaharskoj Africi došlo je do porasta stanovništva (sa 350 miliona na 387 miliona ljudi) koji nisu imali pristup pijaćoj vodi, čime samo ovaj region pokriva polovinu svetske populacije koja nema pristup pijaćoj vodi (a većina tog stanovništva živi u ruralnim predelima). U 2020. godini je svega 30% ukupne populacije Supsaharske Afrike imalo dostupnu pijaću vodu. Na primeru Čada vidimo da je važno praviti razliku između urbanih i ruralnih područja. U urbanim delovima devet puta je veća verovatnoća da će imati pristup pijaćoj vodi nego ruralne oblasti tokom 2020. godine. U izveštaju se navodi da će čistom pijaćom vodom biti pokriveno samo 37% teritorije Supsaharske Afrike do 2030. godine.⁴⁶

Prema istraživanju Univerzitetskog instituta Ujedinjenih nacija za vodu, životnu sredinu i zdravlje iz 2022. godine, utvrđeno je 11 država sa najmanje čiste vode u Africi, a neke od njih su Somalija, Čad, Niger, Gvineja-Bisao i Sudan. U izveštaju se dolazi do zaključka da postoji velika disproporcija u Indikatoru 1: postotak populacije koji ima barem osnovne usluge pijaće vode, gde Egipat, Libija i Mauricijus imaju 99% pokrivenosti, dok Niger ima 47%, DR Kongo i Čad 46%, a Južna Afrika 37%.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Zinav Usman, "Africa Matters to the World Bank's Global Role and Here's How", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/04/13/africa-matters-to-world-bank-s-global-role-and-here-s-how-pub-89530>, 25/10/2023.

⁴⁵ "Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability", 1349.

⁴⁶ "Progress On Household Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 2000-2020", UNICEF, <https://data.unicef.org/resources/progress-on-household-drinking-water-sanitation-and-hygiene-2000-2020/>, 15/11/2023, 31-33, 41.

⁴⁷ "Water Security in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment", United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH), <https://inweh.unu.edu/wp-content/>

Klimatske promene najviše pogađaju države na severu i jugu Afrike, a zbog njih dolazi do problema nedovoljne hrane, usevi nisu uspešni, erodira zemlja, učestalije su pojave različitih bolesti i ljudi se prisilno sele u potrazi za boljim životom.⁴⁸ Iako postoji svesnost o ugroženosti, poražavajuća je činjenica da „do 2050. do 921 milion ljudi u Supsaharskoj Africi mogu biti izloženi ‘stresu izazvanom vodom’ povezanim sa klimatskim promenama, dok 459 miliona mogu iskusiti umanjenu izloženost“.⁴⁹ Pored reka i jezera prolaze kroz isti proces rasta i pada nivoa vode, koje su donele klimatske promene sa posledicom – pitanje opstanka biljaka, životinja, kvaliteta vode i ciklusa života. Procene kažu da će godišnje biti preko 300 dana sa toplotnim talasima koji će zagrejati jezera za 4,2°C.

***Afričke države koje se suočavaju sa oskudicom vode:
Južna Afrika, Tanzanija, Čad, Madagaskar,
Kenija, Malavi i Gana***

Kao što je do sada prikazano, države su pogođene klimatskim promenama i osećaju brojne posledice. Ipak, ono što ističe i povezuje države o kojima se u nastavku govori jesu iste posledice, koje u stvari predstavljaju dva ekstrema, a to su suše i poplave. Kako je sve povezano, tako i ove dve pojave mogu da proizvedu posledice u vidu nedostatka hrane i vode, koje vode migracijama stanovništva ili međusobnim konfliktima oko resursa.

U izveštaju Međuvladinog panela o klimatskim promenama (IPCC), navode se dva grada kao primeri rastuće pretnje, oskudice i načina rešavanja problema pijaće vode koje ima stanovništvo, izazvano klimatskim promenama.⁵⁰ Suša u Kejptaunu 2015–2018. godine je nastala zbog nedovoljne količine padavina, čiji uzročnik predstavljaju klimatske promene. Zato se Južna Afrika priprema za „Nulti dan“ (predikcija je bila za mart 2018. godine) – dan(e) kada će mnogi gradovi ostati bez pristupa vodi, koji će izazvati probleme po opstanak. Zbog toga nastaju novi problemi – Kejptaun je uspešno informisao i podstakao građane da troše manje vode, ali je nastao finansijski šok jer gradski budžet zavisi od prodaje vode koja je višestruko skuplja nego u zemljama Zapada, kao i izazivanje problema u funkcionisanju turizma i poljoprivrede. Sve ovo nateralo je vlasti da preispitaju način ophođenja prema vodi i razmišljanje o pouzdanim alternativama – poput podzemnih voda. Kejptaun je doneo Strategiju vode (*Cape Town’s Water*

uploads/2022/07/State-of-Water-Security-in-Africa-A-Preliminary-Assessment_Final_07_2022.pdf, 15/11/2023, 8.

⁴⁸ “Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, 1346.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1344.

⁵⁰ “Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, 1343.

Strategy) kojom se apeluje na visoku osetljivost grada zbog nestašice vode, uz nužnu saradnju više sektora zarad uspešnog ovladavanja problemom.⁵¹

U Tanzaniji, u gradu Dodomi, stanovništvo se od sredine 20. veka izdržava vodom iz izvora Makutapora, koji je vremenom i postao glavni izvor vode.⁵² Zbog velike dopune podzemnih voda izazvano El Ninjom iz 1997–1998. godine, utvrđeno je da je izuzetno važno čuvanje vode da bi se prilagodili klimatskim promenama. Ipak, ne postoji sigurnost da su te zalihe dovoljne da bi se stvorila otpornost grada na potencijalne suše u Supsaharskoj Africi.⁵³

Jezero Čad je primer jedne od najveće vodene površine sa pijaćom vodom koja počinje da se smanjuje zbog prekomerne eksploatacije. Ovo jezero protiče kroz osam država i predstavlja 8% teritorije Afrike. Od 1960. godine 90% vode je nestalo zbog prekomerne konzumacije i uticaja klimatskih primena, a kao posledica se javljaju građanski ratovi i migracije zbog nemogućnosti održavanja životnih uslova. Glavni izazovi vlada ogledaju se u pokušajima mirenja zavađenog stanovništvo i pokušaju obnove opustošenog jezera.⁵⁴

Na jugu Madagaskra stanovništvo se suočava sa najmanjom pokrivenošću vodom, koje je pre svega izazvano klimatskim promenama i sušama, čime dolazi do pretnje po opstanak stanovništva. UNICEF uz saradnju sa *European Union Joint Research Centre*, pokušava da pronađe nove izvore, posebno iz podzemnih voda, ali i da pronađu efikasan sistem za prepoznavanje nivoa kvaliteta vode i predviđanje promena u nivoima dostupne vode. Zato je UNICEF podstakao stvaranje sistema za rano upozoravanje i alarmiranje u slučajevima nestanja vode.⁵⁵

U studiji slučaja iz 2023. godine poređani su podaci i izveštaji iz različitih izvora, kojima se poredi uzroci i posledice nepostojanja čiste vode. Područje koji Dinko i Bahti (Dinko Hanan Dinko, Ibrahim Bahti) istražuju je semiaradna oblast (stepa), konkretno tri države – Kenija, Malavi i Gana. Klimatske promene izazivaju nesigurnost u poljoprivredi (od koje su sve tri zemlje zavisne), kao i dostupnosti hrane i vode koje su praćene sušama i poplavama. Zbog navedenih problema neophodno je da se kreiraju i kratkoročne i dugoročne akcije kojima će se prilagoditi, pripremiti i odgovoriti na nesigurnost u pristupu vodi.⁵⁶ Ono što razlikuje ove zemlje

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Leon Usibge, "Drying Lake Chad Basin gives rise to crisis", *Africa Renewal*, December 2019 – March 2020.

⁵⁵ "Reimagining WASH: Water security for all", 8.

⁵⁶ Dinko Hanaan Dinko & Ibrahim Bahati, "A Review of the Impact of Climate Change on Water Security and Livelihoods in Semiarid Africa: Cases From Kenya, Malawi, and Ghana", *Journal of Climate Resilience and Justice*, Vol. 1, 108–109, DOI: 10.1162/crcj_a_00002.

jeste to što Kenija i Gana očekuju uvezanost rasta temperature i opadanje padavina, a za Malavi se očekuje da ima najveći porast temperatura. Za Ganu se očekuje porast temperature od 3,2°C, za Keniju 4,5°C, a za Malavi 6°C, što ukazuje da će rast temperature produbljivati uticaje suša i poplava.⁵⁷

Kenija je jedna od najugroženijih država po parametrima bezbednog pristupa vodi, jer njeno stanovništvo zavisi od poljoprivrede (preko polovine stanovništva se njome bavi). Funkcionisanje zemlje zavisi od padavina, posebno u semiaradnim delovima zemlje koje ima 80%, a obradive zemlje ima svega 2%. Na sve to, nezaobilazna je činjenica da je u zadnjih pet decenija utvrđen trend porasta temperature, koji je praćen El Ninjom i smanjenjem padavina poput primera 2008–2011. godine, kada je suša pogodila Rog Afrike i izazvala 50–70% smanjenje padavina. Poplave su takođe nužna posledica klimatskih promena koje su i izazvane toplim efektima El Ninja, a koje je teško predvideti jer su iznenadna pojava. Pored toga što izazivaju štetu po javnu i privatnu imovinu, one utiču na javno zdravlje izazivajući malariju ili stomačne bolesti prenesene vodom.⁵⁸

Malavi je zemlja koja je još više zavisna od poljoprivrede (90% stanovništva), a samim time kišnice i vode, uz koju idu i atributi da je polovina stanovništva na ivici siromaštva, a četvrtina je hronično siromašna. Uviđaju se jasni trendovi rasta temperature i suše, teže je pratiti kretanje poplava. Nažalost, zbog rasta temperature i smanjenja padavina nema dovoljne količine vode, jer Malavi postaje toplija, suvlja država sa predikcijama porasta temperature za 5°C do kraja veka. Uz to, Malavi sa jednom kišnom sezonom neće moći da nadmaši sve toplije i suvlje periode koji će postati normalna pojava. Veliki problem koji nastaje zbog suša je i pad nivoa vode, posebno površinskih voda, od kojih zavisi 92% stanovništva.⁵⁹

Sa istim problemom opadanja nivoa vode suočava se i Gana, kao i sa trendovima da će u delovima koji su semiaradni biti još suvlja klima, a gde je vlažna tropska klima postaće još vlažnije. Ganu takođe prati porast temperature i opadanje padavina 9–27%. Poljoprivreda je ponovo na udaru, jer zavisi od padavina i to je trend koji pogađa ceo region.⁶⁰

Nakon posmatranja sedam država Supsaharske Afrike i brojnih efekata koje klimatske promene sa sobom donose (poput porasta temperature i nedovoljne količine padavina) dolazi se do konstatacije da je šest zemalja najpre pogođeno sušama i opadanjem količine padavina. Implicira se zaključak da su dominantni problemi sa kojima se Supsaharska Afrika suočava porast temperature, opadanje nivoa mora, duži i češći suvi periodi, pad prinosa i prisilne migracije usled nedostatka vode i hrane.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 113

⁵⁸ Ibid., 109–110.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 111.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 111–112.

Mogući načini delovanja

Prioritetno je da svaka država ponaosob definiše glavne uzročnike nedostatka pijaće vode (ukoliko navedu infrastrukturu, da tačno utvrde šta je prioritet za rešavanje) i da utvrdi način na koji može da sanira i unapredi egzistencijalne probleme i potrebe stanovništva. U ovom delu rada će se navesti i neki spoljni problemi koji multiplikuju problem pijaće vode i aktivnosti kojima bi se moglo pomoći u pronalasku rešenja.

Afrička razvojna banka procenjuje da je kontinent odgovoran za manje od 3% ukupnih efekata emisije gasova staklene bašte i da su klimatske promene izazvale pad BDP-a po glavi stanovnika 5–15% godišnje.⁶¹ Posledice koje klimatske promene donose su često nepredvidljive, ali kada jesu glas o njima se možda slabije čuje. Jedan od razloga za to može biti disproporcija predstavljenosti afričkih naučnika u Međuvladinom panelu o klimatskim promenama. Prema istraživanju, svega trećinu naučnika u Panelu čine predstavnici Afrike, Azije i Latinske Amerike, dok 42% zauzimaju evropski predstavnici i 19% čine predstavnici iz Severne Amerike i Kariba.⁶² Iako je premisa da naučnici treba da deluju objektivno i nepristrasno, teme koje se nameću u međunarodnim odnosima su takve da odgovaraju partikularnim interesima najmoćnijih subjekata. Problemi sa kojima se suočavaju najsiromašnije zemlje u Supsaharskoj Africi, poput nedostatka vode i hrane, ne mogu da se mere sa problemima zapadne Evrope, koja želi da uveća ekonomski rast i unapredi demokratiju. Sa navedenim statističkim podacima može se ići ka zaključku da ukoliko nema proporcionalnog predstavljanja svih kontinenata, teško je zamisliti da će na dnevni red doći pitanja iz zemalja Trećeg sveta.

Uz problem zastupljenosti naučnika sa afričkog kontinenta, može se nadovezati problem sistema praćenja podataka u Africi. U brojnim istraživanjima se uviđa da iako postoje podaci, oni potiču iz najrazvijenijih država, a za one nerazvijene često ostaju prazna polja. O tome svedoči izveštaj *Water Security in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment*, gde je istraživanje vršeno na 44% teritorije, odnosno 24 afričke zemlje.⁶³ Izuzev podataka iz Južne Afrike i Kenije, podaci su ograničeni i često nedostupni, pa samim time je teško predvideti klimatske promene.⁶⁴ Zato se podaci i predviđanja često zasnivaju na dokumentima izvan kontinenta. Zabrinjavajući podatak je da je svega 3,8% svetskog ulaganja u istraživanje klimatskih promena uloženo

⁶¹ Alexander Csanadi, "The IPCC's Lack of Geographically Diverse Expertise May Be Stymieing Climate Efforts", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/05/ipcc-s-lack-of-geographically-diverse-expertise-may-be-stymieing-climate-efforts-pub-90469>, 26/10/2023.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ "Water Security in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment", 8.

⁶⁴ "Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability", 1298.

u Afriku 1990–2020. godine, koja je visoko ugrožena i osjetljiva na klimatske promene. Takođe, u istom vremenskom periodu, ulaganja u istraživanja o Africi bila su usmerena u institute van Afrike (78% novca je išlo u Evropu i SAD, oko 14% u Afriku). Nedostatak finansijskih sredstava dodatno opterećuje postojeće probleme pristupa podacima, (ne)zastupljenost afričkih naučnika, ali i demotiviše pokretanje novih istraživanja koja zahtevaju ulaganja. Kako sa sigurnošću možemo reći da istraživači u razvijenim zemljama mogu doći do istih rešenja i odgovora kao istraživači iz epicentra problema? Da li možemo da verujemo da će na isti način da alarmiraju javnost na hitno rešavanje problema? Baš zbog opravdanog straha možemo videti da su istraživači iz Afrike često angažovani kao saradnici, a ne kao rukovodioci projekata.

Od velikog značaja za implementaciju svih dogovora, podizanju svesti o problemima izazvanim klimatskim promenama ili ugroženosti nekih regiona imaju Ujedinjene nacije, kao međunarodna organizacija sa najvećim uticajem. Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, kao najvažniji organ, može da ima veći uticaj na proces donošenja odluka, posebno jer su njegove stalne članice i najmoćnije države sveta, najmoćnije i jedne od najvećih emitera gasova sa efektom staklene bašte. Kada bi se neko pitanje iniciralo u ovim okvirima (uz potencijalnu pratnju nekog ugovora), domet rešenja bi možda bio vidljiviji.

Da bi se utvrdilo kakva je saradnja država potrebna, neophodno je utvrditi karakteristike nekog regiona, poput istorijskih činjenica i geografskih obeležja. Zatim treba težiti utvrđivanju problema i njihovom rešavanju. Recimo, ako države imaju problem sa pristupom pijaćoj vodi, a imaju izvore koji protiču kroz više država, potrebno je regulisati efikasno korišćenje. Deset zemalja članica Inicijative za basen Nila (*Nile Basin Initiative*) su kroz saradnju kreirale Okvirni sporazum o saradnji u basenu Nila (*Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework*).⁶⁵ Cilj njihovog dogovora je saradnja država kroz koje protiče Nil, podstičući održivi razvoj, pravedno i razumno korišćenje vode unutar granica država učesnica sporazuma.⁶⁶ Uz to je utvrđeno postojanje Komisije za sliv reke Nila, kao institucionalni mehanizam nadzora nad sprovođenjem ugovora.⁶⁷ Iako svaka država u sporazum ulazi sa unapred utvrđenim stavom i ciljevima, kao i da bi sebi unapredila položaj, ovakva ideja može da bude dobar stimulans i za druge regione da potraže rešenje za unapređenje odnosa kroz saradnju, a u cilju opstanka.

⁶⁵ "Cooperative Framework Agreement", Nile Basin Agreement, <https://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/nbi/cooperative-framework-agreement>, 1/11/2023.

⁶⁶ "Agreement on the Nile River Basin cooperative framework", Nile Basin Initiative, <https://www.nilebasin.org/images/docs/CFA%20-%20English%20%20FrenchVersion.pdf>, 1/11/2023.

⁶⁷ "Cooperative Framework Agreement".

Zaključak

Kroz istraživanje problema koje izazivaju klimatske promene uviđamo da ekološka bezbednost još uvek može biti posmatrana kao nov i netradicionalni fenomen.⁶⁸ Iako je ideja da se krene od sekuritizacije klimatskih promena, države globalnog Severa će teško prihvatiti politike redukcije upotrebe uglja, nafte, prirodnog gasa uz izdavanje sredstava za spašavanje od nestanka globalnog Juga. Upravo najveći emiteri izbegavaju odgovornost, ostavljajući na cedilu manje razvijene zemlje, sa manje uticaja na globalnom nivou. Ipak, vidi se promena i napredak u podizanju svesti javnosti i kreatora politika o konkretnim problemima na konkretnim područjima. Nakon godina velikih problema, konačno je održana Konferencija o vodi 2023. godine, koja može da pokrene proces aktuelizacije problema pijaće vode.

Kada pokušamo da sumiramo uspešnost sekuritizacije kroz četiri elementa koji teorija sekuritizacije sugerise, kao sporni elementi ispostavljaju se publika, koja treba da razume i prihvati specijalne mere, ali i pronalaženje globalnog autoriteta koji će apelovati na probleme i moći da nametne obaveznost sprovođenja redovnih, ali i vanrednih mera. Samim tim, ne možemo potvrditi ni ispunjenost specijalnih mera, jer nema ko da ih sprovede, niti način da se legitimišu. Sve što se do sada čini ostaje na nivou država koje se obavezuju na neke sporazume, poput Okvirne konvencije o klimatskim promenama zarad stabilizacije emisije gasova sa efektom staklene bašte i regulisanja čovekovog uticaja na klimu (1992), Kjoto sporazuma za industrijalizovane države da smanje emisije gasova sa efektom staklene bašte (1997), Pariski sporazum koji je dobrovoljan i poziva na smanjenje zagrevanja Planete (2015) ili Klimatski pakt iz Glazgova kojim je dogovoreno smanjenje korišćenja uglja (2021). Nažalost, uspešnost sporazuma na globalnom nivou je upitna, jer kad se prave preseki uviđamo da je ipak više neuspeha u ostvarivanju dogovorenog, posebno od najrazvijenijih zemalja koje su uglavnom i najvaći emiteri. Pošto su to mere koje pogađaju ceo svet, države i građani koji su najpogođeniji klimatskim promenama će želiti i podržavati zahteve za smanjenje emisije gasova ili za utvrđivanje fondnova kojima će se pružiti finansijska pomoć, ali je to teško prihvatljivo za bogate zemlje koje treba da daju novac i stegnu kompanije da poštuju regulative za ekološko-efikasno poslovanje.

Da bi odluke bile uspešnije, neophodno je da su one koncentrisanije na određene regione. Potencijalno dobra ideja se nazire u primerima Okvirne konvencije o klimatskim promenama jer je utvđena potreba da se pronađu efikasna rešenja, kako bi se zadovoljili suprotstavljeni interesi. Međutim, sam termin „region“ se tumači kao „regionalna organizacija ekonomske

⁶⁸ Džon Barnet, „Ekološka sigurnost“, 211.

integracije“, odnosno međunarodna organizacija koju čine suverene države.⁶⁹ Pariski sporazum dodaje da one probleme koji su globalno definisani, niži nivoi treba da prilagode sa onim sa čime se suočavaju. Ono što ova dva ugovora podržavaju jeste princip „zajedničke ali različite odgovornosti i odgovarajućih mogućnosti“, čime se utvrđuju različiti nivoi regulisanja uzroka i posledica klimatskih promena.⁷⁰

Sekuritizacija nam daje mogućnost da izađemo iz okvira tradicionalnih definisanja aktera i daje slobodu u razumevanju realnosti. U ovom slučaju, uprkos preduzetim merama i izvesnim pomacima shodno datoj problematici, uspešnost sekuritizujućeg procesa zahteva da svi elementi sekuritizacije budu zadovoljeni, što na nivou država koje su razmatrane još uvek nije postignuto. Iako je najefikasnije da svaka država samostalno definiše mere, čime bi se pokrenuo proces desekuritizacije dosadašnjih vanrednih mera i vratio na proces politizacije, vrlo je izazovno takav cilj postaviti za zemlje Trećeg sveta. Kao osnova rešavanja problema sa kojima se ovaj region suočava može se identifikovati regionalni dogovor i saradnja. Supsaharska Afrika je, kao region, neupitno ugrožena i zahteva alarmantne akcije. Ipak, globalni dogovor je težak, a i kada do njega dođe uglavnom je neobavezujuć i ostavlja prostor za delovanje po sopstvenoj volji, odnosno izbegavanje obaveza. Zato države koje su siromašne, ugrožene i pod pretnjom nestajanja, moraju da se udruže u zajedničko delovanje. Jedna od glavnih prepreka za dogovor su svakako građanski i međunarodni sukobi, ali je ovo pravo mesto da se podele među njima stave sa strane i da ovo načine najmanjim zajedničkim imeniocem njihovog pomirenja i budućeg mira.

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⁶⁹ Dakle, ovde ne vidi pojam region kao geografski pojam, već isključivo kao organizaciju.

⁷⁰ Dragoljub Todić, „Klimatske promene i sistem zaštite klime: od globalnog (preko regionalnog) do nacionalnog“, 16–19.

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Jedan pogled na biografiju Kemala Kiričdaroglua (Kemal Kılıçdaroglu)

M. Hakan Yavuz and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, *Kemal Kılıçdaroglu and the New Republican People's Party in Turkey*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2023, pp. 164.

U neizvesnoj godini, uoči opštih izbora, pojavila se interesantna studija posvećena razvojnem putu najstarije i najveće partije u Turskoj – Republikanske narodne partije (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) i njenom lideru Kemalu Kiričdaroglu. Autori knjige bili su ugledni politikolog Hakan Javuz (*M. Hakan Yavuz*) i njegov mlađi kolega Ahmet Ozturk (*Ahmet Erdi Öztürk*). O naučnom kredibilitetu autora nedvosmisleno svedoče njihovi bogati akademski angažmani, kao i naučni članci i monografije posvećeni istraživanju različitih aspekata turske politike.¹

Više od stotinjak strana studije, podeljenih u šest poglavlja, autori su posvetili sažetom prikazu razvoja Republikanske narodne partije, kao i rasvetljavanju ključnih momenata iz porodičnog života (značaj turkmenskog i alevitskog porekla), obrazovanja i dugogodišnje karijere u državnoj službi njenog sadašnjeg lidera Kemala Kiričdaroglua. U okviru biografske analize analitički fokus stavljen je na razumevanje Kemalovog moralnog i političkog pogleda na svet.² Povlačeći paralelu sa Marksovom (*Karl Marx*) tvrdnjom da pojedinci mogu da imaju veliku ulogu u oblikovanju istorije ukoliko se pridržavaju okolnosti nasledenih iz prošlosti, autori ukazuju na delikatnu poziciju Kemala Kiričdaroglua koji u svom delovanju mora da se kreće unutar granica istorijskog nasleđa RNP i preovlađujućih društvenih i političkih okolnosti.

¹ Sa stanovišta balkanske naučne zajednice posebnu pažnju privlače monografije: Ahmet Erdi Ozturk, *Religion, Identity and Power: Turkey and the Balkans in the Twenty-First Century*, Edinburgh University Press, 2021; M. Hakan Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism*, Oxford University Press, 2020.

² M. Hakan Yavuz and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, *Kemal Kılıçdaroglu and the New Republican People's Party in Turkey*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2023, pp. 45–73.

Mada relevantnost i aktuelnost predmeta ovog istraživanja nije potrebno detaljnije obrazlagati, njegova naučna vrednost proističe iz potrebe dubinskog razumevanja osnovnih karakternih crta, ključnih biografskih momenata i ukupnog političkog delovanja jednog od najistaknutijih turskih opozicionara – Kemala Kiričdaroglua. Iako analiza političkih prilika u Turskoj, tokom proteklih decenija, ukazuje na pokušaje pružanja objektivnih pogleda, ocene autora o akterima i događajima savremenog političkog života izgledaju na momente pristrasno, romantizovano, pa čak i ostrašćeno. Autori ne samo da ne ostavljaju prostora za bilo kakve dileme u pogledu vrednovanja i ocene Erdoganove vladavine, već nisu skloni ni da previše biraju reči, opisujući je u samom uvodu studije kao „kleptokratsku“, „republiku straha“ itd.³ Polazeći od čvrstog uverenja da Erdogan daje prioritet sopstvenim interesima u odnosu na interese Turske, oni smatraju da njegovu vladavinu obeležava apsolutna kontrola političkog polja, sistemska korupcija i erozija demokratskih normi, institucija, nezavisnosti pravosuđa i slobode štampe. Dok autori s pravom ukazuju na opasnost od sve dubljih etničkih i verskih podela, dotle u određenoj meri sugestivno ističu da Republikanska narodna partija i njen lider Kemal Kiričdaroglu predstavljaju jedini tračak nade za tursku demokratiju i društvo, a naročito za njegove građanske elemente.⁴

Čitavo jedno poglavlje studije posvećeno je ideološkom razvoju i repozicioniranju RNP duž političkog spektra. Na ovom planu autori su izneli pohvale za velike i sistemske napore RNP u pogledu skidanja etikete elitizma i usvajanja novih elementa partijskog identiteta koji osiguravaju njenu vitalnost i efikasnost u suočavanju sa savremenim izazovima. U tom pogledu istaknute su nove odrednice poput „levica centra“, „demokratska levica“, „nova levica“ i „anadolska levica“.⁵ Ipak, u kontekstu savremene dinamike izneta je pretpostavka da osnivački principi i ideološki koreni RNP predstavljaju ograničavajući činilac za promenu partijskog identiteta i glavnu prepreku za sprovođenje socijaldemokratske i liberalne politike. Konkretnije rečeno, autori smatraju da čvrsta posvećenost ka sekularizmu i izražen antireligijski stav sprečavaju njeno prilagođavanje savremenim okolnostima i trendovima.⁶ S druge strane, može se postaviti pitanje – da li bi osavremenjavanje partijskog identiteta proširilo biračku bazu RNP, imajući u vidu relativno stabilnu biračku podršku koju uživaju njeni temeljni principi.

Dodatna vrednost studije ogleda se u preglednom i sažetom hronološkom prikazu evolucije RNP, od uvođenja višepartizma preko postepenog usvajanja socijaldemokratskih vrednosti do pokušaja

³ Ibidem, p. 2.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 6.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 30.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 69–73.

pozicioniranja na levom centru političkog spektra.⁷ Sa stanovišta savremenog političkog trenutka najveću pažnju privlači napetost koja obeležava kretanje RNP od partije države do partije naroda. U odnosu na raniji period kada je zbog uspona islamističkih i kurdskih pokreta osnažena identifikacija RNP sa državom, autori smatraju da je kao odgovor na trenutnu potpunu kontrolu države od strane AK partije primetna sve snažnija identifikacija RNP sa turskim društvom.⁸ Upravo u ovom procesu i Kemalovom „nijansiranom razumevanju uloge države u turskom društvu, autori vide otvoreni prostor za postizanje političkog uspeha RNP.⁹

Sledeći hantingtovski pogled na Tursku, autori ukazuju na istorijske osnove i postojanost njene raspolućenosti između onoga što ona jeste i onoga što želi da postane, odnosno između konzervativne islamske države sa dubokom nostalgijom za Osmanskim carstvom i modernizacijskih nastojanja koja obuhvataju integracije u zapadne međunarodne institucije.¹⁰ Sagledavajući evoluciju turske države i društva kroz ove pretpostavke osnovna teza i preporuka studije svodi se na zastupanje uravnoteženijeg i inkluzivnijeg pristupa vladanju, koje bi u obzir uzeo položaj i interes različitih etničkih i verskih identiteta i grupa unutar turskog društva. Za razliku od vlasti koja insistira na politici identiteta koja polarizuje društvo, na osnovu njegovih dosadašnjih izjava prema Kurdima, autori smatraju da se Kemal Kiričdaroglu protivi ovom pristupu naglašavajući, s druge strane, zajedništvo, ideju bratstva i saradnje.¹¹

U okviru centralnog dela studije posvećenog savremenom političkom angažmanu Kemala Kiričdaroglua, naglašena je njegova uloga u afirmisanju inkluzivnijeg diskursa RNP praćenog novom strategijom komunikacije i antielitističkim imidžom.¹² Autori smatraju da se u suštini nove Republikanske narodne partije nalaze svakodnevna pitanja radničke klase, briga za demokratiju, pravdu i prava svih pojedinaca. Pored uvođenja značajnih promena i novina, autori zaključuju da RNP pod Kemalom Kiričdarogluom nije odbacila svoj temeljni identitet, već ga je reinterpretirala i osavremenila predstavljajući ga kao vitalni segment nezavršenog modernizacijskog procesa u Turskoj.¹³

Odstupajući od rigidnog naučnog pristupa, autori su na momenat pribegli romantizaciji lika i dela Kemala Kiričdaroglua, naglašavajući njegovu otpornost na pokušaje kriminalizacije, nepokolebljivu odlučnost ka

⁷ Ibidem, pp. 13–43.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 144.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 120.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 5.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 112.

¹² Ibidem, pp. 75–121.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 144.

razbijanju straha, sposobnost mobilisanja masa i otvoreno zagovaranje demokratije i ljudskih prava. Iako je reč o delikatnom pitanju, teško je osporiti odlučujući doprinos Kemala Kiričdaroglua i veliku političku cenu koju je RNP platila prilikom objedinjavanja opozicije sastavljene od političkih partija različitih usmerenja i profila.

U završnim delovima studije autori su se bavili spoljnopolitičkim pogledima Kemala Kiričdaroglua zasnovanim na polaznoj tezi da je trenutna spoljna politika vođena pod palicom Redžepa Tajipa Erdogana (*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*) dovela do mešanja u unutrašnje stvari suseda, izolacije Turske na globalnoj sceni i povećanja izazova po njene nacionalne interese.¹⁴ Nasuprot tome, smatraju autori, Kemal se zalaže za povratak na staze tradicionalne spoljne politike, što uključuje obnovu odnosa sa tradicionalnim saveznicima na Zapadu.¹⁵ Istini za volju, vredi podsetiti da ideja o aktivnoj i diferenciranoj spoljnoj politici potiče još iz vremena nekadašnjeg ministra spoljnih poslova Ahmeta Davutoglua (*Ahmet Davutoğlu*) i da ne predstavlja specifičnost Erdoganove vladavine. Najzad, iako se tvrdnje autora o preteranoj i nepotrebnoj militarizaciji Turske lako mogu potkrepiti preciznim podacima, prilikom njihove ocene u obzir se moraju uzeti i turbulentne regionalne prilike, narastajući bezbednosni izazovi sa kojim se Turska suočava, kao i dramatične razmere aktuelne globalne militarizacije.¹⁶

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Vuk LAZIĆ

¹⁴ Ibidem, pp. 123–138.

¹⁵ Ibidem, pp. 128–129.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 141.

Međunarodna politika

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UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

OPIS ČASOPISA, CILJEVI I OPSEG

Međunarodna politika je recenzirani naučni časopis otvorenog pristupa koji izdaje Institut za međunarodnu politiku, vodeća naučna institucija u regionu posvećena istraživanju međunarodnih odnosa. Više od 70 godina ovaj interdisciplinarni časopis objavljuje originalne, analitičke, teorijske, pregledne i stručne radove o širokom spektru savremenih međunarodnih političkih, ekonomskih i pravnih odnosa. U svoja tri godišnja izdanja časopis *Međunarodna politika* ima za cilj da objavljuje visoko kvalitetna istraživanja orijentisana na razmatranje širokog spektra međunarodnih i spoljnopolitičkih pitanja. U tom kontekstu časopis se interesuje za politike najvažnijih aktera koji oblikuju savremene međunarodne odnose. Relevantne su i teme posvećene različitim teritorijalnim i etničkim sukobima i sporovima, od međudržavnih do unutardržavnih, kao i njihovim širim regionalnim i globalnim političkim, ekonomskim i pravnim implikacijama. Za časopis su značajne i druga pitanja koja utiču na savremene međunarodne odnose, kao što su globalna trgovina, ekonomski i energetske odnosi, međunarodne i regionalne integracija, različiti oblici terorizma i fundamentalizma, kao i izazovi koje predstavljaju migrantska kriza, globalno širenje zaraznih bolesti i nuklearnih kapaciteta u svetu. Dakle, ovaj naučni časopis je zasnovan na otvorenom i širokom pristupu predmetnoj oblasti, dajući prvenstvo priložima koji nude otvorena, teorijski i praktično utemeljena gledišta aktuelnih međunarodnih procesa. Na taj način časopis nastoji da na što kredibilniji način objasni raznolike i nedovoljno istražene nove fenomene na međunarodnoj sceni.

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Primeri:

Bogdan Stojanović, *Teorija denuklearizacije: zašto države prekidaju programe nuklearnog naoružanja?*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2021, 205.

Džon Rols, *Pravo naroda*, Alexandria Press i Nova srpska politička misao, Beograd, 2003, 107.

John Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 221.

Duško Lopandić (ed.), *Regional initiatives in Southeast Europe: multilateral cooperation programs in the Balkans*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2001, 24–32.

Theodor Winkler, Brana Marković, Predrag Simić & Ognjen Pribičević (eds), *European Integration and the Balkans*, Center for South Eastern European Studies, Belgrade & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 2002, 234–7

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Primeri:

Michael Levi, “The Organisation of Serious Crimes”, in: Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, 878–84. (878–9 ili 878).

Robert J. Bunker & John. R. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences”, *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1998, 55–76.

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Primer:

John Gapper, “Investor votes should count”, *The Financial Times*, 17 April 2006, 9.

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Primeri:

“Resolution 1244 (1999)”, Security Council of the United Nations, 10 June 1999.

“Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine”, *Službeni list APV*, 17/91, Novi Sad, 18. jun 1991, 1–14.

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Primer:

Maureen Lewis, *Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia?*, IBRD & World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, [http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/\\$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf](http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf), 14/09/2004, 3.

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Uredništvo

EDITORIAL POLICY

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International Politics is a peer-reviewed, open-access scientific journal published by the Institute of International Politics, a leading scientific institution in the region dedicated to the research of international relations. This interdisciplinary journal has been publishing original, analytical, theoretical, review, and expert papers on a wide range of topics in contemporary international political, economic, and legal relations for more than 70 years. The journal *International Politics* aims to publish high-quality research on a wide range of international and foreign policy issues in its three yearly issues. In that context, the journal investigates the policies of the most important actors who shape contemporary international relations. Topics dedicated to various territorial and ethnic conflicts and disputes, from interstate to intrastate, as well as their wider regional and global political, economic, and legal implications, are also relevant. Other issues affecting contemporary international relations are also significant for the journal, such as global trade, economic and energy relations, international and regional integration, various forms of terrorism and fundamentalism, as well as the challenges posed by the migrant crisis, the global spread of infectious diseases, and nuclear capacity in the world. Therefore, this scientific journal is based on an open and broad approach to the subject area, giving priority to contributions that offer open and theoretically and practically grounded points of view on current international processes. In this way, the journal tries to explain diverse and insufficiently researched phenomena on the international stage.

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A reviewer who has well-founded suspicions or knowledge of ethical standards' violations by an author is obliged to inform the editor about it. A reviewer should recognize important published works not cited by their authors. He should also alert the editor to important similarities and coincidences between manuscripts under consideration or of any other published articles or manuscripts that are in the review process in another journal, if he/she has personal knowledge of this fact. If a reviewer has knowledge that the same manuscript is being considered in several journals at the same time, the reviewer is obliged to inform the editor about it.

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During the review process, editors may require authors to provide additional information (including primary data) if it is needed to make a judgment about the scientific contribution of the manuscript. Editors and reviewers must keep such information confidential and must not use it for personal gain.

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Verification of the allegations and evidence presented

- The Editor-in-Chief, in agreement with the Editorial Board, will decide on the initiation of the procedure aimed at checking the presented allegations and evidence;
- During that procedure, all presented evidence will be considered confidential and will be presented only to the persons directly involved in the procedure;
- Persons suspected of violating ethical standards will be given the opportunity to respond to the accusations.

Decisions regarding the established violations of ethical standards are made by the Editor-in-Chief in cooperation with the Editorial Board and, if necessary, with a group of experts. The following measures are planned and can be applied individually or simultaneously:

- Publishing a press release or an editorial describing the breach of ethical standards;
- Sending official notice to managers or employers of an author/reviewer;
- Unconditional rejection of manuscripts or withdrawal of already published articles in accordance with the procedure described under *Withdrawal of already published articles*;

- The author is permanently prohibited from publishing in *International Politics*;
- Informing the relevant professional organizations or authorities about the case so that they can take appropriate measures.

When resolving disputed situations, the Editorial Board is guided by the guidelines and recommendations of the Committee on Publication Ethics (Committee on Publication Ethics - COPE, <http://publicationethics.org/resources/>).

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In the case of violation of the rights of publishers, copyright holders, or authors, violations of professional ethical codes, i.e., in the case of sending the same manuscripts to several journals at the same time, false claims of authorship, plagiarism, manipulation of data for the purpose of fraud, as well as in all other cases of gross violation of ethical standards, the published article must be withdrawn. In some cases, an already published article can be withdrawn in order to correct subsequently observed errors.

Standards for resolving situations when an article must be withdrawn are defined by the guidelines of the Committee on Publication Ethics (Committee on Publication Ethics - COPE, <http://publicationethics.org/resources/>), and the same practice was also adopted by *International Politics*.

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International Politics is a four-monthly scientific journal published in April, September, and December every year. The journal publishes articles in Serbian and English.

The journal publishes peer-reviewed original and reviewed articles and book reviews in the fields of international relations, foreign policy, international public law, and international economics.

The original research article presents the research results with a clear contribution to expanding and/or deepening existing knowledge. It should be set up so that it has the following parts: an overview of the situation and the goal of the research; a clear explanation of the theoretical background (review of literature) in the introduction; a hypothesis or research question; applied methods; a presentation and explanation of the results; and a conclusion that talks about the main research findings, hypothesis, or research question.

A review article provides a comprehensive summary of research on a certain topic or a perspective on the state of the field by describing current areas of agreement as well as controversies and debates. The review article identifies gaps in knowledge and the most critical research questions that still haven't been answered. It also suggests directions for future research.

A book review is a systematic description and/or critical analysis of the quality and significance of a book, edited volume, or textbook. A book review should include a general description of the topic or problem the book is about, a summary of the book's main argument, basic information about the author, an overview of the book's contents, strengths, and weaknesses, and a summary of the reviewer's opinion of the book.

For contributions to be considered, they must be prepared according to the instructions below:

I – Instructions for Writing Articles

1. Articles should contain 5,000 to 8,000 words.
2. Articles should be written in English or Serbian, using Times New Roman font size 12, with page numbers in the lower right corner.
3. The name and surname of the article's author should be written above the article's title.
4. The name and surname of the author/s of the article (and eventual title), the name of the institution where he/she is employed and its headquarters, as well as the author's address for correspondence (postal, institutional, or electronic), and ORCID ID should be written in the first footnote.
5. If the author wants to let readers know that some of the views in the article are his or her own and not those of the institution where he or she works,

he or she must add a special footnote with the symbol * to the end of the title of the article, where it will be specifically mentioned.

6. The abstract is attached in both Serbian and English, and the author should indicate the research question, the most essential hypotheses, context, and research conclusions. The abstract should contain up to 200 words, and below that, the author should list up to 10 keywords.
7. Latin, ancient Greek, and other non-English words and phrases (like *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire*, etc.) should be written in italics in the text.
8. Footnotes must be written at the bottom of the page (Footnote option), and footnotes' labels should be exclusively put at the end of the sentence.

Following these suggestions, the footnotes should include information about the specified bibliographic unit:

a) Monographs

The full name of the author, the title of the monograph (in italics), the name of the publisher, the place of publication, and the year of publication. If only one page of the source is cited, the page number should be indicated; if more than one page is mentioned, the middle line is used without a space (for example, 123; 22–50).

When a collection of papers, which one person has edited, is cited, it should be written (ed.) with a period. On the other hand, when there are more editors, it should be written (eds) without a period.

Examples:

Džon Rols, *Pravo naroda*, Alexandria Press i Nova srpska politička misao, Beograd, 2003, 107.

John Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 221.

Duško Lopandić (ed.), *Regional initiatives in Southeast Europe: multilateral cooperation programs in the Balkans*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2001, 24–32.

Theodor Winkler, Brana Marković, Predrag Simić & Ognjen Pribićević (eds), *European Integration and the Balkans*, Center for South Eastern European Studies, Belgrade & Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 2002, 234–7.

b) Articles in scientific journals

The full name and surname of the author, the article's title (in quotation marks), the journal's name (italic), the volume number, issue number, and page

number from- to. The page numbers are separated by a dash (-) without a space. If some data are incomplete, it is necessary to emphasize that.

Examples:

Michael Levi, "The Organization of Serious Crimes," in: Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, 878–84. (878–9 or 878).

Robert J. Bunker & John R. Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences", *Transnational Organized Crime*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1998, 55–76.

c) Articles in daily newspapers and magazines

Specify the author's name (or initials if only those are given), the article's title in quotation marks, the name of the newspaper or magazine in italics, the date in Arabic numerals, and the page number(s).

Example:

John Gapper, "Investor votes should count", *The Financial Times*, 17 April 2006, 9.

g) Citing documents

Specify the name of the document (in quotation marks), the article, point, or paragraph to which the author is referring, and the name of the journal or official journal where the document was published (in italics), with the volume number, issue number, place, and year of publication.

Examples:

"Resolution 1244 (1999)", Security Council of the United Nations, 10 June 1999.

"Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine", *Službeni list APV*, 17 /91, Novi Sad, 18. jun 1991, 1–14.

d) Citing internet sources

The name of the author, the title of the work or article, the full Internet address, which allows the specified source to be reached by typing the specified address, the date of accessing the page on the Internet, the page number (if any), and if the attachment is published in PDF.

Example:

Maureen Lewis, *Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia?*, IBRD & World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, <http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care>

+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/\$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf, 14/09/2004, 3.

f) Repetition of previously mentioned sources

When we refer to a source that has already been cited in the text, after other footnotes, the author's name and surname, the title of the source, then op. cit., and finally the page number must be written (e.g., Michael Levi, "The Organization of Serious Crimes", op. cit., 879). Ibid. or Ibidem is to be used exclusively when citing the source mentioned in the previous footnote, with an indication of the number of the page/pages if the new statement is from that source (e.g., Ibid., 11).

At the end of the article, a bibliography is attached, which should contain all the sources and literature cited in the text in the form stated in the footnotes guide. The only difference is that in a bibliography, it is mandatory to put the author's last name first and then their first name, and the entire bibliography is organized in alphabetical order by the first names of the authors cited (or the names of the documents used).

II – Instructions for Writing Book Review

1. Book Review shouldn't be longer than two and a half pages in Word format (single spacing), or more than 1,200 words (8,800 characters with spaces).

2. At the beginning of the review, the bibliographic references of the book are cited according to the rules for listing monographs in footnotes. In the end, the total number of pages should be listed (for example, p. 345).

3. Book Review must contain footnotes.

4. The author can specify the title of the review of the book or collection in capital letters — font size 14, which is subject to change by the editorial office of the journal.

5. The font size, font, and alignment of the text should be in accordance with the previously mentioned suggestions for writing articles.

6. At the end of the review, the author's full name and surname are stated in italic, with the entire surname written in capital letters (e.g., Žaklina NOVIČIĆ).

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Рат у Украјини: оно што знамо и оно што не знамо, Небојша Вуковић, Михајло Кобања (ур.), броширано, 2023, 270 стр.

Александар Јанковић, *Глобализација 2.0 – ка другом веку НР Кине*, броширано, 2023, 252 стр.

Михајло Вучић, *Слобода изражавања и историјски злочини*, броширано, 2022, 178 стр.

International Organizations: Serbia and Contemporary World, Volume I, Duško Dimitrijević, Toni Mileski (Eds.), hard cover, 2022, 582 p.

International Organizations: Serbia and Contemporary World, Volume II, Duško Dimitrijević, Toni Mileski (Eds.), hard cover, 2022, 530 p.

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Book of abstracts – Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries in the context of global changes, Katarina Zakić, Aleksandar Mitić (Eds.), CD, 2022